MONTHLY REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00022R000200040038-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2000
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: September 2, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84-00022R000200040038-8
'T'ranscribed ror abd by
19 January 1953
The Assistant Director, N,
Via :Chief, Plans and Policy Staff
Chief, Global Survey Group
2 September 19L9
ilionthly Report
Reference: ORE Operating Procedure - Instruction No. 1, 3 August 19L19, and
attached Reporting Guide for G/GS.
1. In view of my absence during most of August and the absence of my
colleagues now, I am unable to render a full report forAgust.
2. The principal problem noted by this Group during August was a deterio-
ration in effectiveness of the procedure of formal coordination. Two especially
vexatious. aspects of this development were the increasing tendency of IAC
agencies:
a. To dissent after thorough working level coordination had been
accomplished and with respect to issues never previously raised in the
process of working level coordination.
b. To dissent on irrelevant issues, either ignoring the terms of the
problem presented or attributing to the text meanings neither intended nor
properly attributable to it (in some cases, expressly disavowed).
This problem is now new. The trend referred to is merely an aggravation of a
long-standing situation. Although NSC 50 may have some influence in this direc-
tion, it is apparent that the principal factor is sensitivity regarding depart-
mental budgetary interests. Under the influence of prospective budget cuts, the
tendency to base intelligence estimates on departmental policy considerations
rather than upon objective analysis has reappeared.
3. No meaningful recommendations can be made until the existing confusions
with respect to missions and doctrine have been clarified by basic decisions in
relation to NSC 50. The experience referred to above, however, can be used to
support the point that CIA's independence of judgment must be preserved as a
safeguard against departmental bias.
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