THE ATTACHED DRAFT MEMORANDUM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00022R000200040026-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2000
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: January 29, 1947
• Content Type: MEMO

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16 December 191.
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til&ORATfD AIe "IRSSISTANT DIRECTOR, R & E
Subject: The attached draft memorandum
29 January 19)47
1. Paragraphs 2 through 9 and paragraph 14 of the subject
memorandum are premised upon misconceptions expressed in para-
graph 1. A critical examination of that paragraph will therefore
dispose of more than half of the text under consideration.
2. The tone of this first paragraph (and of paragraphs 2
and 6) implies that the survey conducted by'OCD discovered serious
deficiencies in the C.I.G. Daily Summary. This interpretation
cannot be reconciled with a candid reading of the OCD report,
particularly with the expressions of satisfaction and appreciation
attributed therein to the President, Admiral Leahy, the Secretary
of War, the Secretary of the Navy, General Eisenhower, and Admiral
Nimitz. Actually the findings of the survey were extremely
gratifying. To the producers of the Summary it is significant and
discouraging that the only allusion they have heard to these find-
ings should have been a belated misinterpretation to the opposite
effect.
3. Insofar as the first paragraph depends upon a quottion
from Captain Grantham, it is based upon a quotation out of context
with consequent distortion. It ignores Captain Grantham's state-
ment that he "likes the summaries just as they are now prepared"
and that the President and Admiral Leahy find them "entirely satis-
factory."
4. The quotation itself is incomplete. The full text reveals
that Captain Grantham himself nullified his own point by conceding
that his comment was not based on any change in the substantive
context of the Summary, but only on its dissemination. Since there
has been no change in dissemination either, the point falls to the
ground. Tne Summary has always been designed primarily for the
President, further dissemination being intended to inform others
as to the information furnished him. It appears that Captain
Grantham made an offhand comment, which ne himself realized, on
second thought, that he was unable to sustain. It is curious that
anyone in C.I.G. should have been unable to realize that also.
5. The remark regarding "some small pique" is absurd in the
face of the oregoing. It is contradicted by both the next of the
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OCD report and the further testimony of the officer who interviewed
Captain Grantham.
6. The constructive suggestions elicited by the OCD survey
(items 1,2,4,5,7,b, and 13 of the "Synopsis") have already been
adopted so far as practicable. This point can be sustained in detail
if need be.
7. Paragraphs 3-6 of the draft memorandum concern a proposal
that certain members of ORE (presumably additional to the present
Current Division) be designated to specialize in the production of
current intelligence with a view to meeting the "complaints" record-
ed in the OCD survey. Inasmuch as the survey was commendatory
rather than complaining, and inasmuch as its constructive suggestions
have already been put into effect to the extent practicable in any
case, the supposed need for radical innovation does not exist. We
have, of course, already discussed among ourselves the idea of the
specialization of additional personnel in current intelligence.
Such specialization, without close coordination with the Branches,
would tend to impair the quality of the summaries. Assuming the
requisite coordination, it is the considered opinion of all concerned
in the actual production of the summaries that tue question is mere-
ly a matter of internal convenience, that the adoption of the idea
would be without appreciable effect on their content.
6. Paragraphs 7-9 relate to the idea of several daily summaries
on different levels, an idea which appears to be derived essentially
from Captain Grantham's ill-founded attempt to distinguish between
an original and a subsequent orientation of the Daily toward dif-
ferent levels. The futility of an argument derived from that premise
has already been demonstrated.
9. There has been, in the past, some discussion of a special
summary for the President and the members of the N.I.A. .only. This
idea was originally put forward on the gr?Dund th.:t certain material
now denied us might be made available for a summary of such limited
dissemination. We cannot know, of course, what the nature and volume
of that material might be, whether it would in fact be made available
to us, and whether a summary prepared by us would be the most
efficient means of circulating it among so small a group. In any
case, it was then agreed that no basis of distinction existed ;with
respect to the information currently available and that the more
exclusive summary would not be undertaken until access to appropriate
information had been assured. As for a summary for the President
alone, we are unable to distinguish between his interests and the
collective interests of the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy.
10. The idea of a summary prepared, outside of his own office,
for the use of the President (or any other particular recipient)
without marks of emphasis by his personal staff reveals a certain
naivete. Any selection that could be made must necessarily contain
items of more immediate interest than others, to which it would be 11 e 'tg #N
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Daily, we could still never obviate marks of emphasis by an aide
in the light of his more intimate kno,-~ledge of the recipient's
special interests of the moment. V Te accomplish our function in
narrowing the field to a selected group of items all of which are
of potential special interest. Considering this in relation to
the President, whom our summary is primarily designed to serve, it
would be interesting to know how Admiral Leahy would react to an
attempt on our part to usurp his function. There is a certain
temerity in the contemplation of this idea without consulting him.
11. Paragraph 10 of the draft memorandum proposes a radical
change in the character of the weekly. It was originally established
as a means of accomplishing what is impossible in the Daily -- the
presentation of the most significant current developments in
perspective and with consideration of probable consequences. As
such, it is an essential supplement to the Daily (see, for example,
items 2-5 of the OCD "Synopsis") and is designed primarily to serve
the President and the N.I.A., in consonance with N.I.A. Directive
No. 1. The proposal is to convert the 'Weekly into a synopsis of
current events, primarily for the presumed benefit of G-2, A-2, and
O.N.I. The implicit suggestion that these agencies would obtain,
through such a Weekly, all or most of what they need or desire to
know of current political and economic intelligence, is fantastic.
The service, if any, would be in relieving them of the necessity
to publish weeklies of their own for their own purposes. This pre-
supposes a circulation in the hundreds of copies, with all that that
implies in relation to content.
12. The present Weekly is a higher order of endeavor than
that proposed. It may transcend our present capabilities for com-
pletely satisfactory execution, but the Director has enjoined us
to aim high. Before it is abolished consideration should be given
to the following points:
a. Synoptical weeklies of the type proposed are common-
place, precisely because they are a less demanding task; the
selective and analytical approach of the C.I.G. Weekly is
unique. Is it desired to abandon this original contribution
in favor of a co:mnon place one? Who will perform this func-
tion if C.I.G. does not?
b. Are the President and the N.I.A. better served by
a selective and analytical weekly, or by a synoptical one
of a sort which it is well known they will not read?
c. Who commands priority in the services of C.I.G.,
the President and the N.I.A., or G-2, A-2, and ONI?
d. Are the recipients of the present Weekly willing
that it should be abolished in favor of the proposed
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substitute? The OCD survey indicates general approval of the
present form; even G-2 considers it "excellent and of substan-
tial benefit." -
e. Is it known that G-2, A-2, and O.N.I., the supposed
beneficiaries of the proposed change, actually desire it?
f. If the proposed Weekly were undertaken, would it
actually relieve G-2, A-2, and O.N.I. of the necessity to
produce publications oriented toward the particular needs of
the several services? Would they actually abolish their own
corresponding publications, or would those publications
simply be duplicated by yet another of the same type, but
so general in character as not to be fully satisfactory to
anyone?
13. An alternative to the abolition of the present Weekly in
favor of that proposed would be, of course, the publication of both
types. That is, however, beyond the capabilities of our present
staff, if ORE is to amount to anything more than a magnified Current
Division.
14. Paragraphs 11 and 12 of the draft memorandum propose a
series of monthly situation reports, yet another form of current
reporting. Such overemphasis upon routine, periodic reports must
inevitably divert the slender resources of ORE from the analysis
of fundamental problems, as exemplified in ORE 1, or of emergent
critical situations as they develop or are foreshadowed. The al-
ready projected program for the ORE series contemplates the pre-
paration of a general coverage of fundamental studies, as a basis
for the initial determination of requirements and as a plans of
reference for subsequent analyses of emergent situations. Such
subsequent reports, however, should be produced as indim.ted by the
developing situation rather than on a routine, periodic basis. The
only good idea in this paragraph is the incidental one of a regional
rather than a purely national approach, but that point of viewis
one for which we have already striven.
15. Paragraph 13 presents, in brief and incidental form, what
we conceive to be our eventual primary function. All that has gone
before is a distraction from it and an impediment to its accomplish-
ment. If the President and the N.I.A. may be regarded as somewhat
special recipients within the meaning of the last sentence, it is
agreeable. We trust that in most cases we will Yee writing for them.
16. Paragraph 14 appears to be a sententious reiteration of
the idea in paragraphs 7-9 with particular application to estimates.
In the ORE series we normally provide a brief summary which will
serve to indicate the "must" reading to anyone sufficiently attracted
by the title to be interested at all; the remainder may be skipped
or read in accordance with th, degree of satisfaction provided by
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the summary, or interest aroused thereby. But, as shown in para-
graph 10 above, no device will obviate entirely the usefulness
of an aide.
17. Paragraphs 15 and 16 concern a further diversion of
ORE's limited manpower, already thoroughly dissipated if the
preceding recommendations of this draft were adopted, to the prepara-
tion of an outline for the National Intelligence Digests in duplica-
tion of or conflict with that being prepared by the Defense Project.
The eventual responsibilities of ORE with respect to the NID's are
as yet ill defined, or rather are entirely subject to dubious
inference. If ORE is to have a substantial responsibility in this
regard, it were well that it should have more voice than at present
in developing the outline, but preparation of a duplicate outline
would invite either collision or futility.
18. Paragraph 17 is completely unintelligible to me.
19. Paragraph 18 implies that C.I.G. has not as yet produced 14
any intelligence. ORE has in fact produced a,considerable body. of
intelligence which has been well received, according to the OCD'
survey. This point is demonstrated in your progress report to 31
December, which the author of the draft memorandum should read.
This production is impressive in terms of the resources available,
although perhaps not so great as it might have been had the over-
head represented in ICAPS and OCD been directed toward the support
rather than the distraction and hindrance of ORE. The diversion
of effort occasioned by the draft under discussion is a case in
point. Its author could better enhance the reputation of C.I.G.
were he to address himself to the unsolved probbms of interdepartmental
coordination and planning, upon the solution of which the further
development of an ORE program now depends.
LUDWELL L. MONTAGUE
Chief, Intelligence Staff
ATTACH.
as noted above
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Transcribed for abd r :ern
16 December 1952
29 January 1947
M&MPUiNDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, R & E
Subject: The Mission of ORE
1. The true primary mission of ORE is clear in the light of
the President's Letter and of N.I.A. Directives No. 1 and No. 2.
It is to produce strategic and national policy intelligence through
the correlation, evaluation, and final synthesis of all intelligence
information and finished departmental intelligence available in the
State, War and Navy Departments and other Federal agencies. By
"strategic and national policy intelligence" should be understood
that intelligence required at the highest policy making and planning
level as a basis for the determination of national policy and
strategy in the broadest sense. It relates to those issues which
are of collective concern to the State, War, and Navy Departments,
or, conversely, which are not the exclusive concern of any of them.
In this concept ORE has no occasion to duplicate or compete with
departmental intelligence agencies - rather it is charged to make
full use of them and of their product - but ORE does have the
function of final evaluation and final synthesis. The departmental
agencies are tributary to it. Its own contribution is the added
value provided by authoritative final interpretation and synthesis
for the benefit, primarily, of the high authorities whom it serves,
and incidentally of the contributing agencies. It must be supported
and manned in such a way as to assure that it does speak with
recognized authority.
2. Since the inception of N.I.A. Directive No. 5 this clear
concept has been confused. That paper introduced considerable
ambiguity regarding a research function in ORE. No new authority
was required to expand the staff provided to perform the supplemental
research found necessary to accomplish the mission indicated in
paragraph 1. The initial draft of the Directive, however, had
reference to "basic" research, and so alarmed the departmental
agencies by its implications regarding duplication and eventual
supercession of their activities that ever since there has had to
be resort to all sorts of expedient explanations intended to allay
these fears. There is reason to suppose that the confusions and
contradictions introduced in the course of these explanations result
from their expediency and lack of candor. Their general tenor is
to give verbal assurance against duplication of functions while at
the same time justifying the establishment of duplicate research
facilities. To this end it is said that ORE will not conduct research
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in fields of primary interest to any department, but will conduct
research at initio in certain undefined fields not of primary
interest to anyone. These "gaps" cannot be defined because they
do not exist. If, however, this doctrine were taken literally,
it would reduce ORE, to the status of a drudge performing
miscellaneous tasks in the service of the departmental agencies,
inverting the order indicated in N.I.A. Directives No. 1 and 2.
Never, during the last six months, has there been any indication
that C.I.G. understood, or was even aware of, the mission indicated
in the preceding paragraph, although that is the primary mission
of C.I.G. in the terms of its basic charter, the President's letter.
3. Until this dichotomy is resolved there can be no firm
basis for planning the organization, recruitment, and work program
or ORE, nor any stability in our relationships with departmental
agencies. Hitherto the cart has been put before the horse - we
have been required to devise an organization and a T/O to accomplish
we know not what, and are now called upon to state the qualifications
required in personnel in ignorance of the tasks they may have to
perform. It is impossible to determine such qualifications, or to
induce the most highly qualified. personnel to accept positions in
ORE, until this situation has been clarified and stabilized. In
any case, no coherent program of research can be based on the concept
indicated in paragraph 2. The departmental agencies are as confused
as we as to where they stand, and react accordingly. In short, the
failure of ICAPS to establish a clear concept of the mission of ORE
and of its functional relationship to the departmental agencies is
preventing the development of ORE as an effective instrument for the
accomplishment of any purpose.
LUDVGELL L. MONTAGUE
Chief, Intelligence Staff
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