(Sanitized) POLICIES---COMMENTS OF ESTIMATES GROUP

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP84-00022R000200030002-8
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 12, 2000
Sequence Number: 
2
Case Number: 
Content Type: 
NOTES
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PDF icon CIA-RDP84-00022R000200030002-8.pdf131.01 KB
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Approved For Release 2007/27: CIA-RDP84-00022R09A2Q40.3Q2-8 25X6 ^ Policies---Comments of Estimates Group 1. Very general impression, offered as such and nothing more: that reader is ILL GIB being told g very little he either doesn't know or could not infer about 25X6 policy. Perhaps this is inevitable, the having no iron curtaih; yet, as usual, the Top Secret label I Alt that exotic myster"# and breathless surprises lie beyond. 2. Summary. Seemed to E.G. that model of ORE 1 had been carried too far. In ORE 1 the 1,2.3. order tkmsee had been used to fit a special case where main specific considerations werenenumerated. In ORE 26,.the process becor-es practically a numbering of ensuing paragraphs, represented in the summary by one or two sentences seems from each. Result is the summary bnommas too long and too diffuse. Would suggest compressing in style of more recent ORE's. 3. p.4(bottom)to P.5 (top). Toom much in oneparagraph, loosely held together by 25X6 general idea of the Needs to be broken up into component parts. 25X6 When you mention investments in Africa, etc., aren't a lot of 25X6 people going to think right off about - military plans for the area which have been so well pbblicized? Wouldn't they expect full discussion about plans and pro 25X6 gress of plans for making this area substitute for either h Approveeereoro an eae Re9bA707/27 : CIA-RDP84-00022R00020003000 - 000033 Approved For Release 26@007/27: CIA-RDP84-00022RO0020003QP2-8 4. p.6. _ Believe this might be halved. Far as one can see, all it says is that they're tied to our tail; know it, and will remain tied until they can shake loose. 25X6 5/. P.7. "Moreover, the .etc." Considering that there are still -- ----~ .,. -_ ilA "r,.Lj!jO U, suggest the inference might be taken here , little as you intended it, that under tempting enough circum- 25X6 stances the might destint us. If this is true, it should be stated clearly and without qualification. If it is inetneeivable las implied previously in paper) no hints should be left that would arouse easily..aroused slas suspicions. 6. Same page. A similar mail might be engendered by the discussion of the Satellites. Here there might seem to be some most un-characteristic wishful 25X6 ~ C..~ ILLEGIB thinking in How can the simultaneously ILLEGIB adopt a line parallel to ours toward the Soviet complex---which is some- thing little shor evert warfare---while cultivating nice friendly trade relations 7. pp.10-12. Discussion of the Near East seemed to E.G. definitely inconclusive. Case could be made that this is the most important area discussed; yet there are a lot of unanswered questions. For example, in the struggle to keep the Soviets Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP84-00022R000200030002-8 Approved For Release 2W/07/27 : CIA-RDP84-00022R0002000002-8 25X6 out of Azerbaijan many believe that the would fail to back us up if thoir own oil interests were too deeply imperiled, or that they would exchange concessiorwith the,Russians if they thought it wise. In short, if it became a choice of which to lose---the US or Abadan---which w,uldgo? Greece, Turkey, and Iran get only the most cursory mention; yet US. interests there are considerable 25X6 at present and the views ofoward them correspondingly important. Believe 25X1A the people in- could help a lot to expand this. ILLEGIB 8. Military Section. Seemed fine in general. ILLEGIB Have feeling there is one thing 25X6 missing: much is made of fact that ^ is experimenting for self and 25X6 Impression gained that ^is among those who expect a push-button war and know .that 'in any case, they can't compete in sheer manpower and materiel field; hmem hence great emphasis on zsimammnz science and secret weapons. If any truth i:h any of this, shouldn't there be full discussion of what is happening on research and the-rest of it? Has paper been fully coordinated in ORE. If not, just about every branch skzx could probably contribute something valuable. Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP84-00022R000200030002-8