INTELLIGENCE FOR THE FUTURE A DISTILLATION OF VIEWS BY THE PRESIDENT S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD 2 DECEMBER 1976

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83T00966R000100040062-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2009
• Sequence Number: 62
• Publication Date: December 2, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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INTELLIGENCE FOR THE FUTURE
A Distillation of Views
by the
R President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
2 December 1976
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
General.
The report does not present a prioritized inventory of intelligence
requirements for the future. It is, rather, an overview of the
problems, potentials and prospects which lie ahead for the intelligence
community and derivatively, for those whom Intelligence' serves.
Conceptions of the future being fallible, judgments in the report
must be subjected to extensive, critical evaluation. We view this
process, wherein certain perceptions will be discarded and others
modified, as a proper utilization of a report of this nature. Further,
we hope that similar endeavors will be repeated at regular intervals
to keep pace with the dynamics of change.
Observations
The Board rates of overriding importance, the development of
initiatives to restore public understanding and trust in intelligence
and intelligence institutions. This can be an important adjunct to
security legislative and fiscal support for intelligence programs;
to the passage of legislation for the protection of sensitive intelligence
sources and methods; to the maintenance of security discipline by
personnel within the intelligence community; and to sustain the ability
to recruit people of integrity and high competence.
Strategic weapons intelligence and the Soviet Union will remain
predominant targets. However, the role of tactical and technical
intelligence in support of military commanders must continue to be
given adequate attention in the decade ahead. In particular, as the
U.S. faces a growing need to import critical commodities, maintenance
of unhampered sea lines of communication will be essential. Fulfillment
of this mission could be jeopardized by a Soviet naval threat of growing
sophistication. Effective intelligence is the first step towards coping
with this threat.
The future significance of economic intelligence will be dependent upon
several factors: refinement of analytic techniques which minimize
the flow of redundant and irrelevant data; sharpening of requirements
so that the policy-makers' genuine needs are addressed; recognition
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by producers that comprehensive analysis must incorporate all
relevant disciplines -- political, military, technological, as well as
economic; and improved means of tapping the economic expertise of
the private sector. We underscore the need for a continuing, close
working relationship between principal users and producers to assure
that these factors are given proper consideration.
The Board has reviewed and references in its report several recently
published studies by the intelligence community which contain a . .
number of innovative and technological approaches aimed at improving
intelligence for the future; certain of these approaches are very
encouraging and will be given detailed consideration by our successors.
Also enclosed with the report is a two-page summary of Findings.and.
Recommendations from an April 1976 report by a Board subcommittee
which assesses National Intelligence Estimates and makes suggestions
for their improvement.
Among the most important innovations to pursue, we believe, are:
-- a breakthrough in automating the processing of foreign
language voice intercepts to aid in reducing voluminous data collected
without loss of important intelligence;
-- space reconnaissance system to 25X1
avoid loss of intelligence capabilities at critical intervals;
-- means for reducing the vulnerability of our space
reconnaissance systems by "hardening" existing systems and by
developing the capability to produce greater numbers of less
sophisticated, less expensive systems;
-- comprehensive examination of the government's responsibility
to make the public aware of, and to provide the means of thwarting,
intrusions to privacy by foreign intelligence services and the illegal
efforts of private citizens intercepting communications and computer
data links;
-- refinement of the concept of "competitive analysis, "
following completion of the experiment being conducted under the
auspices of the DCI concurrent with production of this year's NIE ? _ -
on Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict;
-- a means of seeing that which is hidden, as we face
increasingly sophisticated efforts to conceal and deceive.
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The concept of "streamlined" management, born 20 years ago with
the inception of our space reconnaissance program and employed
isince in the operation of that program, needs to be carefully preserved.
The imposition of layers of administrative and budgetary review will
-ultimately prove more costly, less effective and potentially destructive
of the unique capabilities of this program. To preserve streamlined
management the issuance of new guidance from the President will be
:required.
Recommendations
1As an aid in determining future capabilities and limitations in the
intelligence system, we recommend that 3 to 4 models of the world
20 years hence be developed, under the auspices of the National Security
Council so as to reflect a senior, policy-level consensus of the
ranges of probabilities in world relationships, and that the Director
of Central Intelligence undertake a community-wide estimation of the
intelligence system's performance under each of the projected futures.
Crises stemming from nuclear weapons proliferation and acts of
-terrorism will involve the Chief Executive more frequently in the
decade ahead and effective intelligence in these areas will be vitally
important. To assure its availability and utility, we recommend
that the subject and structure of intelligence support to crisis manage-
ment be given the most thorough review. This review should be
directed by the National Security Council.
Concealment and deception by the Soviets require greater attention
and novel approaches to better understand and cope with the serious
vulnerabilities they pose to U. S. security interests. We believe a
major contribution toward greater understanding could be achieved by
a 1-2 year study effort conducted by a "tiger team" of highly competent
analysts, insulated from daily bureaucratic life, and given access to
all relevant intelligence and operational data. We recommend that
.the Director of Central Intelligence evaluate such a proposal with a ..
view towards its early implementation.
With respect to certain kinds of intelligence such as weapons systems,
the decision-makers' real need is for a "net assessment" of the
opposing forces. Issues such as capabilities of Soviet ICBM, and
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the Soviet air defense system really ask whether U. S. MINUTEMAN
missiles are vulnerable to Soviet attack and whether the B-52 will
be effective against Soviet defenses. Net assessments will grow in
importance and a renewed effort is required to determine how they
can be performed and within what institutional framework; a proposal
is currently before the Board.
Soviet technological innovations, especially in their military and
economic applications, warrant the keenest attention by the
intelligence community. As the USSR breaks new ground, unfamiliar
to the U.S., the prevention of surprise will become more difficult.
Special efforts at targetting Soviet research and development are
warranted. We urge that the DCI take a new look at this problem
with the view of recommending a more intensive and more imaginative
effort in the future.
How the U. S. is perceived by others, both adversaries and allies,
will remain a key issue for intelligence, and grow in importance as
the U.S. continues efforts to rely on credibility, rather than force,
as the means of sustaining foreign policy relationships. Previous
intelligence community efforts to assess foreign (USSR) perceptions
of the U.S. are applauded; we urge that they be made more compre-
hensive and that they be kept current.
The past decade has seen an emphasis on technological improvements
in intelligence collection systems. Human source collection and
analytic processes have not experienced corresponding advances. A
vigorous effort needs to be undertaken to achieve major improvements.
in these human aspects of intelligence:: the recruitment of agents;
the management of data; and in-depth understandings of foreign
relationships.
There are nearly 2, 000 Communist bloc officials resident in the
United States; each year, in excess of 4, 000 Soviets enter the United
States as commercial or exchange visitors; and 200 Soviet ships call
at 40 U.S. deep-water ports.
. a high percentage of the individuals in each category are intelligence
or security officials. Currently, five separate agencies engage in
foreign counterintelligence activities, each on its own. There is no
U.S. counterintelligence policy and no coordinated statement of ^~
counterintelligence objectives. A Presidential review of the U. S.
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counterintelligence policy is required as a basis for the formulation
of a national counterintelligence policy and a statement of counter-
intelligence objectives.
Security discipline of personnel within the intelligence community
has been difficult to maintain in the face of a culture which has come
to abjure secrecy; we endorse Deputy Secretary of Defense Ellsworth's
suggestion that a blue ribbon commission examine these changed
values in American society with a view to determining how to restore
adherence to the principles of confidential service to the government.
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