TRENDS IN ARMEMENT PROGRAMS OF LESSER POWERS IN THE 1980S AND IMPLICATIONS FOR US INTERESTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83T00966R000100040036-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2007
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: June 9, 1982
• Content Type: LETTER

ip1 Ad ffNl1I V131C .07/04104 : CIA-RDP
Notional Intelligence Council
9 June 1982
NOTE FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
Here's a way to deal with the Direc-
tor's proposal in his 7 June memo, "After-
math of the Falklands-" I propose to
assign it to I Iwho will need
support from DIA and other parts of the.
DoD as well as from your people. However,
I believe that a formal Community product
is not appropriate.
At tachments
cc: NIO/GPF
Henry S. Rowen
C/NIC
0966R 00100040036-8
 Approved For Release 2007/04/04: CIA-RDP83T00966R000100040036-8
Approved For Release 2007/04/04: CIA-RDP83T00966R000100040036-8
 Approved For R ease 2007/04/04: CIA-RDP83T00966R00100040036-8
7 June 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: DOI
Chief, C/NIC
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Aftermath of the Falklands
1. In the aftermath of the Falklands, a number of lesser powers
will be reevaluating their security position in terms'of their fore-
structure, particularly in terms of the value of smart weapons, their
access to these and other weapons, and economic opportunities afforded
by this development.
2. I.have already suggested looking ahead to evaluating the present
prospective position of Brazil, Israel, Korea, Japan, Argentina and other
countries with the economic strength and technological capability to
?~ enhance their role as arms suppliers. It is perhaps more important to
look at the other side of this equation to find the types of weapons and
missions to which these lesser powers may turn to deter larger powers.
For that matter, the demonstration of the value of a potency of smart
bombs may place a new premium on close-in launching sites and arrangements
for using them in the defense.and deterrence planning of larger powers.
These factors are relevant obviously in the terms of ships vs. aircrafts,
the tendency of-air to air missiles to make air combat suicidal to both
parties, and to guided missiles to tank equation.
3. Will you give this some thought and evaluate our capability to
deal with what I see is an important intelligence problem coming over
the horizon and let's discuss what we should be doing about it.
William J. Casey
Anoroved For Release 2007/04/0~E IAZRDP83T00966R000100D49036-8