LETTER TO HARRY ROWEN FROM STEVEN ROSEFIELDE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83T00966R000100020017-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 11, 2007
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: March 9, 1982
• Content Type: LETTER

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THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA
AT
CHAPEL HILL
March 9, 1'g82
Harry Rowen
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.
Dear Harry:
The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hili
Gardner Hall 017 A
Chapel Hill, N.C. 27514
Last December the President announced that bilateral Science and
Technology agreements between the U.S. and the Soviet Union would not be
renewed this July because it was thought, at. least in part, that the
benefits of these exchanges accrued onesidedly to the Soviets. The
administration appears to believe that the Soviets have little technological
know~how to offer the U.S. and that the U.S. receives no compensatory
benefit from joint scientific exchange. .
Based on my own experience at the Central Economics and Mathematics
Institute in Moscow neither of these suppositions is correct, and if the
U.S. implements its stated intention to terminate the S&T agreements I believe
American national security analysis will be greatly impaired.
The S&T agreements provide one of the most effective means I know
for testing theories of Soviet ecoromic behavior and obtaining reliable
intelligence on how the Soviet system functions. If one begins with~the
premise that Soviet military and civilian economic potential are well
understood; that the limits to effective economic reform are self
apparent; that Soviet science, technology and engineering are retrograde,
and cannot be efficiently harnessed because of the cumbersomeness of _
central planning and the deficiency of Soviet management, it of course
follows directly that the U.S. doesn't need a mechanism for testing the
merit of its perceptions, and that any compensatory benefits that might
accrue from the S&T agreement cannot redress the overall imbalance.
This premise however cannot withstand serious scrutiny. For the
past two decades U.S. policymakers have deceived themselves about Soviet
civilian and military economic performance; as well as Soviet advances in
pure and applied science. The government has not only underestimated the
Soviet arms buildup; the real rate of Soviet economic growth; exaggerated
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Harry Rowen
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March 9, 1982
the Soviet oil crisis; predicted a cataclysmic balance of payments
crisis; persuaded itself that the Soviets were critically dependent
on authorized Western technology transfer; but has lulled itself into
the belief that these failings make the Soviets vulnerable to U.S.
leverage. If our theory of Soviet economics were as powerful as is
often supposed, none of these errors would have occurred, or have been
permitted to serve as a basis for national policy.
This conc7usiom suggests that in devising effective na Tonal security
policies for the eighties, it is imperative that mechanisms be established
which permit close monitoring of Soviet achievements in applied sciences
and industrial management. This sort of monitoring is difficult to
accomplish from afar, especially when our pool of trained specialists is
so small. During the last 8 years less than 2 Ph.D.s per year have
matriculated from major U.S. universities in the field of Soviet economics,
and even here the training has been perilously narrow. The Science and
Technology agreements if properly coordinated provide an ideal vehicle for '
redressing both deficiencies. They allow researchers like myself to
plumb the real working arrangements of the Soviet economic system; its
robustness, its staying power, its invulnerability to external pressure,
its military-economic characteristics, while enabling young specialists
to appreciate the competence of Soviet scientists, their approach to
problem solving and to appraise advances as they are being made.
A comprehensive understanding of the forces shaping the evolution
of Soviet growth potential, it seems to me is of vital national security
interest, that must be given full consideration in framing our policy
toward the S&T agreements. With this in mind, I therefore suggest that
the administration's position on the S&T agreements be rethought before
July 7, when all bilateral exchanges are scheduled to terminate. Concretely,
you might consider:
1. recommending to Stearma'n, Keyworth, McGaffigan, Buckley, Scanlan, Pipes and
the Council on Exchange (under the aegis of the GIA) that the
administration's position on the Science and Technology agreements
? be fine tuned to encourage and facilitate joint research that
enables us to monitor Soviet achievements in applied science and
economic management.
2. convening a small group of interested parties to examine the
merit of the. issues I have raised.
For my own part, I am prepared to respond to any queries you might have
on this matter, and would be willing to discuss the issue with anyone you
think appropriate.
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Harry Rowen
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March 9, 1982
Best regards,
Sincerely,
%Steven Rosefielde~
Associate Professor
of Economics, UNC-CH
Adjunct Professor of National
Security Affairs
U.S. Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey
SR/bp
Enclosures
cc: Pat Parker
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