A PERSPECTIVE ON WESTERN EUROPE, 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83T00966R000100010049-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 14, 2007
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: January 13, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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13 January 1982
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: A Perspective on Western Europe, 1982
1. A mutual crisis of confidence will underlie not only US-West European
but intra-European relations as well during 1982. The touchstone will*be
responses to East-West tension, almost certain to be kept taut by the Polish
situation, and to controversy over modernizing the European-based nuclear
deterrent. Increasingly, the cynosure of the Atlantic and European arenas
will be West Germany, whose (mostly unwanted but inherent) centrality-to the
complex of strategic, political, and economic interests that unite and divide
Americans from Europeans, and Europeans among themselves, will never in the
post-war era have received more exposure.
2. During this year, but probably only temporarily, the internal German
political debate may focus more on the economy and less stridently--assuming a
businesslike continuation of INF negotiations in Geneva--on missile
deployments., The government coalition will be strained by contrasting
approaches to combatting unemployment. In the background, moreover, will be
worries, about long-term structural weaknesses, that will highlight the
difficult choices Bonn faces between defense and welfare commitments and
between meeting demands from the EC and other external requirements such as
third-world development and support for Turkey.
3. The evidence that West Germany's economic strength--however good
relative to its European partners--cannot be taken for granted may add to
Bonn's growing self-preoccupation, already encouraged by a sense of diplomatic
vulnerability over its Ostpolitik requirements, of dependence on developments
in superpower relations, and of the increasing gap internally between German
leadership and much of the public. A change of Government in Bonn will prob-
ably not occur before elections in the fall of 1984, but intense coalition
differences or losses in crucial state elections could threaten the Schmidt
government earlier. The principal concern both of Germans and other Europeans
is that a premature change of regime not coincide with, and thus seem to be
precipitated by, a German-US crisis, which might entail serious polarization
of domestic German politics.
crisis and evolving attitudes
to the Polish
,
4. Nest Germany s response
toas
successrivet
Arc INF deployment Forlotin any case her'Europeans, continue
ofEBonn'sneffortswell
American, attention.
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maintain Western (particularly US) confidence in its policies will influence
their own ability to balance fidelity to the Alliance with preserving a poten-
tial for European autonomy. British, French,::artd Italians will not be loath
to criticize German "softness" on East-West questions and will multiply re-
assurances to the US on their own Atlantic-loyalties. But they will also try
to support Bonn through joint European positions lest Germany's $ey role in
sustaining the effective unity'of both the Alliance and the EC_ tend to be
nullified by US-German disputes and internal German deadlock.
5. The potential danger to Europe from differing responses to East-West
tension may well foster greater seriousness this year among the EC-Ten about
addressing the debilitating Community farm and budget problems and improving
the concerting of foreign policies. But such "strategic" imperatives have
failed before to overcome rivalry among Europeans, and diverging German and
French domestic economic policies, for example, as well as the potential
spillover within Europe of international protectionist pressures could again
offset the impulse for greater agreement.
6. Renewed efforts to air security policy in European frameworks--the EC
and the Western European Union--are also likely. Interest in such discussions
will be symptomatic of continued uneasiness over East-West relations and
perhaps also of European sensitivity to voices in the US arguing for reducing
US military commitments to Europe in the light of broader US requirements.
Security review in the Alliance itself, meanwhile, may still be on the agenda
of the British, who have again broached the need for a thorough look at NATO
forces and doctrine--characterized recently by one high official as "the
inadequate backed by the incredible." The British and others' attracted to
overall policy reviews are probably aware that there may now be no politically
palatable answers to Alliance security dilemmas, but hope nevertheless for
results to justify national shifts of priorities they already feel compelled
to make. Still, Europeans are also under pressure to appear responsive to the
long-standing dissatisfaction with NATO doctrine among specialists that is in-
creasingly being reflected in popular opinion and contributing to the malaise.
behind the peace movement.
7. How much southern Europe will add to European tensions during this
year remains problematical. European Socialists appear influential enough to
keep Turkey's relations with Western Europe at arms length while the military
is in control, thus making more delicate any US endeavors to garner support
for Ankara. European NATO members will not, however, countenance Greek sug-
gestions for anti-Turkish steps within the Alliance. The Europeans will also
be resistant to Greek attempts to use its EC membership to disrupt agreement
which would otherwise be possible on East-West or Middle East questions.
Spain, although it will come closer to, and may achieve, NATO membership this
year (ratification by the Allies may take longer than the US. had anticipated),
will probably make little progress in negotiations with the Europeans toward
the goal, domestically more popular than NATO, of EC entry. And potential
threats to Spanish democracy may create new uncertainties in northern Europe
about Spain's role.
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to be an inspiration to numerous people now under Moscow's domination
and the major inpediment to Soviet designs outside of its empire's
borders. The primary goals of Moscow's policy toward the US will remain
to circumscribe it militarily and to isolate--it. from its traditional
allies. Arms control will be a primary-vehicle to achieve both of these
goals: to get some control over any US modernization programs, and to
present any US hesitation to accept Moscow's proposals as proof of
American bellicosity which 'imperils the entire world. The US response
to this Soviet diplomatic and propaganda challenge will lay the major
part in determining its success or failure.
6. Moscow's heavy reliance on military power has been partially
self-defeating, because it has stimulated establishment of the oper-
ational foundations of an anti-Soviet US-Western Europe-Japanese-PRC
alliance. But that de facto alliance is itself marked by contradictory
impulses, some of which are fundamentally outside, of Soviet control
(e.g., the US dilemma over the PRC and Taiwan) but others which are
subject to Soviet manipulation, the most important being the US-FRG
rift.
7. Since it continues to see Europe as the principal East-West
battleground, the USSR is giving priority attention to that continent
and in particular to Germany -- a nation whose undetermined place in the
European concert of nations has brought about two wars in this cen- _
tury. After 1945, a vanquished Germany was divided and the two halves
eventually incorporated into opposing alliances. Now three interrelated
developments, in the half hitherto firmly anchored in the Western
alliance are' offering the USSR political and economic openings. First,
the FRG, particularly under Schmidt's leadership, is seeking to play a
more important role in the East-West field -- still beneath the umbrella
of the alliance but, in effect, more independent. from it. Second, there
is the reemergence of the old geopolitical strand of German thinking
that seeks cl-oser ties with Moscow. Third, there is a convergence of
big business and labor desires for closer economic ties to the East --
another repetition of a trend which marked German policy in the 20's and
30's. The USSR has already had some success in capitalizing on these
impulses and will continue its efforts to do so.
8. In Asia, despite its previous failures, Moscow may soon
perceive new opportunities to improve its relations with Japan. That
country's motivation is mainly economic as it looks for new sources of
raw materials and markets to high technology goods. Any progress in
Soviet efforts to split the European alliance will make it easier for
Moscow to persuade Japan that the USSR meets both of Japan's trading
needs.
9. The USSR will also continue to pay..gr"t attention to any
opportunity to move China away from the US. It will maintain a high
military capability along its border, refuse to make ,any significant
concessions (particularly on the..d.)sputed border question), but will
also make sporadic effortt,t& reopen a dialogue. Its primary effort is
still damage-limitation; but this could be transformed into a drive for
positive gains if.PRC-US relations deteriorate.
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Communist bid for a
8. It is not impossible, meanwhile, that an Italian
governmental role could, during the year, again pose a dilemma for the US and
for Italy's European partners. The Polish crisis has enabled the PCI again to
mark its distance from the Soviet Union'..-How much political credit it will
gain in Italy remains to be seen, but the party will doubtless maintain that
it would be a viable partner for either Socialists or Christian .Democrats in
the event of a downfall of'the7 Spadolini-led coalition. Given-the rivalries
between and within the two other major parties, continued ostracism of the
Communists, while likely, cannot be taken for granted. Neither can a united
European opposition to a PCI that belittles Soviet-style socialism, favors INF
"balance," and is resolutely pro-European.
Acting P ation 1 nt igence fficer
for Western Europe
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