PROSPECTS FOR 1982 IN SOVIET STRATEGIC PROGRAMS AREA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83T00966R000100010048-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 14, 2007
• Sequence Number: 48
• Publication Date: January 11, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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11 January 1982
Copy 5
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM: National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs
SUBJECT: Prospects for 1982 in Soviet Strategic Programs Area
1. In this note I will confine my remarks to the area of Soviet strategic
forces, which I regard as the most critical of my concerns. My observations
are in two categories: the major Soviet program developments that we should
expect to see this year, and the major issues in the national security
community.
Soviet Strategic Program Developments
2. In 1982 the Soviets will continue deployments of a variety of new or
modernized strategic systems but no major new systems will be deployed for
the first time:
--Replacement of SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 ICBMs with the more accurate
MIRVed variants.
--Additional long range MIRVed SS-N-18 missiles on D-class SSBNs.
--Further deployments of SS-20s, Backfires, and Fencer bombers;
retirement of some older missiles and bombers.
--Further deployments of'SA-1O and Mod' oxbat interceptor
low-altitude-capable air defense systems.
3. Testing will continue for, and we expect to gain an improved under-
standing of the characteristics of several major systems that could be deployed
in the next several years (projected initial deployment is indicated):
--SS-NX-20 SLBM (1984) for the Typhoon SSBN.
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SUBJECT: Prospects for 1982 in Soviet Strategic Programs Area
--Long-range RAM-P bomber (1986).
--SS-NX-21 SLCM (1984), for deployment on submarines.
--ALCMs (1986), for potential deployment on Backfire and RAM-P.
--ABM interceptors.
--RAM-K (1984) and RAM-L (1984) air defense interceptors.
--AWACS aircraft (1983).
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4. Flight testing will probably begin in 1982 for several new or
modernized missile systems (projected initial deployment is indicated):
--Medium-sized solid propellant ICBM (1984), similar in size and
weight to MX.
--Small-sized solid propellant ICBM (1985), for mobile deployment.
--Improved SS-18 and SS-19 variants (1985).
--Improved lon ran a liquid propellant SLBM (1984) to replace
SS-N-8 or SS-N-18.
5- We'mav learn more about severa rograms
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--Three new or improved solid-propellant land-based missiles.
--Improvements in the late 1980s for ICBMs, IRBMs, and SLBMs.
--Mobile basing modes for new ICBMs.
--New peripheral attack bomber.
--Various ABM programs.
,,7-Directed-energy programs.
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SUBJECT: Prospects for 1982 in Soviet Strategic Programs Area
Likely Important Security Issues
6. Soviet strategic force developments are of high interest to the community.
The Defense Department and Congress will continue to focus on a number of
problems that relate to their examination of US program decisions:
--The capabilities of Soviet weapon systems against US Minuteman
silos and various basing modes for MX. The increasing vulnerability of
US silos'is portrayed well - 'le
defense for MX in silos,I will
probably become increasingly attractive to o is year, an we wi 1 need
to examine Soviet capabilities against it.
--The vulnerability of US command, control, and communications (C3).
The US strategic modernization program has heavy emphasis on improving C3
and there is increasing awareness of thefmaliratinnc, nf thig wpaknpqq fnr
US strategic doctrine and force programs.
--The capabilities of Soviet bombers against future US continental
air defenses. As a result of the recent identification of the long-range
RAM-P bomber. there will be added impetus in DoD for improved air defenses.
7. I have sensed an increasing level of interest in strategic defense issues.
The potential improvements in Soviet strategic defenses in the next ten to twenty
years may be. greater than those for offensive systems, given the high level of
capability the latter have achieved. Preparations for the review of the ABM
Treaty scheduled for this fall will intensify the examination of strategic defense,
perhaps including air defense and civil defense. The IIM on Soviet BMD,
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SUBJECT: Prospects for 1982 in Soviet Strategic Programs Area
scheduled for March/April will doubtless generate considerable concern over US
ballistic missile defense programs and US offensive missile capabilities against
Soviet ABMs. While the deployment of a ballistic missile defense for MX might
become DoD's preferred solution to ICBM vulnerability, attention needs to be
focused more clearly on which side would gain the greatest overall advantage, in
the near term and in the long term with more widespread ABM deployment by both
the US and the Soviet Union. I
8. The portrayal of the strategic balance will be quite different this
year. Neither the Annual Report to Congress by the Secretary of Defense,
scheduled for delivery later this month, or the new NIE 11-3/8, will have the
usual comparisons of US and Soviet strategic force levels, before and after a
nuclear exchange. (The statement by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
will continue to show these figures.) Instead, the Joint Net Assessment Report,
due in a few months, will address the strategic balance. Congress is likely to
complain strongly about this, and will probably not be satisfied with our "net
assessment" agreement with DoD. However, I believe that, without these
comparisons, we are doing a better job of addressing Soviet strategic force
capabilities in this NIE 11-3/8 than in the past. I believe it is important
that we continue to support the idea of doing net assessments jointly with DoD,
and that we extend the scope of this effort to those subjects such as US
bombers against Soviet air defenses, which the Intelligence Community alone
cannot examine very well.II
9. Arms reduction proposals for both intermediate and intercontinental
range nuclear forces will be examined at length this year. The Intelligence
Community has a key role both in the monitoring area and in the projections of
Soviet forces under various limitations.
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10. The changes over the last several years in US strategic doctrine have
resulted in greater emphasis on US force and C3 endurance in a protracted nuclear
conflict. The debate on these matters is quite confused, in part because of a
lack of understanding of Soviet views in the Defense community, Congress, and
the public. There will be increasing concern with the limitations in being able
to evaluate tThe effects of attacks on Soviet military capabilities--a more
difficult task than just calculating the damage against a set of fixed targets.
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SUBJECT: Prospects for 1982 in Soviet Strategic Programs Area
There is a greater role than in the past for the Intelligence Community in
helping inform the US policy and planning community. We will have to be more
helpful in describing Soviet strategic force operations in dynamic terms and
at a greater level of detail. In particular, the significance to their war-
fighting capabilities of the destruction or disruption of various fixed and
mobile Soviet military facilities, needs to be much better understood. We
will need to focus our analyses to a greater extent on such problems. The
new NIE 11-3/8 will be very helpful in clarifying Soviet concepts of nuclear
warfare. I believe that it will create a much more vivid impression of how
different the Soviet view of nuclear warfare is from the traditional view in
the West. The material on Soviet force operations in the Estimate has
received favorable review from a wide variety of reviewers and participants
in the Estimate, and is likely to stimulate new directions in analysis, along
the lines needed by the Defense community. 0
11. The new NIE 11-3/8 may be depicted as being a much more "hardline"
Estimate, with the insinuation that this has come about because of pressures
from a "hardline" Administration. Interestingly enough, a number of our
reviewers who are not in the "hardline camp" have commented favorably on the
draft thus far, and consider it improved in many ways over the recent Estimates.
I agree, however, that the Estimate is less moderate in its portrayal of Soviet
strategic programs and capabilities, but I believe this portrayal is realistic
in the face of the evidence that is carefully reviewed and evaluated in the
Estimate. I-I
Lawrence K. Gershwin
 SP Z/8z
SUBJECT: Prospects for 1982 in Soviet Strategic Programs Area
Distribution:
Cy 1 - DCI
2 - DDCI
3 - ExDir/CIA
4 - ER
5 - Chm/NIC
6 - NIO/SP
7 - DDI
8 - ADDI
9 - DDI Registry
NIO/SP:LKGershwin
(11Jan82)
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WHAT TO LOOK FOR IN 1982
of East/West relations.
1. The imposition of martial law in Pal-and represents the triumph
of the most reactionary forces in the Soviet empire, sets the stage for
further crises in the empire, and reinforces the confrontational aspects
2. Soviet behavior in Poland has shown that the USSR's ruling
elite values political control above all and will press vigorously for
the reestablishment of traditional totalitarian control mechanisms
despire their likely negative impact on economic productivity. By the
same token, the Polish events display unmistakeably the bankruptcy of
Marxist-Leninist ideology and the economic stagnation brought about by
adherence to Soviet-style centralized planning.
3. These negative phenomena prevail throughout the empire, but
most acutely in the USSR itself. Because of its commitment to the
totalitarian model, fear of public disorder, and vested career in-
terests, the Soviet leadership is not likely to institute any meaningful
economic reforms and will only grudgingly tolerate some economic reforms
elsewhere (e.g., as in Hungary). The Soviet Union, therefore, emerges
as a country with little political or economic attractiveness to
others -- one relying increasingly on military might to conquer (Afghan-
istan), retain control (through a proxy as in Poland), intimidate
(Norway, Pakistan), or increase its influence (as through military
assistance in the Third World).
4. In Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union is satisfied with Jaruzel-
ski's crackdown so far and will continue to press the Polish leadership
as a whole in order to ensure that it stays on the present repressive
course. The Polish leadership is likely to do so in the coming year --
despite the economic and social costs of a recentralized, totalitarian
method of rule. Romania may soon present another sort of problem in
that its relatively independent foreign policy depends greatly upon
Ceaucescu's personalized, nationalistic style of rule. Ceaucescu's
position could be undermined by deteriorating economic performance
arising from policy and planning miscalculations, raw materials short-
ages, and mounting external payments problems. Although Ceaucescu
himself will strive not to sacrifice his independence for Soviet
economic assistance, any major upheavals or leadership dissentions may
be exploited by Moscow for its own ends. The USSR will continue to
follow the situation in Yugoslavia closely. So far the collective
leadership has remained cohesive but it may soon be more severely tested
by poor economic conditions and ethnic rivalries -- the disturbances in
Kosove being of most immediate concern to Belgrade. The Party congress
currently scheduled for the spring should give, us a better indication of
how well-the leadership as currently structured can cope with mounting
problems.
5. Outside of Eastern-:.Europe, the Soviet Union sees the US as its
principal competitor. By virtue of its size, military power, economic
might, and historical role as the defender of freedom, the US continues
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to be an inspiration to numerous people now under Moscow's domination
and the major inpediment to Soviet designs outside of its empire's
borders. The primary goals of Moscow's policy toward the US will remain
to circumscribe it militarily and to isolate'4t.from its traditional
allies. Arms control will be a primary- vehicle to achieve both of these
goals: to get some control over any US modernization programs, and to
present any US hesitation to accept Moscow's proposals as proof of
American bellicosity which 'imperils the entire world. The US response
to this Soviet diplomatic and propaganda challenge will lay the major
part in determining its success or failure.
6. Moscow's heavy reliance on military power has been partially
self-defeating, because it has stimulated establishment of the oper-
ational foundations of an anti-Soviet US-Western Europe-Japanese-PRC
alliance. But that de facto alliance is itself marked by contradictory
impulses, some of which are fundamentally outside of Soviet control
(e.g., the US dilemma over the PRC and Taiwan) but others which are
subject to Soviet manipulation, the most important being the US-FRG
rift.
7. Since it continues to see Europe as the principal East-West
battleground, the USSR is giving priority attention to that continent
and in particular to Germany -- a nation whose undetermined place in the
European concert of nations has brought about two wars in this cen- -
tury. After 1945, a vanquished Germany was divided and the two halves
eventually incorporated into opposing alliances. Now three interrelated
developments in the half hitherto firmly anchored in the Western
alliance are offering the USSR political and economic openings. First,
the FRG, particularly under Schmidt's leadership, is seeking to play a
more important role in the East-West field -- still beneath the umbrella
of the alliance but, in effect, more independent from it. Second, there
is the reemergence of the old geopolitical strand of German thinking
that seeks closer ties with Moscow. Third, there is a convergence of
big business and labor desires for closer economic ties to the East --
another repetition of a trend which marked German policy in the 20's and
30's. The USSR has already had some success in capitalizing on these
impulses and will continue its efforts to do so.
8. In Asia, despite its previous failures, Moscow may soon
perceive new opportunities to improve its relations with Japan. That
country's motivation is mainly economic as it looks for new sources of
raw materials and markets to high technology goods. Any progress in
Soviet efforts to split the European alliance will make it easier for
Moscow to persuade Japan that the USSR meets both of Japan's trading
needs.
qat attention to any
9. The USSR will also continue to pay.gre
opportuni-ty to move China away from-the US. It will maintain a high
military capability along its border, refuse to make.any significant
concessions (particularly on the.disputed border question), but will
also make sporadic efforts-t9,ropen a dialogue. Its primary effort is
still damage-limitation; but this could be transformed into a drive for
positive gains if -PRC-US relations deteriorate.
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10. In the Third World, opportunities for Soviet intereference will
arise either because of the inability of native politicians to create a
viable order (e.g., Angola in 1975 or Iran today) or because of the
rejection by significant elements of the population of an economic order
which is perceived as exploitative (Nicaragua in the 1970s, El Salvador
today). Areas for potential Soviet gains can be categorized as follows:
-- Low risk, moderate gain: This includes most
countries of Africa, many of which can be
influenced through the use of proxies (Cuba
in the past and possibly Libya in the
future).
-- Moderate risk, high gain: Iran.
-- High risk, high gain: Central America.
The degree of Soviet exploitation of opportunities in all of these areas
will be tempered by their perception of the possibility of direct US-
Soviet military conflict, which the Soviet leadership will strive to
avoid.
11. In the long run, the USSR cannot escape from its internal
problems by external action. The impending succession already influ-
ences Soviet behavior, as various political leaders attempt to position
themselves; and this will be an increasingly important factor as the
septuagenarians who form the core of the Soviet leadership begin to
die. Upon Brezhnev's departure from the scene -- through death,
incapacitation, or a coup -- the Politburo will be faced with the
difficult task of maintaining a ruling consensus in an empire beset with
troubles and in the face of continued deaths in their own midst. Sharp
policy disputes are likely at this juncture, and it is quite possible
that some leaders might argue for either a more or less conciliatory
policy toward the West -- if only to serve their own short term personal
ends. Such a situation could, therefore, present the US with new
dangers or an opportunity to steer the USSR into a more accommodating
posture. While there is no certainty of this happening, the US should
at least be prepared for this contingency.
12. in-summary, in 1982 we can expect the following:
-- Within the USSR and its empire, tightened
controls but the possibility of some minor
and ineffective economic reforms.
-- In Soviet policy toward the. US and its
allies, a drive to isolate the USI
In Soviet-Chinese relations, continued low-
key efforts to keep relations from worsening
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and to block any strengthening of US-Chinese
ties.
In the Third World, continued instigation of
anti-Western activities and granting of
support -- mainly military -- to anti-Western
governments, and movements. Two areas bear
special watching.
-- In Iran, Moscow will stand ready to increase
Soviet involvement (political, economic,
subversive, and even military) while trying
to avoid provoking the injection of US
military power into the region.
-- In Central America, the Soviets will display
even greater care to keep a low profile so as
not to provoke the US, but will continue to
support the consolidation of Sandinista power
in Nicaragua and to use that country as a
funnel for the provision of support to
neighboring insurgent movements.
13. The overall picture which emerges is of an internally troubled
USSR trying to keep the lid on its own empire and simultaneously heavily
engaged throughout the world. So far it has been generally successful
in both areas. Moscow's ability to sustain these successes in the
future will depend in no small part on the ability of the US to recon-
cile the most important differences within its own camp and to evolve an
effective but not overly provocative anti-Soviet policy. The Soviet
succession period could present the US with increased opportunities to
influence Soviet behavior.
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