PROSPECTS FOR 1982 - NIO/GPF

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83T00966R000100010045-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 14, 2007
• Sequence Number: 45
• Publication Date: January 15, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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DDI #320-82
15 January 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA
:
FROM
: I
SUBJECT
.
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELUGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20345.
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
Acting NIO for General urpose forces
Prospects for 1982 - NI0/GPF
The attached point paper highlights key developments expected or
possible in Soviet-Warsaw Pact general purpose forces over the next
year and key issues in this arena with which the intelligence and policy
communities will have to grapple. We can elaborate on any of these
that interest you.
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SOVIET GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES IN 1982
Expected Major Trends in the Forces
? Continued force restructuring and improved command & control and
surveillance & targetting.
? Little real change (either growth or reduction) in force size.
? Little impact from arms negotiations.
? Increase in forces committed to Afghanistan; continued attempts to
expand access to foreign naval and air bases.
? Continued modernization of weapons and support systems.
-- Ground Forces
? New tank (potential for technological "surprise") and several
modifications of existing tanks.
? Continued deployment of SS-21 and some SS-23 in Eastern
Europe (implications for INF).
? Formation of several new active ground force divisions,
principally along the Sino-Soviet border.
? Large increases in Soviet artillery--much of it self-propelled.
-- Air Forces
? Deployment of new close air support aircraft and continued
testing of two new fighters.
? Testing of new intercontinental bomber (implications for
US air defense and 6-1 programs).
-- Naval Forces
? Soviet CVA program development (ships and aircraft) and
deployment of new cruiser and possible new attack submarine
(implications for US naval programs)
Potential Issues
? Force Readiness: an IIM on ground force readiness will challenge
traditional assumptions with significant implications for US/NATO
warning assumptions.
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SOVIET GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES IN 1982 (Cont.)
? Naval Policy: an NIE will project the d"evel?opment of the Soviet
Navy and its roles and missions into the 1990s with implications
for the development of US/NATO naval forces.
? Economic Decline: the'perennial question of the degree to Which
a declining Soviet (and East European) economy can support continued.
growth in military programs; given the economic prospects for 1982,
the question takes on added import.
? NSWP Reliabilit : an IIM will attempt to speculate on Soviet
perceptions of t e reliability of their East European allies given
the events in Poland, Romanian intransigence, East European economic
decline, and other factors; a subjective issue, possibly contentious,
but offering opportunities for US policy initiative.
? Chemical Warfare: mounting evidence of Soviet and/or surrogate use
of lethal mycotoxins in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia presents
serious challenge to the US and NATO who currently have neither a
chemical defense capability against nor retaliatory capability with
such weapons.
? Exercise Activity: we expect the Soviets and their allies to engage
in more exercises focusing on conflict on the periphery of the USSR
(SW Asia, Middle East), global-scale contingencies, with increased
emphasis on land-air-sea operations and more sophisticated command
and control.
? Tank Programs: several unilateral and community efforts will focus
on a dynamic Soviet tank program. There is a new modern tank (T-80?),
there are at least two modified versions of older tanks incorporating
new technology (T-64M and T-72M) and there may be a program to sub-
stantially upgrade the T-55 which, despite its age, constitutes the
? Modernization and Future Forces: completion of an 18-month interagency
project offers the potential for substantial changes in community
assessments of current and future ground forces. Despite aggressive
modernization programs, the force is not nearly so modern as normally
perceived and is not likely to change radically in character for at
least well into the 1980s. The findings of this CIA-DIA-Army project
will be published this summer and almost certainly will stir controversy.
? NATO: likelihood of increasing disparity between US and European
perceptions of Soviet-Warsaw Pact threat and NATO response (implications
for MBFR, INF, NATO force modernization).
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PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN 1982
Central America
Compared with one year ago, the extreme left-in Central America is stronger
while terrorism and guerrilla warfare have*had a major role in undermining all
the economies of the region. At the same time, the threatened governments and
their supporting coalitions have maintained workable cohesion in -:the face of the
growing pressures both because of their expectation that the new US administration
would help prevent communist success and because of internal political develop-
ments and opportunities such as the return to constitutional government in
Honduras, the scheduling of elections for El Salvador (March 1982), Guatemala
(March 1982), and Costa Rica (February 1982).
At present with a prudent, active and comprehensive US-led effort in the
region, success would be possible against the extreme left without the commitment
of US forces to prolonged ground combat. However, the efforts to date are too
little and too fragmented. Under the assumption-that the curr nt pattern of
US action continues in 1982, the following are my judgments about probable
results.
Nicaragua
with Cuban, other Soviet Bloc, and radical Arab help, the Marxist-Leninist
Directorate will continue its main policies which include; rapid and thorough
efforts to eliminate any armed threat to the regime; continued full support for
the revolutionary left in the rest of the region (including Honduras and Costa
Rica), continued military buildup for internal repression, and. to provide a
shield for the export of subversion; and,the use of propaganda' to maintain
Western political and economic support from many democratic-socialist governments
and parties. This last implies that some moderate internal groups (parties,
trade unions, church) will be walled off from political power rather than
-crushed completely at this stage because the regime will continue to feel strong
enough to eliminate them whenever necessary and will want the propaganda and
deception benefits of their continued existence.
El Salvador
There is more than a 60% chance for an extreme left victory this year or
early 1983--perhaps temporarily disguised behind a negotiated settlement which
establishes:a, "new army" including the guerrillas and a "coalition government".
The revolutionary left has enough armed strength to continue the destruction of
the economy and launch coordinated attacks involving hundreds of fighters.
That in combination with their international propaganda apparatus will be used
to: prevent or discredit the March 1982 elections, dramatically increase the
costs of US military and economic support, and, create a sense of momentum and
ultimate inevitability of their victory.
These factors would then be combined with the current apparent lack of US
congressional and public support for additional military help for El Salvador,
well-dramatized acts or allegations of "government" or "rightist" brutalities
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and the congressionally mandated preconditions for aid tol Salvador (signed
a
into law on 29 December 1981) to bring about either a congressionally-required
cutoff of military aid or a fatal delay while a highly emotional debate is
carried on in the US (China,-1945-48 an example of the process). In plain
terms, this political-paramilitary war could well be lost either in the field
through attrition and guerrilla success or in-t-hg_US through a lack of effective
support or a combination of both.
Guatemala
On 18 December 1981 CIA/DDI doubled the estimated guerrilla strength from
about 2,200 to about 4,400. External communist support continues,and the
terrorists of both the extreme left and extreme right are killing or intimidating
all moderates, politicizing the formerly uninvolved Indinans, and destroying the
economy.
The Guatemalan government is, in fact, politically weaker than that in
El Salvador because it is far more linked to extreme rightist violence against
non-communist moderates. It is also much more internationally isolated because
the transnational groups supporting the Salvadoran Government (the Latin
democracies, free trade unions, and Christian Democratic parties) do not and
will not support a continuation of the current Guatemalan reaction to the
extreme left terrorism.
Barring a major positive change in the Guatemalan government or a guerrilla
defeat in El Salvador (which would require substantial US initictives not now
visible), the prospect is for a continuation of present negative trends. If
the extreme left wins in El Salvador (however initially disguised), the same
is likely to,occur in Guatemala within a year, perhaps sooner, due to the
collapse of morale and the ending of positive expectations about US power and
will.
Honduras
Cuban/Nicaraguan objectives are to neutralize Honduras in the guerrilla
conflicts through a combination of subversion, promises (being left alone), and.
threats. These last will include more support for the armed left inside Honduras
to distract the government along with short-term Nicaraguan military attacks.
which will be denied.
If events in the region continue as at present, by the end of 1982 Honduras
will probably be neutral at best and perhaps on the way to "Lebanonization" with
extreme left' guerrillas in effect controlling sectors of interest to them.
Costa Rica
Strong democratic traditions will probably preserve the current political
system through the end of this year despite the severe stresses brought on by
economic problems and the impending Cuban-sponsored subversion. Evidence in
hand show" clearly that both Cuban and Nicaragua have begun actions to build an
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to harass and distractoe Costa Rican regime and whic~ight cause a political
breakdown in 1983.
The clear Cuban/Nicaraguan purpose is to prevent the newly-elected Costa
Rican government from cleaning up their networks within the country and to
deter Costa Rica from any active help to anti-Sandinista movements or the
threatened regional governments. Social Democrat Luis Alberto Monge will
probably be elected and take office in, May 1.982. H:! would try to resist this
pressure for neutrality and might succeed unless and until the extreme left
won in. El Salvador.
Belize/Panama
Both governments are fragile and ripe for political subversion leading to
a "Grenada-type"takeover. My sense is that the groundwork will be established
in 1982 with the threat more visible in 1983. Cuba and its partners will
probably not move too actively on these targets until El Salvador is won.
The continued and growing strength of the extreme left will persuade
President Lopez Portillo he has been correct to pursue a dual strategy of
maintaining normal relations with the Central American governments while
providing political and tangible support to the revolutionary left. His last
year in office will most likely witness Lopez Portillo trying to vindicate his
three years of self-deception by becoming more active on behalf of a "negotiated"
victory for the extreme left in El Salvador and perhaps even Guatemala.
That, in turn, will add to other normal bilateral problems (i:.nigration,
fishing) and be used by the left wing of the governing party as the basis for
stirring up.anti-US feelings beyond the,political and opinion'-making elites
which currently hold those views. This would then make it more difficult for
the new president to cooperate with the US in Central America after his
inauguration in December 1982.
At the same time, the communist and radical left may well be using its
increased help for the guerrillas in Central America as a means for expanding
and strengthening the public and clandestine organizations and skills needed
to obtain more power in Mexico after Central America is communist.
Other Latin American Countries--In Brief:
Colombia
More than 600 guerrillas now are active; defeating them will require more
US help which might be given. If not, the guerrilla threat will grow but not
endanger the government this year.
Brazil
Failure to carry through on reasonably fair elections this year (emergency
law of 11-January 1982) could well lead to major strikes and clashes between
the government and a labor-church-party-student coalition which has been looking
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forward to liberalizati Heightened social-politi;.alflict, in turn, could
severely limit foreign investment, foreign bank loans, o oan renewals. This,
in turn, would cause severe economic retrenchment and additional social protest
which could unleash government repression.
This downward political-economic spiral could radicalize much of the
democratic opposition, end the.liberalizatiorr-.process, and lead to a major
crisis in 1983-4. However, there is still. time to avoid this possibility.
Venezuela
The Christian Cemocratic government of Venezuela has been a major partner
of the US on behalf of moderate groups in the Caribbean region. Therefore, the
evidence indicates that Cuba is encouraging efforts by extreme leftist groups
to increase terrorism in Venezuela and use the territorial dispute with Guyana
as another source of pressure.
A Few Concerns Outside Latin America:
Recognizing that I am not informed about the CIA-derived information on
these countries, I nevertheless wanted to share a few of my concerns outside
Latin America.
Western Europe-US
Repression in Poland should have brought about a reaffirmation of Europe-US
solidarity but did not. Therefore I continue to see three issues leading to
wider gaps between the US and the social democratic governments and parties of
Europe, especially France, Greece, Germany: 1) the correct actions required to
contain the USSR; 2) Middle Eastern strategy--PLO or Camp David; 3 the
revolutionary left in Central America.
Middle East
North Yemen represents a Soviet breakthrough in political-paramilitary
warfare: its partners help the groups trying to overthrow the government while
Moscow provides military help to that same government and thereby establishes
a probably, deadly grip to be disguised by "unification" and pseudo power sharing
between the South and North.
Iran
The North Yemen ploy is being attempted by Moscow--the ethnic and extreme
left guerrillas are helped by Soviet partners, the communist party infiltrates
the government while pretending sympathy for the clergy and the USSR now has
offered Khomeini military and intelligence helpto deal with these threats.
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Pakistan/Afghanistan
My sense is that Moscow will use any and all military means to crush the
Afghan resistance in 1982. That may also include the use of private direct and
indirect military (Afghan and/or Indian forces) and guerrilla war threats
(Baluchi separatism) in order to persuade Pakistan to terminate its support for
the Afghan resistance.
Destabilization forces including Libya, South Yemen, Ethiopia (Aden Treaty),
Syria, various Pa estinian terrorist groups will probably receive even more
Soviet Bloc support for action against an array of targets including Egypt,
Sudan, Turkey, Oman, Persian Gulf oil mini-states.
National Intelligence cer
for Latin America
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