THE OUTLOOK FOR SUDAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83T00966R000100010007-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 14, 2007
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: February 19, 1982
• Content Type: SNIE

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Director .,
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Estimate
Secret
19 February 1982
393
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SNIE 78-82
THE OUTLOOK FOR SUDAN
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and
the Treasury.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ............................................................................................................ v
KEY JUDGMENTS .................................................................................................... 1
DISCUSSION .............................................................................................................. 3
Significance for the United States ......................................................................... 3
Recent History (The Problem) ............................................................................... 3
The Faltering Economy ......................................................................................... 4
Economic Prospects ................................................................................................ 5
Domestic Challenge ................................................................................................ 6
Sectional Tensions ................................................................................................... 7
The Military: Key to Nimeiri's Survival ............................................................... 7
Foreign Policy ......................................................................................................... 8
Egypt ................................................................................................................... 9
Saudi Arabia ........................................................................................................ 9
Ethiopia ............................................................................................................... 9
Libya .................................................................................................................... 10
The Hardline Arabs ............................................................................................ 10
The USSR ............................................................................................................ 10
Outlook/Succession ................................................................................................. 10
BIOGRAPHIC ANNEX ............................................................................................. 13
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SCOPE NOTE
This Special National Intelligence Estimate assesses the outlook for
Sudan over the next 12 to 15 months. It focuses on critical economic de-
velopments that could come to a head in the coming months. With IMF
and promised donor aid, the Nimeiri regime has bought itself some
time. It still must implement a politically risky economic reform
program. President Nimeiri's constitutional term runs until May 1983.
This SNIE looks at conditions or events that could shorten his allotted
tenure.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
President Nimeiri has recently preempted a threat to his continued
rule, but his support in the military clearly is slipping. While his
replacement of several military leaders critical of his performance has
reduced the immediate threat of a coup, a deteriorating economy and
forthcoming austerity measures could trigger attempts to oust him.
Furthermore, there is a risk that the military will not continue its
support for Nimeiri if economic conditions deteriorate as expected. In
such a case, the President's ability to remain in office through the end of
his term in May 1983 is doubtful.
The government's belated efforts at economic reform will not bear
positive results before two or three years, and living conditions will
worsen during the coming year for the bulk of the Sudanese population.
A hike in bread prices planned for April could result in serious unrest
and renewed demonstrations against the regime.
Libyan leader Qadhafi poses the most serious external threat.
Growing domestic unrest in Sudan will increase Nimeiri's vulnerability
to foreign subversion.
The military almost certainly will play the dominant role in any
successor regime. If senior officers were to take control of the govern-
ment, policies toward the United States would probably remain un-
changed. If junior officers were to assume control, Sudan would be
likely to move away from its pro-US, pro-Egyptian orientation and
toward the Arab middle ground.
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DISCUSSION
Significance for the United States
1. Sudan, the largest country in Africa, occupies a
strategic position in the Middle East and the Horn of
Africa. In recent years the government of President
Gaafar Nimeiri has played an important role that
parallels US efforts to prevent the further growth of
Soviet and Cuban influence in the region and to
protect US access to vital oil supply routes.
2. Because of the strong US strategic interest in
establishing a military presence in the region,
Nimeiri's offer in March 1981 to make military facili-
ties available to the United States-with the proviso
that Sudan itself must be threatened before such
facilities are used-has caused Sudan to assume great-
er importance to the United States. Access to facilities
in Sudan could provide a valuable contribution to
support of the US presence, deployments, exercises,
and surge capability in the region. It will provide
flexibility and redundancy to respond to contingencies
in the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Penin-
sula, and the Indian Ocean and throughout Africa.
Additionally, Sudanese airspace is an important airlift
avenue en route to countries in the region.
3. President Nimeiri supported the Camp David
accords in 1978, when almost all other Arab leaders
condemned Egyptian President Sadat's peace policy.
In contrast to other Arab states, Sudan never broke
diplomatic relations with Egypt, although Khartoum
did recall its ambassador for several months. More
recently, Nimeiri has worked to rally support for
Egypt among moderate Arab states. In addition, Sudan
has generally supported moderate positions in regional
and international forums, despite pressures by radical
Arab states.
4. In Africa, the importance of Sudan for the
United States was heightened by the revolution of
1974 in Ethiopia and the subsequent establishment of
a substantial Soviet and Cuban presence there, as well
as by the signing of the tripartite Libyan-Ethiopian-
South Yemeni anti-Western alliance in August 1981.
Sudan also has promoted peaceful resolution of re-
gional conflicts, notably in Namibia and Western
Sahara. Sudan has cooperated with Uganda's other
neighbors to prevent Libyan exploitation of the unset-
tled situation in that country. President Nimeiri also
attempted to orchestrate a diplomatic campaign
among African states to force Libyan leader Qadhafi
to withdraw his forces from Chad.
Recent History (The Problem)
5. Although initially openly hostile to the United
States and inclined to align with the Soviet Bloc,
President Nimeiri began moving Sudan's policies to-
ward the center following an abortive Communist-led
coup in July 1971. Subsequently, Nimeiri survived
another major coup attempt in 1976 and serious
antigovernment demonstrations in August 1979. He
has been able to stay in power largely because of his
ability to maintain the loyalty of the military and his
skill in dealing with Sudan's disparate political and
tribal groups. In 1972 Nimeiri negotiated an end to the
17-year-long civil war between northern Muslims and
black southerners. In 1977, through his pursuit of
national reconciliation, he persuaded key dissident
groups to abandon subversive efforts against the cen-
tral government. At the same time, he has used the
security forces to effectively neutralize remaining
opposition groups.
6. The most serious problem facing Nimeiri is
longstanding but growing unhappiness over the re-
gime's inability to reverse the nation's economic de-
cline. By late 1981, chronic shortages of consumer
commodities and gasoline appeared to be worsening.
There has long been grumblin he grndyinl
decline in the standard of livine
7. The increase in the official price of sugar an-
nounced on 31 December to honor a tentative agree-
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ment with the IMF led to a wave of student demon-
strations and set the stage for a showdown between
Nimeiri and his critics in the military. Nimeiri met
with high-level civilian and military officials during
the period 17-21 January to evaluate the disturbances
and the country's economic problems.
Nimeiri moved decisively against those who a crt i-
cized his policies and leadership.
8. Abd al-Majid Khalil-mentioned most often as
the likely successor if Nimeiri were forced from
office-was relieved of his posts as First Vice Presi-
dent, Defense Minister, and Commander in Chief of
the Armed Forces. He also was removed from his
position as Secretary General of the Sudanese Socialist
Union, the country's sole legal political organization.
Nimeiri also fired a number of other senior officers,
including the chief of staff, the commander of the
airborne forces, and the commander of the Khartoum
garrison-all positions of key importance to the re-
gime's security.
9. By acting quickly, Nimeiri also prevented the
traditional civilian opposition groups from uniting
with his military critics. The Muslim Brotherhood
continues to cooperate with the government, while the
Ansar Muslim sect remained neutral during the crisis
and consequently lost its opportunity to affect the
outcome. Another major opposition group, the Nation-
al Unionist Party, has been in disarray following the
recent death of its leader Sharif al-Hindi.
10. Although the abruptness of Nimeiri's action
caught his critics by surprise and lessened the chances
of an immediate military coup, it has further isolated
Nimeiri from objective criticism of his policies and has
lowered the overall competence of senior officials.
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of Staff for Administration, Maj. Gen. Yousif Ahmed
Yousif, Deputy Chief of Staff for Lo?;istics, and Maj.
Gen. Abd al-Rahman Suwar Dahab, Deputy Chief of
Staff for Operations and Training, reportedly will
jointly perform the duties of chief of staff until
Nimeiri selects a permanent replacement.
11. The confrontation with the military, moreover,
leaves Nimeiri's room for maneuver considerably re-
stricted. Even though he has removed some potentially
disloyal officers, discontent remains.
The Faltering Economy
12. Sudan's precarious economic situation is the
major factor behind the discontent that is threatening
Nimeiri's rule. (See table 1.) Inflation now is running at
an estimated 40 percent, foreign exchange is scarce,
and the lot of the urban middle class is likely to
worsen. After years of neglect and ineffective action,
the government finally appears intent on pursuing
economic reform. Moreover, the IMF and aid donors
have required major policy changes in return for
balance-of-payments support.
13. The adverse domestic economic trends of recent
years worsened in 1981 as real output fell for the third
straight year. Difficulties in the agricultural sector,
which accounts for 40 percent of national output and
almost all exports, are largely to blame. Production of
cotton-Sudan's most important export crop-fell to
half the 1978 level because of deteriorating irrigation
facilities and disincentives arising from government
pricing policies. Other major crops fared little better.
Output in the small industrial sector faltered, with
most plants operating well below 50 percent of capac-
ity because of power cuts, labor disputes, poor man-
Minister of State Security Umar al-Tayyib,
has become the de facto
number-two man in the regime, and seems likely to Population, mid-1981 ........................................................ 19 million
replace Khalil, who was an able professional officer, as Per Capita GDP, 1981 ....................................................... $300
first vice president. Nimeiri himself assumed Khalil's Real GDP Growth, 1979/80 (July-June) ........................... -0.6%
1980/81 .............................................. -0.5%
other duties as Defense Minister and Commander in
Money Supply Growth, 1979/80 ....................................... 21%
Chief of the Armed Forces. Minister of Presidential 1980/81 ....................................... 50%
Idris Inflation Rate, 1980 ........................................................... 20%
1981 ........................................................... 30%
Maj. Trade Deficit, 1981 ........................................................... $1.1 billion
Gen. Taw iq Saleh Hassan u Kadok, epU y hief Foreign Exchange Reserves, December 1981 .................. $17 million
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agement, and shortages of imported 'spare parts and
raw materials.
14. Persistent government mismanagement has re-
sulted in rapidly expanding budget deficits. Domestic
government borrowing to finance these deficits and
increased credit to money-losing public-sector firms
led to a 50-percent increase in the money supply in the
year ending 30 June 1981. The government's efforts to
reduce subsidies on consumer goods by raising prices
has added to current inflationary pressures: a 39-
percent increase in petroleum prices in November was
followed by a 63-percent hike in sugar prices and 10-
to 25-percent increases in cigarette prices in January.
15. Sudan's domestic economic problems are more
than matched by the magnitude of its foreign pay-
ments difficulties. The 1981 performance was particu-
larly poor as exports of $500 million were dwarfed by
imports totaling $1.6 billion. By the end of 1981
foreign exchange virtually disappeared from the bank-
ing system and Sudan's access to international credit
dried up. Thirty-day credits for petroleum purchases
were no longer available and the country's sole refin-
ery was forced to close briefly for lack of imported
crude.
16. Uncontrolled borrowing for overambitious de-
velopment projects started in the 1970s left Sudan
saddled with an enormous foreign debt-an estimated
$3.1 billion at the end of 1980-and arrearages of
about $1.3 billion-more than double 1981 export
earnings. After two years of negotiations, Sudan
reached agreement with foreign banks in late 1981 to
reschedule $500 million of overdue loans and efforts
are being made to reschedule $370 million in unpaid
suppliers credits.
17. Sudan's exceedingly difficult financial position
has made the country dependent on foreign aid and
IMF loans. In the fiscal year ending 30 June 1981,
Sudan received close to $1 billion in economic aid and
IMF loans. The IMF was the largest single source of
funds, providing $300 million under a three-year
Extended Fund Facility. Saudi Arabia provided $150
million in project and special balance-of-payments aid;
the United States provided $127 million in economic
assistance. (See table 2.)
18. The government's inability to come to grips
with the country's difficulties, combined with the
nonpayment of foreign obligations, has seriously un-
Sudan: Estimated Official Transfers,
Capital Inflows, and IMF Loans 1980/81
(million US dollars)
IMF, Net .......................................................................... 300
Saudi Arabia .................................................................... 150
United States ................................................................... 127
EC/Japan ........................................................................ 118
Kuwait ............................................................................. 50
Abu Dhabi Fund ............................................................. 50
Arab Monetary Fund ...................................................... 30
World Bank ..................................................................... 35
United Arab Emirates .................................................... 25
Other Arab ...................................................................... 35
Other Bilateral/ Multilateral ........................................... 35
Total ............................................................................. 955
dermined the confidence of foreign aid donors, the
IMF, and private creditors. Propelled by the insistence
of foreign creditors that Sudan press forward with
economic reform, as well as by the realization that
changes were needed, Sudan reached a tentative
agreement with the IMF in October 1981 for a $220
million loan tied to a new one-year economic reform
program. This replaces the final year of its three-year
Extended Fund Facility arrangement, whose condi-
tions Sudan had failed to meet.
19. Although Nimeiri took the initial steps set out in
the IMF agreement-devaluation, a 39-percent in-
crease in petroleum prices, a 10-percent hike in
customs duties, and a commitment to phase out sugar
and wheat subsidies-the agreement quickly unrav-
eled when Nimeiri removed Finance Minister Sulay-
man, the architect of the program. The IMF also was
concerned about a shortfall in government revenues
and the failure of aid donors to provide sufficient
balance-of-payments support for 1982. In early Janu-
ary 1982 the IMF agreement was patched up and
Sudan managed to cover its revenue shortfall by
raising sugar and cigarette prices and increasing cus-
toms duties. The agreement was approved by the IMF
Board on 18 February, and, if aid promised by donors
comes about, this will meet essential 1982 foreign
exchange requirements.
Economic Prospects
20. Although recent aid pledges and the IMF loan
will buy time by covering Sudan's 1982 foreign pay-
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ments needs, Khartoum still must deal with the politi-
cally sensitive task of imposing additional economic
reforms and austerity measures as part of its IMF
agreement. Government price hikes, continuing short-
ages, and inflation will worsen the position of urban
workers and the middle class. The 33-percent increase
in bread prices scheduled for April could create
serious unrest. Another round of bread price hikes
may occur in the summer.
21. Should Sudan fail to make reforms under the
IMF agreement, Khartoum would lose access to IMF
funds after its May performance review. This would
eliminate the $105 million in IMF funds scheduled for
release in the second half of 1982. The resultant
foreign exchange crisis would cause domestic instabil-
ity. Such a failure of the IMF agreement also would
threaten Sudan's access to funds from aid donors.
22. Two separate events in 1982 will have signifi-
cant implications for Sudan's longer term economic
prospects:
- The World Bank will host an aid donors meeting
in May to discuss a three-year investment pro-
gram it is drawing up jointly with Sudan. This
program is expected to commit Sudan to policies
necessary for agricultural and industrial re-
covery.
- Financial arrangements to build an oil refinery at
Kusti (Kosti) are to be concluded this year. Oil
discoveries by Chevron since 1979 are the major
bright spot in Sudan's economic future. While
exploration is expanding, discoveries to date are
relatively small-sufficient to produce only
25,000 barrels a day-and will not benefit the
economy until the Kusti refinery is built. Sudan,
the World Bank, and Chevron are in the process
of negotiating financing for the refinery, with the
goal of completing arrangements this year so that
construction can begin and the refinery can
become operational in 1986.
Domestic Challenge
23. While Nimeiri has successfully weakened the
Ansar Muslim sect-whose adherents constitute ap-
proximately one-fifth of Sudan's estimated 19 million
people-it continues to be a significant force on the
Sudanese political scene. The principal Ansar leader,
Sadist al-Mahdi, has withdrawn from direct participa-
tion in the government because of Nimeiri's refusal to
grant him a larger role. A small group headed by
Sadiq's cousin, Wali ad-Din al-Hadi al-Mahdi, never
accepted reconciliation with Nimeiri and continues
actively to oppose the regime.
24. Reflecting the historic Ansar distrust of Egypt,
Sadiq disapproves of Nimeiri's close ties with Cairo.
He also opposed Nimeiri's decision to resist the Libyan
presence in Chad and his offer of military facilities to
the United States. Sadiq has periodically visited Libya
and probably has received financial support from
Qadhafi.
25. The Muslim Brotherhood is the most conserva-
tive of all organized Islamic groups in Sudan. Its
primary base has been the faculty and the student
body of the University of Khartoum. Despite its small
membership-estimates vary widely between 60,000
and 300,000 nationwide-the appeal of the Brother-
hood's militant brand of Islam has made it a signifi-
cant political force. Consequently, even though the
Brotherhood's leader, Hasan al-Turabi, serves as Attor-
ney General, some security officials regard the organi-
zation as a threat to the regime and closely monitor its
activities.
26. In recent months, growing public unhappiness
with the regime has forced Nimeiri to rely more
heavily on the Brotherhood. During the January dis-
orders, Turabi ordered Brotherhood students to restrict
their activities to the campuses and not to participate
in street demonstrations. Nevertheless, because of the
gains made by the Brotherhood in the January elec-
tions for the National Assembly, where it now report-
edly controls over a quarter of the seats, Nimeiri may
feel compelled to take steps to reduce its influence.
27. The National Unionist Party is the most impor-
tant of those groups actively seeking the overthrow of
Nimeiri. It reflects the views of secular merchants,
civil servants, and professionals who oppose the con-
servative forces represented by the Ansars and the
Muslim Brotherhood and resent the dominant role of
the Army. In the past the party drew much of its
strength from the Khatmiyyah Muslim sect, the princi-
pal rival of the Ansar. Somewhat smaller than the
Ansar, the more loosely organized and less militant
Khatmiyyah sect historically has favored closer rela-
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tions with Egypt. The party now appears to have split
into two factions: the Khatmiyyah sect and a more
leftist group formerly headed by Sharif al-Hindi, who
died in January. Al-Hindi's departure removes one of
Nimeiri's bitterest critics from the scene. He probably
will be succeeded as leader of the party by his deputy,
Ahmed Zein Abdin. Although the January demonstra-
tions in Khartoum over the increase in the price of
sugar were spontaneous, National Unionists and Com-
munists may have orchestrated the more violent pro-
tests that followed in the provinces.
28. The Sudanese Communist Party was estimated
to have 15,000 members in mid-1979, but it has been
seriously weakened by government actions since the
disorders in August 1979, in which the Communists
played a significant part. The party, nevertheless, has
considerable assets in the labor movement and among
students. Although it can no longer mount a direct
challenge to the regime, it can stimulate unrest.
29. The Sudanese Ba'th Party has only a few
hundred members and does not constitute a serious
danger to the Nimeiri regime. Active primarily at the
University of Khartoum, it is closely monitored by
security officials.
30. Student groups, often a barometer of public
opinion, have participated in a number of anti-
Nimeiri demonstrations. Student involvement in anti-
regime demonstrations in 1964 helped bring down the
military government. Campus politics, especially at
the university level, are influenced by various radical
elements, including followers of the illegal Sudanese
Communist Party and by the conservative Muslim
Brotherhood. The government has in the past provided
free education and transportation. Recent economic
pressures, however, have caused some of these privi-
leges to be curtailed, contributing to student demon-
strations in December 1981 and January 1982.
31. Communist-influenced labor unions also have
demonstrated against the government over economic
issues. The railroad strike in 1981 was harshly dealt
with by Nimeiri. Although unions did not participate
in the most recent series of student demonstrations,
they could find common cause and join in or organize
popular demonstrations if general unrest grows. Such
events could compel the regime to use its military
forces to maintain control.
Sectional Tensions
32. North-south tensions, which had been gradually
easing since the conclusion of the Addis Ababa agree-
ment of 1972 that ended a 17-year-long civil war,
began to intensify again in early 1980. The predomi-
nantly black, non-Muslim southerners have long be-
lieved that they have not received a fair share of
development funds and have also been concerned over
efforts by northern Muslims to give Islamic Sharia law
greater force. The choice of Kusti in the north for the
proposed site of a small refinery-rather than Bentiu
in the south, which is close to recent oil discoveries-is
seen by southerners as a deliberate effort to deprive
the south of its natural resources. Despite a compro-
mise intended to give southerners more employment
and greater access to the products of the refinery,
protests over the location of the refinery are likely to
continue.
33. The north-south division was further exacer-
bated by the dissolution last October of the southern
regional assembly and the replacement of the southern
executive council by a military administration. Al-
though new elections and a referendum on dividing
the south into three regions are to be held this spring,
it is clear that Nimeiri favors that division as a means
of reducing the dominant role of the Dinka tribe in
southern politics. The creation of new administrative
units could cause greater tribal conflict, increase
southern resentment against the north, and make the
south more susceptible to Libyan- and Ethiopian-
sponsored subversion.
34. Western Sudanese, many of whom have close
links with their fellow tribesmen in Chad, are particu-
larly susceptible to Libyan-sponsored subversion.
Many of them travel to Libya, and at least some have
been recruited by Libya for destabilization missions
into Sudan. The Libyan withdrawal from Chad, how-
ever, has reduced somewhat the danger of cross-
border raids into western Sudan by Libyan-trained
dissidents.
The Military: Key to Nimeiri's
Survival
35. The military helped Nimeiri come to power in
1969, and the continued support of key military
personnel and units has allowed him to remain in
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power. The Army proved loyal to Nimeiri during the
conflict with the Ansars in 1970, even though many of
its personnel were at least nominal members of the
sect. It was Army support that enabled Nimeiri to
regain power following the abortive Communist-led
coup in July 1971. Although some officers joined the
rebels during the 1976 Libyan-backed, Ansar-led coup
attempt, and many other members of the armed forces
remained neutral, Nimeiri was able to maintain con-
trol with the support of personnel from key units.
Since then, the regime has stepped up efforts to
maintain military loyalty.
Much of this discontent is attributed to Nimeiri's
failure to consult with his advisers before taking
action, his public berating of individual officers, and
his inability to justify his economic austerity program.
The Army, however, did respond when called on to
assist police in containing student demonstrations and
closing down schools in Khartoum during the January
1982 demonstrations. His recent purge of senior offi-
cers probably will help Nimeiri in the short term, in
part because of the confusion caused among his mili-
tary and political critics.
37. Many senior officers apparently view the re-
moval of First Vice President Khalil as a disagreeable
event, but not one that requires immediate reaction.
The near-term chances of a coup by senior officers has
been decreasing with the passage of time. Moreover,
Khalil, who figured in most plans to replace Nimeiri,
reportedly is opposed to succession by other than
constitutional means. Nevertheless, anti-Nimeiri senti-
ment is likely to grow as economic difficulties worsen.
38. The loyalty of junior officers remains unclear
but they are suffering economic hardship. Following
the showdown with his critics in January, Nimeiri
reportedly planned to announce an immediate pay
increase for middle and lower ranks. Even a pay hike
would do little to improve Nimeiri's popularity among
junior officers, whose salaries must be stretched to
support their extended families.
over the sentiments of the "young majors"-a group
identified as not fully supporting the regime. These
are officers who graduated from military college
shortly after the 1969 revolution and before the
abortive coup in July 1971. These military classes were
particularly large (300 to 700 in each class instead of
the normal 100 to 200) and therefore face reduced
chances for rapid promotion over the next few years.
40. The Sudanese police, who have the primary
responsibility for controlling demonstrators during dis-
turbances such as those in January 1982, have for years
been plagued by poor morale because of low pay and
prestige. Shortages in personnel and longstanding ri-
valries with the Army may hinder the ability of the
police to contain future disturbances. There were,
however, no reports of police refusing to confront
protesters in January.
41. The survival of the regime ultimately depends 25
on the continued willingness of the military to use
force to put down widespread public disorders. In
October 1964 the government of Ibrahim Abbud fell
when the Army refused to suppress massive street
demonstrations. Additional government-imposed aus-
terity measures seem certain to increase sentiment in
the military for Nimeiri's removal, even among those
officers who have consistently supported him. Morale,
perhaps the key factor in the willingness of the
military to support the regime, appears now to be the
lowest it has been in recent years.
Foreign Policy
42. Sudanese foreign policy under Nimeiri until
recently has been conciliatory and pragmatic, aimed
at avoiding conflict with better armed neighboring
states and at securing badly needed foreign economic
aid. Nimeiri tried to maintain friendly relations with
both Egypt and Saudi Arabia after the Camp David
accords in 1978, to improve relations with Ethiopia
beginning in 1979, and, to the extent possible, neutral-
ize the Libyan threat. The peacemaker role that he
attempted to play in African disputes-Chad, Eritrea,
the Ogaden-and in the radical-conservative Arab
split enhanced his prestige in the OAU and the Arab
councils.
43. But Nimeiri's balancing act began to fall apart
following Libya's military intervention in Chad in
December 1980. The Libyan military threat to west-
ern Sudan through Chad propelled him into greater
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dependence on Egyptian military support (through the
Egyptian-Sudanese mutual defense pact of 1976) and
on the United States (whose military aid to Sudan
tripled in 1981). Moreover, the signing of the Libyan-
Ethiopian-South Yemeni pact in August 1981 (and the
initiation of Libyan-Ethiopian subversive plots against
Sudan) has increased Nimeiri's security concerns.
44. The resultant closer alignment of Khartoum's
foreign policy with those of Cairo and Washington has
burned Sudan's bridges to the radical Arabs and
strained its relations with some conservative Arabs.
Nimeiri's public vendettas against Libya, the PLO,
Syria, and Iraq have intensified the threats to Sudan's
internal security. In addition, his campaign against
Qadhafi has received little support from other African
states and led to his isolation on that issue at the June
1981 OAU summit.
45. During the late January 1982 confrontation
between Nimeiri and elements of his government, a
review of Sudanese foreign policy was recommended
to see if it has adversely affected Sudan's ability to
obtain Arab aid. Moreover, Nimeiri's conduct of for-
eign policy-especially his open quarreling with the
radical Arabs-has contributed to the unease with his
political leadership. Thus far, however, questioning of
the close ties with Egypt appears to be muted; most
Sudanese see no alternative for the time being.
Egypt
46. The close Sudanese-Egyptian relationship is dic-
tated by geographic, economic, and cultural ties and,
in recent years, by Nimeiri's need for Egyptian mili-
tary backing against external enemies. Even so, the
relationship is an ambivalent one, largely because of
Sudanese fear of Egyptian dominance. Many Sudanese
resent Cairo's "big brother knows best" attitude and
resist subordination of Sudan's national interests to
those of Egypt.
47. Nimeiri initially endorsed the Camp David
accords; by late 1978, however, his need for financial
support from conservative Arabs caused him to qualify
his support and in December 1979 he lowered Suda-
nese diplomatic relations with Egypt to the charge
cl'affaires level. A shift came in March 1981 when full
diplomatic relations were resumed, followed by Egyp-
tian President Sadat's visit to Khartoum in May and
Nimeiri's visit to Cairo in July.
48. The Saudis value Sudan as an anti-Communist
state that helps counter the influence of pro-Soviet
states in the Red Sea region. But Sudan also has
shortcomings from the Saudi perspective:
- Riyadh is lukewarm about Nimeiri, recalling his
early radical days and worrying about his politi-
cal staying 'power)
While the Saudis understand Sudan's need for a
close security relationship with Egypt, Nimeiri's
explicit support for Egypt and the Camp David
accords makes it difficult for them to grant
Sudan large amounts of aid)
Ethiopia
49. A historical antipathy exists between "Chris-
tian" Ethiopia and Muslim Sudan, but it has waxed
and waned depending on the political orientation of
the regimes in Khartoum and Addis Ababa:
- Sudanese relations with Haile Selassie improved
after Nimeiri's break with the Communists in
1971, and the Emperor helped to mediate the
settlement of the Sudanese civil war.
- Relations deteriorated again after the revolution-
ary military regime took power in Ethiopia in
1974. The nadir came in 1976 when Ethiopia
supported an unsuccessful Libyan coup against
Nimeiri, and Nimeiri reacted by endorsing an
independent Eritrean state.
- Ethiopian leader Mengistu and Nimeiri reached
a rapprochement in late 1979 and the Sudanese
initiated an effort to mediate the Eritrean prob-
lem. But Nimeiri was unable to arrange negotia-
tions between Addis Ababa and the insurgents.
- By the summer of 1981 Ethiopia's serious eco-
nomic problems contributed to Mengistu's deci-
sion to negotiate the tripartite pact with Libya
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and South Yemen, in order to get Libyan finan-
cial aid. Qadhafi's quid pro quo included Ethio-
pian cooperation in subversion against Nimeiri.
Until recently Mengistu's cooperation has been
halfhearted, reflecting his desire to prevent re-
newed Sudanese support to the Eritreans. As of
early 1982, however, Mengistu may have decid-
ed to increase his support for Libyan-sponsored
anti-Nimeiri operations.
50. It is possible that the current fighting in Eritrea
may inadvertently spill over the border into Sudan.
While Mengistu might sanction "hot pursuit" raids
should Nimeiri lift current restrictions on Eritrean
dissidents in Sudan, he clearly hopes to restrict the
fighting to Ethiopian territory.
Libya
51. Qadhafi's hostility to Nimeiri, originally related
to the Libyan leader's desire to hurt Egypt through its
more vulnerable neighbor and supporter, has become
a deep-seated personal antipathy. The Libyan leader
has used a variety of Sudanese dissident groups to
attempt to subvert the Nimeiri regime. Tripoli backed
unsuccessful Ansar coup attempts in 1975 and 1976,
and members of the sect figure in some of the
subversive efforts now being mounted from Tripoli
and Addis Ababa. Qadhafi has aided other Sudanese
dissidents, including the late Sharif al-Hindi and
southern Sudanese. Until the withdrawal of Libyan
forces from Chad in late 1981, Qadhafi was able to use
the Chad-Sudan border as a staging area for sabotage
and air raids against Chadian insurgents based in
Sudan.
52. The withdrawal from Chad has largely elimi-
nated Libya's ability to threaten Sudan with conven-
tional military force. But Qadhafi's major threat has
always been subversion, which he sees as providing the
best opportunity for overthrowing -the Khartoum re-
gime. He is continuing to recruit and train Sudanese
dissidents. In addition, Ethiopian cooperation under
the tripartite pact gives Qadhafi new bases from
which to mount subversive operations.
The Hardline Arabs
53. Nimeiri's relations with the hardline Arabs have
been uneasy since the early 1970s and worsened after
Sudan began to support Egypt openly on the Camp
David accords. Iraq has been the most hostile and has
aided Sudanese dissidents, including al-Hindi and the
Ba'thists. Diplomatic relations were broken in 1979,
but they were resumed in 1980 when Nimeiri en-
dorsed Iraq's call for an Arab charter, which he sees as
a way of enticing Baghdad away from Moscow.
54. Nimeiri expelled the local PLO representatives
in Khartoum in February 1981 and publicly attacked
the PLO leadership in May 1981. At the same time he
denounced Syrian activities in Lebanon and down-
graded Sudanese diplomatic representation in Damas-
cus.
The USSR
55. The Soviets would certainly applaud Nimeiri's
ouster. They consider the Nimeiri regime tied to the
United States and have criticized Sudan for alleged
provocations against Libya and Chad. Moscow, for
example, was quick to point out Sudan's participation
in the US Operation Bright Star and claims that the
exercise was a "dress rehearsal" for an invasion of
Libya. There is nothing to indicate the Soviets are
directly involved in efforts to destabilize the Khar-
toum regime. The Soviets were expelled from Sudan in
1971 because of their suspected complicity in a coup
attempt led by the Sudanese Communist Party. Rela-
tions were restored in 1972.
56. Moscow probably values Libyan and Ethiopian
efforts to destabilize the Sudanese regime. Similarly,
the Soviets probably view the tripartite agreement
among South Yemen, Ethiopia, and Libya last summer
as a useful balance to Nimeiri's pro-US posture and
hope it will facilitate better coordination of subversive
political efforts aimed at undermining Nimeiri.
Outlook/Succession
57. Since taking power in 1969, Nimeiri has sur-
vived many serious challenges to his rule and in each
instance military support has been critical to his
success. The student protests in early 1982, and the
showdown between Nimeiri and his critics in the
military, however, demonstrate that Nimeiri's support
in the military has been eroded.
58. Nimeiri's dismissal of First Vice President and
Defense Minister Abd al-Majid Khalil and more than
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20 other high-level officers probably has reduced
temporarily the chances of a military move against
him. The short-term stability of the government prob-
ably also will be enhanced as Nimeiri loyalists replace
the purged officers.
59. Nimeiri's longer term survivability would be
enhanced by large-scale infusions of additional eco-
nomic aid to finance increased imports. To stem the
loss of public confidence in Nimeiri's leadership,
however, such assistance would have to be on the
order of several hundred million dollars more than is
currently being provided by donors and the IMF. Most
donors are reluctant to provide additional assistance of
that magnitude. Significant new aid, if obtained,
would discourage the regime from instituting essential
economic reforms. It could also discourage creditors
from being generous in rescheduling debts. Substan-
tially higher aid from the United States would clearly
identify Washington with the present regime in the
minds of most Sudanese, and consequently could
damage US relations with a successor government.
60. Attempts by groups in the military to depose
Nimeiri or to force him to resign remain a distinct
possibility. Even some of those officers who supported
him in January might seek his removal in the event of
a renewal of public disorders. Such demonstrations
could occur without warning or specific cause, al-
though they probably would be triggered by new
austerity measures, such as the bread price rise sched-
uled for April. There could be protests this summer
when temperatures will be high and rain will com-
pound the already serious communication, transporta-
tion, and supply problems. The Muslim holy month of
Ramadan, when fasting makes tempers short, also falls
during the hottest part of the year. Moreover, should
Sudan lose access to IMF funds after its May per-
formance review, it will experience a sharp increase in
domestic unrest. This will severely test the military's
loyalty to the regime.
61. Thus, there are many factors working against
Nimeiri's remaining in office until his present six-year
term ends in May 1983. Although he appears to have
recovered fully from a stroke suffered about April
1980, he has been under considerable pressure since
late 1981 and his behavior has been erratic. If he
believes that the opposition to his continuing in office
is again building, Nimeiri could decide to step down
before his opponents move against him. Although his
threats to resign earlier this year now appear to have
been a ploy, he may actually have been prepared to
step down rather than risk clashes between supporters
and critics.
62. Should Nimeiri leave office voluntarily, Umar
al-Tayyib-if, as seems likely, he becomes first vice
president-would succeed temporarily to the presi-
dency. Presidential elections are constitutionally re-
quired within 60 days. Tayyib, however, is widely
disliked in the military and, even if he were to win the
election, might soon be forced from office. We would
expect policies under a government controlled by
Tayyib to differ little from those under Nimeiri.
Sudan would be likely to maintain its pro-Western and
pro-Egyptian foreign policy. Tayyib probably would
be a very weak leader, however, and more easily
influenced by his advisers than Nimeiri.
63. The military is almost certain to play a major
role in any successor government regardless of
whether the change occurs by constitutional means or
if Nimeiri is forced from office. A government con-
trolled by politically conservative senior officers prob-
ably is the most likely should Nimeiri fall within the
next few months. In that event, policies toward the
United States and the West probably would change
very little. US relations with a successor regime, even
one dominated by conservatives, however, could be
damaged if leaders of the new government believed
that the United States had interferred in Sudanese
internal affairs to maintain Nimeiri in power. Such a
government would be suspicious of Soviet intentions in
the region and any improvement in relations between
Khartoum and Moscow would come slowly. Sudan's
present identification with Egypt is unpopular with
many Sudanese, however, both in and out of the
military, and Sudanese-Egyptian relations under a
conservative military government probably would cool
somewhat.
64. As long as Nimeiri continues in office and
frustration with present policies builds, a coup by
younger and more radical officers becomes increasing-
ly likely. If younger officers with a nationalist or Pan-
Arab orientation were the dominant force in a new
government, Sudan probably would move toward a
more nonaligned position. Such a regime would at-
tempt to ease strains with Libya and Ethiopia, al-
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though it would remain suspicious of the goals of
Qadhafi and Mengistu. Such a Sudanese regime would
continue to seek aid from the United States, but also
would improve relations with the USSR and East
European states. In domestic affairs, Sudan probably
would again turn toward a socialist economy, reverse
or at least stop the present regime's policy of divesting
itself of state-owned corporations, and take a more
aggressive policy toward the south, an action that
could stimulate new conflict between the two parts of
the country.
65. If younger officers or enlisted men with a
radical or extreme leftist orientation were to control a
successor government-an unlikely possibility, but one
that cannot be completely discounted-US interests in
Sudan and the region would be very seriously
damaged. Soviet influence would be greatly enhanced
and considerably increased opportunities would be
provided for Libyan and Ethiopian activity in regional
affairs.
0
66. The nonmilitary opposition groups in Sudanese
society are unlikely to control a successor government,
but might well be invited to participate in a military-
dominated coalition. Under a successor government in
which conservative elements in Sudanese society-the
Ansar Muslim sect and the Muslim Brotherhood-
played a role, Sudan would move away from its pro-
Western and pro-US stance, and distance itself from
Egypt and move toward the Arab middle ground. The
USSR, however, probably would be unable to increase
its influence significantly. Sudan probably would re-
scind its offer of military facilities to the United States,
although the government also would oppose Soviet use
of such facilities anywhere in the area. It would,
nevertheless, continue to seek economic aid from the
United States. The leftist opposition groups-the radi-
cal wing of the National Unionist Party, the Sudanese
Ba'th Party, and the Sudanese Communist Party-are
unlikely to play a role in a successor government
controlled by conservatives or nationalists, but could
have considerable influence if a radical, Libyan-style
regime succeeded the present government.
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BIOGRAPHIC ANNEX
Gaafar Mohamed NIMEIRI
Gaafar Mohamed Nimeiri, aided by a small circle of
"free officers," seized power in a coup in May 1969
and named himself Prime Minister. He became Presi-
dent in September 1971 and, except for 13 months
during 1976-77, has continued to serve as Prime
Minister.
After taking over the government, Nimeiri success-
fully overcame opposition, first from conservative
Muslim groups and then from Communists and their
sympathizers. In February 1972 he settled the 17-year-
long insurrection in the south, granted amnesty to the
rebels, gave the area partial autonomy, and integrated
southerners into the government. In February 1981 he
granted partial autonomy to other regions as well.
Nimeiri has the reputation of being hard driving.
yet calm.
career Army officer until the 1969 coup, Nimeiri
attended the US Army Command and General Staff
College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, during 1965-66.
Before coming to power he was arrested several times
for coup plotting.
Umar Muhammad aI-TAYYIB
Maj. Gen. Umar Muhammad al-Tayyib has served
since 1978 as Minister of State Security and since
October 1981 as Third Vice President. Close to the
President, he is responsible for both internal and
external intelligence and has often acted as Nimeiri's
envoy on foreign missions. Tayyib clearly harbors
aspirations of becoming president.
Although Nimeiri's dismissal of Abd al-Majid Khalil
as First Vice President leaves Tayyib as number-two
man in the regime, Nimeiri, aware of Tayyib's unpop-
ularity with the military, has delayed naming him as
first vice president. Nevertheless, Tayyib remains the
most likely successor to Nimeiri if the Sudanese Presi-
dent should decide to leave office voluntarily before
the end of his present term in May 1983.
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Abel ALIER Wal Kwai
Second Vice President since 1971, Alier is the
highest ranking southerner in the national govern-
ment. As the "southern" Vice President, he has-
during his career-consistently advocated the southern
view, while supporting the national government. He
was instrumental in arranging the February 1972
cease-fire with the southern rebels, ending Sudan's 17-
year-long civil war. Much of Alier's influence derives
from his close relationship with Nimeiri, though he
may currently be somewhat out of favor because of his
opposition to Nimeiri's plans to administratively di-
vide the south. Alier is not thought to play any role in
the current political realignments being undertaken by
Nimeiri.
The 49-year-old Alier (who holds a law degree from
Yale) served as President of the High Executive Coun-
cil, the south's regional governing body, during 1972-
78 and again from May 1980 until the council was
dissolved by Nimeiri in October 1981. Despite losing
his power base as Council President, Alier (who is a
Dinka tribesman) is believed to have retained strong
support in the south; he will probably remain a pivotal
factor in southern Sudanese politics.
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