USSR MONTHLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83T00853R000300040005-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 10, 2008
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: November 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
USSR :Monthly Review
State Dept. review completed
Secret
NAVY review
completed.
SOV UR 82-01OX
Novemb~ 1982
Copy 44 4
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
USSR Monthly Review
The USSR Monthly Review is published by the
Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries
regarding the articles are welcome. They may be
directed to the authors, whose names are listed in the
table of contents.
Secret
SOV UR 82-010X
November 1982
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Secret
Contents
Soviet Influence and Perspective: Soviet Influence in the Third World-Instruments, 1
Pressure in the Opportunities, and Tactics
Third World
Moscow's increased capability for involvement in Third World
conflicts is a major legacy of the Brezhnev era. Through the
establishment of client states in the Third World, the USSR created
new opportunities for expansion of its influence and, in the case of
Cuba, cultivated an important ally-and sometimes surrogate-to
further Soviet aims. The careful choice of targets is another element
of the Brezhnev legacy, as the leadership limited its major involve-
ment in Third World conflicts to situations where there was little
risk of superpower confrontation.
The Soviet-Syrian Relationship After Lebanon
3 25X1
Moscow and Damascus have emerged from this summer's crisis in
Lebanon, which severely strained their relations, more dependent
upon each other than ever. The Soviets have increased their stakes
in Syria by providing a more advanced air defense system and
additional advisers-and have thereby probably raised expectations 25X1
in Damascus that in future Syrian-Israeli clashes Moscow will
respond more forcefully.
Soviet Activity in the Caribbean Basin
7 25X1
Since the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua in 1979, the Soviets have
taken a new interest in the Caribbean Basin area and have moved
quickly to exploit revolutionary instability there in hopes of promot-
ing further leftist change. Nonetheless, the Caribbean area is on the
periphery of Soviet security concerns, and Moscow will proceed with 25X1
caution in order to avoid provoking strong US countermeasures
against its key equities in the region, Cuba and Nicaragua.
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The use of Soviet conventional forces for "power projection" beyond
the Eurasian landmass receives little attention in Soviet military
literature and is not reflected in the current Soviet force structure.
The likelihood of military involvement beyond Soviet borders is
affected by many factors, especially Moscow's perception of US
interests, the local balance of forces, and the Soviets' generally
conservative view of their own conventional capabilities in distant
areas.
Soviet Naval Activity Outside Home Waters in 1981
Soviet overseas naval deployments-excluding those of naval air-
craft-declined during 1981, largely as a result of a cutback in
forces in the Indian Ocean. The Navy was used in several cases to
respond to regional political crises.
A senior official at Moscow's leading institute studying economies of
the Communist World believes that the USSR's declining domestic
performance is undermining the credibility of the socialist model
abroad. He contends that increasing economic stringencies at home
require a rethinking of current Soviet Third World assistance
policies.
Tighter Soviet Control Over CEMAI
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Soviet Influence and
Pressure in the
Third World
Instruments, Opportunities, and Tactics
Perspective: Soviet Influence in the Third World-
During the Brezhnev era, the USSR supplemented its traditional instru-
ments of influence in the Third World with new capabilities and became
more flexible in its choice of tactics and targets. Although more willing to
become involved in Third World conflicts than its immediate predecessor,
the collective leadership under Brezhnev was more careful in the conduct
of foreign policy. In contrast to Khrushchev's behavior, the Brezhnev
leadership expanded Soviet influence in the Third World while avoiding
situations that posed a high risk of superpower confrontation.
Arms sales and associated training and advisory packages are the longest
standing instruments of Soviet policy in the Third World and continue to
be the USSR's major means of influence. At present there are more than
16,000 Soviet military advisers and technicians in Third World countries,
primarily in support of Soviet arms sales. As discussed in the article on
25X1 Soviet-Syrian relations, the USSR is trying to use weapons deliveries to
Syria to counter the Arab tilt away from Moscow.
Moscow's longstanding emphasis on arms sales as an instrument for entree
in the Third World has been supplemented by the acquisition of a limited
capability to project military power to distant areas:
? Major naval surface combatants increased in number from 184 in 1965
to 270 in 1982.
? Amphibious ships capable of distant-area deployment increased from 14
in 1965 to 80 in 1982.
25X1 ? Military Transport Aviation aircraft capable of long-range flights in-
creased from five in 1970 to 230 in 1982.
The Soviets also acquired a sizable naval presence in the Mediterranean
and the Indian Ocean, as well as small naval groups off West Africa and in
the South China Sea (see article on Soviet naval deployments outside home
waters). They currently have limited access to port facilities in all of these
1 Secret
SOV UR 82-0IOX
November 1982
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areas, as well as in Cuba.
Nonetheless, as discussed in the article on Soviet military intervention
beyond Eurasia, there continue to be major limitations on Moscow's
capability to conduct military operations far from its borders in the face of
effective local opposition. Present-day constraints include an inability to
provide tactical air support in distant theaters, limited naval gunpower, and
the lack of a network of foreign bases from which to mount distant
operations
Moscow has also enhanced its potential for influence in the Third World by
the use of proxies and other intermediaries. The proxy relationship
minimizes the level of direct Soviet involvement while achieving Soviet
aims and projecting an image of "socialist solidarity" with Third World
regimes. This relationship applies most directly to the situations in Angola
and Ethiopia, where Soviet penetration is linked to local conflict. In both of
these countries, the USSR supplies most of the weapons, material, and
logistic support for the Cuban combat forces.
The revolutionary or destabilizing propensities of countries such as Cuba
and Libya also afford Moscow opportunities to further its objectives in the
Third World. As the article on Soviet activity in the Caribbean illustrates,
Moscow has maintained a low profile in the US "backyard" while
promoting leftist change through its support of Cuba. Castro's revolution-
ary ambitions in the region ensure that Moscow will not miss opportunities
to further its influence with leftist groups who seek to establish new
regimes in Latin America. The USSR's growing interest in the Caribbean
and Central America suggests that Moscow may view this region as
offering the best prospects for new Soviet successes in the Third World
today.
Soviet policy in the Third World also has reflected a skillful opportunism.
The Brezhnev leadership carefully selected those "exploitable" opportuni-
ties that emerged in distant Third World settings. In the case of Angola
and Ethiopia-the most dramatic of Moscow's Third World interven-
tions-the USSR was fairly confident of success and saw limited risk of
confrontation with the United States. Moreover, the Soviet decision was
facilitated by Cuba's willingness to bear the bulk of the "human" burden
associated with military intervention.
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The Soviet-Syrian
Relationship After
Lebanon
Moscow and Damascus need each other more than
ever. The ineffectiveness of the Soviets' response to
Israel's invasion of Lebanon and thorough thrashing
of Syrian forces in the Bekaa Valley severely strained
relations between the USSR and Syria. The realiza-
tion by both, however, that their political and military
reversals had increased the importance of their rela-
tionship quickly spurred efforts that eased the strain.
Primary among these efforts has been Moscow's
response to Syria's acute need for a more effective air
defense network. The new equipment and the greater
involvement of Soviet advisers and technicians in-
crease both Moscow's stake in the survival of Presi-
dent Assad's regime and the risk that Soviet personnel
could become directly involved in future clashes be-
tween Israel and Syria
Background
In the Middle East, out of necessity rather than
design, the Soviets have gradually put most of their
eggs in the Syrian basket. Before Assad's seizure of
power in 1970, the Kremlin's support of the chronical-
ly unstable regimes in Damascus was relatively limit-
ed; Syria was isolated in the region, and Egypt played
the central role in Soviet strategy. President Sadat's
expulsion of Soviet military advisers in 1972 forced
the USSR to give more emphasis to developing Syria
as a reliable partner. Cairo's turn toward the United
States after the 1973 war, its abrogation of the
friendship and cooperation treaty with Moscow in
1976, and its signing of the Camp David Accords in
1979 accelerated the Soviet-Syrian cooperation. Dur-
ing this period (1973-79), Damascus received nearly
$6 billion worth of arms from the USSR and became
the second-leading recipient-after Libya-of Soviet
weapons in the Middle East. The upswing in the
relationship was exemplified by the signing in October
1980 of a treaty of friendship and cooperation, long
sought by Moscow.
Despite the improved ties, important differences re-
mained. Unlike some Third World regimes that have
developed close relations with the USSR, the Syrian
Ba'th Party and Assad do not have an ideological
affinity with Moscow. Assad was careful to keep the
Soviets in Syria on a short leash. He only reluctantly
granted port calls to Soviet ships, and he opposed a
major increase in the number of Soviet military
advisers. Moscow-as.is its practice with most Third
World countries-withheld its most advanced air and
ground equipment. The two nations' most significant
disagreement arose when Syria intervened in the
Lebanese civil war in 1976 despite the Kremlin's
strong objection. Events in Lebanon this year again
caused serious differences between Moscow and Da-
mascus but also served, ironically, to bind the two
even closer together.
The Israeli Invasion and Moscow's Response
The Syrians were shaken by the rapid Israeli advance
on Beirut and especially by the Israeli Air Force's
total dominance of the air over Lebanon. The seeming
ease with which the Israelis destroyed the Syrian
surface-to-air missile sites in Lebanon and along the
Lebanese-Syrian border and downed almost 90 Syrian
MIGs with only one loss of their own caused Damas-
cus to question the worth of its Soviet weaponry.
The Soviets privately blamed the Syrians' poor show-
ing on the operators of the weapons rather than on the
weapons themselves. Moreover, the Kremlin contin-
ued to refuse to consider itself bound to protect the
Syrian presence in Lebanon. Although after 1976 the
Soviets toned down their opposition to the Syrian
occupation and in 1981 even tacitly recognized its
legitimacy (during the crisis over Syria's introduction
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of SAMs into the Bekaa Valley), they made it clear to
Damascus that Soviet "commitments" to assist it did
not extend to the Syrian forces in Lebanon.
Moscow's support for Syria during this summer's
crisis was limited to unimaginative diplomatic and
propaganda backing, a relatively modest resupply of
military equipment, a slight augmentation of the
Soviet Mediterranean Squadron, and naval patrols
along the Syrian and Lebanese coasts. None of these
actions affected the outcome of the crisis. In addition,
the Kremlin highlighted its irrelevance with an ill-
considered policy toward the evacuation of PLO and
Syrian forces from West Beirut. It engaged the late
President Brezhnev's prestige in warning Washington
against introducing US troops into Beirut-and then
had to sit by impotently as all sides, including the
Syrians, accepted those forces.
The Soviet connection thus proved to be of question-
able worth to Syria in a time of great need. Neverthe-
less, the Assad regime did not begin looking elsewhere
for arms-partly because it recognized that it had
nowhere else to turn for large amounts of military
equipment, and partly because Moscow began to take
steps to remedy Syria's most glaring military weak-
nesses
Repairing the Damage
Shortly after the clashes between Syrian and Israeli
forces on 9-11 June, the Soviets began to send high-
level military officials to Damascus. In addition to
determining how the SAMs and MIGs were destroyed
with such seeming ease and trying to mollify Syrian
grievances over the performance of Soviet weapons,
they presumably began mapping out a strategy to
meet Syria's military needs.
Some of this equipment began arriving in late July,
around the time of the visit of the Chief of the Soviet
General Staff, Marshal Ogarkov-the highest level
Soviet defense official to visit Damascus since 1975.
While they are training the Syrians, Soviet personnel
operating the new equipment will be in a more
exposed position than ever before in Syria. Although
there is no evidence that the Soviets manning these air
defense systems will be with Syrian forces in Leba-
non, their presence at SAM sites even on the Syrian
side of the border will increase the likelihood of their
being involved in hostilities if future Israeli airstrikes
spill over the border. The scale of the Soviet pres-
ence-now some 3,300 to 3,500 personnel-is still far
short of that in Egypt in 1970-72, when Moscow sent
complete SAM units and fighter brigades totaling
15,000 men. But the Kremlin has increased its stakes
in Syria, and this in turn might constitute a compel-
ling reason to provide more decisive aid to Damascus
in future crises.
any commitment to come to Syria's defense.
Continuing Limitations
Despite this effort to strengthen the Syrian air defense
network, there have been no reliable indicators that
the Soviets plan to introduce their own combat units
into Syria, and we believe the Kremlin would be loath
to do so. Similarly, Moscow remains unwilling to sign
Shortly after the United States and Israel announced
their intention last fall to conclude a "strategic coop- 25X1
eration" agreement, the Syrians began to speak pub-
licly about the need to balance this with a similar
agreement between Moscow and Damascus. Foreign
Minister Khaddam made such a statement before his
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visit to the USSR in January 1982 but failed to win
over the Soviets. The Syrians, nonetheless, continued
to call for a "strategic alliance.'
The USSR's behavior during the Lebanese crisis
demonstrated its reluctance to risk a military confron-
tation with Israel or the United States for the sake of
either the PLO or the Syrian presence in Lebanon.
This does not necessarily mean that it will avoid such
risks in any future crisis if the stakes are greater. But
Moscow's primary concern is still to maintain its
freedom of action and ability to decide on its own-
unfettered by formal commitments-when and where
territory. The Soviets would probably demand such
concessions in return for any agreement that in-
creased their commitment-even symbolically-to
the Assnrl regime
to make a stand.
The Assad regime also has reason to impose limits on
its military relationship with the USSR, despite its
desire for a formal commitment from Moscow:
? The Soviet presence has never been popular in
Syria. During 1980-81 about 20 Soviets were assas-
sinated, presumably by the Muslim Brotherhood.
There also are some within the ruling Ba'ath party
and probably-since Lebanon-some among the
military who oppose closer ties with Moscow.
? Damascus has to be careful not to alienate Saudi
Arabia, its primary source of financial assistance.
? Assad still seems reluctant to allow the USSR to
enlarge its naval support, independent intelligence
gathering, or communications facilities on Syrian
Potential Problem Areas
Although Israel's invasion of Lebanon has driven the
Soviets and Syrians closer together, at least temporar-
new frictions in their longer term relationship.
ily, there are a number of issues that could lead to
Lebanon. Moscow's recent substantial military assist-
ance to the Syrians does not necessarily mean that it.
wants them to hold fast in the Bekaa Valley. It
recognizes the vulnerability of the Syrians' position
there, and an Israeli move to oust them would again
pose unwelcome choices for Moscow:
? The Soviets would be hesitant to provide military
aid to shore up a Syrian forward deployment that
they regard as militarily untenable.
? However, another failure to come to Syria's aid
while it battled Israeli forces would threaten the
foundations of the Soviet-Syrian relationship and
further undercut the USSR's greatly diminished
credibility in the Middle East.
Given these considerations, the Soviets probably 25X1
would be compelled to assist Damascus despite their
limited ability to affect the military situation in
Lebanon. In addition to forceful diplomatic offensives
against Israel and the United States, Moscow would
take further steps to aid Syria militarily. Such assist-
ance would be aimed not at saving the Syrian pres-
ence in Lebanon but at preserving the USSR's posi-
tion in Syria. It would also warn Tel Aviv and
Washington of the risk of Soviet involvement if the
Israeli offensive were to cross into Syria.
Negotiations to obtain the mutual withdrawal of 25X1
Syrian and Israeli forces from Lebanon could also
cause problems for Moscow. Although the Soviets for
purely military reasons would probably prefer that
Syria withdraw from the Bekaa, they are not likely to
urge Assad to do so because a mutual withdrawal is
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likely to occur only as a result of US mediation, which
would leave the USSR on the sidelines. Moscow, in
this case, would probably use its leverage with Da-
mascus in an attempt to forestall a US-sponsored
solution, but would have little choice other than to
acquiesce if the Syrians decided to go along.
An Arab-Israeli Peace Settlement. The new fluidity
in the peace process also raises the potential for
disagreement between Moscow and Damascus. There
are three major "peace plans" under discussion: the
US (announced by President Reagan on 1 September),
the Arab (agreed to at the Arab League summit in
Fez, Morocco, 6-9 September), and the Soviet (re-
packaged by President Brezhnev in a speech on 15
September).
Syria was evidently the driving force behind the Fez
Plan's call for UN Security Council guarantees of a
settlement, which would enable the USSR to play a
role. The Soviets, however, may be concerned that
Syria's decision not to condemn the US initiative
officially and its participation in the Arab League
delegation that traveled to Washington in late Octo-
ber to discuss common points between this initiative
and the Fez Plan reflect a readiness on the part of
Damascus-despite its rhetoric-to accept a negotiat-
ing forum that would leave Moscow out. The Kremlin
also must have been disappointed by Syria's luke-
warm endorsement of Brezhnev's new peace proposal,
which attempted to make the Soviet position more
compatible with the Fez Plan.
and Assad.
The PLO. The defeat of the PLO in Lebanon and its
dispersal throughout the Middle East has complicated
the three-cornered relationship between the USSR,
Syria, and the Palestinians. The Kremlin found it
difficult in the past to balance its relationship with
PLO leader Arafat and Assad so as not to affront
either. It has sought to keep a direct link to Arafat
and has opposed Syrian attempts to control the PLO.
The current widening of the rift between Arafat and
Assad could make the Soviet balancing act impossible
to maintain. Thus, the Soviets will devote consider-
able effort to preventing a total break between Arafat
Outlook
The lack of alternatives open to Moscow and Damas-
cus suggests that their mutual dependence will grow.
With the loss of the PLO's military arm, the erosion
of PLO support for the USSR, and Moscow's continu-
ing inability to capitalize on the war between Iran and
Iraq, Syria is more than ever the most important
Soviet foothold in the Middle East. The Israelis'
advance in Lebanon along the western flank of Syria
has increased its military vulnerability and, concomi-
tantly, its need for Soviet military support. Assad, no
matter how much he distrusts Moscow and wishes he
had a benefactor more able to exert influence on the
other powers in the region, apparently believes that
the USSR is the only country that can provide Syria
the military "parity" with Israel he considers neces-
sary before any acceptable peace settlement can be
reached.
The Soviets, by increasing their exposure in Syria
through the provision of some of their most advanced
conventional military equipment and the advisers to
man it, probably have raised expectations in Damas-
cus that in future Syrian-Israeli clashes they will
respond more forcefully. This narrows the Kremlin's
maneuvering room-the commodity it has always
prized most in Middle Eastern crises. Failure to
satisfy such rising Syrian expectations would lead to
an even deeper strain in relations than occurred this
summer over Lebanon.
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Soviet Activity in the
Caribbean Basin
Moscow has reason to be satisfied with its efforts in
the Caribbean Basin. In a short time and with modest
economic cost, the USSR has gained a foothold in
Nicaragua and Grenada and complicated Washing-
ton's relations with its hemispheric neighbors. The
Soviet leadership understands that growing instability
in the area, especially in Central America, creates
serious policy dilemmas for Washington. In Moscow's
view, if the United States does not respond effectively
in Central America during the next few years, revolu-
tionary momentum will accelerate there and else-
where in Latin America. If Washington intervenes
directly, however, Moscow perceives that it will be
able to stimulate international criticism of US action.
In either case, the USSR anticipates that revolution-
ary ferment in America's own backyard will divert
US attention and resources from more distant prob-
lems and lead to an upsurge of anti-Americanism
throughout the Third World.
Objectives
Soviet activity in the Caribbean Basin-and in Latin
America generally-is largely motivated by the
USSR's global competition with the United States
and its ideological commitment to support revolution-
ary movements. Moscow's basic aim is to undermine
US influence by expanding political, economic, and
military ties and by promoting radical change. To-
ward this end, the Soviets also actively try to exploit
the latent anti-US sentiment that exists in much of
Latin America.
With the exception of Cuba, however, the Caribbean
region is relatively peripheral to Soviet geostrategic
concerns. Except in Cuba, the USSR has expended
only limited resources in this area. Aware that US
security interests would cause Washington to react
strongly to certain Soviet activities in the Caribbean,
Moscow has let the Cubans take the lead. The
Soviets, nevertheless, are establishing links to leftist
groups and Communist parties in the Caribbean
Basin
Activity
In the Caribbean island states Moscow engages in a
variety of activities aimed at garnering influence and
heightening anti-US sentiment. Most of its efforts
focus on the orthodox Communist parties, which
Moscow has traditionally used as instruments of
Soviet policy. The Soviets give most of these parties
an annual financial stipend and proffer "guidance"-
in some cases amounting to instructions-in formulat-
On the Central American mainland, where armed
insurgencies are in progress, Moscow has used differ-
ent tactics and has moved more aggressively to exploit
revolutionary opportunities. Soviet support and guid-
ance for Central American revolutionary movements
now focus on:
? Encouragement of broad revolutionary coalitions
uniting pro-Soviet Communist parties with their
traditional leftwing rivals.
? Creation of loyal military components.
? Use of hemispheric and other intermediaries.
? Training of revolutionaries.
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Constraints
Despite its optimism about trends in the region,
Moscow recognizes that there are major constraints
on its ability to influence developments. Foremost
among these is the attitude of the United States.
Moscow is wary of placing itself in direct confronta-
tion with US forces. This concern accounts in part for
the limited and sporadic nature of Soviet naval de-
ployments to the region. Although their naval
forces-particularly the reconnaissance aircraft sta-
tioned in Cuba-are useful to demonstrate support for
Castro and do have operational benefits, the Soviets
have shown that they are mindful of the political
repercussions of altering their naval presence. In
1979, for example, a Soviet task group apparently en
route to Cuba was abruptly diverted before entering
where in the region
Caribbean waters. The transit of the task group
coincided with US discussions of the Soviet brigade in
Cuba. Such behavior has been characteristic of the
Soviets since the Cienfuegos Controversy in 1970, and
Moscow probably will continue to refrain from devel-
oping a major naval support base in Cuba or else-
the Bloc countries.
The Soviets have shown particular concern over the
possibility of inciting Washington to use military
force against their most important regional equities-
Cuba and Nicaragua. US warning of the conse-
quences of delivering Soviet-supplied MIG aircraft to
Nicaragua may prompt Moscow to defer such deliver-
ies. Nonetheless, preparations for their arrival contin-
ue, as evidenced by training of Nicaraguan pilots in
Similarly the level of arms deliveries to Cuba in
1981-the second-highest annual total on record-
and the more circumspect Soviet efforts to build up
Nicaragua's military forces principally through Mos-
cow's allies and other intermediaries, are also indica-
tive of the USSR's continuous commitment to
strengthen the military power of its principal
Caribbean clients. Continued Communist rule in
Cuba is highly important to Soviet prestige, as Cuba
serves major Soviet foreign policy interests in the
Third World, particularly in Africa and Central
America. For example, it was Fidel Castro's initiative
to increase support of the Nicaraguan revolutionaries
in 1978 that eventually enabled the Soviets to estab-
lish a diplomatic, economic, and military presence in
that country. Now the Soviets are working closely
with the Cubans to consolidate the Sandinista regime,
which both view as central to promoting leftist gains
in the Caribbean region.
The radical regime in Nicaragua, and to a lesser
extent the one in Grenada, are also of political and
symbolic significance to the USSR. At a time of
economic stringencies at home, Moscow's willingness
to respond to some of Nicaragua's and Grenada's
economic needs attests to the importance it attaches
to the survival of these regimes. Nevertheless, the
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Soviets appear reluctant to commit the substantial
hard currency assistance most needed by Managua
and have privately advised the regime to be cautious
in disrupting economic ties with Nicaragua's most
important Western economic partners.
Propaganda F4ffort
To blunt any US reaction, and to exploit the rising
anti-US sentiment in Latin America in the wake of
the Falklands crisis, the USSR continues to sponsor
various propaganda activities, including using front
organizations such as the World Federation of Demo-
cratic Youth, the World Federation of Trade Unions,
and the World Peace Council to support Caribbean
undermine the US position in the region.
Outlook
Local US military and economic preponderance and
Washington's increasingly vigorous policy in the re-
gion are unlikely to affect Moscow's long-term objec-
tive of eroding US influence in the Caribbean region.
Instead, Moscow will probably continue to pursue
circumspect tactics in exploiting instability and urge
its allies to provide assistance to local revolutionaries.
It will stress that a US-Cuban confrontation must be
avoided. Moscow, nevertheless, almost certainly will
continue to encourage Caribbean revolutionaries, to
underwrite the Cuban economy, and to support-
while minimizing its own visibility-Cuban assistance
to the local leftists. It will work in this way to 25X1
maintain a degree of revolutionary mgmentum to
Moscow has also exploited generally leftist sympa-
thies of the Mexican Government and has encouraged
the Mexicans to become more active in the Caribbean
Basin and thus complicate US initiatives there. The
Soviets almost certainly were behind Havana's back-
ing for the Mexican initiative on Central America last
spring, no doubt seeing it as a promising tack to halt
the momentum against the regional leftists in the
wake of successful US-backed elections in El Salva-
dor. In this context, Moscow probably hopes that the
austerity measures which the International Monetary
Fund (which is seen by some as dominated by the
United States) has proposed to combat Mexico's
economic crisis will intensify nationalist sentiments
and lead to a more assertive foreign policy, particular-
ly in the Caribbean region. At the same time, the
Soviets recognize that economic difficulties could lead
the new Mexican Government to adopt a more cau-
tious stance in the region to avoid strains in relations
with the United States, as happened in Jamaica in
1980.
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Limitations on Soviet
Military Intervention
Beyond Eurasia
Over the past 10 years, various Soviet spokesmen have
stated that the "changing correlation of forces" vis-a-
vis the United States has enabled the Soviet military
to assume a new role-one outside the borders of the
USSR. Despite this assertion, Soviet behavior still
shows the Kremlin's sense of caution and of the limits
to Soviet conventional military capabilities in distant
areas. Soviet restraint during the current Lebanese
crisis suggests that the Kremlin's perceptions of the
local balance of forces and of US interests continue to
25X1 be the dominant factors in Moscow's decisionmaking
calculus.
carriers and amphibious ships.
We do not believe the Soviets have either a power
projection doctrine or the forces needed to carry out
operations in distant areas against anything more
than light opposition. For example, such key Third
World states as Israel and South Africa have modern
air and mechanized forces that could fend them off.
Moreover, construction patterns within the Soviet
defense industry suggest that relatively little emphasis
has been given to those programs that would be
essential for improving Soviet power projection capa-
bilities over the next 10 years, such as large aircraft
along the lines of traditional military doctrine.
Soviet Intervention Doctrine
In judging whether the use of military force is
necessary to solve a problem, Moscow has always
made a critical distinction between states on its
borders and those in noncontiguous areas. The former
fall within traditional national security interests, and
the Kremlin uses a substantially different yardstick
for threat and risk assessment when they are involved.
In addition, the forces needed to resolve a crisis on the
borders of the USSR can be massed and operated
The Soviet invasions of Hungary, Czechoslovakia,
and Afghanistan all demonstrate Moscow's willing-
ness to use force to correct a situation across its
border deemed inimical to Soviet interests. From the
standpoint of Soviet military doctrine, the most recent
of these-the invasion of Afghanistan-does not dem-
onstrate a fundamentally new approach toward the
use of military forces nor suggest a greater inclination
to use Soviet combat forces in the Third World.
In respect to the use of Soviet military forces in the
noncontiguous areas, we do not believe a developed
doctrine for intervention or force projection exists. It
is true that since the early 1970s Soviet military and
political writers have made references to the "external
function" of the Soviet armed forces. For example:
? Some observers have attached particular signifi-
cance to a statement Marshal Grechko made in
1974 that the role of the Soviet armed forces "is not
restricted to their function in defending our Mother-
land" and that the Soviet state "resolutely resists
imperialists' aggression in whatever distant region
of our planet it may appear."
? Admiral Gorshkov, Commander in Chief of the
Soviet Navy, has also paid increasing attention in
his writings to the political value of global naval
deployments, and Soviet naval authors in particular
have discussed issues regarding local wars
But none of these discussions has yet been developed
to the point where it can be said to represent a
doctrine for distant military intervention.' It is note-
worthy that while the open and classified Soviet
military literature in the US Intelligence Communi-
ty's abundant holdings discusses almost every possible
aspect of military operations on the Eurasian land-
mass, virtually nothing is to be found on the conduct
of distant operations.
25X1
While the Soviet Union does not appear to have a
doctrine for the integration and deployment of combat
forces in distant areas, it does use a wide range of
'The term "doctrine" is used here as Marshal Grechko used it in
1975: "a system of views on the nature of war and methods of
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Excerpts From The Sphinx and the
Commissar, by Mohamed Heikal
[Immediately on arriving in Moscow during the
1956 Suez crisis, Shukri Kuwatly, President of
Syria, asked to see Khrushchev and Marshal Zhu-
kov. At the meeting, a highly emotional Kuwatly
insisted that Egypt must be helped.]
"'is it for me to tell you what to do?" shouted
Kuwatly. "Egypt is being attacked, and Egypt
believed you were going to come to her aid. If you
do nothing your position in the Arab world will be
utterly destroyed ....
Zhukov produced a map of the Middle East and
spread it on the table. Then, turning to Kuwatly, he
said, "How can we go to the aid of Egypt? Tell me!
Are we supposed to send our armies through
Turkey, Iran, and then into Syria and Iraq and on
into Israel and so eventually attack the British and
French forces?"
At this Kuwatly ... cried, "Do you want me, a
poor civilian, to tell you, the great marshal, the
military instruments to support its foreign policy
efforts in the Third World. Primarily through military
sales, but also through the training of foreign military
personnel, resupply efforts in crises, and the use of
military advisers, Moscow seeks to build relationships
with client states. Given Soviet limitations in compet-
ing with the West on economic or technological
grounds, Moscow's willingness to supply arms and
advisers is frequently its only bond with-its clients-a
situation which explains to a large degree the histori-
cal fragility of many of these relations
Forces for Intervention
There is no evidence that the Soviet Union has any
distinct military organization or equipment whose
conqueror of Germany, what should be done?"
Khrushchev folded up the map and told Kuwatly,
"We'll see what we can do. At present we don't
know how to help Egypt, but we are having
continuous meetings to discuss the problem."
It was when [Egyptian Defense Minister] Badran
and his party were leaving [in June 1967, on the
eve of the Six-Day War] that the real misunder-
standing took place. Marshal Grechko ... chatting
to Badran at the foot of the aircraft steps ... said:
"Stand firm. Whatever you have to face, you will
find us with you. Don't let yourselves be black-
mailed by the Americans or anyone else." After
the plane had taken off the Egyptian Ambassador
in Moscow, Murad Ghaleb ... said to him, "That
was very reassuring, Marshal." Grechko laughed,
and said to him (in Russian), "I just wanted to give
him one for the road."
primary purpose is combat operations in distant areas.
Soviet conventional forces are trained and equipment
is developed for the purpose of winning a war on the
Eurasian landmass. Improvements in equipment and
training can provide greater capabilities for more
distant operations, but whatever distant-area benefits
may be derived are "spinoffs" from what is essentially
a continental view of war.
The Soviets' seven airborne divisions and their one
division and three brigades of naval infantry, along
with transport aircraft and amphibious ships, are
usually considered the forces best suited for distant
deployments. Depending on the scenario presented,
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these forces do have some capability for distant
operations. Nevertheless, their capability suffers from
the fact that this is a role for which they were not
designed or trained. The Soviets view their airborne
and amphibious units as part of an offensively orient-
ed combined-arms force. The limited organic firepow-
er of these units makes them dependent on tactical air
support and a quick linkup with conventional ground
force elements. Some of the major constraints facing
Soviet forces in distant operations are:
? The lack of a network of large-scale foreign bases
from which to mount and sustain operations.
? The lack of tactical air support, resulting from a
lack of aircraft carriers and the limited range of
Soviet tactical aircraft; this problem is aggravated
by the absence of an aerial refueling capability for
the fighters.
? The limited amphibious lift capacity of any single
fleet of the Soviet Navy, and the limited naval
25X1 gunfire support available for operations against
well-armed Third World forces.
Among programs now under way, the two that will
most significantly improve Soviet power projection
capabilities in the future are those for the develop-
ment of the first large Soviet aircraft carrier and a
new large heavy transport aircraft. The carrier is not
expected to be operational until about 1990, however;
and although the transport will almost certainly fly
within the next year, significant numbers will not be
available until the latter part of the 1980s. The Soviet
aerial refueling program remains inexplicably mori-
bund, and programs for the construction of transport
aircraft and amphibious ships lack the vigor of Soviet
programs for strategic weapons, ground forces equip-
ment production, or tactical aircraft. In the event of
any Soviet defense cutback, it is quite probable that
the first systems to be cut would be those least critical
to primary Soviet military missions-including those
most closely associated with a potential power projec-
tion mission.
new dimension of Soviet strategy. The passage of
time, however, has presented no similar episodes, and
in neither country has the Soviet-Cuban assistance
subdued the internal or external threats to the client
regime. It now appears that these combined opera-
tions succeeded (to the extent that they did) because of
a unique confluence of events in each case
South Africa will remain a major source of instability
in the region, particularly in Mozambique, but the
Soviet and Cuban interest in exploiting this tension to
gain a military presence will be restrained by the
recognition that Pretoria almost certainly would be
unwilling to tolerate a large Cuban combat force near
its borders. The emergence of the United States from
the self-imposed restraint of the Vietnam/ Watergate
period (as demonstrated by its combined action with
the French and Belgians in Zaire's Shaba Province in
1978) will also affect the Soviet leaders' perceptions of
their scope of action. Opportunities for Soviet
manipulation may arise periodically, but Moscow's
calculations for the likelihood of success are much less
certain. 25X1
Caution in Foreign Military Commitments
The Soviet regime historically has been extremely
cautious in committing forces beyond its periphery.
Threats to intervene are normally quite vocal, but
have always been made after the peak of a crisis had
passed and have always been formulated in imprecise
language that leaves all options open. This pattern
was demonstrated in every Middle East crisis from
1956 through 1973; the growth of Soviet strategic and
conventional forces during that period did not affect
the pattern 25X1
The current crisis in Lebanon is notable for the lack
of any Soviet threat to protect its interests or those of
its clients. Even by past standards, Brezhnev's letter
to President Reagan on 7 July was a weak and open-
ended warning, noting that if US Marines were to go
to Beirut "the Soviet Union will build its policy taking
this fact into account." Such caution strongly suggests
that Moscow's intended audience was not the United
Operations in Africa
The success of joint Soviet-Cuban operations in Ango-
la in 1975-76 and in Ethiopia in 1977-78 led to much
concern in the West over what was perceived to be a
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States and the West, but the Arab states and other
Third World nations, to whom the Soviets wanted to
demonstrate reliability as an ally.2
This caution and military conservatism are deeply
rooted in history. The dangers of "adventurism" are a
common theme in Soviet military-political literature.
In their invasions of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan,
Soviet planners demonstrated a conservative approach
in their force assessments and operational planning-
reflecting an attitude that appears throughout their
classified writings.
An episode that illustrates this attitude among the
military was the dismissal of Marshal Moskalenko,
head of the Strategic Rocket Forces, in April 1962.
This was approximately the time that the decision to
emplace missiles in Cuba was taken, a decision Mos-
kalenko presumably opposed-and which Marshal
Zakharov himself later attacked as one of Khru-
shchev's "harebrained" schemes. Similarly, the mili-
tary leadership demonstrated apprehension about
Khrushchev's threats regarding Berlin.'
An article published in Military Thought in 1971
expressed in theoretical terms the importance of
caution and the proper meshing of military capabili-
ties and foreign policy goals:
Military strategy, just as military science as a
whole, is strong and correct only when it is built
on careful consideration of all objective factors,
'There has been only one large-scale deployment of Soviet military
forces outside the periphery of the USSR-the 15,000 Soviet air
and air defense personnel in Egypt in 1970-71-and it does not
invalidate this view of Soviet caution. The Soviet air defense system
in Egypt in 1970 was primarily a reserve force whose combat
actions were closely coordinated with Egyptian authorities and were
generally restrained and cautious. Both the pilots and the SAM
crews operated under guidelines designed to minimize confronta-
tions with the Israelis while giving the appearance of an effective
deterrent force. Soviet pilots were cautious throughout, and when
their only air-to-air engagement with the Israelis resulted in the loss
of four MIG-21s, all Soviet fighter units stood down for two weeks.
Similar restraint can be expected of Soviet personnel in their
current efforts to improve the Syrian air defense system.
' The Penkovsky Papers brings this out vividly: "Many generals
bluntly say: `What in hell do we need this Berlin for? We have
endured it for 16 years; we can endure it for a little more. One of
these days Khrushchev will catch it good! They will hit him in the
teeth so hard that he will lose everything. . . .' Even our marshals
and generals consider him to be a provocateur, the one who incites
in strict conformity with the tasks and capabili-
ties of the foreign and domestic policy of a
state. Disregard of objective laws or underesti-
mation of important factors as a rule leads to
military political setbacks. Although diploma-
cy as a means offoreign policy usually comes to
one's aid in such cases, it is not always able
completely to neutralize the consequences of
military-strategic miscalculations.
In the Middle East arena, Soviet planners certainly
include among their "objective factors" the Israelis'
overwhelming local superiority and the strong US
commitment toward an ally. In these circumstances,
while the military fate of Syria represents an impor-
tant interest in Soviet foreign policy, that interest is
almost certainly surpassed by Moscow's determina-
tion not to risk its superpower image by exposing its
forces to the possibility of defeat. It would be a
devastating blow to Soviet military prestige if an
intervention force were to be defeated by Israeli
forces. Should the Kremlin be forced to consider such
an- operation, the military leaders would at least have
recourse to the Marxist vision that history is on their
side anyway, and could argue that diplomatic retreat
carries less disgrace than military defeat.
Moscow's sensitivity toward its military prestige was
demonstrated in an unprecedented fashion in June
1982 when, after the Syrian debacle in Lebanon, a
TASS article directly challenged the "deliberately
false information on Soviet combat equipment" and
its performance in the conflict. A day earlier TASS
saw fit to carry a commentary from a Jordanian
newspaper stating that while the Soviet Union is
pledged to arm its Arab friends, "The Soviet Union
has never promised to any Arab country to bring its
armies to defend it."
Such disclaimers have been made before. In an
interview with a Kuwaiti newspaper in April 1980,
Pravda political commentator Yuriy Zhukov rhetori-
cally asked the Arab leaders: "Do they expect the
Soviet forces to liberate their land for them? This is
the duty of the Arab armies." Soviet caution extends
beyond the Middle East, as evidenced by Moscow's
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official statement via TASS the day after China
invaded Vietnam: "the heroic Vietnamese people,
which has become the victim of a fresh aggression, is
capable of standing up for itself this time again, the
more so since it has reliable friends." The statement
closed with a pledge to honor the obligations of the
Friendship Treaty with Hanoi-a treaty which con-
tained no obligation to go to Vietnam's defense.
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Soviet Naval Activity
Outside Home Waters
in 1981
Throughout 1981, significant trends in Soviet naval
deployment patterns included:
? Expanded reliance on naval reconnaissance aircraft
operating from overseas bases. In addition to con-
tinued antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and recon-
naissance missions from airfields in Cuba, Angola,
South Yemen, Ethiopia, and Vietnam, the Soviets
initiated deployments to Syria and Libya (see figure
1).
? The use of naval ships to respond to regional
political crises or to demonstrate Soviet support for
a friendly government. The deployments of Soviet
warships in response to South Africa's attacks on
Angola, to the tensions resulting from Syria's place-
ment of missiles in Lebanon, and to the attempted
coup against President Rene in Seychelles were
examples of such activities.
? Continued foreign deployment of the highly capable
units that joined the fleets in 1979 and 1980, such
as the Ivan Rogov (the Soviets' largest amphibious
ship), and maiden deployments by newly construct-
ed units such as the Udaloy guided-missile destroy-
Soviet naval ships spent about 55,000 ship-days'
outside home waters during 1981-4.5 percent
below the record high totals of 1980, but still about
3 percent higher than the previous peak year of 1974.
Soviet presence declined somewhat in the Indian and
Pacific Oceans-the two regions that accounted for
the dramatic increase in 1980-and in the waters off
West Africa. Ship-days almost doubled in the Carib-
bean in 1981 but were relatively stable in the Atlantic
and the Mediterranean. Changes in the composition
of naval forces in distant waters included cutbacks for
' The Naval Ocean Surveillance Information Center provides statis-
tics for Soviet deployments outside home waters and determines the
regional limits of distant deployments. A ship-day represents one
ship away from home waters for one day.
Figure 1
Overseas Deployment of Soviet Naval Aviation,
1976-81
0 TU-16 Badger, Syria M TU-142 Bear F, Vietnam
IL-38 May, Syria TU-95 Bear D, Vietnam
. IL-38 May, Libya - TU-95 Bear D, Angola
0 IL-38 May, Ethiopia ? TU-95 Bear D, Cuba
IL-38 May, South Yemen
17 Secret
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Figure 2
Ship-Days in Distant Waters, by Region,
1974-81
Indian Ocean
West African watersa
Caribbean Sea
Atlantic Ocean
Mediterranean Sea
ablest African ship-days are not available for 1974-75 and are included in
Atlantic Ocean data.
Figure 3
Ship-Days in Distant Waters, by Type, 1974-81
Hydrographic and space event
support ships
Amphibious ships
Mine warfare ships
General purpose submarines
- SSBNs
most types of ships except auxiliaries and mine war- Indian Ocean
fare ships. (Figures 2 and 3 summarize Soviet out-of- Soviet ship-days in this area dropped about 9 percent
area deployment trends by region and type since during 1981. The Indian Ocean Squadron consisted of
1974.) an average of 30 ships-slightly less than the 32 ships
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Figure 4
Ship-Days in the Indian Ocean, 1974-81
Hydrographic and space event
support ships
N Amphibious ships
Throughout the year, the Squadron consisted of an
average of three or four general purpose submarines,
four or five major surface combatants, a mine warfare
ship or patrol craft, an amphibious unit, and 15
auxiliaries. For the first half of the year, no ship
equipped with antiship missiles operated with the
Squadron, and the burden of providing a cruise
missile capability fell to the submarine force-an
E-11-class nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine
(SSGN) and a newer C-I-class SSGN. The presence
of general purpose submarines fell more than 20
percent, but a pair of Northern Fleet V-class nuclear-
powered torpedo attack submarines (SSNs) operated
in the region for part of the year.
Surface combatants a
General purpose submarines
that normally were present during 1980 (see figure 4).
The decline in Soviet presence paralleled a drop in US
naval force levels following the resolution of the
Iranian hostage crisis. The Squadron's major respon-
sibility is to monitor Western naval movements, and
the decline in US deployments to the Indian Ocean
probably permitted this reduction
As in earlier years, Soviet ships spent much of their
time at international anchorages off Socotra Island
outside the Gulf of Aden and did not engage in
extensive training. In addition, Moscow dispatched a
cruiser and a frigate to Seychelles as a show of
support for President Rene, who thwarted a merce-
nary coup at the end of November. An amphibious
ship spent two weeks in the area of Seychelles in
December as a further gesture to Rene
An important aspect of Soviet naval presence in the
region is the continuous deployment of IL-38 May
ASW aircraft-normally four to Aden, South Ye-
men, and two to Asmara, Ethiopia-for periods of
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about two months. The level of flight operations
increased slightly during 1981. The aircraft monitor
Western forces in the northern Arabian Sea, but they
cannot cover the waters around the US naval base at
Diego Garcia.
Paci fIc Ocean
Partly because fewer ships transited to the Indian
Ocean, Soviet ship-days outside home waters in the
Pacific Ocean decreased last year. There were 29 or
30 ships on distant deployments-down from 32 in
1980. Nonetheless, the Soviets maintained a naval
force of about two warships, seven support ships, an
intelligence collection ship (AGI), and an SSGN or
cruise missile submarine (SSG) in the South China
Sea.
Continued improvements of Cam Ranh Bay included
construction of a new pier and some support buildings
and. the installation of a fresh water system. Cam
Ranh still lacks bunkering facilities, however, and its
repair capabilities are limited to maintenance per-
formed in a floating drydock for small combatants
and diesel submarines or by a Soviet repair ship. It is
a convenient stopover for ships en route to the Indian
Ocean from Pacific Fleet bases, however, and Soviet
ships made about 10 port calls per month there during
1981
Ships on distant deployment in the Pacific normally
conduct only limited training. Last year, there was no
large-scale exercise in the Pacific, but the Soviets did
carry out an unusual transit around the northern
Pacific and down the west coast of the United States.
The training cruise, which involved a Kara-class
guided-missile cruiser and a C-I-class SSGN, was the
first such deployment across the Pacific since 1974.
The Soviets also cooperated with the Vietnamese
Navy in a small-scale ASW exercise last fall.
Mediterranean Sea
Soviet ship-days in the Mediterranean Sea increased
only marginally and remained well below. the level of
the early 1970s, when the Soviets had access to naval
facilities in Egypt. Generally the Mediterranean
Squadron included seven or eight general purpose
submarines, eight or nine major surface combatants, a
mine warfare ship or patrol craft, and about 26
auxiliaries. There were no amphibious ships with the
Squadron for most of the year.
Routine operations of the Squadron include monitor-
ing Western naval movements and carrying out anti-
submarine and anticarrier exercises. In 1981 there
were several cases of heightened or unusual activity:
? In May and June Moscow reinforced the Squadron
and shadowed the US naval forces that moved to
the eastern Mediterranean during the Syrian missile
crisis.
? Soviet tactical aircraft deployed to bases in the
region for the first time since the Soviet Naval
Aviation squadron withdrew from Egypt in 1972.
The aircraft-two IL-38 Mays and four TU-16
Badgers-staged to Syria in late June as part of
preparations for a joint ASW-coastal defense exer-
cise that took place in July. Several Soviet amphibi-
ous ships were dispatched from the Black Sea to act
as the aggressor force.
? Soviet ships and aircraft began a series of deploy-
ments to Libya after the Syrian exercise. Soviet
warships-which had not called in Libya since
1970-and submarines made additional port calls
before the end of the year, and IL-38s operated
from Libyan airfields on several occasions. There
have been subsequent visits in 1982, and a pattern
of deployments may be evolving. The stability of
Soviet access will continue to be conditioned by the
uneasiness of Moscow's relationship with Qadhafi.
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naval auxiliary in Havana.
ing the year's total only somewhat lower than that of
1978. The Soviets also kept research or space event
support ships and an AGI in the Caribbean and a
West African Waters
The Soviet presence off West Africa dropped by 40
percent in 1980. No amphibious ship served with the
contingent-the first such gap since 1971-and large
combatants were present only briefly in the summer.
Soviet naval forces were more visible than in earlier
years (when they spent most of their time in either
Conakry, Guinea, or Luanda, Angola, or in transit
between the two ports). During the first two months of
1981, two Soviet warships were sent to the waters off
Dakhla, Western Sahara, to protest the seizure of
Soviet fishing trawlers. Although a compromise was
reached, Moscow kept a minesweeper on patrol in the
fisheries area for the rest of the year. Late in the
summer, Soviet warships again responded to regional
political developments-this time to the conflict be-
tween South Africa and Angola. Three combatants,
including two diverted from other operating areas,
made port calls in Luanda and eventually moved
closer to the area of conflict by visiting Mocamedes,
Angola. These incidents demonstrated the political
utility of the West African contingent despite the
continued decline in the Soviets' commitment of naval
ships to the region 25X1
25X1
Outlook
We have not seen dramatic changes in Soviet naval
operations in distant areas thus far in 1982, and do
not expect any. Nevertheless, the use of the Navy to
respond to regional political tensions will cause fluctu-
ations in force levels. Indian Ocean ship-day totals for
the first nine months of 1982 dropped marginally.
Renewed conflict in the Indian Ocean, an expansion
of US naval forces there, or new opportunities for
access in the littoral states could prompt the Soviets to
augment their naval presence there or to intensify
their level of activity. Similarly, the use of naval
forces to signal Soviet concern about the Israeli
invasion of Lebanon and to track the US naval units
concentrated in the eastern Mediterranean may alter
the yearend picture of the Mediterranean Squadron.
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Atlantic Ocean
Ship-days in the Atlantic Ocean dropped about
2 percent, to some 13,900. The presence of surface
combatants rose more than 50 percent, an increase
partly accounted for by ships moving to a Baltic
exercise during the summer, the transfer of the
Udaloy guided-missile destroyer to the Northern
Fleet, and the reinforcement of the West African
patrol. Other activities in the Atlantic included sur-
veillance of Western naval exercises, monitoring of
US SSBN transit routes, Northern Fleet exercises in
the spring, and joint Warsaw Pact naval training._
Caribbean Sea
In April 1981 a Soviet task group-a Kara-class
cruiser and two frigates-called in Cuba for the first
time since 1978. Similar task groups were sent out in
both 1979 and 1980 but were recalled before reaching
Cuba. During their stay in Cuba, the Soviet ships
carried out ASW and coastal defense training with
the Cuban Navy. The presence of the task group
25X1 drove ship-day totals up more than 60 percent, mak-
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Worldwide, the real changes will not be numerical,
however, but qualitative. Large, capable ships already
operational will increasingly take responsibility for
representing the USSR, as the Moskva ASW cruiser
did in Nigeria recently. Newly constructed combat-
ants-the Sovremenny and Udaloy guided-missile
destroyers or the Kirov nuclear-powered cruiser-
probably will be active in foreign waters. The Soviets
may also redistribute the burden of distant operations
by experimenting with new force combinations, such
as the initial deployment in June 1982 of a V-111-class
SSN from the Pacific Fleet to the Indian Ocean.
The use of maritime reconnaissance aircraft will
remain central to the Soviet presence outside home
waters and may expand. More Bear D's or a different
type of aircraft may deploy to
]Cuba. The recurrent use of the airfield at Tripoli,
Libya, may evolve into a routine presence of Soviet
land-based aircraft in the Mediterranean, and Soviet
hopes of securing air rights in northwest Africa as a
supplement to Luanda may be fulfilled. Overseas
bases for naval aircraft proved of some value to the
Soviets during the Falklands crisis, and Moscow will
be quick to exploit opportunities for new air access.
The Soviets will also actively pursue wider access to
support facilities throughout the Third World.'In
recent months they have made evident their interest in
Sri Lankan repair facilities, and they may expect to
make inroads with the newly elected Mauritian Gov-
ernment or with the troubled governments of Sey-
chelles or Madagascar. The search for naval access
will be low key but will influence the selection of ports
of call and the level of regional naval presence.
Similarly, the Navy's role in reassuring those states
that already provide some logistic support will con-
tribute to keeping ship-day totals for 1982 well above
the level of the early 1970s.
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Soviet Economic Woes
Affecting
Global Influence
A senior official at Moscow's leading institute study-
ing economies of the Communist World believes that
the USSR's declining domestic performance is under-
mining the credibility of the socialist model abroad.
He contends that increasing economic stringencies at
home require a rethinking of current Soviet Third
World assistance policies. His unorthodox arguments
suggest that economic problems may be generating
pressures on the Soviet elite for changes in the
traditional Soviet modus operandi abroad as well as at
home.
In the August issue of Voprosy Filosofii (Problems of
Philosophy), Yuriy Novopashin, a sector chief at the
Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System
(IEMSS), argues that Moscow's influence abroad is
limited by the Soviet Union's poor economic perform-
ance at home. He asserts that furthering socialist
revolution depends not only on direct assistance to
leftist client regimes and revolutionary movements
but also on the "demonstrative effect" of successes in
the Communist World. A Communist country, he
contends, must provide an attractive model of "effec-
tive socioeconomic growth" and "just social rela-
tions." He chastises those who try to whitewash the
flaws in the Communist system in an effort to influ-
ence world public opinion. The surer path to world
influence, he suggests, is through a "self-critical
assessment" of Communism "in all its complexity and
contradictoriness."
Novopashin takes direct aim at the economic per-
formance of the Communist states. He cites statistics
showing a dramatic decline in the growth rates of
economic production and national income in CEMA
countries in the latter half of the 1970s and acknowl-
edges that the trend has continued into the 1980s,
attributing these problems largely to flaws in the
economic system. As a result, he argues, the level of
economic development in Communist countries "can-
not yet preclude shortages of certain food products
and consumer goods and, frequently, low quality of
such goods." These shortcomings, he suggests, ham-
per Communism's ability to provide an attractive
alternative to capitalism.
Impact on Aid
Novopashin finds the Soviet Union at a disadvantage
in economic competition with the West in the develop-
ing world. He admits that the USSR and its Commu-
nist allies find it difficult to help Third World client
states "in all the many salients where such assistance
would be desirable." He criticizes left-leaning Third
World leaders for expecting the Communist states to
finance dubious efforts to "force" socioeconomic
change through rapid industrialization. In his view,
this Stalinish preoccupation with developing basic
industry-the traditional goal of Soviet economic
aid-has been too costly for both patron and client,
usually resulting in a decline in the standard of living
and an alienation of the population.
Novopashin uses these arguments to call for a restruc-
tured Soviet aid strategy that he claims would more
effectively serve both domestic and foreign policy
needs. In particular, he recommends:
? A shift in emphasis in economic assistancefrom
developing basic industry to increasing agricultural
production. Such an approach would serve the
interests of both parties, he maintains, particularly
in light of the "existence of a food problem" in
Communist countries.
? Greater selectivity in choosing client states. He
implies that a more discriminating approach would.
not only save money but also enhance the Soviet
Union's international prestige by avoiding "compro-
mising ties with repressive, antipopular regimes."
He charges that some self-proclaimed "socialist-
oriented" Third World leaders actually "discredit
the idea of socialism" with their harsh "mobiliza-
tion" policies.
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? Greater coordination of efforts by the Communist
states in their Third World aid policies. He sug-
gests that it is particularly important for the CEMA
countries to pool their resources in order to compete
with the efforts of Western countries to step up their
''`economic expansion" in the Third World.
Novopashin's arguments stand in contrast to recent
paeans to aid policies by prominent Soviet Third
World specialists who may be lobbying to protect the
foreign aid program. Recent articles by Africa Insti-
tute director Anatoliy Gromyko and Oriental Studies
Institute deputy director Georgiy Kim, published in
September issues of Kommunist and Mirovaya Ekon-
omika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya (World
Economy and International Relations) respectively,
effusively praised Soviet economic assistance and
specifically defended its emphasis on developing basic
industry.
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Secret
Briefs
Defense Council The late President Brezhnev's speech to a special conference of Soviet military
Membership commanders on 27 October provided a unique opportunity to examine the current
composition of the Defense Council, the USSR's highest deliberative body on
defense matters. Brezhnev was the only officially acknowledged member of the
Council, but the presence of five other full Politburo members on this occasion-
Yuriy Andropov, Konstantin Chernenko, Andrey Gromyko, Nikolay Tikhonov,
and Dmitriy Ustinov-suggests that these five figures now constitute the Council's
25X1
senior membership and the group from which the new chairman probably will be
chosen.
Others present on the rostrum included Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov, Chief of the
General Staff, and Leonid Smirnov, chairman of the Military-Industrial Commis-
sion. Their presence on this occasion as well as their responsibilities for the full
range of military and industrial matters suggests that they are the only two non-
Politburo members of the Defense Council. 25X1
Tighter Soviet Control A Soviet diplomat in Belgrade recently stated that a "major review" of CEMA re-
Over CEMAO lationships is under way and that the USSR will propose at a CEMA summit next
spring that the Soviet Union assume a more "active" role, while other members
become more "passive." Although members would retain considerable autonomy,
economic planning would have to be coordinated more closely to avoid duplication
This is the clearest indication that Moscow intends to use the proposed CEMA
summit to advocate a basic restructuring of the organization. If the report is true,
it probably reflects recognition that the USSR's economic problems require more
strenuous efforts to reduce inefficiencies within CEMA and the burden of Soviet
aid to Eastern Europe. Moscow may expect the severe economic problems of the
25X1 East Europeans to make them more amenable than in the past to increased Soviet
Substitute
dominance of CEMA. Their determination to resist encroachments on their
autonomy, however, and to pursue their individual objectives within CEMA make
it unlikely that the USSR will achieve its goals in the near term,
the binding of titanium carbide, and that a formal announcement will be made
25X1
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shortly. The new hard metal is said to consist of tungsten, molybdenum, and
nickel. The research unit was directed to discover a substitute
because cobalt would soon be unavailable in the USSR for nonmilitary applica-
tions. 25X1
ments from Zaire and, more recently, Zambia.
Cobalt is a superhard, heat-resistant metal used extensively in the production of
military hardware. If the claim is true, the discovery of a substitute represents an
important technological breakthrough in this area for the Soviets. (The United
States developed partial substitutes for cobalt when supplies were threatened after
Zaire was invaded in 1978.) The Soviets have been steadily increasing their
domestic production of cobalt but still import about 15 percent of their require-
Soviet Criticism of
Private Agriculture
in Poland
Soviet television recently reported that the quantity of grain being sold in some
parts of Poland is not commensurate with this year's good harvest because private
farmers are withholding their produce from government buyers. The report also
asserted that at least one cooperative farm is unable to expand its holding, and
thereby increase its efficiency, because private farmers refuse to sell it land except
at inflated prices.
include the issue among Poland's unresolved problems
The continued prevalance in Poland of private agriculture periodically attracts
Soviet criticism on economic and ideological grounds, and some Soviets consider it
among the basic causes of the Polish crisis. It has received relatively little attention
in recent Soviet commentary, presumably because it is considered less urgent than
the need to rebuild the party, win back alienated workers, and limit the role of the
Church. The recent broadcast is a reminder, however, that the Soviets continue to
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 Secret
Secret
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