SOVIET ELITE CONCERNS ABOUT POPULAR DISCONTENT AND OFFICIAL CORRUPTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83T00853R000200150001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 29, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Soviet Elite Concerns
About Popular Discontent
and Official Corruption
State Dept. review
completed
Secret
SOV 82-10192X
December 1982
Copy 2 G v
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Directorate of
Intelligence
and Official Corruption
Soviet Elite Concerns
About Popular Discontent
This assessment was prepared byl
Current Support Division, Office of Soviet Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
addressed to the Chief, Current Support Division,
SOVAJ
Secret
SOV 82-10192X
December 1982
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Soviet Elite Concerns
About Popular Discontent
and Official Corruption
Summary Brezhnev's death comes at a time of heightened concern among Soviet
Information available elites about public morale and official abuse of power. The dominant
as of l December 1982 attitude appears to be one of pessimism about the popular mood and
was used in this report.
apprehension about the implications of corruption for the future of the
Soviet system. There is also considerable sentiment among some elites for
firm measures to restore discipline and morality within the population at
large and within the regime itself.
This sentiment, which probably accounts in part for Andropov's ascendan-
cy, may lead the Politburo to move toward more conservative social and
political policies. Such policies would be compatible with some changes
in economic administration, but probably would preclude any broad
introduction of market mechanisms, increase in popular participation in
the political process at lower levels, thaw in cultural policy, or expansion of
unofficial contacts with the West.
iii Secret
SOV 82-10192X
December 1982
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Soviet Elite Concerns
About Popular Discontent
and Official Corruption
Over the past several years, and especially over the
past several months, a number of Western observers
in Moscow have detected in Soviet society an air of
general depression and foreboding about the future.
Some of these observers believe that the mood of the
population changed during the latter part of Brezh-
nev's tenure.
and perceived a diminishing base of support for the
regim
portrayed the Soviet Union today as a
country beset by a major crisis of values.
oscow during a six-month stay this year much
some of the judgments in the paper tentative. Never-
theless, available evidence supports the general con-
clusion that Soviet elites have become more concerned
about the potential consequences of popular discon-
tent and official abuse of power than they have been
for the past quarter of a century.
Uneasiness About Social Malaise
Soviet elites are aware that in recent years conditions
giving rise to popular discontent have worsened while
the regime's resources for maintaining social stability
and motivating the work force have diminished. Offi-
cials are probably most concerned about the adverse
effect of popular dissatisfaction on labor productivity.
But they are also worried about the possibility of
social disturbances serious enough to produce chal-
lenges to political control. 25X1
Since Stalin's death, coercion has diminished as an
instrument of political control. Ideology is virtually
dead as a means of inspiring loyalty to the regime and
high worker productivity. The regime's control of
information has also loosened somewhat. Soviet citi-
zens have greater access than ever before to informa-
tion from abroad and from unofficial sources within
the USSR. Expanded contacts with the West have
enabled the population to compare its lot with that of
peoples who enjoy a much higher standard of living.
deeper and more widespread than previously. Dusko
Doder, The Washington Post Moscow reporter, in a
series of articles published in November maintained
that the Soviet Union has entered a period character-
ized by stark pessimism about the future at all levels
of society. A political officer in the US Embassy in
Moscow has recently reported his similar impression
of the climate of opinion in the Soviet Union.F_
This paper assesses recent evidence on how Soviet
elites themselves perceive the mood of the population
and the problem of corruption in the political system.
Most of the reports cited apparently refer to percep-
tions of middle-level officials, although some of the
reports may refer more to attitudes current among the
"intelligentsia" (white-collar professionals) than to
attitudes of officials. Where possible, the paper identi-
The imprecision of much of the reporting does not
permit a more systematic delineation of differences
among various elites. Gaps in the data base and the
probable biases of individual sources necessarily make
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More importantly, since the mid-1970s declining eco-
nomic growth rates have made it difficult for the
regime to provide the gradual improvements in living
standards that the Soviet population had come to
expect in the Khrushchev and early Brezhnev years.
Brezhnev abandoned Khrushchev's ideological re-
formism and attempt to rationalize party rule on the
basis of a broad "populist" consensus of values.
Instead, he sought a narrower legitimacy for the
regime, based more completely on attention to the
population's material needs. In the end, however, he
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failed to satisfy consumer desires. Shrinking opportu-
nities for upward social mobility and the hardening of
class lines appeared to contribute to a loss of faith
among many in their ability to improve their material
circumstances through individual effort.
These developments have led to a general growth of
apathy, cynicism, and disgruntlement in Soviet soci-
ety. This pervasive malaise manifests itself in a
growing consumption of alcohol, increasing labor
turnover, episodic strike activity, and a flourishing
black market. Over the past several years, official
Soviet statements have recognized the negative effects
of these phenomena on worker output. Official publi-
cations, for example, have stressed that labor turnover
produced by worker dissatisfaction with living condi-
tions is economically counterproductive. High-level
regime spokesmen, including former Premier Kosygin
and General Secretary Brezhnev, have acknowledged
that wage incentives lose force when workers are
dissatisfied with the quality of goods and services
available for purchase.
The more immediate problems in food supply caused
by four consecutive harvest shortfalls have increased
official wariness of the popular mood.
Soviet officials in discussions with foreigners over the
past year have expressed concern about a broad range
of problems relating to civic morale:
? Last December a Soviet source told US Embassy
officers that a department head in the Central
Committee's Academy of Social Sciences had ex-
pressed the opinion that the-country was in a state of
"economic, political, and ideological crisis."
? The same month, Pravda's Propaganda Department
chief, in a discussion with US Embassy officers,
expressed considerable concern over the lack of
commitment of Soviet young people, their " con-
sumerism," their interest in religion, and their 25X1
desire to avoid military service. He also acknowl-
edged that Soviet managers now face a difficult
time in dealing with workers because workers are
offended by the privileges managers enjoy.
? In February a USA-Canada Institute official told
an American official that there was a great deal of
unrest in non-Russian republics. The Soviet popula-
tion, he stated, is disgusted, unhappy, indifferent,
and inert.'
? Another official of the institute told an American
official in April that Soviet society faced a major
crisis in discipline, reflected in labor problems,
crime, and friction between nationalities.
' On the surface, elite concern about popular inertia and apathy
may appear logically inconsistent with elite concern about the
potential for disorder. Apathy, it may be argued, produces econom-
ic problems for the regime by lowering labor productivity but does
not create political problems in the sense of producing unrest. F_
This apparent ambiguity in elite attitudes, however, has major
antecedents in Russian history. Russian elites, both in Tsarist times
and in the Soviet era, have feared that the population's inertia and
alienation from the state could be transformed into spontaneous
eruptions of unrest. Several Western studies of Soviet society
during the late Stalin period also contended that the typical
character structure of the Russian worker and peasant classes was
one that fluctuated sharply between passivity and violent revolt
The pattern of Russian social history suggests that these percep-
tions of Soviet elites and Western scholars have not been entirely
erroneous. Over the centuries, lengthy periods of resigned quies-
cence on the part of the masses have been punctuated periodically
by jacqueries. Thus, the concern of Soviet elites today about the
dual problem of popular indifference and popular protest, while
sharpened by current conditions, has deep historical roots.
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Events in Poland over the last two years probably
have heightened these concerns. The Polish strike
movement did not produce any significant sympathy
protests in the Soviet Union, but it focused the
attention of Soviet officials on internal Soviet condi-
tions that could create problems for them:
Over the past year Soviet propagandists have in-
creased their efforts to combat "antisocial" behavior
and moral laxity. Particular attention has been paid to
Soviet youth's cynicism, "hooliganism," infatuation
with Western consumer goods, and lack of apprecia-
tion for improvements in the standard of living since
World War II. At the same time, regime actions such
as closing down direct-dial telephone service to and
from Western countries have served to curb contacts
between Soviet dissidents and foreigners.
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Recent speeches and articles by military figures have
also displayed unusual concern about pacifism among
young people and about ethnic tensions in the armed
forces. Defense Minister Ustinov's Armed Forces Day
speech in February placed unusual stress on the
theme of harmony among the various nationalities
serving in the armed forces. In a pamphlet published
in June, Chief of Staff Ogarkov deplored youth's
tendency to underestimate the danger of war. General
Yepishev, head of the military's Main Political Direc-
torate, made similar remarks about youth's pacifism
in a July lecture.
Corruption and the Campaign Against It
Reinforcing apprehension about the popular mood is
an apparently growing concern among Soviet elites
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we believe many officials fear that corruption is greater access party party officials have to choice consumer
eroding the regime's legitimacy, undermining public goods.
respect for law and order, and diminishing the party's
capacity to get the country moving again.
Corruption, of course, is present in varying degrees in
most societies and has been a prominent feature of
Soviet life since the 1920s. Nevertheless, although it is
impossible to measure the extent of corruption pre-
cisely, there are indications that during the past
several years bribery, embezzlement, and other abuses
of power among Soviet elites have become so preva-
lent and so blatant as to suggest a significant lowering
of accepted norms of behavior.'
Most members of the political elite seem to have
developed a caste mentality and appear strongly
motivated by a desire to preserve and extend their
privileges, especially for their children.
Nepotism and illegal activity to advance private ends
are reportedly common at the highest levels. The
efforts of Leningrad party boss Romanov, a Politburo
member, to feather his nest are notorious. Brezhnev
himself, by assiduously promoting the career interests
of both his son-in-law and his son despite the reported
involvement of his children in corrupt activities, was a
prime offender.
Current economic stringencies may have sharpened
competition among Soviet elites for perquisites and
heightened resentment among nonparty elites of the
2 An evaluation of the extent of corruption depends on how the term
is defined. If defined in an absolute sense as the use of position or
power to further private ends, virtually the entire Soviet elite is
corrupt. If defined in a relative sense as the use of position or power
to further private ends in ways that violate accepted norms of
behavior, corruption in the Soviet Union is much more restricted. If
the latter definition is employed, the threshold of what constitutes
corruption rises as the subordination of the public weal to private
interest becomes a widely tolerated feature of a political system.
For an extended discussion of this.subject, see Konstantine M.
Simis, USSR: The Corrupt Society (New York, 1982). Simis was a
Moscow lawyer who emigrated from the Soviet Union in 1977.F-
Corruption and the competition for privilege common-
ly are regarded as symptoms of the loss of social
purpose among elite groups, but they are also a cause
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reportedly implicating Brezhnev's children contribut-
ed to the erosion of Brezhnev's political position in the
months prior to his death. According to dissident
Marxist Roy Medvedev, Andropov may also have
used a rumored scandal involving Kirilenko's son to
force Kirilenko's removal from the leadership.
The official campaign against corruption, which be-
gan last year, should be viewed in the context of these
concerns on the part of KGB and other elites. The
campaign may serve several purposes. On one level, it
is in our view intended to combat "antisocial" behav-
ior on the part of ordinary citizens and to persuade the
population at large of the regime's determination to
root out malfeasance within the party. The campaign
may also be intended to provide excuses and scape-
goats for shortages of consumer goods and other
economic dislocations. By exposing corruption on the
part of lower level functionaries and prosecuting some
of them, higher officials may hope to deflect criticism
from themselves.
Because so many higher officials are themselves vul-
nerable to charges of corruption, however, a campaign
against corruption at lower levels runs the risk of
getting out of control. Although probably intended
initially as propaganda for the populace and second-
arily as a protective device for top leaders, the
anticorruption campaign has become a vehicle of
political struggle within the Politburo. The fact that a
number of fairly high-level officials have actually
been netted during the course of this campaign (an
article in Pravda indicated that one USSR deputy
minister was executed) suggests that some leaders
have exploited anticorruption sentiment to attack
political opponents.
Andropov, in particular, evidently has used the anti-
corruption issue to further his political ambitions. As
a former KGB chief he possesses derogatory informa-
tion about his fellow Politburo members. Andropov is
consequently in a position either directly to blackmail
leaders who fear exposure of their illegitimate activi-
ties, or to use the derogatory information more sub-
tly-by selectively leaking it in order to damage an
opponent's reputation, or by prosecuting corruption
cases at lower levels aggressively so as to create a
political climate that other leaders find threatening.
Andropov evidently has employed this political weap-
on already. A KGB investigation of corruption cases
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The anticorruption issue may have facilitated Andro-
pov's rise in a more important way.
n ropov has a personal reputation
of being "clean." This reputation possibly made his
candidacy a popular one among broader segments of
the political elite. According to a senior Soviet diplo-
mat in Yugoslavia, Andropov received an unusual 25X1
standing ovation at the May meeting of the Central
Committee that promoted him to the secretariat. 25X1
Whether or not top leaders share the preferences of
lower level officials, they are sensitive to them, and
support for Andropov within the elite as a whole may
have been a factor in the Politburo's selection of him
as the successor.
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Many officials protected by Brezhnev's personnel
policies, which treated corrupt and incompetent party
workers indulgently, may fear a concerted drive to
purify the party. Several Western newsmen in Mos-
cow have picked up rumors that Chernenko attempted
to capitalize on this fear. Chernenko's favorable and
pointed reference to Brezhnev's personnel policies in
his speech to the Central Committee meeting that
installed Andropov could be interpreted as evidence in
support of these rumors. One reason for Chernenko's
failure may have been that the concern of the elite as
a whole about the long-term corrosive effects of
corruption carried greater political weight than the
apprehension of the most culpable party officials
about the consequences of a purge.
Yearning for a Strong Leader
Perceptions of an erosion of discipline within the
population and the party have evidently led many
officials to long for a return to the order of Stalin's
day. Although few in the Soviet Union would wel-
come a full-scale rehabilitation of the Stalinist terror
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apparatus, many officials see "Stalin" as a positive
symbol for the sort of tough leadership they believe is
needed today:
? In July, a senior Soviet diplomat in Washington told
a former high-level US official and Soviet specialist
that he was a "Stalinist" in the sense that he
believed that for the USSR to survive and to
improve it needed a great deal of social discipline
and a strong leader of the Stalin type, which
Brezhnev was not.
Several Soviet sources have suggested that Andropov
is, or is seen to be, a man who can answer the
country's need for firm leadership. A USA-Canada
Institute official, for example, told a US official last
April that of the current leaders, only Andropov fit
the model of a vozhd (strong leader).
In addition to pragmatism and
tactical flexibility in dealing with dissent, Andropov
has the reputation of being a strong advocate of
measures to prevent Western ideological penetration
and any manifestations of civil unrest or disobedience.
In recent months, several press articles have implied
that policies during Brezhnev's tenure led to a growth
of permissiveness in society. Last November, for
example, an article by well-known conservative publi-
cist Aleksandr Chakovsky darkly averred that:
Some comrades have evidently misinterpreted
the "atmosphere of humanism" which was in-
troduced by the October 1964 plenum [which
removed Khrushchev and installed Brezh-
nev] .... These comrades are not in step with
the mass of the Soviet people and are not
contributing to the building of Communism.
The head of the Moscow Writers' Union, Feliks
Kuznetsov, told US Embassy officers in November
1981 that his recent articles were part of an effort to
"tighten the screws" and make a "correction" in the
climate of relative tolerance that has prevailed in
domestic policies since the 20th Party Congress of
1956. Other articles have implicitly criticized the
publication in the Soviet press of articles that take a
"pacifist" line.
Russian Nationalism
The recent emphasis on Russian nationalist themes in
Soviet media probably reflects a heightened desire to
buttress internal discipline. In the past Russian na-
tionalism has been closely associated with repressive
social policies. Appeals to Russian nationalism may be
intended to lay the groundwork for efforts to assert
greater central control over the minority nationalities,
which Russian leaders doubtless believe are less disci- 25X1
plined and more susceptible to foreign influences than
the Russian population. Attempts to associate the
regime more closely with traditional Russian nation-
ideology as a legitimizing force in the Russian repub-
alism may also be viewed as a means of countering
consumer discontent and offsetting the waning of
lic itself.
There have been several indications that Russian
nationalism is gaining strength as a current of thought
in official circles:
? Over the past two years, a number of articles and
speeches of Politburo members-especially those of
the now deceased Suslov-have been more support-
ive of Russian nationalism than leadership pro-
nouncements earlier in Brezhnev's tenure.
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? A Central Committee resolution earlier this year
marking the anniversary of the formation of the
USSR tilted strongly toward Russian nationalism.
The resolution placed heavier emphasis than previ-
ous official statements during the Brezhnev years on
the promotion of Russian language study as an
instrument of integration and on the need to protect
the rights of Russians living in non-Russian repub-
lics. The resolution also called for greater assistance
from non-Russian republics in the development of
the RSFSR's Far Eastern and Siberian resources
and the non-black-earth zone of European Russia. It
attributed a special role to the Russian people in
past Soviet achievements, emphasized the central-
ized character of the Soviet state, and made only
passing reference to the theoretical equality of
Soviet nationalities.
The increased official attention to Russian nationalist
themes and the heightened emphasis on discipline
have, however, produced a reaction from advocates of
more "liberal" domestic policies. Some strong attacks
on conservative Russian nationalist writers, for exam-
ple, have appeared in the press in recent months. Most
notable in this regard were articles by Professor
Kuleshov in Pravda last February and by literary
critic Surovtsev in the literary journal Znamya in
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? Brezhnev, in a March 1982 speech probably coordi-
nated within the Politburo, expanded on these
themes to give a vigorous endorsement to investment
and cadres policies beneficial to the Russian repub-
lic and to Russians living in other Soviet republics.
He advocated the migration of workers from Cen-
tral Asia to areas of the RSFSR suffering labor
shortages, criticized the notion that valuable spe-
cialists should remain in their own republics when
other regions had a greater need for them, and
emphasized even more strongly than in the past that
projects throughout the RSFSR had priority over
those in other regions. He also called for greater
representation of ethnic Russians in party and state
institutions in non-Russian republics.
? The 26th Party Congress in February 1981 enunci-
ated pronatalist policies to be implemented first in
Slavic regions, which have much lower birthrates
than most areas of the country.
Moreover, speeches of some leaders, especially secre-
tary Chernenko and Georgian party boss Shevard-
nadze, have paid less attention to the need for vigi-
lance and discipline than to the need for party
responsiveness to public opinion. Chernenko's speech-
es, for example, have tended to attribute the crisis in
Poland more to the Gierek regime's loss of contact
with the masses than to the Polish party's loss of its
ideological bearings. Chernenko has also cultivated a
"populist" image by promoting commissions to study
public opinion, calling for intraparty "democracy,"
campaigning for greater attention to letters from
citizens, reportedly opposing expressions of extreme
Russian chauvinism in literature, and explicitly criti-
cizing Stalin's repression. His advocacy of steps to
pacify rather than repress disgruntled elements of
society suggests that the proper mix of conciliatory
and coercive s
ocial policies is a live issue among 25X1
F_ I
Conclusions
Soviet elite concerns about popular morale may be
tempered by cognizance that the regime possesses still
powerful instruments of repression and by a belief
that even certain "negative" features of contemporary
Soviet life-such as religion, the black market, and
alcoholism-serve as escape valves for popular frus-
trations. Soviet elites probably also believe that many
citizens-especially of the older generation-retain a
high degree of attachment to dominant values of the
political culture
most Soviet citizens seem
proud of the Soviet global role and place a high
premium on personal security and public order.
few Soviet citizens know
much about Western democracy or regard it as an
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attractive model, and that some fear capitalism as
much as they envy it. Dissent is fragmented, and there
is no organized labor movement or national church
that could serve as a unifying center for disgruntled
There is apprehension among elites that corruption is
sapping the party's moral authority and its ability to
elements of the population.
Nevertheless, since the mid-1970s the mood of Soviet
society seems to have shifted. Although habits of
submission to authority remain stronger in the Soviet
Union than among most peoples in Eastern Europe,
the Soviet population has apparently become more
demanding, more skeptical, and less pliable. As cited
earlier in the paper, Soviet officials are aware that
many non-Russians reject core values of the system
and that many young people doubt that the system
any longer has values or ideals. The welfare-oriented
features of the Soviet system have always been those
that evoked the most positive responses from the
population, but the regime's performance in recent
years has increased doubts among consumers about
the party's commitment and ability to provide ade-
quately for their material well-being.
These trends in Soviet society have given Soviet elites
cause to question the efficacy of current policies for
ensuring high labor productivity and regime legitima-
cy. The impact of low public morale on worker output
is probably the most immediate concern of officials.
But Soviet elites also know-as Brezhnev reminded
them on more than one occasion-that the problem of
satisfying the material needs of the population is "not
only an economic, but also a political matter." Judg-
ing by vigilance and anticorruption campaigns of
recent years,
____]Soviet elites today probably eel
ess secure a out popular quiescence than at any time
since the de-Stalinization period of the 1950s.F_
Reporting about pervasive corruption at all levels of
the Soviet system also suggests that Soviet officials
today have a lower commitment to serving the party
or the country, as opposed to their bureaucratic and
especially their private interests, than ever before.
provide effective leadership.'
These trends in elite attitudes may have major impli-
cations for policy change in the post-Brezhnev period.
Initially, internal policy may contain a mix of "au-
thoritarian" measures (for example, increased central
controls over the use and movement of labor) and
"liberal" ones (such as increased support for private
agriculture and some private services). On balance,
however, it seems likely that Andropov and his col-
leagues will increasingly attempt to accommodate
elite concerns by bolstering Russian nationalism as a
prop to the system and adopting generally more
conservative social policies. The regime may, for
example, place greater emphasis on negative incen-
tives (the loss of one's job or reduction in salary, the 25X1
threat of arrest) than on positive incentives (higher
wages, improved supplies of consumer goods) for
political conformity and hard work.
At the same time, Andropov is likely to undertake a
major crackdown on corruption. The appointment of
former head of the Azerbaijan party Geydar Aliyev to
the post of First Deputy Chairman of the Council of
' It should be noted that these statements are relative. They do not
suggest that corruption is a new phenomenon in Soviet life, or that
patriotism no longer serves as one motivating force in Soviet elite
behavior. Rather, it is the judgment of this paper that Soviet elites
today are less inclined than in the past to subordinate personal
advantage to the pursuit of societal goals as defined by the party.
With all caution against romanticizing the CPSU in earlier periods,
it may be said that Soviet elites under each of Brezhnev's predeces-
sors exhibited a higher degree of idealism than appears to be the
case today. Ideological fervor was of course greatest under Lenin in
the early years of Soviet power, but during the Stalin years Soviet
officials retained a conviction that they were pioneers building a
new society. In fact, it was precisely during the darkest years of the
purges that large numbers of Soviet party cadres made the supreme
sacrifice of confessing to crimes they had not committed. Although
some confessions were induced by torture, considerable evidence
suggests that loyalty-to Stalin and to the party-was the chief
motivation of many of the show trial defendants. Finally, even
under Khrushchev, party officials working on ambitious programs
such as the Virgin Lands campaign displayed an esprit and sense of
social purpose that nothing in the Brezhnev years matched.
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Ministers may have been a first step in this direction.
Aliyev, a career KGB official with no experience in
economic management, has been in the forefront of
the anticorruption campaign.
The elevation of former Gosplan official Nikolay
Ryzhkov to the secretariat may also portend the
introduction of more forceful measures to curb official
malfeasance and to ensure strict government compli-
ance with party directives. Ryzhkov, who will be
overseeing the work of ministries in key sectors of
heavy industry, has stressed in his published writings
the need for greater executive and labor discipline.
Andropov's speech on 22 November to the Central
Committee also emphasized this theme.
Such a policy orientation would be compatible with
some changes in economic administration. These
might include an end to state subsidies for items of
basic consumption and greater emphasis on monetary
incentives for factory managers to utilize labor more
efficiently-which would lead to the firing of nonpro-
ductive workers. Efforts to strengthen political and
social controls over the population probably would
preclude, however, any broad introduction of market
mechanisms, increase in popular participation in the
political process at lower levels, thaw in cultural
policy, or expansion of unofficial contacts with the
West.
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 Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2008/07/29: CIA-RDP83T00853R000200150001-8
Approved For Release 2008/07/29: CIA-RDP83T00853R000200150001-8