USSR: THE IMMEDIATE POST-BREZHNEV POLICY AGENDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83T00853R000200100002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 15, 2007
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
NOT C VE T
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USSR: The Immediate
Post-Brezhnev
Policy Agenda
Secret
SOV 82-10178
November 1982
Copy
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
USSR: The Immediate
Post-Brezhnev
Policy Agenda
This assessment was prepared by the Current
Support Division, with contributions from the Policy
Analysis and Soviet Economy Divisions, in the
Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions and comments
may be addressed to the Chief, Current Support
Division F777
Secret
SOV 82-10178
November 1982
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USSR: The Immediate
Post-Brezhnev
Policy Agenda)
Summary Initial statements and actions by the new Soviet regime indicate a
Information available considerable effort to project orderliness in the succession and a business-
as of 15 November 1982 as-usual image. Although Andropov's first speech after Brezhnev's death
was used in this report.
last week sounded a discordant note, asserting that " imperialists will never
meet our pleas for peace," his eulogy at the deceased leader's funeral on 15
November adopted a more moderate tone, specifically reiterating the
regime's intention to seek a relaxation of international tension. The need to
fill vacancies in the Politburo and Secretariat can be expected to introduce
contention among ambitious leaders seeking to improve their position in the
present fluid political situation. Some may take opportunistic positions on
various issues which they later will change; others may abandon positions
they have long professed to support. Even a smoothly functioning Politburo
is unlikely to be content simply to conduct "Brezhnevism without
Brezhnev." 25X1
The first item on the new leaders' agenda will be putting together the
policymaking team. Once this has been accomplished, the new team will
turn to some immediate economic issues. In the next few months, the
leadership will be compelled to grapple with a host of complex domestic
and foreign policy problems that accumulated as Brezhnev's ability to
provide effective leadership slipped away 25X1
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Post-Brezhnev
Policy Agenda)
The Immediate Task: Putting Together the
Policymaking Team
Key personnel decisions will be at the top of the
Politburo agenda in the coming days. While the speed
of Andropov's selection as party leader suggests that
the leadership is sufficiently united for the present to
avoid political stalemate, an unusually large number
of important vacancies in key institutions must be
filled, and the process is likely to generate political
tension and conflict. These positions will be filled by
members of the current top leadership, creating addi-
tional important vacancies in their wake. The cumula-
tive effect of these changes will provide an early
measure of Andropov's abilit to consolidate his posi-
tion in the leadership.
To judge from his initial fast start, Andropov is
almost certainly attempting to move promptly to
fashion a leadership collective that is responsive to his
political and policy aims. Unlike the transition period
following Khrushchev's ouster, when a group of con-
spirators-all ambitious and in their political prime-
had to divide up the spoils, Andropov would appear to
face little strong competition from any political rivals
among his colleagues. His apparent ease in elbowing
aside his rival, Chernenko, suggests that the latter
was not able to develop a strong power base independ-
ent of Brezhnev-although Chernenko's willingness to
Andropov's meeting with Vice President Bush on 15
November indicates that he is already moving to
establish himself as the dominant regime spokesman
in foreign policy. This demonstration of his political
strength also raises the possibilit of his taking over
Brezhnev's job as president. 25X1
It still seems probable, however, that other leaders
would hesitate to confer both posts on Andropov from
the outset and therefore would deny him the presiden-
cy-a post Brezhnev held only for the last five years.
One of the remaining senior Politburo members close
to Andropov may be named to the post. Gromyko, for
instance, would appear to be a strong candidate in
view of his lengthy experience in foreign affair2 1
his ties to Andropov.
25X1
The leadership also will be filling a number of other
key posts. Restaffing the party Secretariat appears to
be the most urgent task. Andropov's elevation and
Kirilenko's political demise (he apparently has been
removed from the Politburo and Secretariat) will
leave two important vacancies-the senior secretary
for ideology and propaganda, a role Andropov evi-
dently had played since rejoining the Secretariat in
May, and Kirilenko's position as senior secretary for
heavy industry. In addition, Party Control Committee
Chairman Arvid Pelshe-at 83 the oldest member of
the leadership-also has been ill recently and, accord-
ing to an unconfirmed rumor, died on 12 November.
Although the importance of his committee has waned
in recent years, its function-the maintenance of
discipline in party ranks-is important, and a younger
leader might be able to make it a significant power
base.
Several candidates have been tagged for
advancement:
25X
eign Minister Gromyko, reportedly have close ties to ? Party Secretary Dolgikh has been filling in for
Andropov. Kirilenko since his illness this summer, and h25X1
he is likely to see that their promotion to Politburo candidate in May app r
influence is protected in the new leadership lineup.= to be in anticipation of his eventual assumpti?i l
Kirilenko's responsibilities.
sound different themes at the outset suggests that
underlying differences on substantive matters persist
and that he probably has some support. Party Secre-
tary Kirilenko's reported removal eliminates another
major political rival, and none of the younger mem-
bers of the leadership who might aspire to the top
party post (such as regional party leaders Shcher-
bitskiy, Grishin, or Romanov) appear to be in a
position to offer a serious challenge to Andropov at
present. Two of the most influential figures remaining
in the Politburo, Defense Minister Ustinov and For-
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? Ukrainian party boss Shcherbitskiy is said to be
close to Andropov and to have supported his nomi-
nation of the new KGB chief, against some opposi-
tion from Brezhnev's protege, Chernenko.
Moscow must also decide whether to let the deteriora-
tion in US-Soviet economic relations that has oc-
curred in recent years continue or to signal an intent
to pursue closer ties with the United States. A large 25X1
purchase of US grain and a move to renew the Long-
Term Agreement for another five years could provide
such a signal. If the leadership wishes to make such a
In filling all these positions at the center, new vacan-
cies will be created in lower ranking posts that will
have to be staffed by younger leaders who are now
members of the ruling elite. For the first time in many
years, a substantial renovation of the leadership ap-
pears to be under way, creating the opportunity for
Andropov and his associates to shape the next genera-
tion of Soviet leaders.
Economic Issues Facing the New Leaders
With economic problems pressing from every quarter,
the new regime may opt to act sooner rather than
later to establish clearly the direction of both its
domestic and foreign economic policies. The meetings
of the Supreme Soviet, now set to open 23 November,
and the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council on
17 November, provide the opportunity for the leader-
ship to enunciate any policy modifications.
The main issues requiring immediate leadership at-
tention are the state of the 11th Five-Year Plan
(1981-85) and the state of East-West economic rela-
tions. Because the poor performance of the economy
has put the goals of the five-year plan out of reach,
the new leadership could surface major revisions in
the targets for the remaining three years of the plan.
Such revisions, if they occur, could indicate whether
and to what degree Andropov has already consolidat-
ed his position as well as whether Moscow intends to
alter its resource allocation policy between guns and
butter. This latter issue has become increasingly
contentious over the last year or so, with elements of
the military uin for an even greater share of the
resource pie.
There is ample precedent for a new Soviet leader to
support consumer-oriented policies during the initial
stages of his regime. Andropov has the opportunity
publicly to demonstrate serious support for the con-
sumer, perhaps by increasing resources committed to
housing and stepping up meat production goals. A
major initiative in this direction would be to increase
foreign purchases of meat and grain above the rather
low levels of recent months.
signal, it could use the platform provided by the
meetings of the US-USSR Trade and Economic
Council.
Over the longer term, the new Soviet leadership must
tackle the issues of resource allocation and manage- 25X1
ment of the economy. Specifically, Andropov must
decide (1) whether to continue Brezhnev's agricultural
policies, which have consumed so much of Soviet
investment resources; (2) whether the country can,
and should, step up the pace of investment in the last
half of the 1980s, perhaps at the expense of some
slowdown in defense spending; and (3) whether the
system can or should institute any managerial re-
forms. Before these decisions can be made, however, a
consensus will have to be reached on how best to 25X1
revive economic growth in the Soviet Union. Some
argue that the road to growth is through the incen-
tives that more consumer goods and services provide.
Others maintain that more investment in heavy indus-
tries is the proper route. Andropov's closest ties in the
leadershi have been to those who advocate this latter
course. 25X1
The Andropov Politburo also will be forced to contend
with a growing sense of malaise in Soviet society. The
sources of popular discontent-a perceived decline in
the quality of life, continuing restrictions on freedom
of expression and belief, and rising national conscious-
ness among some of the more than 20 major ethnic
groups-pose problems of varying severity for the
leadership. Discontent over the quality of Soviet life 25X1
and stagnation in production of consumer goods prob-
ably represents the most immediate and important
challenge because it strikes at the heart of plans for
improving the economy through increased productivi-
ty. Although past regime actions-such as massive
imports of grain-indicate that Soviet leaders are
aware of such problems, their policies have as yet
been inadequate to solve them.
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Secret
Foreign Policy Issues
In the area of foreign economic relations, the new
leaders must come to grips with the question of how
dependent they want to be on Western goods, particu-
larly farm products and technology. This issue is tied
closely to their domestic investment policy. For exam-
ple, continued purchases of Western farm products on
the scale of recent years might facilitate some cutback
in investment resources committed to agriculture.
Unless the West becomes more willing to increase its
levels of lending, however, the USSR will have to find
new ways to generate foreign exchange. For example,
allowing direct Western participation in, or equity
financing of, resource development projects might
become an attractive means of developing new hard
currency export markets, particularly since such par-
ticipation would also ease the strain on domestic
investment.
the timing of this announcement is unrelated to
Brezhnev's death and will not see it as a US attempt
to test them. 25 *1
The Soviet leaders may hope that the release of
Solidarity leader Walesa in Poland, Andropov's recep-
tion of Vice President Bush, and perhaps other ges-
tures in the near future, will set the scene for a
possible relaxation of US sanctions. The Soviets will
be interested in seeing whether the US response will
signal a desire to begin improving bilateral relations.
At the same time, they are likely to be wary of
reacting too eagerly to such a US move lest such a
reaction appear to demonstrate their susceptibility to
Western economic leverage. 2511
The new leadership will also look upon their relations
with Eastern Europe as a high-priority concern. 25X1
Polish regime's ability to stifle the demonstrations and
strikes scheduled for 10 November almost certainly
has convinced the Soviets that the worst is past in
Poland. Still, the USSR's cutbacks in oil deliveries to
several of its East European client states and the
persistence of East European economic difficulties
assure continuing problems for the Soviets in a region
which they regard as crucially important to their
security. A meeting of the Warsaw Pact's Political
Consultative Committee, tentatively scheduled for
December, may be used by the Soviets to assure2 rl
The new Soviet leaders are inheriting a situation in
which relations with the United States are at a low
ebb and policy toward Europe and China has been the
focus of increasing attention. In Europe, INF is the
urgent issue. With US missile deployments scheduled
to begin next year and the West German elections
approaching, the Soviets are likely to be engaged in a
review of their INF strategy and assessing the relative
emphasis to be placed on threats and concessions in
the next few months.
Relations with China will also be a priority concern of
the new leadership in the next few months. In his final
days, Brezhnev publicly emphasized the potential for
gain in improving Sino-Soviet ties. The new leaders
will wish to continue Brezhnev's emphasis and signal
their own commitment to maintaining dialogue with
the Chinese. They could make a tactical gesture such
as a token military withdrawal from the border prior
to commencement of the second round of Sino-Soviet
talks early in the new year. In any case, an issue that
allies that their concerns will be addressed.
25X1
The new Soviet leaders will want to reassure their
allies and clients in the Third World of continuing
support. The Soviets probably see little chance for
near-term improvement of their position in the Middle
East. In Asia, relations with Vietnam and India will
remain the chief Soviet concerns. In Africa, the
Soviets will reaffirm support for Ethiopia, Angola,
and Mozambique. Moscow's alliance with Havana
will, of course, remain the centerpiece of Soviet
brooks no delay is how far to go in meeting the olicies in Latin America. M1
Chinese for a significant improvement in relations. 2bAl
Among issues related to bilateral US-Soviet ties,
imminent US announcements on the basing mode for
the MX missile are likely to require the new Soviet
leaders to make a public response. They probably will
respond with the hardline rhetoric characteristic of
Brezhnev's final months. They realize, however, that
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Secret
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