THE SOVIET UNION AND NONRULING COMMUNIST PARTIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 7, 2007
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
The Soviet Union and
Nonruling Communist Parties
Secret
SOV 82-1011OX
August 1982
Copy 0 2 9 5
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
The Soviet Union and
Nonruling Communist Parties
A Research Paper
This report was prepared by of the
Current Support Division, Office of Soviet Analysis, in
close cooperation with other offices of the Directorate
of Intelligence and Directorate of Operations. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be addressed to the
Chief, Policy Analysis Division, SOVA,
Secret
SOV 82-1O110X
August 1982
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The Soviet Union and
Nonruling Communist Parties
0
Overview The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) recognizes and
maintains relations with some 80 nonruling Communist parties worldwide.
The majority are in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. Despite their
proliferation in the Third World, however, most are small, weak, and
ineffective. More than a third are illegal or restricted from participating in
electoral politics. Nationalism, not Communist ideology, is the dominant
political force in the developing countries. The Communist parties that
have succeeded in gaining power owe their success almost entirely to
external support from the Soviet Union and its proxies.
While retaining their Leninist organizational structure and authoritarian
style, several nonruling parties in Western Europe, India, and Japan have
evolved into mass parties attracting broad electoral support and winning
parliamentary representation. With the exception of the French and the
pro-Soviet Indian parties, they have asserted their independence from the
CPSU on a range of issues and have sought to establish national identities.
The small West European pro-Moscow parties influence national politics
through propaganda and labor movement activities and, in a number of
cases, through their connections with the left wings of ruling or major
opposition socialist and social democratic parties. 25
The nonruling parties vary greatly in their dependency on the CPSU and
their willingness to support Soviet policies. Nevertheless, all nonruling
parties, including even the largest and most independent West European
parties, seemingly need to retain ties to the CPSU and remain within the
international movement. For this reason, the elements promoting agree-
ment among the various Communist parties are of more concern to the
West than those generating discord. These parties are bound to Moscow by
an ideological vision of the future in which the triumph of "peace, freedom,
and socialism" is secured by the destruction, or at least a significant
weakening, of Western democratic values and institutions. Even when little
else is agreed on, this shared vision provides the basis for political
cooperation against the West, especially the United States.
Information available as of 15 July 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.
Secret
SOV 82-1011 ox
August 1982
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Nonruling Communist parties pose a serious challenge to US national
interests where they conduct Soviet-supported, subversive activities in
Central America, South Africa, and Iran.
The 1979 Sandinista victory in Nicaragua marked a watershed in Soviet
assessment of the prospects for revolutionary change in the Caribbean
Basin. The Soviets urged the Communist parties, particularly in El
Salvador and Guatemala, to abandon nonviolence and join existing insur-
gent movements. Although these parties represent small minorities within
the guerrilla organizations, the Soviets hope that their superior organiza-
tion and discipline combined with Soviet aid will guarantee them a role in
any future revolutionary regimes.
The pro-Soviet South African Communist Party (SACP), an exile organi-
zation, finds little support within South Africa. But it channels Soviet
funds to, and thus influences, the African National Congress (ANC), the
principal insurgent group operating in South Africa. Although the ANC
itself is not a Communist organization, it is almost entirely dependent on
the USSR and its allies for funds, arms, and military training.
The Soviets provide substantial financial, material, and propaganda sup-
port to Tudeh, the Iranian Communist party. Despite its affiliation with
the USSR, Tude been tolerated because it publicly supports the
Khomeini regime; Tudeh now serves as an instrument
of Soviet subversion and political pressure; in the future it might play a de-
cisive role in Iranian politics should the clerical government be displaced by
a united secular left.
The attitudes of the nonruling West European parties toward the CPSU
vary from unconditional support of any position to explicit criticism of
security and foreign policy actions, such as those in Afghanistan and
Poland. All West European parties share with the CPSU opposition to US
25
25
and NATO curity policies, which serves Soviet interests when translated
into action.
25
25
In addition to ideological ties, most nonruling parties also are bound
organizationally and financially to the CPSU. The CPSU has at its
disposal a number of coordinating mechanisms and a large staff for
Secret iv
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conducting bilateral and multilateral relations with other parties. Most
small and medium-size parties depend entirely upon annual Soviet subsi-
dies for their operating expenses. Even the largest parties, which have
multiple sources of income, indirectly derive substantial financial benefits
through commercial transactions with the USSR.
In general, the Soviets have not found nonruling Communist parties to be
highly effective in promoting their foreign policy interests in either the
West or the Third World. Most of these parties lack access to political
power, suffer from declining ideological appeal, and many are legally
proscribed. In Western Europe the Soviets have advanced their interests
more successfully through international and ad hoc front groups rather
than Communist organizations. In recent years, moreover, the CPSU has
developed varied ties with leftwing socialist leaders and members of the
Socialist International. The Soviets cite parallel views on international
security policies and Third World issues to approach the socialist and social
democratic parties, several of which are major coalition partners or the
main political opposition in NATO countries. In Asia and Africa, the
Soviets have gained more politically by supporting national liberation
movements and other radical groups and by forming alliances with
socialist-oriented but non-Communist radical regimes than by aiding local
Communist parties.
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CPrrvt
Soviet Relations With Nonruling Communist Parties
1
Central America, Mexico, the Caribbean, and South America
1
Regional Survey of Selected Nonruling Communist Parties
6
Portugal 16
Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway 16
Austria, West Germany, Great Britain, and Holland 17
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I
Appendixes
A. CPSU Coordination and Funding of Nonruling Communist Parties
29
B. CPSU Relations With Non-Communist Parties and International
Front Organizations
33
1. Nonruling Communist Parties in Central and South America and
the Caribbean
6
2. Nonruling Communist Parties in Western Europe
12
3. Nonruling Communist Parties in the Middle East and Africa
18
4. Nonruling Communist Parties in South and Southeast Asia
23
5. Soviet International Front Organizations
36
1. Soviet Leaders Meet With Latin American and West European
Communist Party Officials
2
2. Rally Against Missile Deployment in Western Europe
4
3. Leaders of Central and South American Communist Parties
8-9
4. Leaders of West European Communist Parties
14-15
5. Leaders of Middle Eastern Communist Parties
20-21
6. Leaders of the Indian Communist Parties
24
7. Kenji Miyamoto
26
8. Press Conference at Paris Meeting Convened by Soviets
30
9. CPSU Officials and Socialist International Representatives in
Moscow
35
10. The World Peace Council, the Most Important Soviet
International Front Organization
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The Soviet Union and
Nonruling Communist Parties
0
Mexico has long been an important base for Soviet
operations in Central and South America; it provides
Central America, Mexico, the Caribbean, and South a haven for revolutionary exiles and Communist party
America members from throughout Latin America. The Mexi-
Soviet manipulation of several Communist parties in can Government has also frequently permitted various
Central America poses a potentially significant chal- Soviet front organizations and "solidarity" commit-
lenge to US interests even though these parties are tees to hold meetings and congresses.
small and lack influence
2
25
The 1979 Sandinista victory in Nicaragua caused the
Soviet Union to reassess prospects for revolutionary
change through armed struggle in Central America.
As a result, Moscow has urged regional Communist
parties, particularly those in Guatemala and El
Salvador, to abandon their traditionally nonviolent
tactics and join existing insurgent movements. Al-
though these parties represent small minorities, the
Soviets hope that their support for the insurgents, as
well as the parties' superior organization and disci-
pline, will guarantee them a role in any future
revolutionary regimes
Mexican Communists support Soviet interests
through their anti-US propaganda and demonstra-
tions and their participation in Soviet international
front activities. On Soviet instructions, the Mexican
Communists also seek to reinforce existing tendencies
within the Mexican Government and establishment
that oppose US policy and interests in Central
America.
2
In the Caribbean, the Soviets provide limited finan- 2
cial and training support to the Communist and
Marxist parties of the Dominican Republic, Guade-
loupe, Martinique, Guyana, Haiti (in exile), and Ja-
maica. All of these parties are small, weak, and
ineffective, and most of their efforts are devoted to
In Mexico, CPSU relations with the Communist
movement have been strained at times because of
Mexican nationalism and the Soviet invasion of Af-
ghanistan. Moscow has backed the recently formed
Unified Socialist Party of Mexico (PSUM), hoping it
will be more supportive of Soviet regional and interna
legitimate political activities.
Communist parties in South America exert little
influence on national and regional politics. The
Soviets subordinate their ties with the parties to
efforts to improve relations with the governments of
Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru. Even where
these parties are not legally excluded from the politi-
cal process, they must contend with conservative anti-
Communist governments and compete for influence
25
2
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Soviet Leaders Meet With Latin American and West European Communist Party Officials
CPSU Secretaries Andrey Kirilenko (center) and
Boris Ponomarev (right) meet with Rodney Aris-
mendi, First Secretary f the yan Com-
munist Party.
Leonid Brezhnev greets Luis Corvalan, General
Secretary of the Chilean Communist Party, in
1976 after Corvalan's release from prison in
Chile and his arrival in the Soviet Union where
Enrico Berlinguer (second from right), General
Secretary of the Italian Communist Party, at a
Kremlin meeting with Boris Ponomarev Leonid
Senior CPSU Secretaries hold talks with a dele- sovtoto, Eastfoto m
gation of the French Communist Party, headed
by General Secretary Geor es Marchais seated
opposite Brezhnev)
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on the left with new radical groups and terrorist
organizations. Although severe economic and political
problems and social inequities throughout the region
present opportunities for leftist exploitation, Commu-
nists and other radicals must contend with well-
institutionalized governments that enjoy the strong
backing of the armed forces and entrenched private-
sector elites. Except in Colombia, where the Commu-
nist party is loosely allied with a paramilitary group,
the South American parties follow a nonviolent line
laid down by the Soviet Union (see figure 1)
Although most of the region's mainline Communist
parties receive Soviet assistance and support Soviet
international policies, these groups must operate in a
nationalistic political environment. For this reason,
and because South American Communists have been
weakened by factionalism and competition from
newer, more militant leftist groups, neither the
Soviets nor the Cubans appear to believe that the
parties offer much near-term potential through either
the ballot box or armed struggle. The Soviets' interest
in cordial relations with the key states in the region
also limits their manipulation of the Communist
parties.
Western Europe
West European Communist parties, tracing their an-
tecedents to pre-Leninist times, have claimed that
their socioeconomic environment was the focus of
Marx's own thought. Therefore, the parties' ongoing
dispute with Moscow stems not only from arguments
over Soviet actions (for example, Afghanistan and
Poland) but also from claims that their parties have
roots and legitimacy independent of Soviet interests.
Some of these Communists even insist that their
parties are the most advanced because of their Marx-
ist tradition and the experience of operating in demo-
cratic, industrialized states
Because West European nonruling Communist parties
can compete legally and equally for electoral support,
their difficulties charting policies-conducive both to
good, or at least correct, relations with Moscow and to
maximized domestic popularity-are increased. Al-
though the Soviets favor Communist party participa-
tion in the parliamentary system, they are sometimes
reluctant to see parties with independent foreign and
security policies actually come to power. The Soviets,
however, do not usually interfere with local Commu-
nist choices of domestic tactics and strategies. Despite
the efforts of several parties to attract broad support
by espousing democratic politics and independence
from the USSR, they are suffering from declining
electoral strength and waning ideological appeal.
Even the most independent West European Commu-
nist parties are reluctant to break formal ties with
Moscow. European Communists also share a need for
community in a world Communist movement (see
figure 1). Nevertheless, their independence is a genu-
ine development, not a clever choice of tactics.II
Opposition to US security policy binds the parties and
serves Soviet interests, especially when translated into
actions thwarting US and NATO policies (see figure
2). Some of the small and politically insignificant
parties in northern Europe, however, are simply con-
duits for Soviet policies, providing funds and organi-
zational support to the peace movement.
West European Communists do not uniformly support
Soviet security policies; therefore, their activity in
defense of Soviet security interests varies widely.
Italian Communists, for example, while opposing
NATO's basing of cruise missiles, have held back in
attacking the government because they recognize the
danger to European security posed by Soviet medium-
range missiles.
Nevertheless, each West European Communist party
maintains active contacts with Soviet officials at-
tached to local embassies and other diplomatic mis-
sions. While these contacts do not always result in
mutual agreements, they do reinforce interparty com-
munications.
The parties that find it easiest to serve Soviet interests
are those combining staunchly pro-Soviet orientations
with poor domestic electoral prospects. The West
German, West Berlin, and Austrian Communist par-
ties, for example, are simply mouthpieces for Soviet
policies. While ineffective in an electoral sense, these
Communists give important organizational assistance
to domestic peace movements and other anti-NATO
interests.
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Rally Against Missile Deployment in Western Europe
The French Communist Party holds a rally in December 1979
opposin deployment of US medium-range missiles in Western
Europe.
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The Middle East and North Africa
The nonruling Communist parties of the Middle East
and North Africa are small and generally operate,
even where legally tolerated, in an inhospitable envi-
ronment. They enjoy little electoral strength and have
little observable impact on national political life.
Much of the energy of the faction-ridden parties is
devoted to making inroads among trade unionists and
students (where they now must compete with Islamic
fundamentalists), propagandizing through both legal
and clandestine publications, and attempting to pro-
mote occasional civil disorder. As a result, the Soviets
have not benefited very much from the region's
Communist parties and have focused their efforts on
radical nationalist movements.
The exception to this generalization is Iran's Tudeh
Party, which has emerged from years of repression
and exile under the Shah. After many years of
participate in existing political systems. They have not
gained mass appeal and electoral support because of
the postcolonial generation's anti-Communism and
historical, social, cultural, and religious factors. Ex-
cept for India where Communists rule two states,
Communist parties have little political impact, and
few appear capable of serious political disruption. The
pro-Chinese parties have been in decline since Beijing
withdrew its support following the Cultural Revolu-
tion (1966-69).
Southeast Asia and the Pacific
During the past two decades, the Communist parties
of Southeast Asia, with few exceptions, have become
increasingly independent of both Moscow and Beijing.
This trend began when the Sino-Soviet rift of the
early 1960s fragmented local Communist parties by
forcing them to take sides. Most openly supported
Beijing until China's Cultural Revolution when sever-
supporting a party with no apparent prospects for al Maoist groups attempted unsuccessful revolutions
gaining power, the Soviets now have a loyal client that of their own. The survivors of these uprisings appar-
not only participates in Iranian politics but also might ently have decided to judge for themselves the future
become an important factor in the country's future.F~strategies best suited to local conditions.
Sub-Saharan Africa
Although nonruling Communist parties play a limited
role in Sub-Saharan Africa, Marxist parties have
proliferated throughout the region. Only five coun-
tries-Senegal, Nigeria, the French Department of
Reunion, Lesotho, and South Africa-have nonruling
Communist parties officially recognized by the Soviet
Union. None of these groups has been able to attract
political support in its own country because Commu-
nist ideology is generally unpopular throughout the
region.
The Soviets give these parties verbal support and
limited financial assistance; all parties consistently
support Soviet positions.
The South African Communist Party poses the great-
est threat to stability because it provides leadership
and funnels Soviet funds to the African National
Congress (ANC), South Africa's main insurgent
group.
South Asia
Most pro-Soviet Communist parties in South Asia
have renounced violent tactics and have chosen to
Since the establishment of diplomatic ties with the
United States, Beijing has sought to improve relations
with governments in Asia by withdrawing financial
support from several of the remaining pro-Chinese
Communist parties.
Beijing's once prominent role as the exporter of
violent Commmunist revolution, however, has been
assumed by a new Asian power-Vietnam. Vietnam
might well become an Asian Cuba in the 1980s,
encouraging and assisting sympathetic factions within
Asian parties. Hanoi's involvement might lead to
either the parties' increased factionalism or Moscow's
replacement of Beijing as the primary supporter of
Asian Communism. Should the Soviets challenge the
Chinese, Beijing might respond by once again increas-
ing its involvement in neighboring Communist move-
ments.
The nonruling pro-Soviet parties of Australia, New
Zealand, and the Philippines support Soviet foreign
policy interests and international front activities. The
Japanese Communist Party, which is independent of
25
2
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Nonruling Communist Parties in Central and South America and the Caribbean
Estimated
Population
in 1981
Communist Party
Membership
Percentage of Votes
in Latest Election;
Seats in Legislature
Argentina
28,130,000
80,000 claimed
(No elections scheduled)
Proscribed
Pro-Soviet
Bolivia
5,490,000
500 est.
(1980 elections voided)
Proscribed
Pro-Soviet
Brazil
124,800,000
6,000 est.
(1978)
Proscribed
Pro-Soviet
Chile
11,162,000
20,000 est.
(Elections promised)
Proscribed
Pro-Soviet
Colombia
25,217,000
12,000 est.
1.9 (1978); 3 of 311
Legal
Pro-Soviet
Costa Rica (PVP)
2,332,000
6,000 est.
2.7 (1987); 3 of 57
Legal
Pro-Soviet
Dominican Republic
5,855,000
4,500 est.
.62 (1982); none
Legal
Pro-Soviet
Ecuador
8,275,000
1,000 est.
3.2 (1979); none
Legal
Pro-Soviet
El Salvador
4,610,000
800 est.
(1976)
Proscribed
Pro-Soviet
Guadeloupe
304,000
3,000 est.
38.6 (1981); 1 of 3 in Paris
Legal
Pro-Soviet
Guatemala (PGT)
7,310,000
750 est.
(1974)
Proscribed
Pro-Soviet
Guyana (PPP)
857,000
Unknown
20.4 (1980); 10 of 65
Legal
Pro-Soviet
Haiti (PUCH)
5,923,000
350 est.
(1973)
Proscribed
Pro-Soviet
Honduras
3,940,000
1,500 est.
(1980)
Proscribed
Pro-Soviet
Jamaica (WPJ)
2,268,000
3,000 est.
NA (1980); none
Legal
Pro-Soviet
Martinique
302,000
1,000 est.
6.4 (1981); none in Paris
Legal
Pro-Soviet
Mexico (PSUM)
69,100,000
112,000 claimed
5.4 (1979); 18 of 400
Legal
Independent
Panama (PPP)
1,928,000
550 est.
NA (1978); none
Legal
Pro-Soviet
Paraguay
3,268,000
3,500 est.
(1973)
Proscribed
Pro-Soviet
Peru
18,119,000
3,000 est.
2.8 (1980); 4 seats
Legal
Pro-Soviet
Uruguay
2,944,000
7,000 est.
(No elections since 1971)
Proscribed
Pro-Soviet
Venezuela
17,913,000
4,500 est.
1.4 (1978); 1 of 195
Legal
Pro-Soviet
a Sources for tables 1 through 4 are Richard F. Staar, ed. Yearbook
on International Communist Affairs (Stanford: Hoover Institution
Press, 1982) and Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact-
book-1982.
the Soviet Union, is heavily involved in the peace
movement and opposes US foreign and defense policy
interests in Japan.
Regional Survey of Selected Nonruling Communist
Parties
Central America (see table 1)
Guatemala. The pro-Soviet party of Guatemala, the
Guatemalan Workers' Party (PGT), is proscribed; its
total membership is estimated at 750.
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Honduras.1
About half of the PCH's estimated membership of
1,500 broke away in mid-1980 to begin terrorist 25
actionsi
El Salvador. El Salvador's Communist party (PCES)
is illegal (see figure 3). Its estimated membership of
800 includes guerrillas. Prior to the 1979 Sandinista
victory in Nicaragua, the essentially nonviolent doc-
trine of the party closely followed Moscow's design for
regional parties to work within their own political
systems. The PCES received yearly stipends-some
possibly reaching $150,000-but these were neither
guaranteed nor unconditional. All Soviet aid to the
party was reportedly cut off during the 1970s in
response to PCES disorganization and factional dis-
putes.
The turmoil of the 1970s, however, radicalized PCES
followers. Anticipating an outbreak of civil war, the
party in April 1979 formed its own armed wing, the
Liberation Armed Forces (FAL).
At Moscow's urging, since January 1980 the PCES
has been allied with four other Marxist insurgent
groups in the Farabundo Marti National Liberation
Front, which is conducting guerrilla operations
against the Salvadoran Government. Although Mos-
cow has been trying to bolster the PCES by channel-
ing some funds and materiel through the party to the
insurgents' joint command, the PCES apparently
remains the smallest and probably least influential
member of the leftist alliance.
While the PCH has been chronically weak and
plagued by discord among its leaders, it could benefit
from the unity agreement by eventually establishing
control over the other radical groups opposing the
Honduran Government. In this scenario, the PCH,
acting on Soviet and Cuban instructions, might be in
a position to shape the political and military outcome
of the anticipated "prolonged popular war."
Costa Rica. Three Communist parties within the
Costa Rican Communist coalition (PU) generally
cooperate in the Legislative Assembly, but they re-
main philosophically and tactically divided. The larg-
est is the Moscow-line Popular Vanguard Party
(PVP), which has an estimated membership of 6,000
and effectively controls more than 50,000 workers.
Although the PVP reportedly has a paramilitary
brigade of 150 to 200 members who fought alongside
the Sandinistas in 1979, the party has generally
eschewed violent tactics within Costa Rica. In con-
trast, the small, radical, Havana-line People's Revolu-
tionary Movement (MRP) has consistently advocated
violent solutions to political problems.
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Jorge Handel, Secretary Gener- El Dario de Hoy
al of the Communist Part o
El Salvadorl
Mexico (see table 1)
Mexico's Marxist left is weak and divided. Some
tangible progress toward leftist unity did occur in the
recent Soviet-backed formation of the Communist-
dominated Unified Socialist Party of Mexico
(PSUM), but the Communists are not yet close to
commanding national influence. The PSUM, a loose
alliance of the Mexican Communist Party with four
smaller leftist parties, has only 100,000 to 125,000
members, reflecting Communist weakness among
peasant and labor organizations.
Giocondo Dias, Secretary Gen-
eral of the Brazilian Commu-
The Caribbean (see table 1)
The region's largest and potentially most important
parties are the Dominican Liberation Party (DLP)
and the Dominican Communist Party (DCP) in the
Dominican Republic. The pro-Soviet DLP consists of
an estimated 15,000 members under the leadership of
former president Juan Bosch. It has a growing constit-
uency among the discontented urban poor. The party,
which receives Soviet funding, reportedly is willing to
prepare a cadre for armed struggle in light of the
left's poor performance in the May 1982 presidential
elections. (The DLP in coalition with a smaller radical
party won 1 percent of the total vote.)
During 1981, the Moscow-line doctrinaire DCP, with
approximately 7,000 members, lost considerable
ground to Bosch's party. Moreover, the Soviets have
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Radames Larrazabal, member
of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of Venezue-
Athos Ava, Secretary of the
Communist Party of Argentina.
the Duvalier reeime.I
cut their funding in half. Although the DCP prefers
legitimate political activities to violent tactics, it is
increasingly ineffective. It reneged on its agreement
with the Cubans and Soviets to unite in an electoral
coalition with Bosch's party; it received less than
1 percent of the vote in May.
Guyana's People's Progressive Party (PPP), officially
recognized by Moscow, ostensibly represents the East
Indian majority in the country. There are no reliable
figures on the size of its membership. The PPP plays
an ineffective role in opposition to Socialist President
Burnham. Party leader Cheddi Jagan has longstand-
ing ties to Havana and Moscow.
The United Party of Haitian Communists, scattered
in exile among at least four countries, has shown little
ability to engage in more than propaganda attacks on
There are two legal Communist parties in Jamaica-
the Communist Party of Jamaica (CPJ) and the
Worker's Party of Jamaica (WPJ). The CPJ has a
mostly inactive membership of only about 50 people;
it controls several Communist front groups in Jamai-
ca, including affiliates of the two most important
Soviet fronts-the World Peace Council and the
World Federation of Trade Unions. The WPJ, con-
sisting of 3,000 members, is well organized. It is
2
2
25
recognized and supported by the Soviets and Cubans.
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South America (see table 1)
Venezuela. The Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV)
has been in decline for the past several years and now
has no more than 4,500 active members (see figure 3).
The reform programs of the two major Venezuelan
parties essentially preempted its constituency.
The PCV hews to the Soviet line without reservation.
For its loyalty, the party receives monthly subsidies,
and its leaders receive privileged treatment in Mos-
cow. Its support for the Soviets' 1968 invasion of
Czechoslovakia, however, resulted in a split that cost
it nearly half its members, including most younger
leaders.
The PCV supports Soviet views by sponsoring a
number of friendship societies and cultural organiza-
tions. It also distributes Soviet propaganda tracts and
places pro-Soviet information in the Venezuelan me-
dia. These activities, however, exert little influence
within the country.
Colombia. The Communist Party of Colombia (PCC),
made up of approximately 12,000 members, has a
nationwide organization and exerts disproportionate
political influence by infiltration and control of osten-
sibly nonparty groups. It dominates several large
labor confederations and has fomented serious labor
disorders, sporadic social disturbances, and student
violence. On international issues, the Soviet-trained
PCC leadership adheres closely to the Soviet line.=
The PCC, reluctant to become directly involved in
violence, has publicly renounced terrorism as a means
of gaining power. This position allows the party to
dissociate itself from actions of its paramilitary arm,
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC), one of the country's most effective guerrilla
organizations. The FARC is responsive to the PCC
but is not subservient, often taking more radical
action than the PCC would favor; since 1975 it has
become increasingly independent in its political strat-
egy. PCC contact with the FARC is maintained
through liaison agents trained in Moscow. The
FARC's top leaders are also PCC Central Committee
members, some of whom have received training in
Moscow; in addition, it has received some aid and
training from Cuba
Brazil. Communist parties and splinter groups play
only a minor role in Brazil despite the recent political
liberalization and have little chance of exerting much
influence in the foreseeable future. The Brazilian
Communist Party (PCB) is a small, lackluster group-
ing of about 6,000 members (see figure 3). The PCB
has no chance of achieving its principal political
objective, party legalization, soon.
Although the PCB generally follows the Soviet line,
its leadership is in disarray and lacks ideological
consistency. Three splinter groups, which a decade
ago waged a much publicized terrorist campaign,
were decimated by security forces and now are incon-
sequential.
Soviet aid to the PCB, extensive in the 1950s, has
declined to relatively low levels of support for propa-
ganda and organizational activity. Moscow probably
believes even major assistance would not reinvigorate
the party. Moreover, such efforts would undermine
the increasingly important commercial ties that have
developed between the Soviet Union and Brazil in
recent years.
Argentina. The 60-year-old Argentine Communist
Party (PCA), with 80,000 members, is the most
tightly knit and best organized party in the country
(see figure 3). Under the new 1982 party law, the
Communists will be able to engage in political activity
leading up to elections promised for 1984. Their
electoral appeal, however, is unlikely to broaden
significantly because their largely middle class mem-
bership has had only marginal success in attracting
working-class Argentines, despite the current econom-
ic crisis.
The mainstream PCA is nonviolent and has consist-
ently supported the military regime's plan for gradual
transition to democratic government. This support has
allowed the PCA to survive government purges of
leftists since 1976, and recently increased Argentine-
Soviet trade may have further strengthened its posi-
tion. Although it maintains ties with other Latin
American Communist parties, it is indigenously fi-
nanced from business investments and receives no
known external support.
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Peru. The pro-Soviet Peruvian Communist Party
(PCP), although legal, is a minor force in national
politics. Its membership is estimated at 3,000. The
party is a minority in the legislature and has failed to
exploit its powerful labor affiliate to construct a
strong popular base.
For some time the Soviets, who provide most of the
PCP's funding, have been extremely dissatisfied with
the party's performance. They have urged the recently
adopted reforms and will increase fundin if the party
shows progress in rebuilding its strength
Although the Soviets want a strong and activist PCP,
Bolivia. The Communist Party of Bolivia (PCB) fol-
lows the strict Moscow line; it receives Soviet funding,
periodically sends representatives to the USSR, and
they have reason not to promote violent revolution in echoes Soviet positions on international issues. The
Peru. They believe that any such attempt would PCB is proscribed and numbers fewer than 500
disrupt their close military training and supply rela- members. The party has little ability to destabilize
tionship. Moreover, the Soviets probably fear that Bolivia in the foreseeable future but, over the long
insurrection would provoke a rightwing military coup term, the Soviets probably hope to maintain a party
that would severely set back PCP and Soviet gains. structure that could take advantage of eventual politi-
Chile. The Chilean Communist Party has been
banned since 1973 when the military toppled Salvador
Allende's Marxist regime. It still may have as many
as 20,000 members. The majority of the party's top
echelon is in exile. Those leaders who remain in the
country are either in hiding or maintaining a very low
profile.
While the Soviets have become more vocal during the
past year in calling for the overthrow of the Pinochet
regime, they do not believe it is imminent and they
have not committed major resources to the Chilean
Communists.
Ecuador. The Communist Party of Ecuador (PCE)
has considerable strength in the labor movement but
attracted so little support in recent elections that it
lost its electoral status. The PCE, riven by factional-
ism and having difficulty attracting new blood, pre-
sents little threat to stability or near-term opportunity
for Soviet exploitation. Composed of an estimated
1,000 members, the PCE finances and controls the
nation's largest labor confederation, which has more
than 100,000 members, and it also influences the
Worker's Unity Front of democratic and Communist
cal liberalization or serve as a core for active resist-
ance.
Uruguay. The Government of Uruguay, outspokenly
anti-Communist in both domestic and foreign affairs,
has kept the outlawed Communist Party of Uruguay
(PCU) in a weakened and defensive state. The regime
has permitted increased political activity offering the
Communists some opportunity, but aggressive securi-
ty force activities will probably continue to force party
members to concentrate on organizational survival.
The PCU has approximately 7,000 members. The
Soviet-line party receives financial and propaganda
support from Moscow.
Paraguay. The Communist Party of Paraguay (PCP),
with approximately 3,500 members, is proscribed. Its
activities both within Paraguay and in exile in Buenos
Aires are frequently monitored by security forces, and
it represents no significant threat to the government
at present.
labor groups and a Moscow-line student federation=
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Nonruling Communist Parties in Western Europe
Estimated
Population
in 1981
Communist Party
Membership
Percentage of Votes
in Latest Election;
Seats in Legislature
Austria
7,509,000
25,000 est.
0.96 (1979); none
Legal
Pro-Soviet
Belgium
9,900,000
10,000 est.
2.3 (1981); 2 of 212
Legal
Independent
Cyprus (AKEL)
636,000
12,000 est.
32.8 (1981); 12 of 35 Greek Cypriot
seats
Legal
Pro-Soviet
Denmark
5,100,000
9,000 est.
1.2 (1981); none
Legal
Pro-Soviet
Finland
4,798,000
47,000 est.
17.9 (1979); 35 of 200
Legal
Pro-Soviet
France
54,000,000
500,000 est.
16.2 (1981); 44 of 491
Legal
Pro-Soviet
Great Britain
56,000,000
18,500
claimed
0.05 (1979); none
Legal
Independent
Greece
9,671,000
33,500 est.
10.9 (1981); 13 of 300
Legal
Pro-Soviet
Ireland
3,400,000
500 est.
NA (1981); none
Legal
Pro-Soviet
Italy
57,200,000
1,715,890
claimed
30.4 (1979); 201 of 630
Legal
Independent
Luxembourg
400,000
600 est.
5.0 (1979); 2 of 59
Legal
Pro-Soviet
Malta
370,000
150 est.
NA (1981); none
Legal
Pro-Soviet
Netherlands
14,200,000
13,000 est.
2.1 (1981); 3 of 150
Legal
Independent
Norway
4,100,000
500 est.
NA (1981); none
Legal
Pro-Soviet
Portugal
9,996,000
187,000 est.
16.7 (1980); 41 of 250
Legal
Pro-Soviet
San Marino
22,000
300 est.
25.0 (1978); 16 of 60
Legal
Independent
Sweden (VPK)
8,324,000
18,000
claimed
5.6 (1979); 23 of 349
Legal
Pro-Soviet
Legal
Pro-Soviet
Proscribed
Pro-Soviet
West Germany
61,666,000
48,856
claimed
0.2 (1980); none
Legal
Pro-Soviet
The Communist movement in Paraguay is split into
pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions; the PCP is pro-
Soviet. Most PCP members are in exile. Both Moscow
and Beijing provide financial support to their respec-
tive factions
Western Europe (see table 2)
Italy. The Italian Communist Party (PCI)-the larg-
est, most independent nonruling West European party
the government in the late 1970s (see figure 4).
and Italy's second-largest political party with a
claimed membership of more than 1.7 million-has
fallen on difficult days. Its leaders are convinced that
they must reach out to broader elements of the
electorate if they are to regain the momentum that
brought them to the verge of formal participation in
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The PCI-Soviet polemics over Poland have brought
relations to a new low, but the Soviets have not given
up on efforts to influence PCI policies. Party leader
Berlinguer has been especially worried by reaction
from within the party's leadership to the PCI's sup-
port for liberalization in Poland. Armando Cossutta,
the leading pro-Soviet figure in the PCI leadership,
has been outspoken in his criticism of the PCI stand
on Poland. While Berlinguer might view Cossutta's
public stance as divisive and a challenge to his
leadership, it is equally possible that he is tolerating it
in order to appease pro-Soviet elements in the party.
I-- I
The PCI exerts influence at all levels of Italian
politics. Several recent Italian governments have had
to rely on Communist support and include PCI posi-
tions in their own platforms in order to remain in
power. Moreover, the PCI alone or in coalition with
the Socialist Party dominates many regional and city
governments and controls political patronage. The
PCI's control of the country's largest trade union
gives it additional weight in political and economic
affairs.
Although the PCI opposes Soviet views on various
international issues, there is a convergence of PCI-
CPSU positions on some questions. The PCI, for
example, has opposed the deployment of US cruise
missiles in Italy, and it has sponsored several anti-
INF and peace rallies. PCI parliamentary members
have argued against defense modernization and have
advocated democratization and unionization of Italy's
armed forces
France. With an estimated membership of 500,000,
the French Communist Party (PCF) is the second-
largest West European nonruling party (see figure 4).
The PCF is linked financially and ideologically to
Moscow, but how much the Soviets may dictate PCF
foreign and security policy is uncertain. Although
Moscow's financial support is probably of limited
importance to the PCF, the party receives a substan-
tial indirect subsidy through its heavy involvement in
commercial trading companies that deal with the
Soviet Bloc. The Soviets also derive some financial
advantage from this arrangement.
The PCF's support for Soviet policy, including the
invasion of Afghanistan and martial law in Poland,
has hurt the party more than it has helped. The PCF's
working-class electorate has defected in droves, and
the party has lost much of its former attraction for
intellectuals and artists. PCF ability to gain support
for Soviet policies is severely limited. Although
French Communists have organized demonstrations
against US enhanced radiation weapons, against US
policy in Central America, and in support of peace 2
and disarmament, these demonstrations have had
little impact.
PCF control of France's largest trade union confeder-
ation also is limited; the threat to use it to challenge
the government remains more theoretical than real.
The party's control of patronage through its domi-
nance of many important municipal and local govern-
ments gives it a solid base of supporters. Ironically,
the PCF's defense policy views are closest to those 2
held by the Gaullists: favoring an independent nuclear
capability and supporting the government's decision
to build a seventh nuclear submarine.
To date, the PCF has not exploited its position in the
government to support Soviet views. Participation,
moreover, is both an asset and a liability. On the one
hand, the PCF enhances its influence through radio
and television and builds up its reputation as a
respectable political party. On the other hand, howev-
er, the party is being forced to endorse policies it
actually abhors, and it is losing a big share of its
traditional disaffected protest vote.
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Leaders of West European Communist Parties
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Harilaos Florakis, General
Secretary of the Communist
Party of Greece-Exteriors
Ezekias Papaioannou, General
Secretary of the Cypriot Pro-
gressive Party of the Working
Leonid Brezhnev with Alvaro
Cunhal, General Secretary of
the Portuguese Communist
Party.1 --I
Liaison ? Enrico Berlinguer (left), Secre-
tary General of the Italian
Communist Party, and Luigi
Longo, PCI President, at an
April 1976 meeting of the par-
ty's Central Committee.
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Spain. The Spanish Communist Party (PCE), during
Santiago Carrillo's tenure as party leader, probably
will not be of much use to Moscow. Carrillo's anti-
Soviet security policies have become more virulent
with the declaration of martial law in Poland and
have led him to the unusual step of announcing a
formal break with the CPSU. Carrillo's possible
successors may be less overtly hostile toward Moscow
but probably would not turn their backs altogether on
Carrillo's Eurocommunist line.
The PCE has approximately 120,000 members. No
evidence exists of Soviet financial support of the PCE.
The Soviets have made at least one abortive effort to
create a pro-Soviet alternative to the PCE, and there
is evidence that at least moral support for some
splinter groups is continuing. Such support could be
mobilized if the PCE's policy remains staunchly anti-
Soviet. There are indications of receptiveness to Sovi-
et overtures in the Catalan regional party organiza-
The PCE opposes Madrid's granting of base rights to
the United States; the Spanish Government can be
expected to use this as leverage in bilateral treaty
negotiations.
Portugal. The Portuguese Communist Party (PCP),
under the leadership of Alvaro Cunhal, has been one
of Moscow's most loyal West European allies (see
figure 4). The Soviets helped fund and advise the
party's effort to gain power during the revolution in
the early 1970s. Almost all observers believe that the
Soviets still subsidize Portuguese Communist activity.
The PCP claims 187,000 members. Its substantial
strength, about 17 percent of the electorate, developed
largely as a result of the party's long record of
opposition to the Salazar-Caetano dictatorship. To
ensure continued worker and peasant support, the
PCP has energetically defended its policies, both in
the parliament and in the streets. The Stalinist nature
of the party, however, has kept out intellectuals. The
PCP leadership is free to follow the Soviet line in
foreign policy because most members are not very
interested in events outside Portugal. The PCP takes
strongly anti-US positions on southern Africa and
Latin America, and it opposes US use of Lajes Air
Field in the Azores. The PCP newspaper has been
used to float suspected Soviet disinformation regard-
ing US policy toward Angola.
Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway. The Finn-
ish Communist Party (SKP)-although the largest,
with approximately 47,000 members, and most influ-
ential North European party-is beset by a deepening
internal schism that has greatly diminished its politi-
cal effectiveness. Party liberals, who are the majority,
are frustrated by the failure of Soviet officials to rein
in the dissident activity of the Stalinist hardliners.
The liberals have demonstrated a growing willingness
to act contrary to Soviet guidance and instructions.
The less influential Stalinist dissidents depend on
financial subsidies from the USSR and continue to
support Soviet policies, including those toward Af-
ghanistan and Poland in particular.
In Sweden, the CPSC maintains relations with both
the Leftist Communist Party (VPK) and the Commu-
nist Workers' Party (APK). The VPK, which has a
modest parliamentary delegation, projects the image
of a national Communist party with a democratic
attitude. It claims 18,000 members. The VPK has
often been outspoken in its criticism of Soviet policies.
The APK staunchly defends Soviet policy positions.
We do not know either the real or claimed size of the
APK's membership. Both parties are believed to
receive financial support from the USSR and its East
European allies. Neither party is particularly influen-
tial; chances for growth have been seriously hampered
by Soviet behavior in Afghanistan and Poland and by
a Soviet submarine's recent intrusion into Swedish
waters.
The Danish (9,000 members) and Norwegian (500
members) pro-Soviet Communist parties are small,
insignificant, and without parliamentary representa-
tion. They are unswerving defenders of Soviet interna-
tional interests; we think that they receive financial
support from the Soviet Bloc.
Cyprus and Greece. The Cypriot Progressive Party of
the Working People (AKEL) is a growing, well-
organized, well-disciplined Communist party (see fig-
ure 4). With approximately 12,000 members, it cap-
tured 33 percent, a plurality, of the popular vote in the
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May 1981 general election, giving it 12 seats in a 35-
member parliament. The party's growing electoral
strength results from its relatively moderate domestic
policies. The government already relies on AKEL for
informal support, and the party is a potential coalition
partner. In foreign policy, it follows a strictly pro-
Soviet line. Soviet financial support for AKEL mainly
consists of wine purchases from AKEL-dominated
enterprises.
The pro-Soviet Greek Communist Party-Exterior
won 11 percent of the vote in recent national elections
and is the third-largest party in the parliament (see
figure 4). It has an estimated membership of 33,500.
Nevertheless, although the party has substantial in-
fluence among intellectuals and students, its organiza-
tion is stagnant, which might prove a hindrance to
future electoral growth.
Austria, West Germany, Great Britain, and Holland.
The Austrian and West German Communist parties
with 25,000 and 49,000 members, respectively, are
pro-Soviet organizations with little or no electoral
support. The Soviets often use them-and the Greek
party as well-as conduits for propaganda and as
organizers of pro-Soviet, anti-US, anti-NATO activi-
ties in Western countries. These parties, along with
the Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin (formally
part of the East German Socialist Unity Party),
depend largely or entirely on Soviet or Soviet-Bloc
The British, Belgian, and Dutch Communist Parties,
small and without significant electoral prospects, also
receive some Soviet aid. These parties, however, sup-
port Eurocommunist foreign policies. They have suf-
fered internal rifts as a result of the Polish crisis. The
Belgian Communist Party may lose its hardline dissi-
dents because of its Eurocommunism. Both the Brit-
ish and Belgian parties exert some influence on the
left wing of their countries' labor and socialist parties.
The Middle East and North Africa (see table 3)
Iran. Tudeh, the Communist Party of Iran, is small,
with an estimated 1,500 hardcore members and lacks
non lar u ort but it is well organize
Although the Khomeini regime
has been more tolerant of Tudeh than of other leftist
groups, it has on several occasions moved against
Tudeh, even while expanding contacts with Moscow.
Both Iranian officials and opposition leaders claim
that Tudeh has proved useful to the Khomeini regime
by providing information on ethnic minority dissi-
dence, leftist opposition groups, and plotting of coups
by armed forces' members.)
Tudeh leader Kianuri firmly believes in following the
Soviets' lead (see figure 5). With their strong backing,
he took over the party in January 1979.
Party members are regularly trained at Soviet and 25X
East European party schools. Soviet financial assist-
ance to Tudeh may be as high as $1 million a month.
The Soviets also supply large amounts of newsprint-
a scarce commodity in revolutionary Iran-that al-
lows Tudeh to produce a wide range of publications
under both its own name and those of its several front
groups.
Tudeh has between 5,000 and 6,000 sympathizers.
The party emphasizes tight discipline and clandestine 25
organization.
Tudeh and Soviet objectives are promoted by a Sovi-
et-based and -controlled radio station, the National
Voice of Iran (NVOI), which presents itself as a
patriotic, non-Communist institution su porting the
Khomeini regime.
Tudeh's close identification with the Soviets means
that it is widely distrusted as an element of Soviet
foreign policy. The party, therefore, has been unable
to attract substantial popular support. Tudeh's efforts
to form a leftist front have consistently been rebuffed
by mainstream elements of other leftist groups. Party
members cannot run for office; no known party
member holds an official position.
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Nonruling Communist Parties in the Middle East and Africa
Estimated
Population
in 1981
Algeria (PAGS)
19,422,000
Egypt
43,300,000
Iran (Tudeh)
39,958,000
Iraq
13,575,000
Israel (RAKAH)
3,948,000
Jordan
3,443,000
Lebanon
3,097,000
Lesotho
1,365,000
Morocco (PPS)
21,590,000
Nigeria (SWPP)
79,682,000
Reunion
518,000
Saudi Arabia
9,686,000
Senegal (PIT)
5,834,000
South Africa
29,313,000
Sudan
19,312,000
9,107,000
6,663,000
Communist Party
Membership
Percentage of Votes
in Latest Election;
Seats in Legislature
Status
Orientation
450 est.
(1976)
Proscribed
Pro-Soviet
500 est.
(1979)
Proscribed
Pro-Soviet
1,500 est.
NA (1980); none
Legal
Pro-Soviet
2,000 est.
NA (1980); none
Legal
Pro-Soviet
1,500 est.
3.4 (1981); 4 of 120
Legal
Pro-Soviet
500 est.
(No elections since 1967)
Proscribed
Pro-Soviet
12,000 est.
NA (1972); none
Legal
Pro-Soviet
Negligible
(1970 elections nullified)
Proscribed
Pro-Soviet
2,750 est.
NA (1977); 1 of 264
Legal
Pro-Soviet
500 est.
(1979)
Proscribed
Pro-Soviet
2,000 est.,
10,000 claimed
NA (1981); none in Paris
Legal
Pro-Soviet
Negligible
(No elections scheduled)
Proscribed
Pro-Soviet
1,000 est.
NA (1978)
Legal
Pro-Soviet
500 est.
NA (1977)
Proscribed
Pro-Soviet
1,500 est.
(1980)
Proscribed
Pro-Soviet
5,000 est.
3.0 (1981); none
Legal
Pro-Soviet
100 est.
2.1 (1981); none
Legal
Pro-Soviet
In the long term, Tudeh could benefit from its own
organizational skills and the USSR's material sup-
port. Its political opportunities will expand if the
cleric-dominated government is unable to consolidate
its control. To pose a major threat to the regime,
however, Tudeh would need broad support from other
leftists and, possibly, the ethnic minorities.
Iraq. The small Iraqi Communist movement, long the
object of Baathist government repression, is split into
four competing factions, its members scattered with
most of the leadership in exile. It has little power or
influence inside Iraq
About 2,000 members of the Iraqi Communist
Party (CPI), the largest faction, are scattered
throughout the Arab states, the USSR, and Eastern
Europe (see figure 5). The CPI's Politburo operates in
Moscow and Prague.
The CPI publicly supports Soviet policies including
the invasion of Afghanistan. The Soviets minimize
their overt backing of the CPI to maintain and
strengthen good relations with Iraq's Baathist govern-
ment. In the summer of 1980 Moscow even attempted
unsuccessfully to engineer a reconciliation between
the CPI and the Baath Party. The CPI's usefulness to
Moscow is further weakened by tension between the
exiled leadership and members still inside Iraq
Morocco. Morocco's Communist party, the Party of
Progress and Socialism (PPS), was founded in 1974
and is permitted to function openly because of its
moderate stance (see figure 5). As a loyal opposition,
the PPS, for the most part, solidly endorses King
Hassan's policies and is considered to be an authentic
nationalist party; it holds one seat in Parliament.
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Some financial support for the party comes from the
Soviet Union. Active PPS members are estimated to
number fewer than 1,000
Egypt. There are several Communist parties operat-
ing illegally in Egypt and among Egyptian exiles in
Western Europe. The most important is the Egyptian
Communist Party (ECP), reestablished in 1975. The
party is pro-Soviet and has close ties to other pro-
Soviet Communist elements in the Middle East. It
probably has a few hundred members.
The party takes a pro-Soviet line. Although hard 2
evidence of Soviet financial support is not available,
some assistance may be provided through East Euro-
pean embassies.
Syria. The Syrian Communist movement is split into
four major factions, only one of which is legal; its total
membership is estimated at 5,000. In return for legal
status the Bakdash faction, with Soviet encourage-
ment, has until recently fully supported the foreign
and domestic policies of the ruling Baath Party (see
figure 5). Its support for the Assad regime, however,
has driven many of its members into more radical,
outlawed factions. In an attempt to stem the loss of
membership, the Bakdash faction issued a manifesto
in November 1981 criticizing the government's eco-
nomic policies and the lack of political freedom.
Assad promptly retaliated and removed all Commu-
nist party names from the list of candidates for the
People's Council.
The party takes a pro-Soviet line, but evidence of
have been provided through East European embassies,
however.
estimated
Lebanon. The Communist apparatus in Lebanon con-
sists mainly of the Lebanese Community Party (LCP)
and the Communist Action Organization CAO both
legal parties
The Sudan. The Sudanese Communist Party (SCP)
was the largest and best organized Communist party
in Africa until it was decimated by the arrest of many
of its members and the execution of its top officials
following an abortive Communist-led coup in 1971.
During the next few years, it recovered much of its
strength (total membership was estimated at 1,500 in
mid-1979) but was damaged badly by another govern-
ment crackdown following party-orchestrated antire-
gime demonstrations in August 1979.
25
25
have nea
rly 12,000 members, and in
April 1981 its militia had between 1,500 and 2,000
full-time members. If part-time militia members and
party loyalists were called to military duty, the total
strength of the LCP militia could reach approximate-
ly 10,000 men. The CAO developed from a group that
broke away from the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine in the early 1970s, but today it is
primarily a Lebanese rather than a Palestinian party
and draws its membership mainly from Shia Muslims
in southern Lebanon (see figure 5). In April 1982 full-
time CAO militia strength stood at between 300 and
500 men. This number could reach as high as 5,000
with the addition of part-time militia members and
other party activists.
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Leaders of Middle Eastern Communist Parties
Nur-ed-Din Kianuri, Secretary
General of the Tudeh Party of
Problems of Communism
Mushin Ibrahim, founder and
leader of the Communist Ac-
tion Organization in Lebanon.
Muhammad Aziz, Secretary
General of the Ira i Commu-
nist Party.
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Jordan. The Jordanian Communist movement, with
about 1,000 members, is split in several factions.-
Khalid Bakdash, chairman of Sovfoto, Eastfoto m
the pro-Soviet faction of the
Syrian Communist movement.
The Jordanian Communist Party (JCP), established in
195 1, has little influence. Its activities are tolerated
by the government, but it was outlawed for much of
its existence and forced to operate underground for
long periods of time. Receiving aid from Moscow, the
JCP endorses Soviet views on most regional issues. Its
support for the Soviet position on recognizing Israel's
right to exist has made it difficult to recruit followers
from Jordan's Palestinian population.
25,
Israel. The Israeli Communist Party (RAKAH) is
closely allied with Moscow; it supports the Soviets'
call for Israeli withdrawal to the pre-June 1967
borders, establishment of an independent West Bank-
Gaza Palestinian state, and recognition of the PLO as
the sole representative of the Palestinian people.
Because of its Soviet ties and extremist positions,
RAKAH is generally shunned b the other parties in
the 120-member Knesset 25
RAKAH's leadership is 25
almost exclusively ewis , but its backing comes
mainly from Israel's Arab citizenry, particularly Arab
residents of the northern Galilee district. It has 25,
approximately 1,500 members. 2
Sub-Saharan Africa (see table 3)
South Africa. The pro-Soviet South African Commu-
nist Party (SACP) is a small exile group with fewer
than 500 members. It has little popular support inside
South Africa. It does, however, exercise considerable
influence over the policies of the African National
Congress (ANC), South Africa's principal insurgent
group. The SACP also helps funnel Soviet funds to
the ANC. The ANC itself is not a Communist
organization, but it depends on the Soviet Union and
its allies for almost all of its military equipment and
training.
The SACP believes that the ANC's recent success in
carrying out terrorist activities will encourage more
violent forms of black opposition to white rule. Most
ANC attacks have been targeted against economic
facilities and government offices, and the group has
purposely avoided loss of life while carrying out its
operations. Many ANC black militants resent the
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influence of Joe Slovo and other SACP leaders, most
of whom are white, and some ANC members believe
that the SACP has sought to avoid casualties because
of its reluctance to endanger whites. The SACP,
however, is intent on maintaining influence in the
ANC and probably will eventually accept a more
indiscriminate terrorist campaign to appease militant
Although most of its efforts are devoted to assisting
the ANC, the SACP maintains its own organization
and leadership. Most members are probably in Lon-
don, but others who also belong to the ANC spend
much of their time in African capitals. The Soviet
Union is the primary financial backer of the SACP,
which often holds its Central Committee meetings in
Moscow or other East European capitals. The SACP
is consistently pro-Soviet and supports Moscow's posi-
tion on all international issues.
Senegal. None of Senegal's six legal Marxist parties
is a strong force in domestic politics. A small segment
of urban intellectuals are members; the overwhelm-
ingly rural population offers almost no support. More-
over, the parties' leaders are highly competitive, seem-
ingly unwilling to cooperate with each other. Of the
six parties, Moscow recognizes only the Parti de
l'Independence et du Travail (PIT), with probably
1,000 members. The PIT has close ties with Senegal's
militant teachers' union and in 1980 participated in
the union's various antigovernment activities.
Soviet support o e
Nigeria. Because of their conservative nationalism
and entrepreneurship, Nigerians have little interest in
Communism and other radical ideologies. There are
five small Marxist parties, all illegal. The Nigerian
Socialist Working People's Party (NSWPP), the larg-
est with about 500 members, plays an active legal role
in the Nigerian Labor Center. As the only party
officially recognized by Moscow, it receives Soviet
funds. The NSWPP, which does little more than
attend Soviet party congresses, has not played an
active role in labor strikes or other antigovernment
activity.
French Department of Reunion. The Parti Commu-
niste Reunionnaise (PCR) in the French Department
of Reunion is Sub-Saharan Africa's largest Commu-
nist party, claiming 10,000 members as of late 1981.
The PCR, founded in 1959, draws its support from
unskilled and unemployed workers. Maintaining close
ties with the French Communist Party, it has adopted
a relatively moderate political stance, advocating lim-
ited economic and social reforms and continued
French dependency. Internationally the PCR has
consistently supported the Soviets and probably re-
ceives their financial support
South Asia (see table 4)
India. The Communists have been unable to exploit
rapid economic and social change in India. The ruling
Congress Party's political domination, Indian cultural
institutions, and Hindu religious traditions are strong
barriers to Marxism. These factors have shaped the
character of Communist parties, forcing them to work
within the Hindu caste system and to participate in
parliamentary democracy.
Electoral support for the two major Communist par-
ties, the pro-Soviet Communist Party of India (CPI)
and the more independent Communist Party of India-
Marxist (CPM), remains weak. With fewer than a
quarter of a million party members, the CPI and
CPM constitute the leading opposition to Prime Min-
ister Gandhi's Congress (I) Party, but the two parties
do not act as a bloc. In the 1980 national elections,
they increased their parliamentary representation
from 29 to 48 seats, with most of the gains going to
the CPM (13 seats). The overall trend, however,
showed the Communists receiving a declining propor-
tion of the popular vote, which dropped from 9.8
percent in 1971 to 8.9 percent in 1980.
The Soviets can rely on the CPI's prompt obedience to
directives, but their ability to influence Gandhi
through the Communist parties has declined since the
1970s. The CPI and the Congress Party had main-
tained a close political relationship with CPI support
for the Prime Minister following from the 1971 Indo-
Soviet Friendship Treaty. The CPI paid a heavy price,
however, for its association with Gandhi's mid-1970s
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Secret
Estimated
Population
in 1981
Communist Party
Membership
Percentage of Votes
in Latest Election;
Seats in Legislature
Australia (SPA)
14,800,000
1,500 est.
NA (1980); none
Legal
Pro-Soviet
Bangladesh
90,680,000
2,500 est.
NA (1979); 1 of 300
Legal
Pro-Soviet
Burma (BCP-White
Flag)
35,289,000
3,000 claimed
Proscribed
Pro-Chinese
India (CPI)
(CPM)
692,400,000
-
150,000 est.
100,000 est.
2.6 (1980); 11 of 525
6.2 (1980); 35 of 525
Legal
Legal
Pro-Soviet
Independent
Indonesia
154,300,000
50 est.
(1977)
Proscribed
Pro-Soviet
Japan
117,700,000
440,000 claimed
10.4 (1980); 29 of 511
Legal
Independent
Malaysia
14,330,000
3,000 est.
(1978)
Proscribed
Pro-Chinese
Nepal
15,338,000
1,500 est.
NA (1981); none
Legal
Pro-Soviet
New Zealand (SUP)
3,117,000
200 est.
0.5 (1981); none
Legal
Pro-Soviet
Pakistan
90,439,000
300 est.
(1979 elections postponed)
Proscribed
Pro-Soviet
Philippines
50,100,000
200 est.
(1978)
Proscribed
Pro-Soviet
Sri Lanka
15,172,000
6,000 est.
1.9 (1977); none
Legal
Pro-Soviet
Thailand
48,787,000
1,000 est.
(1979)
Proscribed
Pro-Chinese
emergency rule, and its political credibility was al-
most destroyed in the 1977 elections that swept her
from power. The CPI thereafter adopted, probably
with Soviet approval, a line sharply critical of the
former Prime Minister.
Today the widening gulf between the Indian Commu-
nists and the Prime Minister displeases the Soviets,
who do not want to risk their special relationship with
India for a weak and divided Communist movement.
Gandhi herself exploits the fact that Soviet obliga-
tions to her government and India's strategic impor-
tance to the USSR far outweigh the USSR's sense of
responsibility to the Indian Communists
The Soviets are attempting to encourage cooperation
between the CPI and the stronger CPM, which not
only increased its parliamentary strength in the 1980
elections but also won control of two state govern-
ments (see figure 6). CPSU delegations sent to India,
as well as high-ranking CPSU officials stationed
spearheaded by the two Communist parties. 25
open up possibilities for a challenge from the left
there, have made it clear that Communist unity is a
major Soviet goal. While the Soviets recognize that
Gandhi currently dominates the national political
scene, they also believe that once she leaves office her
party might be weakened by internal strife that would 2
CPI and CPM statements indicate that the two
parties may be edging toward the cooperative rela-
tionship Moscow seeks. At a January 1982 congress,
the CPM called for "left democratic unity" and
endorsed pro-Soviet positions on several international
issues without the usual criticism of Soviet "revision-
ism" and the usual reference to evenhandedness be-
tween Moscow and Beijing. At its March congress,
the CPI reiterated its position on the need for a "left
and democratic" alternative to the Congress (I) Party
and for better cooperation with the CPM. The change
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C. Rajeswara Rao, General
Secretary of the Communist
Prominent Politburo members
of the Communist Party of In-
dia (Marxist). From left to
right: E. M. S. Namboodiripad,
Harkishan Singh Sur'eet, and
Promode Dasgupta.I
in the CPM's stance has removed a major impediment
to a rapprochement between the two Communist
parties and has given rise to speculation that they
might reunite.
Sri Lanka. The Communist Party of Sri Lanka/Mos-
cow (CP/M) is the largest (approximately 6,000 mem-
bers) and most important of Sri Lanka's numerous
Communist parties. During the 1970s it took part in
the united front government of Prime Minister Ban-
daranaike and exerted some influence on government
policy. Today the party is irrelevant politically; it has
one member in Parliament. There is no evidence that
the CP/M supports insurgency or terrorism in Sri
Lanka; it is known to oppose the Tamil separatist
movement.
Moscow continues to support the CP/M both finan-
cially and organizationally, but it has been unable to
resolve the leadership succession question that fol-
lowed the death of the party's founder last year. The
CP/M generally adheres to the Soviet foreign policy
line; it endorsed the invasion of Afghanistan and
totally supports Soviet disarmament policies. The
CP/M also has backed Soviet policy by mounting
propaganda campaigns against the United States for
alleged opposition to an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace
and for trying to establish a naval base on the island
of Diego Garcia.
Nepal. Political parties have been banned in Nepal
since 1960. The Communist movement is split into
numerous pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese parties, but in
recent months the line between them has become
increasingly blurred. Some pro-Chinese elements ap-
pear to be gradually moving toward the pro-Soviet
camp because of long-range Soviet attempts to unify
Nepalese Communists and i s fficient financial and
logistic support from Beijing
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Secret
Pakistan. The pro-Soviet Communist Party of Paki-
stan, with fewer than 300 members, has been under-
ground since it was banned in 1954. The rare public
statements attributed to party leaders have invariably
supported Moscow's line. What little foreign support
the party receives comes from the USSR, some
probably funneled through Afghanistan
Bangladesh. The Communist movement in Bangla-
desh is fragmented into some 30 factions of which
only eight deserve attention. The most important
Marxist groups are three pro-Chinese parties: the
United People's Party, the Sammyabadi Dal, and the
Ganotantrik Party. The Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal is
independent of both Beijing and Moscow. There are
four pro-Soviet parties: the Bangladesh Workers'
Party, the National Awami Party headed by Muzaf-
far Ahmed, the Jatiya Ekota Party, and the Commu-
nist Party of Bangladesh (CPB). The CPB appears to
be the only one completely under Moscow's control.
Communists have had little success at the polls; they
seem too weak and fragmented to pose a serious
threat to any Bangladesh Government, but occasional
acts of violence and strikes might cause temporary
disruption in some sectors of the economy.
Southeast Asia and the Pacific (see table 4)
Philippines. The Beijing-oriented Communist insur-
gency in the Philippines presents the greatest threat to
US interests in Southeast Asia. The 8,000-strong
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its
military arm, the New People's Army (NPA), have
grown in the past decade from a minor nuisance into a
potentially serious threat to President Marcos's gov-
ernment. Currently active in at least 43 of the coun-
try's 72 provinces, the party draws support from rural
people suffering from government corruption, military
abuses, and poor economic conditions, and from radi-
cal students and others seeking to limit US involve-
ment in the Philippines. Although the CPP is still
allied with Beijing on all international issues, it has 25
been funded almost entirely from domestic sources
since China withdrew its financial support in 1975.
In addition to the Maoist CPP, the Philippines also
hosts the quasi-legal, Soviet-influenced Philippine
Communist Party (PKP), which has been quietly
working to achieve full legalization. With approxi-
mately 200 members, the PKP poses little threat to
the Philippine Government. It has attracted followers
at the University of the Philippines, the country's
intellectual center. There is evidence that Moscow
would prefer the PKP to pursue Soviet objectives
more aggressively, but the party remains essentially
unresponsive except in its opposition to US military
bases in the Philippines, an issue that finds support
among youth and labor. The PKP receives an annual
Soviet subsidy of $75,000.
Burma. The Burmese Communist Party (BCP)-
second-largest nonruling Communist party in Asia
(with from 12,000 to 15,000 armed troops)-is the
region's major remaining Chinese client. Beijing pro-
vides most of the BCP's military aid-although the
party also uses revenues from domestic opium produc-
tion-and the BCP follows China's line on major
international issues. Termination of Chinese aid
would seriously weaken the BCP and might cause
some elements to seek Soviet or Vietnamese support-
a possibility Beijing uses to justify its continued
funding of the party. The BCP maintains a "liberated
area" in Burma along the Chinese border from which
it conducts an active insurgency against the govern-
ment and tries-unsuccessfully, so far-to exploit
Burmese economic and social ills.
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Thailand. Thailand has two Communist insurgen-
cies-a predominantly Sino-Thai group linked to Chi-
na and a small, new pro-Soviet, pro-Vietnamese group
comprised of ethnic Thais. The Communist Party of
Thailand (CPT) with its military arm, the Thai Peo-
ple's Liberation Army (TPLA), was originally a
branch of the Chinese Communist Party dedicated to
the overthrow of the Thai Government. Although
Chinese support for the party has diminished since the
establishment of diplomatic relations between Beijing
and Bangkok, the CPT-TPLA retains about 8,000
guerrilla fighters who wage jungle warfare against
Thai military forces. Support for the CPT appears to
be declining both because the party's Maoist line is
out of step with the intellectual left and because the
Thai Army has been somewhat successful in curtail-
ing the insurgency.
Malaysia. Outlawed in 1948 and militarily contained
by 1960, the predominantly ethnic Chinese Commu-
nist Party of Malaya continues a limited insurgency
from bases on the Thai side of the border. Split into
three factions in 1974, the party's total membership is
about 3,000. Beijing made a show of reducing its
support for the party in June 1981 by closing down its
own propaganda broadcasts while a rebel-controlled
station continued to operate.
Kampuchea. An anomaly is the ousted but interna-
tionally recognized Government of Democratic Kam-
puchea (DK), a guerrilla organization of 30,000 to
35,000 armed combatants primarily located along the
Thai border. With military assistance from Beijing,
the DK is fighting Vietnamese occupation forces and
the Vietnamese and Soviet-backed regime now con-
trolling Cambodia. Although the DK officially dis-
banded its Communist party in December 1981, the
move was probably merely a propaganda ploy; the
party is believed to remain intact within the DK
government-in-exile structure.
Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. The Japanese
Communist Party (JCP) is the third-largest nonruling
party in the world, the largest in Asia, and claims a
membership of 440,000 (see figure 7). Recognizing
that the Japanese people would never support a
violent revolution, the JCP seeks to establish itself as
a moderate, responsible party determined to defend
the national interest against both Communist and
Figure 7.
Kenji Miyamoto, Chairman of
the Japanese Communist Par-
ty.
Western governments. The JCP has asserted its inde-
pendence from both Moscow and Beijing and has
criticized the USSR for its invasion of Afghanistan
and interference in pressure on Poland.
While not directly supporting Soviet foreign policy
objectives, the JCP is engaged in political actions that
challenge US foreign and defense policy interests in
Japan. The JCP is seeking, for example, to broaden an
antinuclear, peace and disarmament campaign with
anti-US overtones. The party also carries out demon-
strations against US military activities in Okinawa,
hoping to bring about reexamination and possible
abrogation of the US-Japanese Mutual Security
Treaty. It opposes Japan's own defense buildup and is
attempting to upset the government's timetable.I
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Australia's Communist movement is split into four
parties: nonali ned pro-Soviet, pro-Chinese, and
Trotskyite.
The 1,500-member Socialist Par of Australia (SPAI
serves as the Soviet mouthpiece.
The SPA exerts more influence than its numbers
would indicate. It controls or strongly influences
several key unions, most of which are also affiliated
with the Australian Labor Party (ALP). Thus, the
SPA's influence is felt within the ALP.
There are five small Communist parties in New
Zealand. Of these, the New Zealand Socialist Unity
Party (NZSUP) is the largest (approximately 200
members), the most important, and the only Commu-
nist group in New Zealand supported by the Soviet
Union. Throughout its 15-year history, the NZSUP 25
has maintained close links with the Soviet Union,
totally endorsing its foreign policy positions. 2
Despite its small numbers and its tiny electoral
support, the NZSUP has gained significant influence 25
in the New Zealand trade union movement. Like their
Australian counterparts, members of the NZSUP are
active in supporting Soviet international front organi- 2
zations such as the World Peace Council and World
Federation of Trade Unions. 2
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Appendix A
CPSU Coordination and
Funding of Nonruling
Communist Parties
The days when the nonruling Communist parties
formed a network of obedient foreign agencies under
the tight control of Moscow "center" are long gone.
Today, CPSU relations with the nonruling parties are
more complex and differentiated; they are conducted
primarily on a bilateral basis but multilateral rela-
tions remain important. While the Soviets can still
count on the unquestioning loyalty of many parties,
their contact with several large independent parties
has assumed the form of bargaining relationships
between sovereign powers.
Like a conventional foreign office, the Department is
organized into geographical and functional compo-
nents; its geographical components are subdivided
into regional offices with individual country desks.
One of the largest sections of the Central Committee
apparatus, it may have as many as 100 professional
staffers. A special section, the Consultants Group,
managers and the Politburo and Secretariat.
The CPSU, nevertheless, enjoys a special status in the
international Communist movement as first among
equals. It derives considerable prestige from its associ-
ation with Lenin, the Bolshevik revolution, and its
long experience in "building socialism." A pro-Soviet
nostalgia that lingers in many nonruling parties en-
hances that prestige. More important, however, the
CPSU has at its disposal an array of organizational
and funding mechanisms to support its claim to the
"leading role" in the movement.
Coordination Mechanisms
The CPSU Central Committee maintains a large
organization and permanent staff-its International
Department-dedicated to the conduct of relations
with all nonruling parties around the world. The
International Department is an executive agency of
the CPSU Secretariat. Boris Ponomarev, an alternate
(nonvoting) member of the Politburo and a CPSU
secretary, oversees the daily operations of the Depart-
ment on behalf of the top Soviet leadership. Pono-
marev is ultimately responsible to CPSU General
Secretary Brezhnev. Until his death in January 1982,
senior ideologist Mikhail Suslov was Ponomarev's
mentor in the Secretariat. It is not clear whether
Suslov's role has passed to Konstantin Chernenko,
who has assumed many of Suslov's responsibilities, or
to Yuriy Andropov since his co-optation to the Secre-
tariat in May of this year.
The most important interparty matters are handled by
meetings between the top CPSU leadership and their
counterparts in the nonruling parties. At the next
level, the first deputy chief and five deputy chiefs of
the International Department, comparable to deputy
foreign ministers, serve as the CPSU's plenipotentia-
ries in conducting relations and negotiations with
foreign parties. The heads of the regional offices and
the desk officers comprise the party's "diplomatic
corps."
advises the Department's
25
2
The conduct of interparty relations requires a great 2
deal of travel from Moscow by Department officials
or to the Soviet capital by representatives of the
tment does no
nonruling parties because the Dep
maintain a large foreign presence 25
Aside from ad hoc exchanges between party delega-
tions, national and regional gatherings of the nonrul-
ing parties play an important role in the conduct of
CPSU foreign relations. The CPSU regularly sends
delegations to foreign parties' congresses and confer-
ences and receives foreign party delegations at its own
meetings in Moscow, providing an opportunity for
interparty discussions and consultations. It also sends
observers to regional conferences called at the initia-
tive of the participating parties. In some instances, the
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Press Conference at Paris Meeting Convened by Soviets
Georges Marchais speaks at a press conference held at the
conclusion of a meeting of 22 East and West European parties in
Paris in April 1980. The Soviet Union convened the meeting to
coordinate political and propaganda activities aimed at reversing
the NATO decision to modernize intermediate-range nuclear
forces. Soviet representative Boris Ponomarev is seen in the
middle.
Soviets have organized regional conferences in Eu-
rope, the Middle East, and Central America for the
express purpose of coordinating the policies and activ-
ities of the nonruling parties (see figure 8). Such
meetings frequently produce mixed results at best for
the Soviets' efforts to secure backing for their own
views. The CPSU remains stymied in its plan for
convening an international convocation of all ruling
and nonruling parties.
The only permanent multilateral organ of the interna-
tional Communist movement is the "theoretical" jour-
nal Problems of Peace and Socialism (also published
as World Marxist Review). Located in Prague, the
journal's headquarters is staffed by representatives
from among the 63 ruling and nonruling Communist
parties affiliated with its editorial council. The real
locus of power, however, appears to be the editorial
2
25
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Secret
board, which always has been headed by a high-
ranking Soviet member of the CPSU Central Com-
mittee and staffed by a sizable Soviet contingent.
Problems of Peace and Socialism appears to be under
the supervision of the International Department.
The Problems of Peace and Socialism organization
facilitates the CPSU's conduct of interparty relations.
It provides a regular mechanism for Soviet contacts
with other Communist parties and for exchanging
information and views on international and national
issues of concern to the whole movement as well as the
individual parties. The journal and its biweekly Infor-
mation Bulletin are used to disseminate Soviet views
on important issues and elucidate strategies and tac-
tics. Periodic conferences convened in Prague supple-
ment the system of bilateral and regional meetings
used by the Soviets to monitor the policies and
activities of the ruling and nonruling parties. The
most recent editorial conference, in November 1981,
was attended by 90 ruling and nonruling parties,
including even the independent Italian and Spanish
parties.
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Appendix B
CPSU Relations With
Non-Communist Parties and
International Front Organizations
Despite CPSU claims regarding the international
Communist movement's strength and growing influ-
ence on world affairs, the nonruling Communist par-
ties rarely serve as highly effective instruments of
Soviet foreign policy. The majority of these parties
find themselves in politically weak or legally restrict-
ed positions and therefore are unable to influence the
policies of their respective countries. The largest and
most influential parties tend to be also the most
independent and unwilling to do Soviet bidding.
To compensate for this, the Soviets find it expedient
to form temporary relationships or formal alliances
with non-Communist parties and groups that are
stronger than the indigenous Communist movement
and may even have access to governmental power.
These relationships may take the form of party-to-
party contacts conducted by the CPSU or they may
be carried out through a number of Soviet-sponsored
international front organizations. In either case, the
separate strands of these relationships come together
in the International Department.
The immediate tactical purpose behind Soviet con-
tacts with non-Communist parties is not so much
recruitment of these parties to the Soviet cause-
although in some cases that may be a maximal
objective-as it is to counter opponents of Soviet
policies by splitting their ranks and detaching some of
their supporters. When successful, these relationships
and alliances enable the Soviets to penetrate, influ-
ence, and even subvert the political process in a
country where there is no effective Communist party
or one willing to do Soviet bidding.
Relations With Socialist Parties
For many years, the CPSU has had strained relations
with the independent and nationalistic Japanese Com-
munist Party while enjoying rather good relations
with some elements of the Japanese Socialist Party.
In the late sixties and early seventies, the Soviets
began courting their historic enemies on the West
European left-the socialist and social democratic
parties. To some extent the decision to do so was
forced on the Soviets, since they had launched a broad
diplomatic offensive to reduce tensions with Western
Europe. Many socialist and social democratic parties
had become major coalition partners or key opposition
parties in several NATO countries, and the Soviets
recognized an opportunity to influence West Europe-
an policies and public opinion-and through them
US-Soviet relations-by establishing cooperative rela-
tionships with some leftwing leaders and members.
From Moscow's viewpoint, the utility of such relation-
ships lies in the fact that some socialists and social
democrats frequently formulate policies outside the
Atlantic Alliance framework that clash in significant
ways with NATO and US positions. The Soviets are
primarily interested in a tactical political, not ideolog-
ical, rapprochement with the democratic left by coor-
dinating views on detente, security, disarmament, and
North-South issues. They view this as complementing
a broader diplomatic effort to establish a network of
pan-European agreements and institutions on the
2:
25X
Senior members of the CPSU leadership and high-
ranking officials of the Central Committee's Interna-
tional and International Information Departments
serve as contacts with the socialist and social demo-
cratic parties. The policy of rapprochement with the
2 5:
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non-Communist left appears to be controversial in
Soviet policymaking circles, and it has produced
mixed results. Defending this policy before the most
recent CPSU congress, Brezhnev lauded the coopera-
tive relations the CPSU enjoys with a number of
parties while acknowledging that "many" socialists
are "afflicted with the virus of anti-Communism" and
"refer to so-called Atlantic solidarity to justify the
arms race." Soviet policy also suffers from several
conceptual and practical contradictions, the most
important being the resentment of some West Europe-
an Communist parties that oppose CPSU cooperation
with their chief rivals for influence on the left.I
A special target of Soviet influence is the Socialist
International, an organization that includes primarily
West European and Latin American socialist and
social democratic parties. The Soviets are interested
in the Socialist International because its executive
body has formulated policies on disarmament and
Third World issues that are at odds with West
European and US policies.
The Soviets have been particularly active in seeking to
formalize ties with the International's Advisory Coun-
cil on Disarmament. The Soviets have participated in
one of the Council's conferences, have maintained
regular contacts with its study group on disarmament,
and twice have hosted meetings with the Council in
Moscow (see figure 9). During both of these sessions,
the Council's leaders were received by Brezhnev and
Ponomarev for high-level discussions.
Relations With Afro-Asian "Vanguard" Parties
The CPSU, acting through the International Depart-
ment, maintains relations with parties, movements,
and guerrilla organizations throughout the Third
World's "zone of national liberation." ' The Soviet
' Soviet theoreticians usually exclude Latin America from this
"zone" because most of that continent's nations emerged from
colonial status during the 19th century and display a higher level of
political and economic development than the postcolonial countries
of Asia and Africa. The Soviets probably include Central America
in the zone of national liberation in practice, if not in theory, as
demonstrated by their current support for Marxist-Leninist guerril-
la movements there. They may eventually recognize the New Jewel
Movement in Grenada and the Sandinist National Liberation Front
of Nicaragua as "van uard" parties rulin "revolutionary-demo-
cratic" regimes.
Union's long-range political strategy depends in par-
ticular, however, on the development of close party-to-
party ties to a number of radical, socialist-oriented
regimes already in power. Of these, the most impor-
tant are those ruled by "vanguard" parties, which the
Soviets regard as prototypes for full-fledged Marxist-
Leninist party-states. The countries ruled by van-
guard parties include Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia,
Mozambique, South Yemen, Benin, and the Congo.
The Soviets see these regimes as models for future
political and economic development in Africa and
Asia through "close ties with the international Com-
munist movement and the CPSU." They also envision
the evolution of a bloc of states that will be linked to
the Soviet alliance system in Eastern Europe, Asia,
and Cuba through a network of party and governmen-
tal ties that will shrink further the sphere of Western
influence in the Third World. Georgiy Kim, a leading
Soviet expert on Third World affairs, outlined this
strategy saying that "a growth of the role of states
that now hold the left flank of socialist orientation can
be expected. Along with the strengthening of the
positions of the vanguard parties of the working
people and their turning into true Marxist-Leninist
parties, these states may come close to direct integra-
tion with the world socialist system, which in its turn
will be a fresh factor of a further deepening of the
crisis of present-day capitalism."
This integration process is under way. Representatives
of the vanguard parties participate in Soviet and East
European party congresses and in conferences and
publishing activities of Problems of Peace and Social-
ism. They are also active in various Soviet front
organizations. With the exception of Benin and the
Congo, since 1980 the vanguard party regimes have
been accorded observer status at annual meetings of
the Soviet Bloc's intergovernmental economic coordi-
nating body, the Council of Mutual Economic Assist-
ance. Moreover, all except Benin maintain a range of
political, economic, and security relations with the
USSR codified in special "friendship" treaties, and
most have provided the USSR with access to impor-
tant military basing facilities on their national territo-
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CPSU Officials and Socialist International Representatives in Moscow
CPSU officials and representatives of the Socialist International
meet in Moscow in February 1982. Seated on the left from front to
back are Leonid Brezhnev, Boris Ponomarev, Andrei Aleksandrov,
Brezhnev's chief foreign policy aide, and Vital''' Shaposhnikov
deputy chief of the International Department.
International Front Organizations
International front organizations play a vital role in
the USSR's conduct of public diplomacy and propa-
ganda (see table 5). They are used to mobilize public
opinion in support of policies the Soviets favor and
against those the Soviets oppose. The front organiza-
tions present themselves as genuinely public, interna-
tional, and nonpartisan, and thus they are able to
attract support from a wider range of political, social,
professional, and religious groups than if they were
identified openly as Communist and pro-Soviet.
The International Department is the ultimate source
of Soviet funding and coordination for the activities of
the international front groups. The Soviets do not
acknowledge this publicly, and the connection be-
tween the CPSU and the fronts is concealed by using
Soviet "public" organizations as conduits for funds
and directives from the International Department.
Thus, for example, the direct link between the inter-
national Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization based in
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Soviet International Front Organizations
Year
Founded
Headquarters
Claimed
Membership
Number of
Affiliates
Country
Affiliates
Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organi-
zation
1957
Cairo
No data
87
Christian Peace Conference
1958
Prague
No data
At least 80
International Association of
Democratic Lawyers
1946
Brussels
Ca. 25,000
Nearly 80
International Organization of
Journalists
1946
Prague
Over 180,000
Over 120
International Union of Students
1946
Prague
Over 10,000,000
Ca. 118
Women's International Democratic
Federation
1945
East Berlin
Over 200,000,000
129
114
World Federation of Democratic
Youth
1945
Budapest
World Federation of Scientific
Workers
1946
Paris
World Federation of Trade Unions
1945
Prague
World Peace Council
I
Cairo and the International Department is the nation-
al Soviet organization of the same name.
0
The World Peace Council (WPC), headquartered in
Helsinki, is the largest, most influential, and best
endowed (nearly $50 million per year) of the interna-
tional front groups. It conducts propaganda and politi-
cal action campaigns on a worldwide basis on every
international, political, and security issue of interest
to the USSR. The WPC also serves as a clearinghouse
and coordination mechanism for all other front orga-
nizations, whose executive officers sit on the WPC's
presidential committee.
Romesh Chandra, a veteran official of several Soviet
front organizations and a former Central Committee
member of the pro-Soviet Indian Communist Party,
has been President of the WPC since 1977 (see figure
10). The organizational link between the WPC and
the International Department is the Soviet Committee
for the Defense of Peace. Oleg Kharkhadin, a staff
officer of the International Department, is a vice
president of the Soviet Committee. In Helsinki, the
WPC secretariat includes one full-time Soviet repre-
sentative and another Soviet official serves as a vice
president. Vitaliy Shaposhnikov, a deputy chief of the
International Department is a member of the WPC's
presidential committee.
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 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6
Secret
The World Peace Council, the Most Important Soviet International Front Organization
Leonid Brezhnev presents an
Order of Lenin to Romesh
Chandra, an Indian Commu-
nist who serves as President of
the World Peace Council.l-
WPC activities are planned a year in advance and
executed according to a "program of action" worked
out in Moscow and Helsinki. While the themes of the
yearly programs vary, they are almost always decid-
edly anti-US and anti-NATO. So far this year, the
WPC has held numerous worldwide rallies against
US policy toward El Salvador and a conference in
India on creating a "zone of peace" in the Indian
Ocean that was attended by representatives of some
20 countries. The primary emphasis in the 1982 plan
is on preventing implementation of NATO's decision
Members of the World Peace
Council's Presidential Commit-
tee assemble at the US Capitol
during a 1978 visit to Washing-
ton. WPC President Chandra is
in the middle of the second row
regarding modernization of intermediate-range nucle-
ar weapons. The plan calls for a series of national
events (demonstrations, seminars, and colloquiums)
opposing the NATO decision and international pro-
test meetings of mayors, elected officials, and "peace
forces" from West European towns and regions where
new US intermediate-range missiles are to be de-
ployed.
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Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6