NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY THURSDAY 3 DECEMBER 1981

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83T00296R000500030013-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2009
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: December 3, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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WFI~ Central
Intelligence
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National Intelligence Daily
Thursday
3 December 1981
Top Secret 25X1
rn ivin Rr_?Rnrr
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Poland: Response by Solidarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Italy: Peace Movement Grows . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . 3
France-Chad: Concerns in Paris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Guatemala: Counterinsurgency Successes . . . . . . . . . . 5
Japan: Addressing the Trade Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
USSR-Namibia: Concern Over Movement Toward Settlement . . 7
Spain: New Cabinet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Afghanistan-Pakistan: Border Incident . . . . . . . . . . 8
South Africa: "Independence" for Ciskei . . . . . . . . . 9
South Africa - Seychelles: Release of Mercenaries . . . . 9
Pakistan: Student Unrest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Special Analysis
USSR-Afghanistan: Military Balance Sheet . . . . . . . . . 11
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The union's response could take the form of a work
stoppage limited to the Warsaw area or a more general 25X1
strike of short duration. The Warsaw branch may take
action independent of the national Solidarity response
because it has been directly involved from the outset
with the protesting cadets and thus has more at stake.
can use force against other strikers with impunity.
The meeting today of the leadership will be heated,
and Walesa probably will have to fend off demands from
militants for a counterreaction stronger than he is will-
ing to accept. All the union leaders will agree that
some response is necessary in order to maintain their
credibility and not to give the regime the impression it
the country objected to the government's action.
to allow tempers to cool. He also may have needed time
to determine how strongly Solidarity chapters throughout
Union leader Walesa yesterday apparently postponed
a meeting of the union's leadership for a day in order 25X1
measures to discourage such actions by the government.
to ay of the regime s use of force yesterday against cadet fire-
fighters in Warsaw but are likely to opt for more moderate counter-
POLAND: Response by Solidarity
Solidarity leaders probably will issue a strong condemnation 25X1
d
The regime may have decided. on its first major use
of force to demonstrate to the population, to Warsaw
Pact Foreign Ministers meeting in Bucharest, and to Pact
Defense Ministers meeting in Moscow its resolve to oppose
future strikes. The government also has been sensitive
to Solidarity activities in the Ministry of the Interior
and probably felt compelled to resist the cadets' demand
out of fear of setting a bad example.
Conservatives in the regime may have pressed for the
use of force in the hope that Solidarity would react
with a strike. Such a counteraction could be used as
additional justification by parliament to adopt an anti-
strike law, which the party's Central Committee endorsed
Top Secret
--continued
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3 December 1981 25X1
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2 25X1
3 December 1981
Jaruzelski's call for a Front of National Accord.
For the longer term the government's action seems
likely to sour the atmosphere at the working level in
negotiations between the regime and the union. Solidar-
ity probably will be even less responsive to party leader
also were at the scene and available if needed.
the academy. Some 12 truckloads of internal security
troops subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, moreover,
Troops Not Used
There is no evidence that Polish military troops
actively participated in the assault by Polish riot
police on the firefighters' academy. Polish military
police did, however, assist in blocking streets around
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The peace movement has developed into a substantial political
force since Zast summer, but the aovernment's commitment to deploy
cruise missiles remains firm.
The demonstrations over the past few days in Palermo
and Florence are the latest of a series that began two
months ago and have surprised many politicians and labor
leaders by their size. Although the Communists have
played an important role in organizing most of these
demonstrations, non-Communist support also has been
widespread. Many Socialists and Christian Democrats
have joined the campaign in an effort to control it and
to prevent the Communists from monopolizing the peace
issue.
This strategy of leading the demonstrations in a
less radical direction has had only limited success
because Communist participants are exploiting public
interest in various versions of the "zero option." Many
of the slogans at demonstrations portray prevention of
INF deployment in Italy and dismantlement of Soviet
SS-20s as separate goals.
Government supporters, on the other hand, contend
that INF deployment should be canceled only if all the
SS-20s are dismantled first. The Communists, who are
using the peace issue to embarrass the Christian Demo-
crats and Socialists, tend to emphasize the need to stop
INF.
Despite the gains by the peace movement and the
desire of politicians to become part of it, it has not
had as strong and immediate an impact on security policy
in Italy as in the Netherlands and Belgium. The commit-
ments of the Christian Democrats and the Socialists to
INF are based primarily on their determination to prove
their loyalty to NATO--a factor each hopes will strengthen
its prospects for leading future governments. Peace
activity could threaten these ambitions and weaken the 25X1
commitments to INF only if such activity intensifies
substantially and the government parties can no longer
draw much attention to Soviet armaments.
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Libyans a new, opportunity to intervene militarily in Chad.
French officials are concerned that the recent successes in
Chad of the forces under insurgent leader Habre and the continuing
differences over the role of the OAU peacekeeping force may offer
several towns in eastern Chad.
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Units loyal to former Defense Minister Habre are the
best led, most disciplined force in the country. They 25X1
have taken advantage of the Libyan withdrawal to occupy
The French Government is trying to restrain Habre
because it fears the impact of these successes on the
delicate political balance between Habre and President
French may hope that these efforts, co ined with 25X1
increased aid for Chad and the appointment of a new
ambassador to N'Djamena, will seem responsive to Goukouni's
rising concerns about Habre and encourage the two factions
to negotiate. 25X1
rospects for a reconciliation, however, remain
The French also are worried by a growing contro-
versy between Goukouni and the OAU peacekeeping force.
Goukouni wants the force to maintain the security of the
entire country, to reorganize Chad's Army and establish
legitimate government, and to replace the Libyans as a
military counterweight to Habre.
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Mexico
n cessepresenlation is
drily aulhorital ive
BeIFze
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GUATEMALA: Counterinsurgency Successes
Western Highlands.
The Largest offensive conducted to date by the Guatemalan
military apparently has disrupted a major guerrilla front in the 25X1
caches and extensive underground tunnels.
have killed 55 guerrillas and reportedly dismantled
several base areas that included large food and arms
Army Chief of Staff Lucas recently initiated a
major sweep operation in response to increased guerrilla
attacks on population centers in the departments of
Chimaltenango and southern Quiche. The Army claims to
Army officers, surprised by the scope of the insur-
gent network, now believe that they have seriously un-
derestimated guerrilla potential. The pattern of recent
guerrilla raids, coupled with the materiel found in the
insurgent bases, suggests that the guerrillas' strategy
of isolating part of the western Highlands by cutting the
Inter-American Highway was making headway. The fact that
the guerrillas have a communications capability was re-
vealed for the first time when the Army captured three
radios.
To gain backing for its counterinsurgency program,
the Army is continuing to try to improve its image with
civilians. This effort is being aided by guerrilla
violence, which is causing peasants to look increasingly
to the military for help.
The military, however, still has to overcome major
shortcomings in training, transportation, and communica-
tions. In addition, the recent sweep underscored de-
ficiencies in the coordination of infantry, artillery,
and air forces.
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JAPAN: Addressing the Trade Issue
Prime Minister Suzuki is moving swiftly, now that
his new cabinet is in place, to demonstrate his desire
to tackle the trade problem before the opening of US-
Japanese talks next week. He has instructed his cabinet
to agree by 21 December on a plan for unilaterally imple-
menting in April 1982 all tariff cuts agreed to in the
Tokyo round that are scheduled for fiscal 1982 through
the longer term, but they will have no effect in 1982.
In addition to convening a cabinet council to seek
solutions for trade issues, Suzuki has established an
ad hoc group of senior members within the Liberal Demo-
cratic Party to build a consensus in favor of easing
nontariff barriers. He also has involved business
representatives--who constitute a major pressure group
in the party--by asking a commission headed by a busi-
ness leader to examine ways to reduce the barriers.
These measures may reduce Japan's trade imbalance in
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USSR-NAMIBIA: Concern Over Movement Toward Settlement
among black Africans in favor of a Namibian settlement
The Soviets appear concerned about an apparent shift
as
on its territory and would maintain economic links
South Africa.
part ot a settlement, a SWAPO-led independent Namibia
would not allow South African dissidents to have bases
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area to oppose a compromise settlement. A visit by a
high-level Soviet party delegation to Mozambique last
month was at least partly intended to encourage Maputo
Moscow apparently is also encouraging others in the
The cabinet reorganization announced by Prime
Minister Calvo Sotelo on Monday probably will strengthen
his hold over the ruling Center Democratic Union Party.
Personal rivalry and policy conflicts between Calvo
Sotelo and former Prime Minister Suarez recently have
become more serious. Although the Prime Minister has
made some concessions to Suarez and the Center Democratic
left, the new cabinet lineup does not eliminate the
party's deep divisions. No changes were made in the
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, which are
overseeing Spain's accession to NATO and bilateral treaty
negotiations with the US.
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Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
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increasingly frequent border incidents.
sponse to growing public indignation in Pakistan over
Two Afghan helicopter gunships reportedly attacked
several targets in Pakistan's Baluchistan Province yes-
terday, killing five persons and wounding others.
Islamabad, in its strongest protest so far of such border
violations by Afghan or Soviet aircraft, has indicated
that it is considering "retaliatory steps." President
Zia's government recently liberalized its standing rules
for challenging intruding aircraft to permit engagements
closer to the border. The change may have been in re-
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South Africa: Homelands
Ilakyadiktidd.
(Salt Pans;
Orange
Free State
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
debele Kangwane
Province boundary
Independent homeland (not
recognized by the US)
Non-independent homeland
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SOUTH AFRICA: "Independence" for Ciskei
Ciskei will become South Africa's fourth "independ-
ent" black homeland tomorrow. By declaring homelands
such as Ciskei independent, Pretoria hopes to silence
black demands for a share of power. Such independence
will be largely nominal, however, for the new government
will remain highly dependent on white South African ad-
visers and resources. Ciskei will be the legal home of
2.1 million blacks, although about two-thirds of them
will for now remain in white South Africa. Pretoria
will continue to provide 85 percent of the new govern-
ment's operating revenues, but these funds will do lit-
tle to improve Ciskei's meager economic prospects.
South Africa's decision to release outright 39 of
the 44 mercenaries detained following the coup attempt
in Seychelles will be widely viewed as proof of Pretoria's
involvement in the operation. The remaining five, includ-
ing the group's alleged leaders, face provisional charges
of kidnaping--not hijacking--and are free on bail. The
quick release of the mercenaries underscores Pretoria's
disdain for world opinion.
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Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
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Government authorities are having to deal with
growing clashes between Islamic and leftist student
groups. The most serious trouble is in Sind Province,
where student issues are colored by growing regionalist
sentiments and strong support for the opposition Pakistan
People's Party.
The authorities appear to have the
current unrest under control, but the regime could be-
come hard pressed if student disturbances spread to
Karachi and Punjab Province.
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Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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SPECIAL ANALYSIS
USSR-AFGHANISTAN: Military Balance Sheet
The USSR can claim few military successes for the second year
of its occupation of Afghanistan.
18,000 reinductions from a pool of about 300,000 veterans.
Afghan Army forces continued to perform poorly.
Efforts to extend enlistments and recall former service-
men resulted in a higher desertion rate and yielded only
3 December 1981
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Top Secret
The Insurgents
The guerrillas are better
armed than
they were a
year ago and are making better
use
of their weapons.
Antitank rockets and plastic mines were especially ef-
fective against Afghan and
Soviet
supply columns.
the
insurge
nts dominated over
60 percent of the country's distri
cts, compared to about
40 percent last year. The insurge
nt movement remains
fragmented, however, and there have been occasional
armed clashes between rival groups. While their differ-
ences show no sign of diminishing, some groups have been
willing to submerge them temporarily to attack Soviet
and Afghan units.
in the western and northwestern provinces.
provinces and increase in the areas of lower elevation
The stalemate probably will continue during the
winter, when bad weather will hinder military operations.
If the pattern of last winter is repeated, insurgent
activities will decrease in the eastern and northeastern
down the insurgency without large-scale reinforcement.
A substantial increase in Soviet forces on the scale
needed to crush the insurgency seems unlikely. Evidence 25X1
suggests that the Soviets are searching for a successful
political/military strategy that will allow them to wear
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