NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY SATURDAY 5 SEPTEMBER 1981

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83T00296R000400020023-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 15, 2010
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: September 5, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of Top aecret
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Saturday
5 September 1981
Top Secret
Copy 229
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Poland: Kania Continues Tough Line . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Angola : MIGs Move South . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Egypt: Repercussions of the Crackdown. . . . . . . . . . . 4
Lebanon: Conciliation Committee Meeting. . . . . . . . . . 5
USSR-Iran: Status of Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
UK: Trades Union Congress Meeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Kampuchea: Tentative Coalition Agreement . . . . . . . . . 8
Southern Africa: More Anti-US Incidents Possible . . . . . 8
Bolivia: New President . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Czechoslovakia: Husak's Travels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Special Analyses
Poland: Solidarity's First National Congress . . . . . . . 10
EC: Prospects for Political Cooperation. . . . . . . . . . 13
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POLAND: Kania Continues Tough Line
Party Leader Kania's warning on Thursday that the government
would not rule out implementing a state of emergency in the event
of a strike by radio and television workers underlines his deter-
mination to prevent disruption of the electronic media.
This is the first time that Kania has publicly
referred to a state of emergency. In late August he
said that the regime would not allow a radio and televi-
sion strike. In the face of a nationwide strike of radio
and television, the government might initially declare
a state of emergency only in that industry.
Solidarity has not yet reacted to Kania's statement.
Pressure for a strike has come from the Solidarity chapter
of radio and television technicians and not from the
national leadership. On Thursday Solidarity chief Walesa
said that the union would use all legal means to gain 25X1
The union's national leadership may have difficulty,
however, in controlling the technicians. In addition to
their general complaint about limited union access to the
media, the technicians believe that the government has not
negotiated honestly and are angered by restrictions on 25X1
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Angolan fighter aircraft have been moved closer to the scene
Satellite photography of yesterday showed that 13
MIG-21 fighters have been moved from Luanda to Lubango,
some 240 kilometers from the Namibian border. The
Lubango airfield is defended by SA-3 and possibly SA-9
surface-to-air missiles, as well as ZSU-23/4 antiaircraft
guns. Angolan MIGs had not been seen at Lubango since
October 1979; until then, 5 or 6 fighters were usually
Cuban pilots generally operate Angolan MIGs and
probably are manning these aircraft. While they could
pose a hazard to unescorted South African transports and
attack aircraft, they would be outmatched in a clash with
South African Mirages, which are based at Ondangua and
Grootfontein. 25X1
Elsewhere, Angolan charges that the South Africans
have entered Cuando Cubango Province in southeastern
Angola could indicate that UNITA guerrillas have stepped
up fighting in the wake of the South African incursion to
the west. The South Africans would be less likely to
advance into this largely roadless province, where SWAPO
is not located, but they could be resupplying UNITA. The
guerrilla organization reportedly was preparing last
week to increase its operations. South Africa has supported
UNITA over the past five years.
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EGYPT: Repercussions of the Crackdown
The demonstrations in Cairo yesterday are likely to be
followed by additional protests as opposition forces regroup in
the aftermath of the government's crackdown.
Muslim fundamentalists staged limited demonstrations
in several parts of the capital to protest the arrests of
government critics ordered by President Sadat on Wednesday.
At least 60 demonstrators were detained. Security forces
also closed the offices of Egypt's small pro-Soviet
leftist party. The Egyptian press indicates that more
than 1,000 people have been arrested since Wednesday. 25X1
The US Embassy reports that even some of Sadat's
supporters are questioning the extent of the crackdown.
Many Egyptians are worried that Sadat has abandoned his
commitment to liberalize the political system.
Although virtually every major leader of the funda-
mentalist opposition apparently has been arrested, the
Muslim Brotherhood and other groups retain the ability to
cause more serious trouble. The opposition probably wants
to learn what further steps Sadat will reveal in his
speech today and how long the regime plans to hold those
arrested before it considers more violent protests. In
the past, most dissidents have been freed after questioning
or eventually released by the courts for lack of evidence.
5X1
2
Sadat has considerably strengthened Egypt's internal
security forces since the riots in Cairo in January 1977,
and he can count on their loyalty for the time being.
He also retains substantial popular support among Egyptians
who oppose religious extremism. Widespread and prolonged
unrest would test the allegiance of his security units,
however, and could force him to back away from the crack-
down.
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LEBANON: Conciliation Committee Meeting
The Arab Conciliation Committee on Lebanon continues to focus,
at Syrian insistence, on the issue of Christian Phalange ties with
Israel and has again deferred efforts to get a dialogue started
between the Lebanese factions. 25X1
The committee ended two days of meetings in Beirut
yesterday by calling for a ban on the import of weapons
into Lebanon for all armed factions and by announcing its.
intention to form a group to monitor the Lebanese coast
and ports. The committee is not scheduled to convene
again until early November, when it hopes to begin talks 25X1
on fostering a national dialogue.
The decision to establish the monitoring group is meant
to meet Syrian demands for a.mechanism to ensure that no
weapons or ammunition from Israel reaches the Phalange.
Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Lebanon, and the Arab League
Secretary General will be represented on the group.
Phalange militia chief Bashir Jumayyil agreed to the
plan after meeting with the Syrian representative to the
committee's ambassadorial group Thursday, his first direct
contact with the Syrians since the committee began its
current efforts early this summer. Jumayyil told the US
Ambassador that he and the Syrian representative had agreed
to renew the "media truce" between the two sides and to
open all five major crossings between Muslim West and
Christian East Beirut. 25X1
Jumayyil also told the Ambassador he had held off
demands by the Syrians that their troops be allowed to
patrol Christian-controlled ports. Nevertheless, Damascus
probably still hopes to use the monitoring arrangement
eventually to insert some Syrian 25X1
the Christian-controlled coast.
The Christians are likely to stall, however, on
allowing the inspections because the monitoring group's
mandate apparently fails to address the issues of arms
shipments across the Syrian border--a major transshipment
route for Lebanese Muslim factions--and arms delivered to 25X1
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Moscow is citing increased instability in Iran as evidence
of the need for the regime to rely on the pro-Soviet Tudeh
Party.
On Monday, the National Voice of Iran, the Soviet-
sponsored Persian-language radio, stated
that
the recent
bombings indicate that the government is
"not
in control."
It urged the regime to divorce itself fro
m bli
nd fanaticism
and to rely on "Sincere Loyalists"--the S
oviet
s' catchword
for Tudeh.
25X1
Since the revolution, the Soviets have encouraged
Tudeh to align itself with the Khomeini regime in order
to protect itself and to improve its political standing.
They may now hope that the deteriorating situation will
lead the fundamentalists to seek additional support and
that Tudeh will gain influence as a result. Moscow
also may hope that domestic turmoil will induce Tehran
to request more Soviet economic assistance and perhaps
political support.
The Soviets, meanwhile, continue to emphasize the
alleged US role in the bombing last Sunday. TASS has
replayed Iran's charges of US complicity, and Pravda
yesterday paraphrased claims made by Iran's new Prime
Minister Mahdavi-Kani that "foreign agents" were re-
sponsible for the bombing and quoted an Iranian Govern-
ment statement that the US is Iran's "greatest enemy."
6 25X1
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UK: Trades Union Congress Meeting
The British Trades Union Congress, which meets next week, is
likely to move to the Left on defense policy and to intense
criticism of Prime Minister Thatcher's economic program.
The unions appear ready to endorse unilateral
nuclear disarmament; they are particularly unwilling to
support the expenditures for nuclear weapons at a time
of high unemployment and social spending cuts. Unions
affiliated with the Labor Party cast bloc votes that
are usually decisive at party conferences, and an endorse-
ment of disarmament would thus be a victory for Labor
leftists, who will push for a similar resolution at the
annual party conference later this month.
The Congress also will debate important Labor Party
organizational and leadership questions. Union votes
will be decisive later this month, for example, in the
contest between moderate Denis Healey and leftwinger
Tony Benn for the deputy leadership of the party. Most
union leaders are worried that a victory by Benn would
further split the party and cause more defections to the
new Social Democratic Party, but Benn is working hard to
bring rank-and-file pressure on leaders who oppose him.
The unions will find it easier to unite in criticizing
Thatcher. The Congress will reject wage restraint, demand
massive reflation of the economy, and oppose restrictions
on the closed shop. 25X1
The Congress probably will not be able to back its
words with action. Divisions among member unions and
the debilitating struggle within the Labor Party probably
will hamper efforts to mobilize for more effective action
against the government. 25X1
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KAMPUCHEA: Tentative Coalition Agreement
The joint statement signed yesterday in Singapore
by Prince Sihanouk, Khmer People's National Liberation
Front leader Son Sann, and Democratic Kampuchea leader
Khieu Samphan is unlikely to lead to an effective
coalition. The agreement merely expressed a desire for
a coalition government and set up a committee to explore
the prospect. Nevertheless, the agreement--achieved only
after intense pressure from ASEAN--probably will keep
the lid on public rivalry, at least temporarily, and
allow the three groups to pursue their separate interests.
ASEAN will use the agreement to help Democratic Kampuchea
retain its seat at the UN and as a basis for obtaining
wider material and political support for anti-Vietnamese
resistance forces. 25X1
SOUTHERN AFRICA: More Anti-US Incidents Possible
The bomb that caused minor damage to the US cultural
center in the capital of Lesotho on Thursday may have
been set off to protest the US veto of the UN Security
Council resolution condemning the South African move
into Angola. The potential for an anti-US backlash is
growing throughout black Africa and is particularly high
among South Africa's immediate neighbors because of the
presence of South African refugees and insurgents. The
media in these countries--and in South Africa--are claiming
that the US has an implicit partnership with South Africa.
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The government of newly installed President General
Torrelio probably will be weak and will not last long.
Torrelio lacks the support of several Army units as well
as the Air Force and the Navy. He is fronting for more
powerful--but internationally unacceptable--officers
loyal to deposed strongman General Garcia Meza. The
officers believe that Torrelio's relatively clean record
will help secure foreign financial aid, which they see
as crucial for avoiding economic collapse.
On Monday, Czechoslovak leader Husak begins a one-
week visit to Libya, Ethiopia, and South Yemen to promote
closer political and economic ties. He probably will be
the ranking Soviet bloc representative at the celebration
of the seventh anniversary of the Ethiopian revolution
on 12 September and is likely to endorse the tripartite
alliance concluded by these countries last month. The
Czechoslovaks hope the visit will facilitate new trade
and arms agreements. Since the late 1970s, Prague has
provided weapons and military training to Libya and other 25X1
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POLAND: Solidarity's First National Congress
The congress is a small but important step in the gradual
transformation of a revolutionary social movement into a more co-
herent organization. Although it will not change the heterogeneous
nature of the 10-million-member union, the congress will help create
greater consensus on union goals and a firmer institutional base
from which to press for reforms. Solidarity's Zack of coordination
between national and regional leaders will persist, however, and
the country's economic problems will cast a shadow over the gather-
ing. The delegates probably will advocate a far-reaching form of
worker self-management as a solution to the crisis. Solidarity
leader WaZesa will be reaffirmed as the union's chief spokesman
despite some criticism of his leadership.
The first session opens today, as more than/900
delegates gather in Gdansk for three days of debate on
organizational and substantive issues. A second session
at the end of September will elect union officials and
adopt formal policies. Between the two sessions, work-
ing groups will draft recommendations on organizational
and substantive problems.
Union activists are likely to do a great deal of
electioneering. The leadership wants this period to be
one of relative calm, but militants may try to work for
favorite candidates or causes by pressing disputes with
the regime.
The most controversial organizational issue will be
the authority of the national union leadership in Gdansk.
Walesa has previously criticized excessive centralization,
but he now believes that the center needs more power to
focus union strength on key issues and to prevent local
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concerns from dissipating the union's strength. He and
his adherents believe that unsanctioned local strikes
provide the government an opportunity to divide Solidarity. 25X1
Strong regional bosses such as Zbigniew Bujak, the
militant head of the Warsaw chapter, are not willing to
relinquish their authority to the center, arguing that
the regional organizations are closer to workers and can
be more responsive to their needs. The congress will not
resolve this debate. The national leadership may be
given additional power, but the regional chiefs will re-
tain considerable influence and the union's behavior
will continue to be erratic.
The delegates will be asked to adopt official posi-
tions on numerous issues, ranging from the need for more
hospitals to whether the union should create a political
party. Walesa will try to steer a middle course but
may have trouble reining in the militants. Although the
union seems prepared to push especially hard for a far-
reaching system of worker self-management, there is grow-
ing pressure from local activists who want to assert the
authority of the workers in the factory without waiting
for a union-government accord.
The congress will for the first time elect the
union's national leadership. The current leadership
includes many of the strong regional leaders, and most
will probably be returned to office.
There are no serious challengers to Walesa, who is
still seen by most Poles as the embodiment of Solidarity,
but he probably will be criticized as too autocratic and
too willing to compromise with the regime. Some also
dislike his close ties with the Church and his reliance
on Catholic advisers. Several regional leaders are espe-
cially unhappy about his habit of bypassing them and
appealing directly to workers.
Both the Church and the government would like the
moderates in the union to have the upper hand. They have
little ability to influence events directly, although
influential members such as Walesa are willing to listen
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Solidarity will be symbolized by the celebration of an
opening mass for the congress by Archbishop Glemp.
Soviet leaders are worried that the congress will
make Solidarity institutionally more capable of challeng-
ing the authority of the Communist Party. The Soviet
trade union newspaper Trud, for example, on Wednesday
attacked Solidarity's proposed charter, contending that
the union has transformed itself into an opposition force
and that its "extremist wing" aspires to destroy "social-
ism" in Poland and seize power. The Soviets will be
quick to note any signs that Solidarity is moving in
this direction and to demand that Polish leaders oppose
such trends firmly.
Moscow still hopes that Solidarity's political in-
fluence will gradually be reduced and that the regime
will eventually get control of the union. The Soviets
have tried to avoid alienating Solidarity's rank and file
by focusing its harshest criticism on "extremist" leaders,
and they have refrained from attacking Walesa by name.
This restraint suggests that the USSR is resigned to the
continued existence of Solidarity and sees Walesa as a
moderating figure.
The congress will not change the dynamics of the
Polish "revolution from below." The union may come out
of its month-long introspection with a better sense of
mission, but it will still face a government intent on
preserving its own prerogatives and treating Solidarity
as an adversary to tame. The pattern of alternating
periods of tension and relaxation established over the
past year probably will continue to dominate politics
in Poland.
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EC: Prospects for Political Cooperation
EC Foreign Ministers will meet outside London this weekend
for discussions on international problems, including revitalizing
the Middle East and Afghanistan initiatives. They also will con-
sider other proposals to improve foreign policy coordination. The
most far reaching of these is an informal plan by West German
Foreign Minister Genscher to incorporate the loose hierarchy of
committees that handle foreign policy coordination into the formal
EC apparatus and to formalize cooperation on security matters.
Relations with the US have provided the major im-
petus to the increase in EC foreign policy cooperation.
The EC-Ten believe that the US is not providing strong
leadership, and they hope to put some distance between
themselves and certain US policies and to apply pressure
on Washington. They want to increase their political
leverage in NATO on arms control and defense spending.
In addition, EC members want to end instability in
the Middle East and foreign occupation of Afghanistan
and Kampuchea. Although they aim to encourage the peace-
ful establishment of democratic governments in Latin
America, secure independence for Namibia, and preserve
detente, their differences on how to achieve these goals
limit the EC's ability to act as a bloc.
The EC took well over a year to submit a demarche
to Moscow on Afghanistan, and its plan for peace in the
Middle East has gone nowhere. The EC finally managed to
produce the initiative on Afghanistan because the UK was
determined to use its proposal for an international con-
ference to launch its EC presidency and to bring Afghani-
stan back into the international spotlight. None of the
major EC members have developed the same level of com-
mitment to devising a detailed Middle East initiative,
although they share a common concern about the US stance
on the issue.
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West Germany, the UK, and France
Genscher's plan has yet to be officially adopted by
Bonn, but it reflects both the Schmidt government's
stake in EC political unity and uneasiness over US
security policy. Genscher maintains his plan would put
Western Europe on an equal footin with the US, especially
in Alliance consultations. 25X1
The Thatcher government sees cooperation with its
EC partners as a way to regain a measure of its former
influence, particularly among Arab and Commonwealth
states. By pursuing a vigorous foreign policy in both
the national and EC contexts, London hopes to divert
attention from its domestic problems, counter the UK's
image as a reluctant "European," and offset public dis-
enchantment with the Community. Moreover, through polit-
ical cooperation, the UK can try to strike a balance
between its traditional close relationship with the US
and its much more recent EC ties.
The UK does not support Genscher's plan and suggests
instead creating a small secretariat that would remain
in the capital of the EC president during its six-month
term. Although the British also would prefer that
only the larger members hold the presidency, the smaller
states are opposed to such an arrangement.
Despite the French Socialists' public support for
European unity, the government of President Mitterrand
has undertaken a series of major unilateral foreign
policy moves. It has recognized the leftist opposition
in El Salvador, endorsed PLO participation in a Middle
East peace settlement, and voted to condemn South
Africa in the UN Security Council.
Previous French governments have strongly opposed
altering the informal character of foreign policy
cooperation, and Mitterrand may follow suit. While
he may be willing to discuss certain security issues
within the EC and to create a small secretariat to handle
administrative duties, he would not support Genscher's
plan.
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Italy and the Smaller States
Cooperation with its larger EC colleagues offers
Italy an opportunity to foster the image of a major
European power and to avoid committing itself to US
policies it is wary of supporting. The Italians would
favor the Genscher plan if they were assured that they
would not be excluded from decisionmaking and that their
relationship with the US would not be adversely affected
They would oppose any strengthening of EC foreign policy
coordination that allowed the UK, France, and West
Germany to control EC affairs.
Participation in EC political discussions allows
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg to exert in-
fluence on key international issues. They also would
welcome improving political cooperation but fear
domination by the larger EC members.
Greece, Denmark, and Ireland are much more concerned
with protecting their economic positions within the
Community than in strengthening foreign policy coordina- 25X1
Prospects
EC members increasingly will turn to the EC forum to
coordinate their foreign policies. The effectiveness of
political cooperation, however, will depend on the balance
between their motives to join forces and dissension caused
by differences on how to achieve mutual goals.
More than any other factor, US actions will determine
which way the scale will tip. Even if the EC members'
ability to reach common foreign and security policy de-
cisions does not progress much beyond the current level
of development, their tendency to try to take joint
positions will complicate US policymaking.
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