NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY TUESDAY 3 MARCH 1981

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83T00296R000100030008-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2012
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: March 3, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83T00296R000100030008-0
Director of Top Secret
Central
Intelligence
Tuesday
3 March 1981
Top Secret
CO N ID 81 m050JX
arch
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83T00296R000100030008-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83T00296R000100030008-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83T00296R000100030008-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83T00296R000100030008-0
Top Secret
Briefs and Comments
Italy: Political Maneuvering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
South Africa: Economic Leverage on Neighbors . . . . . . 2
El Salvador: Results of Socialist International Meeting . 3
USSR: SA-X-10 Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Pakistan: Poor Response to Strike CaZZ . . . . . . . . . 4
Israel-Lebanon: Raids Against Palestinians . . . . . . . 4
Special Analysis
Spain: Assessing the Coup Attempt . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83T00296R000100030008-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83T00296R000100030008-0
I Top Secret
ITALY: Political Maneuvering
election.
Political parties are beginning to jockey for position 'in
the belief that the government might fall soon and force an early
ing out their election strategies.
The fragility of Prime Minister Forlani's government
was underlined two weeks ago when it lost six successive
procedural votes in Parliament because many members of
all the coalition parties were absent. The government
won five confidence votes on the same financial legisla-
tion this past weekend, however, indicating that the
parties are not prepared to risk a showdown before work-
in realizing their ambitions.
The Socialists--the pivotal partner of the coalition--
apparently hope to expand their role in government and
perhaps even capture the Prime Ministry by scoring new
gains in an election. They probably will support Forlani,
however, at least until after their congress in mid-April,
when the leadership and policies of party chief Craxi
during the last year are expected to gain formal endorse-
ment. In the meantime the Socialists seem determined to
prove that a Socialist-led Italy would be a loyal ally,
convinced that US approval would be particularly helpful
govern without Communist assistance.
Because of charges of corruption and incompetence,
the Christian Democrats have been on the defensive
recently but they are trying to exploit their long history
as Washington's principal interlocutor among Italy's par-
ties to persuade the Socialists to postpone their bid for
control. The Communists probably would welcome new
elections, if the Forlani government can first be kept
in office long enough to demonstrate to the electorate
that the Christian Democrats and Socialists cannot
elections scheduled for June.
The timing of any early election probably depends
on the outcome of important referendums in May--the most
controversial of which concern abortion--and local
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83T00296R000100030008-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83T00296R000100030008-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83T00296R000100030008-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83T00296R000100030008-0
SOUTH AFRICA: Economic Leverage on Neighbors
The imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa--
which will be proposed in UN meetings on the Namibian issue--would
have serious economic repercussions for Botswana. Lesotho, Mozambique,
Swaziland, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
their allies.
The seven states are deeply aware of their vulner-
abilities to South African retaliation and remain reluc-
tant to see sanctions imposed. They may find it hard,
however, to deflect pressures from states farther north,
which have little to lose from such a move. A call for
sanctions probably would be backed by the Soviets and
would not hesitate to use its substantial leverage.
to the economies of the seven black states. Pretoria
Sanctions, unless total and long term, would have
minimal impact on South Africa but would do serious damage
foreign exchange earnings from South Africa.
South Africa supplies 27 percent of the goods
imported by these states, and transships all the oil
imported by Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland.
Five of the states derive 35 percent of their, aaareaate
railroads running.
Zaire and Zambia ship half of their copper exports
from South African ports. Even Marxist Mozambique de-
pends on South African technicians to keep its ports and
and in some cases, inoperable.
The alternatives available to the black states are
few and unattractive. Port and rail facilities in Angola,
Zaire, and Tanzania are already overburdened, poorly run,
The loss of South African technicians would soon
result in the deterioration of Mozambique's facilities.
The region's poorly maintained road network could not
handle a large traffic increase.
continue to prevent their full use.
Even if the black African countries were able to
secure the $2 billion needed to put their road, rail,
and port systems in working order, a lack of managerial
talent and technical expertise and the South African -
supported insurgencies in Angola and Mozambique would
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83T00296R000100030008-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83T00296R000100030008-0
EL SALVADOR: Results of Socialist International Meeting
did not attend the session but did send representatives.
The Socialist International, which met in Panama
over the weekend, reiterated its solidarity with the
leftist opposition forces in El Salvador and said
it considers the Revolutionary Democratic Front the
legitimate representative of the Salvadoran people. The
final communique's call for a political solution--
presumably involving negotiations between junta President
Duarte and the leftist opposition--is a moderation of
the earlier Socialist International position. In addi-
tion, the group said that it would request its leader,
Willy Brandt, to approach President Reagan on ways to
reach a peaceful solution to the conflict. Many of the
organization's Latin American and West European notables
USSR: SA-X-10 Deployment
the Soviets'
newest strategic surface-to-air missile system, the
SA-X-10, at two former SA-2 sites near Novosibirsk in
Siberia.
25X
25X
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83T00296R000100030008-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83T00296R000100030008-0
PAKISTAN: Poor Response to Strike Call
Lawyers boycotted the courts and doctors continued
their week-long strike, but otherwise the opposition's
call to observe yesterday as a "day of protest" went
largely unheeded. The opposition coalition will be dis-
appointed at this lack of response and disturbed that
the only clerical party to join the coalition is backing
out. Tensions remain, however, and the opposition
grouping--which includes the popular People's Party--
hopes to build momentum for protests throughout Pakistan
on 23 March, a major national holiday, and 4 April, the
second anniversary of former Prime Minister Bhutto's
execution.
ISRAEL-LEBANON: Raids Against Palestinians
Israeli airplanes attacked Palestinian guerrilla
bases northeast of Tyre in southern Lebanon yesterday.
This was the seventh Israeli military action in south-
ern Lebanon this year and the first airstrikes since
late January. Since early last year the Israelis have
followed a policy of conducting periodic strikes against
Palestinian bases in southern Lebanon in an effort to
throw the guerrillas on the defensive and prevent them
from organizing attacks against Israel.
Shortly after the Israeli airstrikes, the Palestin-
ians retaliated by shelling Kiryat Shemona with rocket
fire. Palestinian reporting late yesterday indicated
that Palestinian refugee camps near Tyre were shelled
by Israeli or Lebanese Christian forces.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83T00296R000100030008-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83T00296R000100030008-0
SPAIN: Assessing the Coup Attempt
The attempted military coup last week evidently came closer
to succeeding than the government has been willing to admit. The
assault on Parliament probably has not taken the heart out of
ultraconservative officers, whose deep concerns are capable of
Leading them to try to intervene again. The immediate impact of
the attempted coup will depend Largely on how the investigation is
handled and on how successful Prime Minister CaZvo Sotelo's new
government is in recognizing and addressing military concerns.
Spaniards remember that their Civil War and, more
recently, the revolution in Portugal were preceded by
coup attempts that failed. In each case, the plotters
benefited from lessons learned the first time around.
This knowledge, combined with almost daily revelations
that yet another senior military officer has been impli-
cated in the "incident of 23 February," has tempered the
initial reactions of relief.
The Spanish military considers itself the final
arbiter of the nation's destiny, and it has a tradition
of intervening in the political process. From the early
19th century to the Civil War, military pressure gener-
ally took the form of a "pronouncement" against the
authorities by a small segment of the armed forces, who
would then hope for enough support to impose its will
on the government.
Lieutenant Colonel Te'ero's assault on Parliament
was in this tradition.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83T00296R000100030008-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83T00296R000100030008-0
The plot failed because King Juan Carlos acted
Three Army Generals--Milans del Bosch, Armada, and
Torres Rojas--have been arrested, another has been dis-
missed. The King reportedly believes that two or three
other military region commanders were ready to declare
a state of alert. Some 20 additional middle-grade offi-
cers, mostly civil guard lieutenants and captains, also
have been detained along with the civil guards who oc-
cupied Parliament.
Strengths and Weaknesses
In the face of mounting evidence of military
complicity, Spaniards are analyzing the strengths and
weaknesses surrounding the failed coup. The young
democratic system withstood its first serious test,
and Juan Carlos has emerged with enhanced authority.
The King and a makeshift government of assistant
ministers ran the country until the political leaders
were freed. Moreover, the political parties, the trade
unions, and the vast majority of security and military
forces rallied to the crown.
Although the public was initially apathetic or
apprehensive, an estimated 3 million Spaniards turned
out last Friday in support of democracy. The demonstra-
tion in Madrid probably was the largest in Spanish his-
tory.
A new spirit of unity prevails in the ruling Union
of the Democratic Center. In addition, the leftist
opposition and the regional parties, realizing that
they have most to lose from a military takeover, are
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83T00296R000100030008-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83T00296R000100030008-0
also has declared a temporary truce.
now less apt to challenge the new government--at least
in the near term. One Basque terrorist organization
only succeed "over my dead body."
On the other hand, the King was forced to display
his democratic colors once and for all. Future plotters
will remember his comment to Armada that the coup would
to military grumbling.
Ultraconservative officers believe that the King
betrayed the Army. Since the concerns of those ultra-
conservatives are shared by much of the officer corps,
many other officers may feel divided loyalties. This
could limit the King's ability to perform one of his
most important tasks--acting as a sympathetic listener
200 civil guards.
The morale of the security forces, already shaken
by terrorist attacks and by a recent police scandal over
the alleged use of torture, has suffered another setback.
Police, despondent over the lack of government support,
fear that they will all be blamed for the revolt of some
Calvo Sotelo's Task
on would improve.
A witch-hunt to root out all vestiges of Francoism
in the upper ranks of the military would have a devas-
tating impact on morale and would heighten the chances
of another intervention. If the military is allowed to
clean its own house, pockets of ultraconservatism will
be left untouched, but the prospects of keeping the lid
Most officers remain deeply conservative and
favor strong, centralized authority. They see the
government as increasingly powerless to prevent the
dismemberment of Spain by regional separatists and the
destruction of the basic Spanish value system.
Calvo Sotelo's most urgent task, therefore, will be
to establish an image of firmness. There are already
signs that he plans to accommodate the military by
shelving indefinitely such contentious issues as the
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83T00296R000100030008-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83T00296R000100030008-0
university autonomy and divorce legislation. He also
may call a ha to the! further devolution of power to
the regions.
Impact on Foreign Relations
Spain's efforts to enter the EC and to negotiate
a renewal of the bilateral treaty with the US are not
likely to be affected. The pace of the government's
pursuit of its commitment to join NATO, however, will
depend at least in part on the reaction of the leftist
opposition to the coup attempt. If this brush with
militarism persuades the left that entry into NATO might
help to restrain military adventurism, the government
might push ahead quickly.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83T00296R000100030008-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83T00296R000100030008-0
Top secret
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83T00296R000100030008-0