USSR MONTHLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83T00233R000200140001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Top Secret
Intelligence
USSR Monthly Review
Supplement
Top Secret
SOV UR 82-003CX
March 198-1
Copy 2 9 6
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Directorate of Ton Secret
Intelligence
USSR Monthly Review
represent a consensus of CIA analysts.
This codeword supplement to the March issue of
the USSR Monthly Review is published by the Office
of Soviet Analysis. The views expressed in the
articles are those of the authors and do not necessarily
Comments and queries regarding the articles are
welcome. They may be directed to the authors,
Top Secret
SOV UR 82-003CX
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Contents
Premier Jaruzelski evidently intends to destroy Solidarity and reestablish
a stable, Soviet-type regime in Poland. His chances of doing so are
reasonably good. He chose force some months before he actually used it,
because he was confident that Polish forces alone could enforce martial
law and because he became convinced that Moscow would act if he did
not
The authors believe that I larticle oversimplifies the
complicated political process that led to the declaration of martial law in
December and understates the difficulty that he will encounter in
rebuilding the Polish Communist Party. Moreover, they do not believe
there is conclusive evidence that Jaruzelski agreed as early as September
to introduce martial law, which would have different implications for
Poland's future
iii Top Secret
SOV UR 82-003CX
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Top Secret
Jaruzelski and
the Imposition of Polish
Martial Law
Premier Wojciech Jaruzelski evidently aims to de-
stroy Solidarity and reestablish a stable, Soviet-type
regime in Poland. His commitment to the use of force
for the destruction of Solidarity began at least two
months before he imposed martial law. This commit-
ment reflected his recognition that Moscow was pre-
pared to intervene if the Polish leadership did not act,
as well as confidence that Polish forces alone could do
it. Jaruzelski's ability to accomplish his aims will
depend on his success in restoring the severely dam-
aged Communist Party and its core, the party appara-
tus; the prospects for this are reasonably good.)
Initial Anxiety About Jaruzelski
While Moscow's ultimate weapon in the struggle
against Solidarity was Soviet military intervention in
Poland, its penultimate and preferred weapon was the
use of Polish Army and security forces. Beginning in
the spring of 1981, Moscow evidently pressed the
Poles to develop firmer military contingency plans for
dealing with Solidarity, and this led to coordinated
planning by the Polish and Soviet General Staffs.
Jaruzelski Versus Kania on Martial Law
During the summer, sustained Soviet pressure on the
Polish authorities led to increasingly active and inti-
mate combined planning for martial law. In time
Jaruzelski came to share the Soviet view that it was
ets would hardly have approved martial law unless
they were prepared to send in their own troops if the
Polish forces proved unable to do the job. Martial law
evidently would have been imposed in the late sum-
mer of 1981 if First Secretary Kania and the majority
of the Politburo had not opposed it.
? On 8 September, at a moment when extreme views
were at a high point within the movement, the
Solidarity Congress issued a message to "the work-
ing people" of the countries of Eastern Europe,
offering support for the development of free trade
unions.
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Too Secret
? On 14 September the Polish Council of Ministers
met. It is reasonable to suppose that the meeting
was called to consider the Soviet demand for action
and that the Council, with Jaruzelski in the chair,
responded by asking the Politburo to institute mar-
tial law.
Jaruzelski himself, in his 24 September government
report to the legislature, emphasized that preparations
for coercive action by the security forces were going
forward: "I have assigned to the Minister of Internal
Affairs the task of [undertaking] activity that will be
supported, as far as is necessary and appropriate, by
specially assigned military forces and means." Soli-
darity took to heart, at least for the moment, the
threats contained in the Soviet message and in the
regime's statements. It moderated its positions not
only in the proceedings of the second session of the
Solidarity Congress, but also on a number of issues
he sought to avert.
How Jaruzelski Saw Poland's Problem
Jaruzelski's willingness to institute martial law in
mid-September 1981 suggests that:
? He clearly was willing to use force to suppress
Solidarity.
? His proposal was made in response to extreme
pressure, suggesting that Jaruzelski believed Soviet
forces would invade Poland to destroy Solidarity if
the Poles themselves refused to act.
? He must have had some confidence that Polish
forces would suffice to impose martial law, for a
failure would bring about the very Soviet invasion
movement.
These ideas about Jaruzelski's assessment of the
regime's predicament and about his predispositions
shed light on his actions in the interval between
September and December. Unlike many Solidarity
leaders, he credited the Soviet threat to invade; and
even while he negotiated with them, he was prepared
to use force if necessary in order to suppress their
Jaruzelski Replaces Kania
The Changing Events. A month after the Politburo
had rejected martial law, the Polish Central Commit-
tee voted Kania out as first secretary. It voted in
General Jaruzelski, who retained the posts of govern-
ment head and Minister of Defense. The choice of
Jaruzelski, rather than a hard-line party apparatchik
like Olszowski, suggests that both the Soviets and the
Poles now anticipated a military solution to Solidar-
ity's challenge to the regime
under negotiation with the government.
' While asserting that the "Government shares the assessments in
the Politburo statement," the Council of Minister's communique
went on to state that "should an overriding necessity arise it will not
thirk from making use of all means that accord with state
rerogatives."F____-]
' Formally the Central Committee Department for Liaison with
Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries.
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Top Secret
As first secretary, Jaruzelski made few changes in the
Politburo. He may still have perceived it as an
obstacle in December when the decision finally was
made. His address justifying martial law did not
claim Politburo approval,
Jaruzelski's Changing Views. Moscow presumably
intended all along to destroy Solidarity and advocated
martial law to this end; but what of Jaruzelski? He
evidently came around to the Soviet view some time
between early June,
and September. His willingness to
impose martial law in September makes it unlikely
that when he finally acted in December it was only in
response to an ultimatum. Moscow evidently contin-
ued to press for such action, but there are no grounds
to suppose that after September Jaruzelski offered
strong resistance. His failure to do so was doubtless
influenced by the knowledge that he too could be
replaced, and perhaps also by a perception that in the
end Moscow would be satisfied with nothing less.
tivesJ
Jaruzelski may not have been totally committed to
martial law and the destruction of Solidarity after
September, but his negotiations with Solidarity were
clearly deceptive and bordered on bad faith-his
4 November meeting with Archbishop Glemp and
Lech Walesa is an example. By then Jaruzelski
evidently had decided on the use of force against
Solidarity and was not looking for feasible alterna-
Determination To Destroy Solidarity
Alternatives. The situation on 13 December, after all,
did not necessitate the imposition of martial law. On
the contrary, the regime had grounds for hope that it
could split the leadership of Solidarity by playing
upon deepening differences between the "extremists"
and the moderates, led by Walesa. Instead, in early
December the Polish media attacked Walesa along
with the "extremists," suggesting that Jaruzelski
shared Moscow's aim-to destroy Solidarity, not
moderate it.
The regime may have been encouraged by Solidarity's
relatively mild response to a provocative police raid on
striking fire-fighter cadets in early December. This
suggested that its militancy, or its capacity for bold
action,'was on the decline; and at the same time its
popular support was weakening. This would be seen to
facilitate the imposition of martial law, but it also
provided grounds for persisting in a "soft" strategy
(gradually undermining support for Solidarity while
isolating the "extremist" elements in its leadership
and undermining its capacity for militant action). This
strategy entailed far less serious risks than the imposi-
tion of martial law, without closing that option if later
it proved necessary.
Why, as the conditions for its success became more
manifest, was this strategy not employed? Because
Jaruzelski had given up on any softer strategy, either
of reaching an accommodation with Solidarity by
undermining its "extremist" leaders or of subverting
the movement. In December he preferred to destroy
Solidarity by force.'F___1
' Even if the deepening divisions in Solidarity's leadership abated
and popular disillusionment with Solidarity was reversed, the
security forces presumably would have remained a reliable regime
tool and the Polish Army would have retained its prestige and
Other analysts believe that the split in the leadership of Solidarity
increased the pressure on the regime to act because the radical
leaders (who were vocally and openly committed to dismantling the
Communist system) were gaining ground on the "moderates" who
may have been open to compromise. Further, those analysts believe
that the realities of Soviet pressure and economic decline did not
leave the regime much time for long-term strategies.
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Top Secret
Martial law has disrupted the economy and antago-
nized both domestic and foreign opinion. Such pre-
dictable costs could only have been justified by dire
necessity (which, however, was lacking) or by decisive
gains to be expected in the struggle to stabilize Polish
society. Only the destruction of Solidarity, probably,
would warrant the predictable costs of imposing mar-
tial law
Since December
Granted that Jaruzelski and Moscow share the objec-
tive of effectively destroying Solidarity, there may
still be considerable friction between them on impor-
tant tactical issues, as well as on major policies:
? Both desire to exploit Western economic aid, al-
though to obtain such aid Jaruzelski might be
willing to make concessions that would strain Mos-
cow's tolerance.
? Moscow recognizes that the USSR must make
substantial economic sacrifices in order to help the
military regime feed the Polish people and ultimate-
ly restore the economy, but it will provide far less
than Jaruzelski needs.
? Both aim to stabilize Polish society and are willing
to employ the Soviet Army if the Polish Army
proves unable to maintain order. They may disagree
on when Soviet military intervention has become
necessary.
? Both recognize that Jaruzelski will need to employ
the party to implement the military regime's poli-
cies, even as he temporarily reduces the party's
prominence and its role in policymaking; but Mos-
cow may be more interested in early progress
toward the resumption of party rule.
antry.
? Both see the need to accommodate the Church and
the peasantry, but Moscow may be more deter-
mined to restrict the Church's role and to use
forcible measures to requisition food from the peas-
These points of friction are important, but they seem
unlikely to destroy Jaruzelski's usefulness to the
Soviet Union or the confidence based on his successful
imposition of martial law, unless he fails in the
essentials: the maintenance of social order and the
achievement of martial law's key objective, the de-
struction of Solidarity. Economic recovery, while
clearly important, may not be crucial for Jaruzelski's
tenure in the months ahead.
The imposition of martial law by Polish forces alone
has gone at least as well as the Poles and Soviets
might have expected, and probably much better. The
authorities' willingness to take such action suggests
that they discounted the likelihood of effective resist-
ance by Solidarity once the initial action against it
had succeeded. Some Western observers speculate
that Solidarity may prove able to preserve its organi-
zational integrity and capacity for action under mar-
tial law-but the implicit Communist calculation to
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the contrary should not be disregarded. The Commu-
nist authorities turned out to be right about the Poles'
capacity to impose martial law, and they may prove
right about the regime's capacity to defeat Solidarity.
To achieve its aim of defeating Solidarity and reestab-
lishing a stable Soviet-type regime, the Polish leader-
ship under Jaruzelski needs to restore the Communist
Party and its core, the party apparatus. This powerful
social-invention, a creation of Lenin and Stalin, is
being rebuilt in Poland after suffering severe damage
in the course of the past 18 months. The party
apparatus is, of course, an artificial contrivance that
does not grow organically from a people's culture but
is created by outside forces according to a standard
blueprint. When people cease to accept the myths that
sustain it and cease to fear its instruments of repres-
sion, the party becomes vulnerable. Ruling Commu-
nist parties have several times been destroyed or
gravely weakened by mass action of the peoples they
governed.
But just as its artificiality makes the party apparatus
vulnerable to blows from above and below, so does it
make for easy rebuilding in favorable circumstances.
In China, after Mao died in 1976 his heirs quickly
restored rule by the central party organs. In East
European countries where the Communist parties
were badly damaged or destroyed (East Germany,
Hungary, and Czechoslovakia), they have reconstitut-
ed themselves with the aid of the Soviet Army and
exercise renewed authority.
A possible functional equivalent for a massive Soviet
Army presence inside Poland in deterring social disor-
der is the credible threat of a military intervention.
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many actors on the Polish political scene came to
doubt that Moscow had the stomach or the bankroll
for an armed occupation of all Poland. Such doubts
have now been undermined by the imposition of
martial law, which implied Moscow's willingness to
back it up if need be. Leaders of the Church, for
example, now actively fear Soviet armed intervention
and so presumably do other civic figures.
This renewed credibility of the threat of Soviet inva-
sion is a stabilizing force in Polish politics. Even if
Solidarity preserves its command structure under-
ground, the fear of provoking Moscow might deter the
Polish working class from following its lead in bold
actions that could lead to an occupation.
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This is now being attempted in Poland under martial
law, but without the direct involvement of the Soviet
Army. The fate of the present regime in Poland may
depend on its success in this effort. Even effective
military rule may be impossible if the provincial party
apparatus does not win back its self-confidence and a
measure of acceptance by the Polish population.
Moreover, even when martial law ends, military offi-
cers will necessarily continue to rule unless the central
organs of the party apparatus have been revitalized.
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Jaruzelski and Martial Law:
An Alternative View
article is a useful contribution to what will,
no doubt, become a substantial literature on the
emergence for the first time of military Communism,
a system of Communist rule that has just begun to
define itself. Analysts in the Office of European
Analysis believe, however, that the article has two
major shortcomings
gets bogged down in an analysis of
when Jaruzelski came to agree finally with the Soviets
that martial law was an imperative for Poland.
less sensitivity for the political environments of East
European leaders and for the degrees of sophistication
the Titos, Kadars, and Ceausescus of the area have
developed over the years in dealing with the Soviets.
That'Jaruzelski may as early as September have let it
be known in Poland that he favored martial law
means only that he had taken a position that would
divert Soviet and perhaps lower level Polish military
pressure from him to Party First Secretary Kania and
the Politburo, which he knew would reject such a
recommendation. It did not mean, necessarily, that he
genuinely favored martial law at that early date, nor
does it follow that his subsequent negotiations with
the Catholic Church and Solidarity were conducted in
bad faith.
Second, the argument that the regime had no need to
introduce martial law in December because events
were going in its direction lacks a sensitivity for the
Polish political scene at that time. does not
mention that by late November the regime suspected
from month-long negotiations with Solidarity that no
accommodation would be possible on terms accept-
able to it, that Walesa had lost undisputed leadership
of Solidarity, and that the party was incapable of
action-indeed, was rapidly disintegrating. We be-
lieve that these key developments, rather than any
three-month-old ostensible commitment, led Jaru-
zelski to impose martial law when he did
These points are important for what they suggest
about where Jaruzelski may lead Poland in the future
and what the character of his relations with Soviet 25X1
leaders will be. In our view, article is 25X1
misleading inasmuch as it implies that Jaruzelski was
among the first of Poland's leaders to crack under
Soviet pressure and that he is against reform of the
Polish system of rule. Jaruzelski's actions at the
February Central Committee plenum-the first after
the imposition of martial law-suggest a man of a
different stripe. At that session he decreed that the
reform of the party's statutes made the previous
summer be retained and that the nomenclature sys-
tem be opened to Poles who are not members of the
Communist Party
The most disappointing facet of the article is that the
author does not discuss the ramifications of some of
his ideas. After asserting that Jaruzelski acted in
response to extreme pressure, he does not address the
question of Jaruzelski's independence in future situa-
tions, given a reduction of Soviet pressure. The asser-
tion that the premier and the other Polish leaders wish
to reestablish a stable Soviet-type regime is not
followed by a discussion of whether this means Jaru-
zelski is a creature of the Soviets or a "Polish"
Communist. And after noting that in "favorable
circumstances" other damaged parties have readily
rebuilt does not consider whether condi-
tions in Poland are likely to be "favorable."F--]
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Jaruzelski's performance to date suggests that he is in
no hurry to turn power back to the Politburo, and the
party appears so divided and demoralized that its
recovery seems a long-term project at best. We
strongly doubt that the political and economic forces
at play will allow a simple return to the status quo
ante0 does not address the important ques-
tions of what direction Jaruzelski's military Commu-
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Eastern Europe-will take and what its longer term 25X1
implications will be for US policy toward that region,
the USSR, and Western Europe.
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