SOVIET MILITARY MANPOWER: BUILDUP AND IMPENDING CONSTRAINTS

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Soviet Military Manpower:
Buildup and Impending
Constraints
Secret
SOV 82-10085
June 1982
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Soviet Military Manpower:
Buildup and Impending
Constraints
Information available as of 1 March 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.
This paper was prepared by I I Office of
Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be addressed to the Chief Econometric Analysis
Division, SOYA, o
Secret
SOV 82-10085
June 1982
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Soviet Military Manpower:
Buildup and Impending
Constraints
Key Judgments The Soviet armed forces have grown by one-third during the Brezhnev
years, from 3.2 million in 1965 to 4.4 million in 1982.' We estimate that
650,000 were added to combat missions, while the rest of the increase went
to support functions.' The deployment of nearly a half million personnel to
the Sino-Soviet border dominated the buildup. In contrast, the increase of
180,000 men deployed to the NATO Guidelines Area (East Germany,
Poland, and Czechoslovakia) was much smaller. As a result, Soviet combat
forces opposite China are now 40 percent as large as those opposite NATO,
up from 15 percent in 1965. Military manpower grew fastest during 1965-
70, averaging more than 100,000 men a year; during 1975-80, net annual
growth slowed to around 35,000.
On the basis of our analysis of weapons procurement and deployment, we
expect only limited increases in Soviet military manpower in the near term.
More substantial increases could result if reduced-strength Ground Forces
units are mobilized to support operations in Afghanistan, Poland, or other
problem areas and become permanent additions to the armed forces.
Barring such contingencies, we expect the Soviet armed forces to increase
only slightly by 1985-probably by less than 2 percent of their present size.
Further, unless the Soviet leadership dramatically revises its long-term
views of national security requirements, we expect no significant change in
total manpower through 1990. Several developments, however, may cause
reallocations among services and missions:
? New Soviet weapons: The wider use of technologies such as solid fuels,
computers, and solid-state electronics probably will reduce the combat
manpower required to operate many weapon systems, but their complex-
ity is likely to increase support and maintenance requirements.
' For comparison with the United States, we define the Soviet armed forces to include those
elements which fill what the United States judges to be national security roles. This
excludes approximately one and a half million men in the Construction, Railroad, Civil
Defense, and Internal Security Troops. Research undertaken in the last three years has
raised this estimate by approximately one million troops. However, given their noncombat
roles, our better appreciation of their size does not change our estimate of the Soviet threat
(see Other Uniformed Manpower, p. 11). The total, 5.8 million, is used when discussing So-
viet conscription requirements
: Except where stated, this assessment uses the US Defense Planning and Programing
Categories (DPPC) for mission breakdowns and comparisons of US and Soviet forces.
iii Secret
SOV 82-10085
June 1982
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? Sovietforce structure: We expect reorganization in the Ground Forces to
absorb the bulk of the small projected overall growth. We do not expect
reorganization to have an observable impact on manpower in the other
Soviet services.
? New US weapons: If the United States develops and deploys new
strategic systems during the 1980s, the Soviets may have to increase
manpower in systems designed to counter these forces. The net impact is
uncertain, however, since older Soviet weapons may be retired as new
ones are deployed.
? Arms control agreements: If agreements on strategic weapons stabilize
Soviet strategic offensive forces at their 1982 level, our projection of
armed forces manpower would be 1 percent lower by the end of the
decade. However, we believe agreements at the MBFR talks probably
would cause the relocation rather than the elimination of the affected
units]
The changing demographics of the Soviet population will necessitate major
changes to the conscription system even if the Soviets do no more than
maintain current force levels. The number of males reaching draft age
annually will decline from 2.6 million in the late 1970s to 2 million by
1986. Further aggravating this situation is the shifting ethnic composition
of the draft age pool. Persistently high birth rates among Muslim ethnic
groups mean that the less educated, less politically reliable non-Slavic
minorities will account for more than one-third of draft age youth by mid-
decade, up from a one-fourth share in the late 1960s.
We expect two main responses to these demographic phenomena: an
ultimately unsuccessful quest for manpower savings in support units and an
overhaul of the conscription system. The 1.8 million support personnel are
already the target of efficiency drives, but despite the exhortations of the
11th Five-Year Plan, the size of support units is unlikely to decline.
Efficiency in combat support units is increasing, but improvement is not
being converted into equivalent manpower savings. The Soviets instead
have retained the manpower in those units and expanded their capability.
In addition, existing manpower policies are rooted in established military
priorities that the leadership will be reluctant to compromise
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Although the conscription system will provide sufficient manpower to
maintain current force levels in the short run, major changes will be
necessary to keep conscription rates from rising sharply in the late 1980s.
They could easily reach levels that would be difficult to support in
peacetime even by further limiting medical, family hardship, and educa-
tional deferments. We therefore expect an extension of the term of service
as the most likely measure to meet manpower requirements throughout the
decade.
In contrast, the minorities problem has no obvious solution. Moreover, we
have little insight into how the rising number of non-Slavic minorities will
affect military manning practices. The foremost uncertainty is the extent
to which the military can continue concentrating minorities in noncombat
roles without lowering force effectiveness.
The slowdown in Soviet economic growth, caused in part by a civilian labor
shortage, may bring the leadership to consider again reducing military
manpower, although this in itself would do little to resolve the underlying
economic constraints. As the need for a revised manpower policy mounts
over the next few years, internal debate may reveal more about the
approaches that are likely to be taken by the leadership. At present, we be-
lieve an extension of the term of service is more likely than absolute
reductions in manpower.
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Key Judgments iii
Background 1
Current Force Size 2
Shifting Perceptions of Military Requirements 3
National Command and Support 10
Other Uniformed Manpower 11
Outlook to 1990 13
A. Estimating Methods and Concepts
B. Soviet Manpower Estimates, 1965-81
Figures
1. Soviet Military Manpower Organization
2. Soviet Military Manpower
3. Impact of Policy Changes on Manpower in the Soviet Armed Forces 3
4. US and Soviet Manpower by Mission
5. Soviet Combat Manpower Opposite China and NATO
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10. Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces
11. Soviet National Command and Support
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Soviet Military Manpower:
Buildup and Impending
Constraints
Background
The organization and manning of the Soviet military
are determined by military traditions and by the
leadership's perceptions of external threats. This com-
bination of present perceptions and past experience
results in a force that is large by Western standards.'
Major considerations affecting military manpower
requirements include:
? Long vulnerable borders and a history of foreign
invasions and internal conquest.
? Continued tension with China, raising the possibil-
ity of two wartime fronts.
? Use of military conscription for indoctrination as
well as military purposes.
? Geographic dispersal of forces.
? Limited support from allies, whose defense efforts
are smaller and whose reliability is uncertain.
? A large inventory of increasingly modern equipment
that requires a manpower-heavy maintenance and
support contingent.
? A penchant for labor rather than capital-intensive
technologies.
? Preference for military personnel over civilians in
support positions as compared with Western
practice.
As a result of these factors, the present size of the
Soviet military is not simply a larger scale response to
Western armed forces but the product of a longstand-
ing Soviet approach to security problems.
For comparison with the United States, we define the
Soviet armed forces to include those elements that fill
what the United States judges to be national security
roles. These elements are the Ground Forces, Air
Defense Forces, Navy, Air Forces, Strategic Rocket
Forces, parts of national command and support, and
the Border Guards of the Committee for State Securi-
ty (KGB). This definition excludes some large uni-
formed elements of the Ministry of Defense-the
' The People's Republic of China maintains the world's largest
military, with 4 million in field-deployed units and an approximate-
ly equal number in support units for a total between 7 and 8
million.)
Construction, Railroad, and Civil Defense Troops-
and the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs (MVD). F--]
The Soviets include these latter organizations in their
legal definition of the armed forces and consider
service in them to fulfill the military obligation
imposed by the 1967 Law on Universal Military
Service, although they do not have what the United
States considers to be national security functions (see
figure 1). These organizations are included in our
analysis of conscription requirements for the 1980s,
but estimates for them are presented separately.
Our manpower estimates reflect the actual peacetime
manning of individual units.' This approach enables
the most direct use of intelligence data, which gener-
ally report existing manpower, and supports assess-
ments of the resource implications of Soviet military
programs.' All manpower figures presented here are
midyear estimates.
Although women are not subject to conscription, they
may volunteer for military service. The number of
such volunteers is extremely limited. However, women
in certain civilian occupations, nurses or communica-
tions operators, for instance, are assigned to the
reserves and are occasionally called up for military
duty.
methods.
' The Soviets have two additional unit manning concepts-author-
ized peacetime strength and wartime manning. Authorized
strengths reflect manning levels with all programed billets filled.
This includes men not serving with their units because of special
duty, training, sickness, or leave and is usually higher than
"current" manning. The Soviet wartime manning concept envisions
filling out all understrength and cadre units with reserves. We
estimate that bringing all existing units to full strength would
require between 2.0 and 2.5 million reservists, mostly in the Ground
Forces. (The creation of additional units would require the callup of
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Figure 1
Soviet Military Manpower Organization
Included in US definition of armed forces
Not considered to have a primary national security role
Ministry of Defense
General Staff
Main Political
Administration
Committee for
State Security
(KGB)
Strategic i Air Defense
Rocket Forces Forces Air Forces Ground Forces
Regional Administrative
and i and
Military District Technical
Commands Agenciesa
I
Rear Servicesb Special Troopsc' Civil Defense
a Archives, Education, Personnel, Autotractor, Civilian Training, and
Procurator.
b Finance, Food, Medical, Clothing, Fuel, Tourism, Trade, Transportation,
and Administration-Management.
cChemical, Railroad, Engineer, and Signal. Railroad Troops are not
considered to have a national security role.
Ministry of
Intsrne Atits.
Internal Security
Troops
Construction
and
Troop Billeting
Current Force Size the number of civilians employed by the military has
We estimate that the Soviet armed forces have grown grown from approximately 640,000 in 1965 to
at an average annual rate of 2 percent from their 1965 800,000 at present
level of 3.2 million men to a present size of approxi-
mately 4.4 million (see figure 2 and appendix B). The increase in armed forces manpower is primarily
Military personnel that do not have national security the result of the expansion and modernization of the
roles have grown more rapidly, to 1.5 million, up from Ground Forces, which accounted for half of the
about 800,000 in 1965. In addition, we estimate that
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Figure 2
Soviet Military Manpower
2,000 li
1,000
aThe Construction, Railroad, Civil Defense, and Internal Security Troops
are not considered to have a national security role.
growth since 1965. Each of the armed services ex-
panded during this period, however, so that the share
of men among them is relatively unchanged. The
increased size of the forces without national security
missions is due principally to greater numbers of
construction troops, accounting for roughly two-thirds
of the growth in this manpower category
Shifting Perceptions of Military Requirements
The steady growth of the Soviet military under
Brezhnev represents a major shift in strategic think-
ing from the Khrushchev era (see figure 3). During the
Khrushchev years, Soviet doctrine held that a future
war would be short and decisive, escalating almost
immediately to theaterwide and intercontinental nu-
clear strikes. In support of these ideas, Khrushchev
Figure 3
Impact of Policy Changes on Manpower
in the Soviet Armed Forces a
Strategic Rocket Forces F-I Air Forces
KGB Border Guards F1 Air Defense (PVO)
E] National Command and Support fl Ground Forces
Navy
aExcludes units not considered by the US to have a national security
mission: Construction, Railroad, Civil Defense, and Internal Security
Troops (about 1.5 million men in 1981).
emphasized the development of strategic offensive
and defensive forces and downplayed the role of
conventional forces and large standing armies.
Hence, although manpower grew rapidly in the early
1950s as a result of the Korean conflict to 6.8 million,
it declined steadily thereafter to 2.9 million men at
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midyear 1960. The last major cutback began in 1960
when Krushchev announced plans to reduce the
armed forces by an additional 1.2 million by the end
of 1961.
During the Berlin Crisis of June 1961, Khrushchev
indicated publicly that the demobilization had been
halted temporarily. Some Soviet writers have suggest-
ed that the planned reductions were later resumed and
eventually completed. Information from other sources
tends to confirm that some further demobilization
eventually took place but does not verify reductions of
the magnitude described by the Soviets.
In the early 1960s, interest in larger, more balanced
military forces was reawakened as:
? Soviet planners reconsidered their doctrine of a
short nuclear war with NATO and began to plan for
a conventional war of some duration.
? Tension with China raised the specter of a second
wartime front, requiring a major new commitment.
? The Berlin and. Cuban missile crises strengthened
Soviet resolve to redress strategic inferiorityF
By the time of Khrushchev's ouster in 1964, a consen-
sus was emerging in favor of a balanced across-the-
board expansion and modernization of the military.
The Brezhnev regime reversed the reductions in the
Ground Forces and undertook vigorous development
projects for both conventional and nuclear forces.
These shifts in policy, coupled with increasing ten-
sions with China, caused increases that have contin-
ued in all the armed services through the present.
US and Soviet Comparison
The Soviet armed forces currently number more than
twice those of the United States. US manning
dropped from about 3.6 million in 1968 to approxi-
mately its present level of 2.1 million in 1976. In
contrast, Soviet manning levels have risen each year
since the early 1960s.
Because the Soviet military is structured differently
from that of the United States-with five major
services rather than three-organizational compari-
sons are misleading. The allocation of manpower to
military missions, however, can be roughly compared
using the definitions of the US Defense Planning and
Programing Categories (DPPC). These categories
reaggregate the armed forces into support and a
variety of combat missions. Here again, we include
only those Soviet personnel who fill what in the
United States are considered national security roles.
On the US side, the manpower total includes all of the
armed forces and the Coast Guard.'
The comparison in figure 4 highlights several differ-
ences between US and Soviet missions and how they
have changed over time.
? Soviet strategic offensive manpower is larger than
that of the United States because of the USSR's
large peripheral force composed of medium-range
bombers and ballistic missiles that would carry out
strikes against Europe and Asia. Because the United
States is distant from potential war theaters, it has
no comparable force.
? The Soviets commit a large force to strategic de-
fense, reflecting their concern with the US intercon-
tinental bomber force and their proximity to poten-
tial war theaters. Because of the smaller Soviet
intercontinental bomber force, the United States
has only a limited strategic defense.
? The Soviet land forces, which have traditionally
received heavy emphasis, grew substantially due to
modernization and the Sino-Soviet buildup; they are
now nearly three times as large as US land forces.
US ground forces peaked in 1968 at about 890,000
and declined substantially as the United States
withdrew from Vietnam. Since 1975 they have
remained nearly stable at around 550,000.
? The support share of the Soviet military stayed
unchanged at approximately 40 percent, while the
US support share remained roughly 50 percent.
6 This results in a slight overstatement for the United States, since
only those Coast Guard personnel with a military mission should be
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Figure 4
US and Soviet Manpower by Missions
Tactical Air
Navy
Mobility
Strategic
Defense
Strategic Offense
aDefense Planning and Programing Categories shown here divide the
armed forces into one support and six combat missions. "Other uniformed
manpower" is excluded because it is not considered to have a national
security role.
1,500
500 i
Tactical Air
Navy
, Mobility
Strategic
Defense
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 t I l t 1 l 1 t Strategic Offense
1965 70 75 80
? The percent of armed forces personnel devoted to
intercontinental offense is the same for both the
United States and the USSR, about 4 percent.
? Despite the Soviet Union's larger commitment to
the land forces, the US naval and tactical air forces
raise the fraction of manpower devoted to general
purpose forces well above the Soviets')
Theater Distribution
The breakdown of Soviet forces by region conveys an
idea of how Moscow has responded to changing
perceptions of threat, particularly the increased im-
portance of China. The two regions that we consider
in this breakdown are the ones opposite NATO and
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China.' The NATO-oriented region includes forces in
the NATO Guidelines Area (Poland, Czechoslovakia,
and East Germany) and forces in Hungary and the
eight western military districts of the USSR.' Our
definition of China-oriented forces includes those in
Mongolia and the four eastern military districts less
units distant from the Sino-Soviet border
Analysis of the allocation of men to the combat forces
in these areas shows that the Soviets currently have
approximately 40 percent as many men (almost
700,000) facing China as are opposite NATO (over
1.6 million). This allocation has shifted markedly
since 1965, when the number of personnel facing
China was only 15 percent of the NATO-oriented
force (see figure 5)
Another index of the changing priority of China in
Soviet defense planning is the percentage of wartime
manning levels at which units are maintained. During
the 1965-81 period, the ground forces in Eastern
Europe were kept at about 90 percent of wartime
strength, while those in the western USSR (which
would serve as the second echelon in wartime) were
kept at 35 percent. Ground Forces opposite China,
which in 1965 also were manned at about 35 percent,
have been raised to a strength of 50 percent.
The half million soldiers added to China-oriented
forces between 1965 and 1981 represent primarily
increases to the Ground Forces, which account for
about 300,000 of the growth. Tactical air forces and
MR/IRBM forces accounted for virtually all the
Figure 5
Soviet Combat Manpower Opposite
China and NATO
Forces Opposite China Forces Opposite NATO
f-I NATO guidelines areaa
I] Western USSR and Hungary
2,000 2,000
1,800 1,800
1,600
1,400
1,200
1,000
remainder)
Reorganization of the Ground Forces accounted for
some of the manpower increases in forces opposite
NATO. Further increases accompanying the adoption
of helicopters and the new ground attack role of
Frontal Aviation more than compensated for the
decline in Strategic Rocket Forces manpower in the
' The remainder of Soviet manpower-national and service support,
RDT&E, and the intercontinental attack forces-are not included
in these regions. This also excludes units not considered to have a
national security role. Hence, the regional breakdown includes
primarily combat manpowe~
Leningrad, Baltic, Belorussian, Carpathian, Kiev, Odessa, North
western USSR that was associated with the retire-
ment of some SS-3, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles and their
replacement by smaller numbers of SS-20s~
Armed Services Growth
The following sections discuss important develop-
ments in each of the major services since 1965 and
provide projections to 1985 for major organizational
categories. Note that "support" in the discussion
below consists primarily of service and national-level
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headquarters (and units directly subordinate to them),
schools, and rear service units. This is not the same as
the DPPC support category that is used for compari-
son with the United States elsewhere in this paper. E
Ground Forces. The main combat element of the
Soviet Ground Forces is the motorized rifle, tank, or
airborne division. These divisions are subordinate to
corps, army, and military district headquarters, which
provide combat and logistic support. In 1981 the
Ground Forces included 184 divisions, 36 corps and
army headquarters, and miscellaneous command and
support units.9
Since 1965, the Ground Forces have grown by nearly
half, from about 1.2 million to nearly 1.8 million men
(see figure 6). About three-fourths of this growth is in
response to conflict with China, Czechoslovakia, and
Afghanistan, while the rest represents long-term ef-
forts to modernize and expand the standing force.F_
Expansion of the Ground Forces probably began
about 1966 when corps and armies incorporated
larger and more mobile artillery, engineering, and
transport detachments. Divisional increases began in
the late 1960s. The motorized rifle division of the late
1970s, for example, had about one-third more major
weapons than that of the late 1960s. With this
increase in firepower came an increase in manpower
within existing divisions. In the Group of Soviet
Forces in Germany, the strength of tank divisions rose
from 7,800 to 10,000 and that of motorized rifle
divisions from 9,700 to 12,000. For the Ground Forces
as a whole, we estimate that these changes to combat
units have resulted in an overall increase of at least
80,000 men
Units created in response to problems along the Soviet
borders absorbed a great deal more manpower. The
buildup of ground forces opposite China involved the
stationing of 300,000 more men in that area, account-
ing for 55 percent of ground forces growth since 1965.
The legacy of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia led
to the addition of an estimated 50,000 men, and the
' In addition, there are 26 mobilization divisions. Each consists of a
security and maintenance staff of about 200 and a divisional-size
stock of equipment, which in wartime would be manned by
Figure 6
Soviet Ground Forces
200
1965 70 75 80 85
occupation of Afghanistan resulted in a now perma-
nent increase of 30,000. (The remaining 70,000 men
in Afghanistan were already in the Ground Forces
prior to the 1979 invasion.)
Air Defense Forces. The Air Defense Forces (PVO) is
the second-largest Soviet service, reflecting the Soviet
emphasis on homeland defense against air and missile
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Figure 7
Soviet Air Defense Forces
Command
and Support
Control
and Warning
ABM
SAM
attack.1? Over the past decade and a half, PVO
manpower has grown by 70,000 to its present level of
610,000 (see figure 7). Its men operate some 1,200
surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, 2,600 interceptor
aircraft, and 1,300 early warning/ground-controlled
intercept (EW/GCI) sites, making it the world's most
elaborate air defense system
10 The PVO has been restructured to place it more directly under
the operational control of military districts, rather than under PVO
command. There is no indication that its assets or manpower have
changed significantly as a result, so for convenience, this paper uses
The major factor in PVO manpower growth is the 50-
percent increase in EW/GCI sites, approximately
half of which were added along the Chinese border.
This growth reflects an effort to ensure more effective
command and control of the defense forces. In addi-
tion, the deployment of 64 ABM launchers and
associated radars began in 1966, adding a new cate-
gory of approximately 15,000 men by the-early 1970s.
Air defense aviation manpower changed little during
most of this period. Manpower savings associated with
a major reduction of nearly a third in the number of
air defense forces aircraft were offset by the larger
maintenance contingents required by more complex
replacement aircraft
Until 1970 SAM manpower rose as new systems more
than offset phaseouts of older SA-2 sites. During the
1970s, however, manpower requirements from the
continuing deployment of SA-3s and SA-5s have
almost exactly offset the savings from SA-2 deactiva-
tions
Air Forces. For this paper, we divide the Soviet Air
Forces (SAF) into its three functional elements: Fron-
tal Aviation, Long Range Aviation, and Military
Transport Aviation." Led by major expansion pro-
grams in tactical aviation, SAF manpower has grown
by 40 percent to its present estimated level of 540,000
(see figure 8).
Frontal Aviation. This force provides tactical air
support to the Ground Forces, and it is by far the
largest of the air forces. With the large additions of
rotary and fixed-wing aircraft since 1965, it has been
responsible for essentially all of the SAF manpower
growth during the 1965-81 period
About three-fourths of the increase in Frontal Avi-
ation's manpower is the result of the introduction of a
large force of helicopters. With a fivefold increase in
" There is evidence that the SAF has been reorganized, and that
what was formerly Frontal Aviation and Long Range Aviation have
been resubordinated. There is no evidence that assets or manpower
have changed significantly as a result, so for convenience, the
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Figure 8
Soviet Air Forces
aircraft types throughout the USSR. With the re-
structuring of the air forces for an initially conven-
tional air offensive aimed at NATO's nuclear weap-
ons, tactical aviation took on a new emphasis on
ground attack and also obtained improved fighter
capabilities. Adoption of these more capable aircraft
has required an additional 30,000 men since 1970.F-
Long Range Aviation. Intercontinental and peripheral
strike bombers of the LRA are intended for strikes
against theater or strategic targets in Europe, Asia,
and North America. Manning has declined steadily
through the mid-1970s as land- and sea-based missiles
have taken over most of the strategic mission. In
addition, significant reductions in medium bombers
have also taken place
Military Transport Aviation. This force provides
(Rotary Wing) support for airborne divisions, general logistic support
both within and outside Soviet borders, and overseas
delivery of economic and military assistance. Al-
Frontal Aviation though cargo capacity in ton-miles has nearly doubled
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1 1
1965 70 75 80 85
numbers, helicopters have taken on a major role in
ground attack and combat support. We estimate that
the share of tactical aviation manpower dedicated to
helicopters increased from 10 percent to over 30
percent
The expansion of the fixed-wing aircraft inventory by
50 percent took place primarily in the late 1960s and
focused mainly on units opposite China. More signifi-
cant, however, was a major reequipment program
beginning around 1970, which altered the mix of
since 1965, this has been achieved with minimal
impact on manpower, mainly by replacing small and
medium aircraft with heavy transports. Personnel
requirements rose in the early 1970s with the intro-
duction of transport helicopters but have fallen back
to about their 1965 level with the retirement of some
of the smaller transports.
Navy. Since the mid-1960s the Soviet Navy has been
transformed from a force oriented toward defense of
Soviet coastal waters to one which seeks to carry out a
variety of missions, including some in open-ocean
areas. One aspect of this change has been the intro-
duction of VTOL aircraft carriers and increased
numbers of major surface combatants. The newer
ships, larger and more complex than their predeces-
sors, require substantially larger numbers of ship-
board and support personnel, and an additional
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(see figure 9).
Strategic Rocket Forces. Established in 1959, the
Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) is the newest Soviet
service. It is responsible for launching satellites and
for operating nuclear-armed land-based ballistic mis-
siles. The widespread deployment of ICBMs in the
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Figure 9
Soviet Navy
Figure 10
Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces
Command
and Support
Fleet and
Shore Support
Coastal Defense
and Naval
Infantry
Aviation
Shipboard
1965 70 75 80 85
late 1960s was behind the rapid growth of the SRF
(see figure 10). In 1965 there were only 225 ICBMs,
compared with the current count of approximately
1,400. The decline in ICBM manpower by 70,000
after 1972 is due mainly to the replacement of older
manpower-intensive missiles with the later genera-
tions of ICBMs. Also, some of the older launchers
were dismantled to comply with SALT.
Until 1971, MR/IRBM manpower had declined slow-
ly as aging missiles were gradually retired. Until the
late 1970s, the steady decline in MR/IRBM man-
power reflected the increasing Soviet emphasis on
ICBM
MR/IRBM
intercontinental missiles. The decline is expected to
continue as less manpower-intensive SS-20s replace
aging missiles.
KGB Border Guards. The KGB Border Guards are
responsible for patrolling the USSR's 65,000 kilome-
ters of land and sea borders and for initial border
defense in case of invasion. We estimate that approxi-
mately 170,000 Border Guards are assigned to some
90 regimental-size outposts (otryadi) concentrated
mostly along the Chinese and West European borders.
Another 50,000 serve in air, sea, and signals units and
in support functions. Manpower assigned to the KGB
Border Guards has increased by approximately
50,000 since 1965.
National Command and Support. The national com-
mand and support category includes the General
Staff, the Main Political Administration, and Minis-
try of Defense offices. The size of these units is more a
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Figure 11
Soviet National Command and Support
Figure 12
Other Soviet Uniformed Manpowera
General Staff
and Subordinate
Units
1981
1.5 Million
Civil Defenseb
Railroad
Main Political
Administration
function of the growth of the armed forces as a whole
than a reflection of internal changes. Consequently,
these units have grown at nearly the same rate as the
armed services and currently account for a total of
approximately 370,000 men (see figure 11).I
Other Uniformed Manpower
In addition to the units with clear national security
roles, the Soviets include the Construction, Railroad,
Civil Defense, and MVD Internal Security Troops in
their definition of military organizations. In US-
Soviet comparisons, these units are excluded because
either the United States has no counterpart or be-
cause their function is performed by civilians. Togeth-
er, these four categories amount to 1.5 million men,
one-fourth of all uniformed manpower (see figure 12).
Although the size of these units in the past is uncer-
tain, in 1960 they were probably about 800,000. F_
aMen in units not considered by the US to have a national security role.
bCivil Defense Troops were first identified in 1966.
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roughly 50 percent higher than we estimated in
1980.12 This is primarily the result of improved analyt-
ical methods (see appendix 25X1
A). The noncombat missions of these units make it
difficult to identify 25X1
them. Moreover, because these units would not be
directly involved in an armed conflict, they tradition-
ally have not been followed closely by the Intelligence
Community. Research conducted over the last three
years has substantially raised both our estimates and
our confidence in them. The first major upward
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revision, from approximately 500,000 to 1.0 million,
took place in 1980, principally due to the findings of a
study of the Construction Troops." An update of that
study and further research on the Railroad and
Internal Security Troops are responsible for another
increase of 500,000, bringing the current estimate to
1.5 million. Because these units do not have a national
security role, our better appreciation of their size does
not affect our assessment of the overall Soviet threat.
Two events facilitated a dramatic growth over the
past two decades in these units. One was the rapid
recovery from the severe manpower shortage of the
early 1960s. By 1967 the number of persons turning
18 was twice that of 1962. The other was the change
in 1968 from a three-year term of service to a two-
year term. This increased the number of males con-
scripted each year by 50 percent. Together, these
changes provided the military with abundant man-
power to increase both the armed services and the
non-national-security units
Construction troops build and maintain all large
military facilities. In addition, they are a key source
of labor for high-priority civilian projects. They are
not organized or equipped for combat, and in wartime
their mission would be to build fortifications and
repair battle damage behind the frontlines. Their
numbers increased from around 400,000 to over
700,000 during the late 1960s in response to the large
military projects then under way-missile silos, ABM
and SAM sites, airfields, and Sino-Soviet border
facilities. As this work was completed, effort shifted
toward civilian projects on which we estimate they
now spend at least half of their time.
The primary mission of the Railroad Troops is con-
struction and maintenance of rail lines. In wartime,
they would build, reconstruct, and operate rail lines as
necessary to support the movement of combat troops.
We believe that their numbers have remained stable
at approximately 240,000 since the mid-1970s, when
a new corps was formed for the construction of the
Baikal-Amur Mainline.
In the event of a nuclear attack on Soviet cities,
military civil defense units stationed nearby are ex-
pected to establish communications, identify and
mark contaminated zones, perform decontamination,
open blocked transportation routes, and assist civilian
units in rescue and repair work. We believe these
units were first established in the mid-1960s and grew
to roughly 40,000. We have no evidence of new units
being formed since 1976.
The Ministry of Internal Affairs uses troops to main-
tain public order in urban areas throughout the Soviet
Union, to guard numerous government installations,
and to guard some 2 million convicts in penal facili-
ties. (Civilian guards provide security at other govern-
ment and industrial sites.) In wartime, MVD troops
would maintain order in rear areas, including occu-
pied territory. We estimate that their numbers have
increased gradually over the years to 450,000.
Civilians in Defense Activities
The Soviet use of civilians in defense differs substan-
tially from that in the United States. The Soviets
prefer to use military personnel in positions requiring
any military skills, and the United States uses mili-
tary personnel only in positions requiring mostly
military skills. As a result, Soviet civilian defense
workers tend to be in unskilled or clerical jobs.
Although the total Soviet military now uses 820,000
civilians as compared with 620,000 in 1965, this is
still fewer than the 990,000 in the United States. The
ratio of military to civilian defense workers in the
USSR is 7.1 to 1 and 2.1 to 1 in the United States.P
Our estimates of civilians working for the military
generally are made on the basis of less information
than those for uniformed military. Several types of
institutions subordinate to the Ministry of Defense-
such as farms run directly by the military, military
commercial and recreational services, and certain
research facilities-reportedly employ civilians, but
they have not been included here for lack of sufficient
information to estimate their numbers. Their inclu-
sion could substantially raise our estimate.
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Outlook to 1990
Our projections of manpower levels are based on the
force levels projected in the CIA's Soviet military-
economic data base (see appendix A). These force
levels are the result of an annually updated
analysis of Soviet deployments, defense industrial
production, and weapons research and development.
It does not make any assumptions about whether
Soviet leaders might respond to international or do-
mestic problems by changing defense spending. In
effect, then, this is a "base case" projection which is
linked explicitly to forecasted deployment and pro-
curement.
Force Size. Because much of the buildup in military
manpower was due to the deployment of a larger force
opposite China, we expect future manpower growth to
be at much lower levels than in the past. Although the
Soviets will continue producing large quantities of
military equipment, most of this will go toward
upgrading existing units rather than creating new
units
By 1985 a continuation of Ground Forces reorganiza-
tion and expansion will almost certainly increase troop
strength by about 70,000 men, and the deployment of
additional ground attack helicopters is expected to
raise manpower requirements by 10,000. Additional
reduced strength Ground Forces units could be mobi-
lized to support Soviet operations in Afghanistan,
Poland, or other problem areas. If this resulted in a
long-term occupation, there might be further perma-
nent additions to the armed forces.
Recent Soviet statements,
express determination to respond to the expanding
defense effort of the United States. Although we have
not confirmed such a response, it is possible that the
Soviets may have changed the 1981-85 economic plan
to accommodate large increases in defense activities.
If such a move occurred, it would probably include a
combination of increased production for selected sys-
tems in the near term and longer term increases in
investment and development." Until we could deter-
mine the types of new production or deployment,
however, we would not be able to estimate the impact
on military manpower.
Unless the Soviet leadership revises its views of
military requirements dramatically, we expect very
limited growth in the number of uniformed personnel
from 1985 through 1990. There are several possible
developments, however, that may cause modest reallo-
cations of men among services and missions:
? New Soviet weapons: The wider use of manpower-
saving technologies such as computers, solid fuels,
and solid-state, modular electronics probably will
reduce the numbers of men required to operate
many Soviet weapon systems. On the basis of past
analysis, however, we expect compensating in-
creases in the manning of support and maintenance
for these more complex weapons.
? Soviet force structure: As the organization of the
Soviet military continues to evolve, manpower levels
and distribution will change. This will be most
important in the Ground Forces, where reorganiza-
tion has increased overall manning by 80,000 since
1965. We do not expect reorganization in the other
services to have an observable impact on overall
manpower.
? New US weapons: If the United States develops a
new strategic bomber and continues deploying
cruise missiles, the Soviets will probably deploy
more SAMs and interceptors, resulting in a larger
air defense force and noticeably higher overall
manpower levels. On the other hand, a new land-
based ICBM or a larger US Navy would have little
effect because the Soviet defensive forces associated
with these threats are relatively small. However, the
net impact of a Soviet response is uncertain because
it depends on the retirement of older weapons as
well as the deployment of new ones.
? Arms control agreements: If agreements on strate-
gic weapons stabilized the number of Soviet ICBMs
at their 1982 level, our projection of armed forces
manpower would decline by 1 percent in the late
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1980s.15 We believe that any agreement reached
through the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
(MBFR) talks probably would cause the relocation
rather than the elimination of the affected Soviet
units
Impending Constraints. The biggest challenge ahead
for the Soviet military will be changing demographics.
Since 1960, the growth rate of the population has
declined, and it is expected to continue declining
through the end of the century. The number of males
reaching draft age annually will drop from 2.6 million
in the late 1970s to 2.0 million by 1986. Since the
Soviet draft pool consists of males aged 18 to 26, the
full impact will be delayed until the late 1980s. In
addition, the 1979 census confirmed the rising propor-
tion of the USSR's Moslem nationalities. The dispar-
ity in birth rates between Moslem and European
peoples means that the proportion of Moslem minor-
ities will approach one-third of draft-age youth while
the size of the total pool is falling. We expect two
developments in response: a largely unsuccessful quest
for manpower savings and revamped conscription
practices.
The main target for improved manpower efficiency is
likely to be support personnel. We estimate their
numbers at 1.8 million, over 40 percent of the armed
forces. Manpower savings in this area will be difficult
to achieve, however, given the need to maintain the
large Soviet equipment stocks. More importantly, it
will conflict with the high priority the Soviets place on
materiel readiness. For example, current practice is to
minimize equipment use and to rely on civilians at
factories for major repair. In addition, we estimate
that the 139 reduced-strength ground forces divisions
are already structured to be maintained with a mini-
mum of support personnel. Finally, past increases in
support efficiency have not been used to achieve
economies in manpower. Instead, support manning
stayed the same, and the improvements were used to
obtain greater capability. Such practices dim the
prospects for saving much manpower in the support
services
" This assumes that manpower associated with strategic offensive
systems stays at 1982 levels. Of course, if major reductions in
strategic forces are achieved, the result would be further manpower
Another area for laborsaving scrutiny is the Construc-
tion and Railroad Troops, estimated at 1 million men,
or 15 percent of the Soviet military, but the prospects
of reducing their strength conflict with long-estab-
lished Soviet practices. Construction and Railroad
Troops are key sources of labor for high-priority
civilian projects, especially in remote areas, and their
military discipline enables them to achieve much
higher productivity than civilians. Moreover, by con-
centrating ethnic minorities in these units the Soviets
also maintain a useful noncombat means for indoctri-
nating the least politically reliable and least educated
members of the draft pool. The increasing numbers of
draft-age minorities will make the retention of a large
number of noncombat positions for assimilation even
more important.
The remaining men are primarily in combat units,
which by their nature offer few opportunities for
manpower savings. Overall, the military will be hard
pressed to achieve manpower efficiencies without
compromising longstanding management policies.
We expect the Soviets to revise their conscription
practices to keep conscription rates from exceeding
sustainable levels. We believe the three grounds for
deferment from military service-family hardship,
health, and higher education-represent a ceiling that
limits conscription rates to between 85 and 90 per-
cent.16 We estimate current rates are already over 85
percent and are rising.
Evidence of a reaction to the manpower shortage is
beginning to appear. Early in 1982 the Soviets elimi-
nated educational deferments at many universities
and institutes. As a result, many university-bound
students will be conscripted before they complete (or
even before they begin) their higher education. This
action will improve the quality and number of con-
scripts only marginally; at most it will increase drafta-
ble youth by just 5 percent.
'b As used here, the conscription rate is the percentage of males who
are 18 in a given year and are conscripted eventually over the
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Although the Soviets will have to take additional
action to deal with the manpower shortage, so far we
have no indications of further changes to manpower
practices. There is evidence that manning levels in
some combat units have been frozen, but it is too early
to establish a trend. However, the problem of the
shrinking draft pool could be overcome by a six-month
extension of the two-year term of service. The Soviets
could also attempt to circumvent the demographic
constraints by increasing the number of careerists,
having more frequent reserve callups, or using greater
numbers of women and civilians, but each of these
actions would be more difficult and offer a much
smaller payoff than extension of the term of service.
The growing number of minorities poses a dilemma
for Soviet planners, who are certain to be concerned
with the reliability and performance of ethnic groups.
However, little can be said about how this might
actually affect force effectiveness. Foremost among
our uncertainties is the extent to which the Soviet
military feels that its traditional practices for manag-
ing ethnic groups can absorb the larger numbers
The distribution of minorities in the Soviet military is
heavily skewed away from command and combat
positions. In part, lower education and linguistic
problems make it difficult to obtain technical or
commissioned positions, but their near total exclusion
from the officer ranks suggests that political reliabil-
ity is of even greater concern. Well over half of
minority conscripts serve in the Construction, Rail-
road, or Internal Security Troops. Most of the re-
mainder are assigned to noncombat roles in the
Ground Forces or Air Defense Forces. Relatively few
are assigned to the Navy, Air Forces, or Strategic
Rocket Forces or are stationed outside Soviet borders.
(The initial Soviet units in Afghanistan were a brief
exception since many of these were composed of
reservists called up from contiguous areas. After their
90 days of reserve duty expired, they were replaced
with regular conscripts.) A major cutback of Con-
struction and Railroad troops might relieve the man-
power shortage but at the cost of a marked increase in
the proportion of non-Slavic minorities in the armed
forces.
Worsening civilian labor shortages, responsible in part
for the Soviet economic decline, may cause the leader-
ship to consider reducing military manpower. This
policy, however, would itself do little to resolve the
fundamental problems underlying the slowdown in
Soviet growth. The leadership is undoubtedly con-
cerned about the low birth rates among the Slavic
nationalities. At the 26th Party Congress in February
1981, Brezhnev announced a regionally differentiated
policy aimed at raising the birth rate in predominately
Slavic regions. However, the announced incentives are
too small to have more than a minimal effect." Even if
they were successful, there would be no benefits to the
labor force or to the draft pool until the end of the
century. Certainly, pressure will increase on the lead-
ership to make major changes in military manpower
policy, but it will be two or three years before a
decision has to be made. As that point nears, the
shape of the debate should become clearer. At pre-
sent, we expect an increase to the term of service
rather than reductions in manpower
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Appendix A
Estimating Methods and Concepts
Estimating Methods
The CIA model of Soviet military manpower is
patterned after our understanding of the organization
of the Soviet military. The model is part of the SOYA
military-economic data base and has seven major
components-the five services, national command and
support (including units not considered to have a
national security role), and the militarized security
forces. Detailed estimates are made of the order of
battle and manning levels of each of approximately
1,200 unit types and are updated annually. Estimated
manpower is simply the sum of the products of order
of battle and manning levels. In this way, estimated
manpower is explicitly linked to the Intelligence Com-
munity's estimates and projections of Soviet forces.
The manning levels and order of battle are estimated
by a variety of methods
estimate of national security force size is roughly ? 10
percent. That is, we are 90 percent confident that the
true value is within this range around our basic
estimate. Our confidence in the estimate for other
uniformed military is roughly ? 20 percent
we have relatively greater confidence in
our estimates for the 1970s than for earlier periods.
However, our confidence in estimates of individual
units is often less than for service or mission totalsr
The accuracy of order-of-battle estimates depends on
our ability to identify organizational units. The order
of battle for ships is relatively accurate because they
are easily visible and, though mobile, make use of only
a small number of ports. The air unit order of battle is
less certain because aircraft are often in shelters. In
general, however, combat units with their associated
equipment are more easily counted than support or
command elements. The latter do not always have
distinctive equipment or facilities to identify them
The quality of estimated manning levels varies greatly
according to the types of data available. The evidence
on which these estimates are based is often fragmen-
tary and sometimes contradictory. Estimating man-
ning factors is complicated by the fact that even in a
full-strength unit, manning will vary as troops are
rotated and training cycles are completed. In addition,
units of a given type are sometimes manned at
different levels. Civilians, who tend to be in support or
RDT&E units, are particularly difficult to count since
they are not always colocated with military units
stand out as most significant
New Methods and Concepts
Since the publication of the CIA's previous review of
Soviet manpower trends in 1977,18 numerous changes
have been made to our manpower data base. Most of
these have resulted from the Intelligence Communi-
ty's periodic updating and refining of its Soviet order
of battle and combat strength. However, the changes
that tend to have a greater impact on manpower are
those that reflect a better understanding of the struc-
ture and staffing of support functions. Although many
changes have been made in this area, too, several
Perhaps most important for users of these estimates is
the distinction now made between the armed forces
and total military manpower. Since the Soviet Con-
struction, Railroad, Civil Defense, and MVD troops
perform a variety of tasks not related to the US
definition of national security, it is important to
separate this manpower from that with tasks more
similar to the US armed forces. This is the same
distinction made in CIA comparisons of US and
Soviet defense costs.19 This is particularly significant
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since our present estimate for non-national-security
manpower is nearly 1.5 million, 25 percent of total
military manpower
The largest change occurred in our estimate of Con-
struction Troops. Previously, we simply counted these
units
better, unbiased estimate can be made by a statistical
adjustment taking into account the number of units
that are identified more than once. If only a few units
are identified more than once, there is a good chance
that our sample misses many units and that our
estimate is therefore quite low. If many units come up
repeatedly, our sample is likely to be missing only a
few units.
Combinatorial probability theory can be used to
estimate the "maximum likelihood value" for the
actual but unknown number of construction battalions
given the size and structure of our report sample. In
our sample only 20 percent of the battalions were
reported more than once, so the estimate of the total
computed by this method was more than twice the
number of reported battalions.
A major increase over an outdated estimate of MVD
Internal Security Troops was the outcome of a study
of emigres who had served with the Internal Troops.
The MVD divisions identified by the emigres were
verified To confirm
the general magnitude of this estimate, an analysis of
manning requirements for prison guards was also
made. This considerably raised our confidence in the
new estimate.
A study of military training and schools produced a
variety of changes. The net effect was to increase both
military and civilian staffing. Civilian manning also
increased as a result of a study of Ground Forces
support units and a study of civil defense manpower
subordinate to the MVD. A review of information on
the KGB Border Guards produced a more disaggre-
gated organizational structure and documented the
increasing size of units in sensitive border areas.
The original basis of the estimated manpower in
Military Transport Aviation was simply the number
of transport aircraft in the Soviet Union. Our present
estimate takes into account the fact that many of the
transports are actually subordinate to individual serv-
ices, not to Military Transport Aviation. Consequent-
ly, estimated manning for MTA is less than half its
previous level, and the difference is now allocated to
the services according to the number and types of
their aircraft.
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Appendix B
Soviet Manpower Estimates, 1965-81 a Thousands of Uniformed Personnel
National command a
nd general support
270
300
330
340
340
360
360
370
370
Ground Forces
1,240
1,290
1,390
1,500
1,590
1,640
1,680
1,720
1,790
Air Defense Forces (P
VO)
540
530
560
570
580
580
610
610
610
Air Forces
390
410
430
470
480
510
520
530
540
Navy
350
360
370
380
390
400
420
420
420
800
1,100
1,300
1,400
1,400
1,500
1,500
1,500
1,500
4,050
4,500
4,940
5,260
5,390
5,600
5,680
5,700
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