THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF: A COMMAND STRUCTURE FOR MILITARY PLANNING AND OPERATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
Intelligence
Directorate of TOp Secret
The Soviet General Staff:
A Command Structure
for Military Planning
and Operations
Top Secret
sova2-loo6~rx 25X1
May 1982
Copy 3 9 5
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
Directorate of Top Secret
Intelligence
The Soviet General Staff:
A Command Structure
for Military Planning
and Operations
Irtjormation available as o./~ 10 May 1982
has been used in the preparation oJthis report.
This paper was prepared by
Theater Forces Division, Office of Soviet Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
addressed to the Chief, Theater Forces Division, Office
of Soviet Analysis,
This paper was coordinated with the National
Intelligence Council
Top Secret
SOV 82-10067JX
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4 25X1
Top Secret
and Operations
The Soviet General Staff:
A Command Structure
for Military Planning
The General Staff is second only to the party leadership in Soviet national
security decisionmaking. When it was formed in the mid-1920s it was
intended to be the national organization for military planning, but since
then it has also acquired authority for operational control of all Soviet
armed forces.) 25X1
During peacetime the General Staff is the executive agent of the Defense
Council (a deliberative body with both civilian and military members,
presided over by the chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and
charged with advising the Politburo on major defense policy issues). As
such, the General Staff converts Politburo and llefense Council policy
decisions into defense plans and orders. It also briefs the Council on
national security matters, and thus is in a position to influence the
decisionmaking process. 25X1
In wartime the national command authority is the Supreme High Com-
mand (VGK). The makeup of the VGK is not published, but it probably
would include the chiefs of the services and other military figures, and it
would be headed by the General Secretary of the Communist Party
(currently L. I. Brezhnev), with the title of Supreme High Commander.
The General Staff would be the VGK's agent for strategic planning and its
executive agent for operational control of all forces. ~ 25X1
Unlike US staff officers, who have no command authority, Soviet staff
officers are the executive agents of the commander at each echelon of the
military hierarchy. Throughout the Soviet Armed Forces, for example, the
chief of staff is second only to the commander in authority and importance
and is the only officer authorized to issue orders in the commander's name.
The chief of staff directs the work of the operational staff (operations,
intelligence, organization, and communications); coordinates the work of
the arms and technical staffs (such as air and air defense, rocket and
artillery troops, and logistics); and oversees the work of operational staffs at
the next lower echelon.
The Soviet General Staff is organized along functional and geographic
lines. At its heart is the Main Operations Directorate, responsible for all
aspects of defense planning at the national level. (It would order the use of
nuclear weapons by operational units, after appropriate political authoriza-
tion.) The Main Organization-Mobilization Directorate is the next most
influential element; besides managing conscription, mobilization, and
iii 25X1 Top Secret
SOV 81-10067JX
May 1982 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4 _
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
combat training, it determines the organization and equipment levels of all
the services. The General Staff draws up the annual and five-year defense
plans and works with civilian planners to ensure that the overall economic
plan meets defense needs. Other elements of the General Staff specialize in
areas such as intelligence, foreign military relations, and military science.
General Staff personnel form an elite service at the center of the Soviet
command and staff system. They are selected by the staff's Cadres
Directorate and the Administrative Organs Department of the CPSU
Central Committee. The selecting officers examine professional and
political qualifications to choose the most promising candidates from all
branches of service. The political requirement is not pro forma-all
members of the General Staff service are .active party members. Indeed,
political activity is one of the prerequisites to an officer's selection to the
service. A large majority of General Staff personnel are ground force
combined-arms officers. This is partly because of tradition but also because
the Ground Forces are the largest service. 25X1
Throughout the armed forces, members of the General Staff service occupy
the key positions in the main staffs and the key command and senior staff
positions down to about the army level. Because the number of full
members is limited, candidate members of the General Staff service
usually fill the top command and staff positions at the corps and division
levels. The net result is that commanders at each echelon in every service
reflect General Staff training, traditions, military values, and operating
procedures. 25X1
The General Staff system has both advantages and disadvantages as a
mechanism of military command and control. It gives the Soviet political
leaders centralized operational authority over all major field commands,
using unified and well-rehearsed command and operating procedures. On
orders from the Defense Council, the Soviet military leaders would
probably be.able to direct the rapid transition of their forces from a
peacetime to a wartime footing and then to conduct extended military
operations without interruption. The chief disadvantage is that as the elite
system draws the most capable officers to itself it drains them from the
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
Top Secret
The General Staff and National Security Planning 6
Interaction With the Political Leadership 6
The General Staff and Operational Control of the Armed Forces
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
Top Secret
Ministry of Defense
Main Operations Directorate (Glavnoye Operativnoye Upravleniye) 19
Main Organization-Mobilization Directorate (Glavnoye Orgstatno- 25
Mobilizatsionnoye Upravleniye)
Main Directorate for Military Assistance (Desyatoye Glavnoye 28
Upravleniye)
7. Main Directorate of Signal Troops (Glavnoye Upravleniye Voysk 30
Svyazi)
8. Military Science Directorate (Voyennoye Nauchnoye Upravleniye) 34
9. History of the Soviet General Staff
Tables
1. Current Leadership of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces 6
2. Chiefs of the Soviet General Staff Since 1921 35
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
Top Secret
The Soviet General Staff:
A Command Structure
for Military Planning
and Operations
In 1921 the staff of the Workers and Peasants Red
Army (RKKA) was formed to unify command and
control of the armed forces of the new Soviet state.
Many of its personnel were former members of the
Imperial General Staff. The military reform of
1924-25 tied the staff even more closely to the party
and government leaders. At that time Stalin and other
party leaders (who would not have permitted any
central power structure not completely under their
control) viewed the General Staff .primarily as a
planning organ. M. V. Frunze, generally considered
the person most responsible for its founding, wrote:
The functions of this stall must include resolu-
tion of problems connected with the overall
tasks of state defense: mobilization and oper-
ational plans.~~ 25X1
During the next decade the Soviet armed forces
cooperated with and learned from the German Army
of the Weimar Republic, which was training covertly
in the Soviet Union. The staff of the RKKA steadily
increased its operational role and became closely
identified with the young, technically trained element
that was developing within the officer corps. These
developments apparently led to much suspicion of the
RKKA staff within both the party and the military.
25X1 25X1
In the mid-1930s Hitler renounced the Treaty of
Versailles and reestablished the German General
Staff-and shortly thereafter the RKKA staff added
"General" to its name. A General Staff Academy was
organized and enrolled its first class. These measures
added to the concern of those who preferred to see
operational authority kept in the individual services.
These opponents were sufficiently influential at the
time to limit the staff's role mainly to defense plan-
ning and to downgrade its main directorates to direc-
torates and its directorates to departments. Decision-
making within the Commissariat of Defense was
25X1
1 25X1
The General Staff is a part of the Soviet Ministry of
Defense, and its chief is a First Deputy Minister of
Defense; its central position within the Ministry is
shown in figure 1. The General Staff has three basic
mandates:
? To provide a centralized mechanism of troop control
throughout the military establishment.
? To be the top military planning agency for national
security affairs.
? To be the executive organ of the national command
authority for the entire armed forces of the USSR
(and the Warsaw Pact).
The General Staff as we know it today emerged in
1935-amid much resistance from various military
and party leaders who had reservations about this
concentration of power. Since that time, articles have
appeared from time to time in the Soviet press
explaining aspects of the operational role of the
General Staff in peace and war. The articles usually
discuss questions of the staff's responsibilities, its
relationship to other elements of the armed forces,
and its influence in the. high-level military decision-
making process. This may indicate a continuing sensi-
tivity to the need for periodic official reaffirmation of
one General Staff's role.
The concept, organization, and operating principles of
the Soviet General Staff system have evolved from
three separate traditions. The Imperial Russian Gen-
eral Staff was the origin of many of its current
organizational and operational concepts. The concept
that it should'be a highly educated professional officer
corps was imported largely from the German General
Staff. Finally, the concept of an elite, highly central-
ized leadership organ closely tied to the party and
state leadership derives from the Bolshevik tradition.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
'If'nn CPrrPf
specifically reserved for the Commissar and other
party leaders, leaving senior military leaders-includ-
ing the Chief of the General Staff-with little real
authority 25X1
The growing German military threat by the end of the
1930s convinced the Soviet leaders that the profes-
sional military leadership should have the authority
(as well as the expertise) to organize the country's
defenses 'to meet the coming threat. As a result, the
Soviets in January 1941 began a reorganization of the
General Staff. Its directorates and departments were
upgraded to their previous status and new graduates
of the academy were added to the staff.
When Germany invaded in June 1941, the General
Staff was in position to assume overall control of the
Soviet armed forces, and its role and authority contin-
ued to expand as it gained Stalin's confidence. By
war's end, the Soviet leadership evidently was making
no major military decisions without first hearing from
the General Staff) 25X1
After the war, the General Staff retained its authority
for planning, training, and general preparedness but
lost some of its operational authority to main staffs
newly created for the individual military services. One
reason for this may have been a general feeling that
the command, control, and communications systems
available at the time were inadequate to permit any
responsive centralized control over the large and
widely deployed Soviet forces.
The Soviet Navy had a main staff before World War
II, and shortly after the war the Air Force staff was
upgraded to a main staff, while a Ground Forces main
staff was created; the National Air Defense Forces
became a separate branch of the armed forces in
1949, with its own main staff. The creation of the
Strategic Rocket Forces in late 1959, with yet another
main staff, led the military leadership to press for a
command organ with centralized operational author-
ity over all the armed forces. At that time, however,
the General Staff and the political leadership under
Khrushchev were in frequent conflict, exacerbated by
the Cuban missile crisis and the Penkovskiy affair.
Some of the General Staff's leaders were replaced,
and its prestige and authority declined.
With the ouster of Khrushchev in October 1964,
however, the General Staff once again began to
improve its position in the defense establishment. A
few weeks later Marshal Biryuzov, whom Khrushchev
had appointed, was killed in a plane crash and M. V.
Zakharov, who had been ousted in 1963, was returned
to the position of General Staff Chief. Since then the
General Staff has steadily increased its operational
authority and its position within the national security
apparatus. This increase has been enhanced by techni-
cal advances in command, control, and communica-
tions systems, which have allowed it to assume a
constantly expanding operational role in force control.
The evolution of the General Staff is shown graphical-
ly in figure 9 (appendix C). The names of its chiefs
since 1921 are listed in table 2.~~ 25X1
Today, the General Staff is organized into functional
directorates headed by deputy chiefs of staff, as
shown in figure 2 (the names of the current incum-
bents are shown in table 1). The functions of the
General Staff range from operational matters such as
command and control, planning, training and readi-
ness, tactics, intelligence, and topographic studies to
military policy matters such as national security
planning, foreign military assistance, arms control,
and censorship. It is also directly concerned with
issues involving the diverse aspects of weapons acqui-
sition, logistics, military science, and mobilization
The General Staff has more influence on Soviet
military policy today than ever before. Its current
chief, :Marshal N. V. Ogarkov, has considerable ex-
perience and prestige and plays a more prominent role
in political-military decisionmaking than any of his
predecessors over the past two decades
2 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
Figure 1
Ministry of Defense
Collegium (Military High Command)
of the Ministry of Defense
Minister of Defense (Chairman of Collegium)
First Deputy Minister of Defense, Chief of
General Staff (Vice-Chairman of Collegium)
First Deputy Minister of Defense, Commander in Chief, I
Combined Armed Forces, Warsaw Pact
Deputy Minister of Defense and
Commander in Chief for Strategic
Rocket Forces
Deputy Minister of Defense and
Commander in Chief for
Ground Forces
Deputy Minister of Defense and
Commander in Chief for
Air Defense Forces
Deputy Minister of Defense and
Commander in Chief for
Air Forces
Deputy Minister of Defense and
Commander in Chief for
Naval Forces
General Staff of the
Soviet Armed Forces
. Main Staff of
Military Naval
Forces
First Deputy Chief of General
Staff for Operations
Deputy Chief of General
Staff far Organization
Deputy Chief of General
Staff for Communications
Deputy Minister of Defense fo`r
Rear Services i
Deputy Minister of Defensefo~r
Civil Defense.
Deputy Minister of Defense and
Chief of Main Inspectorate i,
Deputy Minister of Defense for
Armament and Equipment
Deputy Minister of Defense for
Construction and Troop Billeting
Deputy Minister of Defense for
Personnel Matters at
1
First Deputy Chief of General
Staff for Warsaw Pact {
Deputy Chief of General Staff
for Intelligence {
Deputy Chief of General Staffi
for Naval Matters i
Main Staff of Rocket
Troops of Strategic
Designation
Main Staff of
Ground Forces
Main Staff of
Air Defense
Forces
Main Staff of
Military Air
Forces
Staff and Directorates
for Civil Defense
Staff and Directorates
for Rear Services
i
Armaments and
Equipment ~
Directorates
Construction and
Troop Billeting
Directorates
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010J05/24:CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
Main Cadres
Directorate
Main Directorate for
Military Educational
Institutions
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
Figure 2
General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces
Chief of the General Staff
First Deputy Chief
First Deputy Chief for Operations
First Deputy Chief for Warsaw Pact
Affairs
Deputy Chief for Intelligence
Deputy Chief for Communications
Deputy Chief for Organizational
Matters
Deputy Chief for Naval Matters
Main
Organizati
on-
Main Directorate of
Main Operations
M
ain Intellige
nce
Mob
ilization
Directorate (GOU)
D
irectorate (
GRU)
Dire
ctorate (GO
MU)
Signal Troops (GUNS)
Main Directorate for
M
ilitary Scien
ce
Militar
y Topograp
hic
Censorship
Military Assistance
D
irectorate (
VNU)
Direct
orate (VTU)
Directorate
(Tenth GU)
Cadres
E
xternal Relat
ions
Ad
ministration
General Staff
Directorate (UK)
D
irectorate (U
VS)
Dir
ectorate (AK
hU)
Academy
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
_ _ 25X1
Current Leadership of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces
Position
Chief of the General Staff and First Deputy Minister of
Defense
First Deputy Chief of the. General Staff
First Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Operations
First Deputy Chief of the General Staff and Chief of Staff for
the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact
Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Deputy Chief of Staff for Organizational Matters
Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications
Deputy Chief of Staff for Naval Matters
General of the Army S. F. Akhromeyev
General of the Army V. I. Varennikov
General of the Army I. A. Gribkov
General of the Army P. Ivashutin
General of the Army V. Ya. Abolins
Marshal of Signal Troops A. I. Belov
Admiral Amel'ko
Main Intelligence Directorate
Main Organization-Mobilization Directorate
Main Directorate of Signal Troops
Tenth Main Directorate
Military Science Directorate
Military Topographic Directorate
Military Negotiations Directorate
Administration Directorate
Academy of the General Staff imeni Voroshilov
General of the Army P. Ivashutin
General of the Army V. Ya. Abolins
Marshal of Signal Troops A. I. Belov
General of the Army Zotov
General-Lieutenant Gareyev
General-Lieutenant Byzov
General-Colonel Chervov
General-Lieutenant Chuvakhin
General of the Army M. M. Kozlov
The General Staff and National Security Planning
The General Staff is the hub of the Soviet national
security planning process, playing a role in both the
formulation and the implementation of policy deci-
sions. In performing these duties it has formed organi-
zational relationships with party and state leaders,
and these relationships have enhanced its influence at
the highest levels.
Interaction With the Political Leadership
Ultimate authority for all decisions of national securi-
ty importance, including defense planning and the use
of military forces, rests in peace or war with the
Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(CPSU). The Politburo establishes military policy and
makes the fundamental decisions regarding the devel-
opment and structuring of the military forces. It
exercises its responsibilities either directly or through
the Defense Council. This is the peacetime pattern
evolved since World War II. There may be some other
process designed for wartime, but the command struc-
ture as it now stands seems adequate for either peace
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
As the principal executive organ of the Defense
Council, the General Staff provides both administra-
tive and operational support. The Main Operations
Directorate ' of the General Staff serves as the secre-
tariat of the Defense Council, setting its agendas,
arranging briefings, and coordinating decisions. The
Staff translates the Council's force structure decisions
into defense development plans and works directly
with the Council during the economic planning cycle.
The Minister of Defense is a member of the Defense
Council, and Marshal Ustinov, the current Minister,
is also a Politburo member. The principal First Depu-
ty Minister is the Chief of the General Staff, a post
that also carries membership in the Defense Council.
Marshal Ogarkov, the current chief, is not a member
of the Politburo, but he attends some of its meetings,
presumably to brief the members on defense matters.
The Staff Chief is also empowered to act as Defense
Minister (as Ogarkov did during Ustinov's illness in
1980).
Role in the State Apparatus
The General Staff is a part of the Defense Ministry, a
government organ staffed almost entirely by active
duty military officers. The staff discharges its respon-
sibilities in the government apparatus through mili-
tary advisers who serve on various committees and
commissions of the Council of Ministers. For
example:
the military department of the State Planning Com-
mittee (Gosplan) and to the Military-Industrial
Commission (VPK), the two most important state
organizations for economic and defense-industrial
planning and management.
? Officers who report to the General Staff's 10th
Main.Directorate (charged with overseeing the
Soviet military assistance program) are assigned to
the State Committee for Foreien Economic 25X1
Relations. 25X1
War Planning 25X1 25X1
The General Staff's Main Operations Directorate is
responsible for drafting the national war plans, which
establish guidelines for Soviet responses to potential
threats. These plans cover not only the operations of
military and security forces but the contributions
required from the civilian sector as we11.0 25X1
For any given threat to the USSR, the national war
plans include variants designed to meet various possi-
ble circumstances. Thus, a plan for war against the
People's Republic of China would include one variant
for conflict with Chinese forces alone and others for
the entry of potential Chinese supporters into the
struggle, with estimates of the forces likely to be
involved. Additional variants would be designed for
both conventional and nuclear war.~~ 25X1
? Officers who report to the General Staff's Material
Planning Directorate (a subcomponent of the Orga-
nization-Mobilization Directorate) are assigned to
'Key subcomponents of the General Staff are discussed in detail in
appendix A~
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
Top Secret L~JC"I
Mobilization Planning
The General Staff s national mobilization plan is a
composite of specific plans for marshaling Soviet
material and human resources in defense of the state.
The mobilization plan is prepared in the Main Orga-
nization-Mobilization Directorate.
A key part ~of this plan is a complete inventory of the
material resources of the Soviet state-from livestock
to heavy metals reserves.Z The inventory is adjusted at
least every five years, and sometimes annually, to
reflect economic changes. The national census serves
as the plan's decennial inventory of human resources.
In preparing and maintaining these inventories, the
General Staff works closely with Gosplan, as well as
with the State Committee for Material Reserves and
the State Committee for Material-Technical Supply.
It is likely that only the General Staff has access to
the total inventory, however.
The inventories prepared for the mobilization plan
form the material base for virtually all military and
economic planning in the USSR.
the mobilization plan was the
basis of the first five-year state economic plan (adopt-
ed in 1929) and that the people associated with
mobilization planning during 1925-33 were deeply
involved in the first two five-year plans
Another key part of the national mobilization plan
specifies the procedures for mobilizing the human and
.material reserves. It has two parts, military and
civilian. The military mobilization plan provides for:
The rapid mobilization of reserve forces.
The conscription of new troops.
The provision of the state military material reserves
for the immediate support of the war effort.
Z In peacetime the General Staff controls a network of military
mobilization reserves consisting largely of weapons, other equip-
ment, and military consumables. At the onset of war the General
Staff also would gain control of a major portion of state reserves.
The civil defense plan has provisions for shelter and
evacuation, but also has major portions intended to
support the long-range war effort by:
Ensuring the protection of economic leaders.
Securing the continued operation of defense
industries.
Converting civilian industries to support the war
effort.
Presumably the mobilization plan calls for an ar-
rangement similar to that of World War II, in which
the defense industries were directly subordinate to the
State Defense Committee. ~~ 25X1
Five-Year Defense Plan
The General Staff initiates preparation of a five-year
defense plan.' The Strategic Planning Directorate of
the Main Operations Directorate drafts guidelines for
the five-year plan and for the 15-year perspective plan
and orders all staffs of the armed forces and all
directorates of the Ministry of Defense to project their
activities for the plan period. It establishes the plan-
ning calendar for the annual and five-year plans and
identifies the general responsibilities (such as training,
procurement, research, logistics, and military assist- 25X1
ance) for each service. On this basis, the service begins
preparing its input to the defense plan, sending out
instructions to its subordinate echelons and asking for
their projections.) 25X1
The primary source of planning factors are the normal
operational requirements of the peacetime armed
forces. Mobilization specifications are another
source-new or altered mobilization plans will include
adjusted requirements for everything from manpower
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
Too Secret
and equipment to training. Unforeseeable develop-
ments can change or add to planning requirements.
Provisions are built into the defense plans so that
inputs such as new technology or unique service
requirements can be accommodated in the planning
cycle. ~~ ~~ 25X1
During the planning process each Ministry director-
ate, each institute and academy, and each army-level
staff in the armed forces develops its contribution to
the various parts of the defense plan. These are
coordinated, approved, and aggregated at each eche-
lon. Throughout this process the General Staff is
called u on to clarify its instructions or settle dis-
putes.~ 25X1
The appropriate General Staff directorates are re-
sponsible for substantive coordination and approval of
the various components of the defense plan. The
Navy's military science research plan, for example,
must be coordinated and approved by the General
Staff's Military Science Directorate. Table of organi-
zation and equipment (TO&E) requirements are de-
termined finally by the General Staff's Main Organi-
zation-Mobilization Directorate, while operational
training plans are reviewed and approved by the
Operational Readiness Directorate within the Main
Operations Directorate. Until plans are approved by
the appropriate General Staff directorate, no action
can be taken to integrate them into the defense
budget.
Eventually the parts of the plan are forwarded to the
Material Planning Directorate (within the Main Or-
ganization-Mobilization Directorate) to be incorporat-
ed into the prospective five-year defense plan.? This
Directorate, staffed by officers who are economists,
engineers, and accountants, prepares both the annual
and the five-year prospective plans under the overall
guidance of the Strategic Planning Directorate. The
core of this effort appears to be the resource estimate,
which includes the projected overall military resource
requirements for manpower; research, development,
testing, and evaluation (RDT&E); procurement: oper-
ations; and maintenance.~~ 25X1
It appears that the personnel of25
the Materta anntng Directorate arrive at the re-
sources estimate by compiling the requirements of the
various services. They apparently coordinate priori-
ties, resource availability, production, and transporta-
tion capabilities through General Staff officers serv-
ing with Gosplan and other commissions and
committees of the Council of Ministers. The Material
Planning Directorate works closely with the Gosplan,
which appears to generate the overall national esti-
mates of resource requirements.s~~
25X1
X1 5X1
When the prospective five-year defense plan is com-
plete and is approved by the leaders of the General
Staff and by the Minister of .Defense, it is scheduled
for presentation to the party leaders. The pattern
followed at this stage does not seem to have changed
significantly since the planning cycles of the 1930s. 25X1
The prospective defense plan is presented in detail to
25X1
party leaders.
' Because of the planning sequence and the early development of
the armed forces' requirements, it appears that the Soviet economic
planning process is oriented toward the physical resource allocation
process, rather than budgeting.0 25X1
~GV~
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
Top Secret
The defense plan approved by the Defense Council,
plus these specific instructions (which are drafted by
the General Staff), forms the basis for the work of
Gosplan's military department. This department re-
views the ongoing economic planning by all depart-
ments of Gosplan to ensure that the needs of the
defense plan are being met within the context of the
overall economic plan. It attempts to reconcile appar-
ent conflicts of priorities and reports to the General
Staff those it cannot reconcile. Most problems appear
to be solved within Gosplan without appeal 1o the
General Staff or other authority
Opportunities To Influence the Planning
Thus, in its planning role, the General Staff has
access to and control over the most comprehensive
economic and defense data bases in the entire USSR.
In formulating policy direction in the area of national
security, the party leadership must depend on the
Staff for reliable, detailed information. This allows
the General Staff to select data and to time its reports
so as to generate support for its policy views0
Even after the political leadership has set the guide-
lines, the General Staff can manipulate the overall
planning process in subtle ways:
As the organization that drafts the five-year defense
plan, it can construct a display of options that favors
the program it prefers.
Through its authority to review and approve the
subcomponents of the defense plan, it can resolve to
its own advantage any interservice rivalries and any
difference in views between itself and a service.
Because it establishes the planning calendar for the
armed forces and determines the frame of reference
for submissions, it can keep the services off balance
in their advocacy of certain programs.
m Because it reviews Gosplan's prospective five-year
state economic plan before its formal submission to
the Politburo, the General Staff has an opportunity
to focus its own lobbying efforts in the crucial, final
stages of the decision process.
The General Staff and Operational Control
of the Armed Forces 6
It is evident that few Soviet military leaders anticipat-
ed the role the General Staff was to play in World
War II as an instrument of operational control.
During the 1930s debate on the relative merits of a
single staff or a set of service general staffs, most
military authors favored the founding of the General
Staff, stressing the value of centralized planning.
Only opponents mentioned-as a danger-that such a
staff might come to dominate operations. Postwar
literature continued this approach, generally charac-
terizing the staffls operational role as a wartime 25X1
phenomenon. By the early 1960s, however, the writ-
ings began to reflect events: the General Staffls role in
controlling the forces was increasing in peacetime
The principle underlying the Soviet General Staff
System is the integration of commands and staffs at
all echelons. Instead of being an adviser to the
commander, outside the chain of command, the chief
of staff at any echelon is second only to the command-
er in authority and importance and is automatically a
first deputy commander. He countersigns all orders 25X1
issued by the commander and is the only officer at
each echelon authorized to issue orders in the name of
the commander. The chief of staff has direct control
of an operational staff-the element within a com-
mand that is responsible for operations, intelligence,
organization, and communications. Moreover, the
chief of staff coordinates the work of the arms and
technical staffs (such as air and air defense, rocket
and artillery troops, and logistics) and oversees the
work of operational staffs at the next lower echelon.
Chains of Command
Early in World War II the Supreme High Command
(VGK~made up of the highest military leaders-
delegated to the General Staff the authority to control
the operational commands in the armed forces. This
authority has never been withdrawn. Its exercise
during the war and early postwar years was usually
confined to ground operations. To control the oper-
ational commands of other services, the General Staff
appeared to work through the staffs of those services.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4 25X1
Top Secret
25X1 25X1
25X1
The chain of command remained relatively un-
changed until the early 1960s. Since then, however,
the configuration has changed significantly, so that
today the General Staff exerts its central control
through different, but overlapping, mechanisms for
Administrative Af'f'airs. General Staff administrative
control of the Soviet Armed Forces is exercised
through the main staffs of the branches and arms of
service and can cross service boundaries. For example,
the Soviet Air Force Main Staff procures aircraft and
equipment for all strategic and tactical air units. The
Main Staff of the Soviet Air Defense Forces (Voyska
PVO) procures all equipment for ground-based air
defense, and its schools provide the technical training
for all air defense forces. Personnel assignments for
enlisted men and regular officers of each service are
administered through the main staff of that service. In
effect, all the day-to-day administrative activities of
the forces pass up the chain of command through the
respective service main staffs to the General Staff.
For specific strategic operations the General Staff has
occasionally created strategic groups of theater air or
naval assets under the main staffs of the services. For
example, a strategic air operation controlled by the 25X1
General Staff through the Air Forces (VVS) Main '
Staff may include not only strategic but also tactical
aviation detached from a front or theater command.
The General Staff used special combinations of stra-
tegic and tactical forces in World War II. 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
Toa Secret 25X1
Planning for Operations
The top officers of a front draft the front's operation
plan, with several variants specified by the General
Staff on the basis of the national war plan. When the
General Staff .has approved it, the front's final oper-
ation plan becomes part of the national war plans.
The variants include offensive and defensive plans and
conventional and nuclear subsets.
the three fronts involved in the operation but also
those commanders' senior staff personnel. It brought
them to Moscow to participate in the operations
planning (under the supervision of General Staff
officers in the Far Eastern Directorate) and sent them
to the Far East with instructions to follow the plan.
Personal Presence. The General Staff also partici- 25X1
pates in operational planning in .the various, com-
mands. During the Manchurian campaign of 1945 the
General Staff selected not only the commanders of 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4 5X1
Top Secret
not changed to the present.10
The officers for the TVD command were chosen from
members of the General Staff's Far East Directorate,
and the officer appointed as commander in chief was
the Chief of the General Staff. The General Staff
presence is seldom this pervasive, but the pattern has
13 Top Secret
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
'l'op Secret
Personnel of the General Staff organization constitute
an elite cadre of the Soviet command and staff
system. This "General Staff service" is composed of
officers chosen from all of the armed forces. Members
of this service hold all the officer positions in the
General Staff and all military attache posts, as well as
a "troop service" element made up of officers who
serve in specific positions with the main staffs and
down to the division level. The troop service positions
are:
Main staff or front level:
commander
chief of staff
chief of operations
chief of intelligence
chief of signals
chief of organization
other senior officers
Army or corps level:
commander
chief of staff
chief of operations
chief of intelligence
chief of signals
Division level:
commander
chief of staffl
In advocating the establishment of the General Staff,
M. V. Frunze described it as the military brain of the
Soviet state, and in this sense, the General Staff
service may be described as the central nervous
system of the military. It links the various arms and
branches of the armed forces to the center and
provides the channels for conveying plans and direc-
tions and for resolving problems and complaints. It
also ensures that strategic and operational command-
ers at all echelons have similar views on the proper
relationship of commander and staff. As a result, the
military leadership at all levels tends to reflect the
General Staff in values, functions, and structure.
The Cadres Directorate of the General Staff serves as
an office of personnel for the General Staff service."
It administers the process of selecting officers for
service on the General Staff, maintains their records,
and prepares and processes documents related to their
assignments, training, education, promotions, and
awards. All its personnel proposals concerning officers
of the General Staff service are sent to the Adminis-
trative Organs Department of the CPSU Central
Committee, which reviews them along with the offi-
cers' political dossiers, supplied by the Main Political
Directorate of the Soviet army and Navy (MPA).12
This review process ensures that both the professional
and the political records of General Staff service
officers are checked regularly."
The process of formal selection to the General Staff
service begins when senior officers judge that a junior
demonstrates the capacity to assume the duties of
division commander or chief of staff. The officer
usually is appointed to the Frunze Military Academy
to study combined-arms warfare, and his dossier is
passed from the Ministry's Main Cadres Directorate
to the General Staff Cadres Directorate. If this
" This directorate is completely separate from the Main Cadres
Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, which is the office of
personnel management for the Soviet officer corps exclusive of the
General Staff service.
'Z The Main Political Directorate of the Soviet army and Navy
(MPA) is an armed forces administrative organization that enjoys
the added distinction of having all the rights and perquisites of a
department of the CPSU Central Committee. Its chief has the
status (though not the title) of a First Deputy Minister of Defense.
The primary responsibility of the MPA is to conduct the obligatory
political education classes and the various propaganda programs
designed by the party for the military as a whole. It also maintains
the political dossiers of the Soviet officer corps. The MPA is
separate from the party apparatus within the armed forces. The
cells and their members are subordinate directly to the party. It is
the MPA, however, that provides administrative support to these
"The review affects all Soviet officers, because the Central 25X1
Committee's Administrative Organs Department also supervises
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
Top Secret
directorate and the Central Committee's Administra-
tive Organs Department approve, his nomination is
sent to the Chief of the General Staff. With his okay,
the nominee becomes a candidate member of the
General Staff service, and his dossier remains with
the Cadres Directorate.'? As his career progresses, he
will eventually attend the General Staff Academy and
upon graduation will become a full member of the
General Staff service, eligible for command and
senior staff assignments at the army, front, and main
staff levels or with the General Staff itself. ~~
Although dominated by Ground Forces officers,. the
General Staff service includes officers from all serv-
ices as well as the specialized arms and branches of
the armed forces. Within the services, the operations
officers have a favored position in gaining appoint-
ments to the General Staff service. Some officers who
rise to two- or three-star rank within their arm or
branch of service-specialists like signal officers, for
example-enroll in the Frunze Military Academy for
combined-arms training and thus become eligible for
selection into the General Staff service. ~ .
The General Staff is not responsible for the day-to-
day administration of military procurement programs,
but it is the central authority for their coordination.
Moreover, the staffls role as a central organ for
planning has enabled the defense sector to maintain a
high priority in the allocation of national resources.
25X1 25X1
It is clear, however, that some aspects of the staff
system could be drawbacks in a war. To the extent
that the staff draws the most capable officers into its
service, it deprives the rank-and-file officer corps of
exceptional leaders-particularly at lower echelons. A
promising brigade commander may move to the Gen-
eral Staff track, train at Frunze, hold several staff
positions, train at the General Staff Academy, and
then be in a position of great command responsibil-
ity-with precious little field experience. Thus, the
General Staffls direct role in controlling the subordi-
nate commands and its priority in recruitment may
combine to reduce the authority, initiative, and profi-
ciency of field commands.) 25X1 25X1
A less formal variant of the selection process also
exists: a young officer may bypass the normal process
by being recommended by a General Staff officer to
the Chief of the General Staff, the Cadres Director-
ate, or a senior officer of the General Staff. There is
some evidence that this process was a factor in the
early selection of Marshal Ogarkov for service on the
General Staff. (~~
The Soviet General Staff leadership and decision-
making process provide the Soviet political leaders
with a centralized mechanism that has brought all
major field commands under direct operational au-
thority. The staff has developed command and ,com-
munications systems and facilities to try to ensure
uninterrupted control during war.
" Because there is usually a shortage of fully qualified officers,
most General Staff positions at the division, corps, and army levels
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
Top Secret
Although the General Staff's role in national security
has its planning advantages for the military, it is not
without cost. Because there is no other ministerial
voice in a position to challenge effectively the Defense
Ministry's use of the large body of economic informa-
tion to which it alone has access, political leaders may
make final decisions in favor of defense programs with
little idea of their consequences for the overall eco-
nomic plan. Even if problems arise, the central posi-
tion of defense programs in the overall plan means
that major adjustments would demand so many rami-
fying revisions that they usually are delayed until the
next annual plan-or even longer, although minimal
changes are made if necessary.
The position of the General Staff belies the traditional
Western view that the interests of the party and of the
military are fundamentally different. In the USSR
they are very closely linked. On the one hand, the
party controls the careers of all officers, with particu-
lar attention to General Staff officers. On the other
hand,'the structure of policymaking in the Soviet state
provides a key role to the military through the
General Staff. This process helps ensure the assign-
ment of high priority to military requirements-and the
close collaboration of political and military leaders.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
Top Secret
Appendix A
Main Directorates of the General
Staff
This appendix pieces together available information
on the main directorates of the Soviet General Staff.
These form the staff's working nucleus, and their
activities demonstrate how the Soviet General Staff
system functions.15 Some of the following details are
contained in the main body of this study but are
repeated here in the interest of completeness
Main Operations Directorate
The Main Operations Directorate (GOU) is the core
of the General Staff. It was formerly known as the
First Main Directorate
plans
National war plans are drafted by the GOU's Strate-
gic Planning Directorate and Operational Planning
Directorate. The latter is composed of geographic
sectors, each of which is responsible for a region of the
world that roughly corresponds to a theater of mili-
tary operations. On the basis of estimates from the
Main Intelligence Directorate, these sectors identify
current and potential threats to the USSR and devise
reponses to them. The resulting war plans lead to the
identification of requirements for new weapon sys-
tems, equipment, manpower, and material reserves as
well as plans for mobilization, exercises, and training.
The personnel of the geographic sectors then oversee
the operational planning by the main staffs of the
services, fronts, fleets, and army-level commands to
assure that plans at these levels fit the national war
"The General Staff has other directorates that specialize in
supporting activities; these are discussed in appendix B.C
In addition, the geographic sectors:
? Exercise operational control over the armed forces
at the national level and supervise the commands'
implementation of the operations plans.
? Oversee and coordinate special operations (an e 25X1
tended air operation, for example) through the
service main staffs.
? Control the formations assigned to the Reserves of
the Supreme High Command (RVGK).
? Provide additional personnel to man front- and
theater-level reserve command posts during war-
time. 0 25X1
There is a group of functional directorates within the
GOU that deal with such subjects as nuclear weapons,
space systems, and concealment and deception. The~25X1
handle such special problems as strategic camouflage25X1
nuclear targeting, and technological threat analyses,
all of which become inputs to the national war plans
and to lower level operations plans.
25X1 25X1
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
Top Secret
The GOU coordinates and directs the training of the
Soviet armed forces through its Operational Readi-
ness Directorate. This directorate prepares and up-
dates annual and five-year training plans to reflect the
needs of the national war plans. It provides some of
the umpires for exercises conducted by the General
Staff and. works closely with the Main Inspectorate of
the Ministry of Defense in overseeing small-unit
exercises and combat training. In the event of war, it
provides additional officers to the operational com-
mands. 0 25X1
The GOU contains several sections that assure the
General Staff liaison with the five branches of the
armed forces and with the specialized service arms.
Requests for information from anywhere in the armed
forces pass through these sections, which also dissemi-
nate General Staff instructions and information.
25X1
25X1
Main Intelligence Directorate
The Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) is the appa-
ratus through which the Deputy Chief of the General
Staff for Intelligence supervises the acquisition, proc=
essing, and analysis of intelligence on foreign defense
matters. It manages the collection of human and
technical intelligence by the Soviet armed forces,
analyzes this information, and produces and dissemi-
nates finished intelligence to the military and political
leaders.
The activities and responsibilities of the GRU are
highly compartmented and separated from those of
-the other components of the General Staff; it is in
another building. Its head is the only deputy chief who
reports directly to the Chief of the General Staff
rather than through a first deputy chief. Known as the
Second Main Directorate for years, the GRU is
considered to be second only to the GOU in status.
Even so, the GRU has only limited access to the
GOU's war plans and supporting data.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010!05124 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
Figure 3
Main Operations Directorate (GOU)
(Glavnoye Operativnoye Upravleniye).
Office of the Chiet
Defense Council Secretariat is
attached to the Office of the Chief
of the Main Operations Directorate
Strategic Planning
Directorate
Operational~Planni ng
Directorate
Northwestern
~ Sector
Western Sector
Southwestern
Sector
Southeastern
Sector
Far Eastern
Sector
Operational Readiness
Directorate
Western
Hemisphere
Sector a
African Sector a
Pacific Maritime
Sectors
Atlantic Maritime
Sector a
Indian Ocean
Maritime Sectors
Command Posts
Directorate
Troop Control
Directorate
Weapons of Mass
Destruction
Directoratea
Space Warfare and
Camouflage` Directoratea
(Appears to have been two
directorates before 1977)
Strategic Rocket
Forces Department
Ground Forces
Department
Armored Troops
Section
Airborne Troops
Sedian
Rocket and Artiller
Troops Section
Chemical Troops
Section
Engineer Troops
Section
a
Denotes titles that may not be official
Note: Directorate=Upravleniye; Department=Otdel;
Sector= Napravleniye; Section= Otdeleniye
Troop Service
Directorate a
Military Air Forces
Department
Civil Defense
Forces Department
Military Negotiations
Directoratea
Military Naval
Forces Department
Air Defense Forces
Department
Rear Services
Department j
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010!05124 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010!05!24:CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Q
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010!05!24:CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
L~X1
Main ?rganization-Mobilization Directorate
The Main Organization-Mobilization Directorate
(GOMU) has been restructured more often over the
years than any other component of the General Staff,
but its functions have stayed about the same. When
the General Staff was first formed, it had two sepa-
rate directorates for organization and mobilization
matters. Both were abolished at the onset of World
War II, and most of their duties and resources were
transferred within the Defense Ministry to a newly
created Main Directorate for Organization and Man-
ning of the Forces (Glavupraform). This arrangement
was found to be inefficient, and by 1942 the Organi-
zation Directorate had been re-created within the
General Staff to handle everything except mobiliza-
tion. Shortly after the war the Glavupraform was
abolished and the Mobilization Directorate was re-
stored as a component of the General Staff. By 1950,
the two had been merged into a single main director-
ate again, the current GOMU. 0 25X1
The Organization Directorate, one of four primary
elements of the GOMU, establishes the TO&E re-
quirements for all the service arms and branches of
the Soviet armed forces in accordance with the re-
quirements of the national war plans. It then super-
vises the services' TO&E arrangements for their
formations. This directorate also:
Plans for the transfer of units and introduces new
units into higher echelon formations.
Authorizes changes in levels of manpower and
equipment.
Top Secret
Q
within the Organization Directorate.18
Calculates manpower, equipment, and supply re-25X1
quirements to support operational plans.
The structure of the Organization Directorate paral-
lels that of the Main Operations Directorate in corre-
sponding to the branches of service and the primary
field commands of the armed forces. The field-com-
mand departments (called geographic departments)
are apparently responsible for operational planning
The Mobilization Directorate drafts and oversees the
implementation of the national mobilization plans for
the military and civilian sectors. These plans are basic
inputs to Soviet national economic planning. (The
General Staff's mobilization plans, for instance,
served as a model for the first national five-year
economic plan, adopted in 1929.) This directorate
administers the conscription program, as well as the
premilitary and reserve training programs, through
the nationwide military commissariat (voyenkomat)
system. Finally, the Mobilization Directorate super-
vises the planning of military transportation and
logistic support to the armed forces and coordinates
this support through elements of the Staff of the Rear
of the Armed Forces.~~ 25X1
The Replacements Directorate (Directorate of
Records and Control Over Nominal Strength and
Reinforcements) is the central personnel and troop
service organ of the General Staff. It is often referred
to as the manning or personnel directorate. This unit:
Oversees the personnel directorates of the service
main staffs, which maintain the enlisted personnel
records for all the armed forces.
Supervises the assignment and employment of civil-
ian support services for the armed forces.
"These GOMU Geld-command departments are not competing
with the General Staffls Main Operations Directorate in their
operational planning. General Shtemenko summed up the situation
by saying that the GOU decides what will be done, and the GOMU
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010!05!24:CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
Figure S
Main Organization-Mobilization Directorate (GOMU)
(Glavnoye Orgshtatno-Mobilizatsionnoye Upravleniye)
Office of the
Chief of GOMU
Organization
Directorate
Northwestern
Sector
Western
Sector
Southwestern
Sector
Far Eastern
Sector
Southeastern
Sector
Probable other
sectors
Ground Forces Department
Armored Troops Section
Airborne Troops Section
Rocket and Artillery
Troops Section
Chemical Troops Section
Engineer Troops Section
Air Defense Forces
Department
Military Air Forces
Department
Military Naval Forces'
Department
Rear Services
Department
Civil Defense Forces
Department
Strategic Rocket
Forces Department
Note: Directorate=Upravleniye;
Department=Otdel; Sector=
Napravleniye; Section=Otdeleniye
Mobilization
Directorate
Military Commissariat
Departmeni
(Voyenkomat)
Military Transportation
Department?
Reserve Personnel
Department
Military Training and
Education Department
Economic Mobilization
Department
Probable other
departments
I
Directorate of Records
and Control Over Nominal
Strength and Reinforce-
ments (Replacements Di-
rectorate)
Replacements
Department
Unit Losses
Department
Unit Banners and
Honors Department
Probable other
departments
Material Planning
Directorate
Economic Planning
Department
Rear Services
Department
Material Reserves
Department
Probable other
departments
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010!05!24:CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4 25X1
Too Secret
The GOMU's Material Planning Directorate coordi-
nates the preparation of the annual and five-year
defense plans and drafts the final defense contribution
Main Directorate for Military Assistance
Responsibility for the overall execution of the Soviet
military assistance program is vested in the General
Staff's Main Directorate for Military Assistance..This
unit is commonly known as the 10th Main Directora_ to
of the General Staff. It was originally part of the
GRU but was made a separate directorate in 1954
and a main directorate in 1960
The 10th Main Directorate is organized into two
directorates and three support elements. One of the
directorates has an individual department for each
country of the socialist bloc, and the other is stru~-
tured into geographical departments that deal with
Third World regions where the Soviets conduct or
plan military aid programs. The support elements are
a cadre department, a financial department, and an
institute of foreign languages. The cadre department
is responsible for the administrative needs and records
of Soviet officers who are assigned to the 10th Main
Directorate as aid advisers and of foreign military
personnel who are training in the Soviet Union.
25X1
Directorate Responsibilities in Military Assistance
The 10th Main Directorate is responsible for the
planning, administration, and review of military as-
sistance programs. Its planners pull together:
? Studies of clients' military aid requirements.
? Annual and five-year military aid plans, which
become part of the annual and five-year defense
plans.
? Military aid studies for Soviet leaders.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4 ;
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
Top Secret
Figure 6
Main Directorate for. Military Assistance (Tenth Main Directorate)
(Desyatoye Glavnoye Upravleniye)
Office of the Chief
of the Tenth
Main Directorate
Directorate of
Financial Affairsa
Military Institute of
Foreign Languages
a Denotes titles that may not be official.
Note: Directorate=Upravleniye;
Department=Otdel; Sector=
Napravleniye; Section= Otdeleniye
Directorate for Peoples
Democracies
Polish Department
East German
Department
Czechoslovakian
Department
Hungarian
Department
Romanian
Department
h
Bulgarian
Department
Cuban Department
Mongolian
Department
Vietnamese
Department
Probable other
departments
Third World Countries
Directorate a
Near Eastern
Department
South Asian
Department
Far Eastern
Department
African Department
Latin American
Department
Probable other
departments
Directorate for
Cadres Abroad a
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
Tnn ~PPrPf
Figure 7
Main Directorate of Signal Troops (GUVS)b
(Glarnoye Upravleniye Voysk Svyazi)
Operational-Technical
Directorate
Long-Range Communi-
cations Department
Northwestern Sector
Western Sector
Southwestern Sector
Near Eastern Sector
Far Eastern Sector
Plans Department
Communication
Satellites Section
Radio Relay Section
High-Frequency
Radio Section
Cable Communications
Section
Office of the Chief of
Signal Troops of the
Armed Forces
Communication Center
of the General Staff
? Combat Training
Directorate
Higher Signal
Academies
Military Signal
Schools
Department for the
Field Post System
Note: Directorate=Upravleniye;
Department=Otdel; Sector=
Napravleniye; Section=Otdeleniye
Communications
Trains
Automated Systems
Directorate s
Control Systems and
RDT&E Institutes
Communications
Aircraft
Auxiliary
Communication
Centers
Equipment and
Supply Directorates
Equipment
Department
Supply Department
Construction
Department
F
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
Top Secret
Appendix B
Routine Functions of the General
Staff
Daily Operations
The General Staff's routine activity closely relates to
the day-to-day operations of the armed forces and the
maintenance of their operational readiness._For exam-
ple, the use of military units to assist in harvesting is
closely supervised by the General Staff and follows
plans and instructions from the Main Organization-
Mobilization Directorate. This organ oversees the
entire military induction and basic training apparatus
in the USSR and allocates new conscripts among the
services, the KGB Border Guards, and the MVD
Internal Troops. It also oversees the logistics system
throughout the USSR and aims to ensure that the
prescribed unit strengths and equipment holdings are
being maintained. 25X1
Intelligence
The collection and dissemination of intelligence is
another routine responsibility of the General Staff.
The Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) regularly
assigns tasks to various collection resources and pro-
vides daily briefings to the military and political
leadership. Its central command post maintains cur-
rent situation reporting on all strategic threats to the
USSR. The GRU trains intelligence officers and 25X1
supervises their espionage activities worldwide. Mili-
tary attaches are trained in its Military Diplomatic25X1
Academy and are under GRU operational control.
Weapons Acquisition
The Defense Ministry's Main Armaments Directorate
has the principal administrative responsibility for
weapons development and acquisition within the mili-
tary establishment. It was removed from the General
Staff in 1970. At that time the staff's other responsi-
bilities were being enlarged, and it was felt that the
complexity of weapon technologies, the magnitude of
the development effort, and the volume of interaction
with the defense industry was an excessive burden.
the General Staff still coordinates and approves
budget and arms procurement requests from the
services and initiates weapons developments and
Although much of the routine work has. been shifted,
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
Top Secret
modifications. General Staff officers, principally from
the Main Organization-Mobilization Directorate, are
involved in a wide variety of armament decisions-
from coordinating basic research to scheduling tank
production. An article in the Soviet Military Encyclo-
pedia focuses on directorates concerned with weapons
procurement and finances and notes that they orga-
nize their work according to directives of the General
Staff, orders of the Ministry of Defense, and resolu-
tions of the party and government.
Censorship
The General Staff reviews all articles proposed for
publication in military magazines and newspapers. Its
censorship role spills over into the civilian sector as
well, where the open publication of a wide array of
Foreign Relations
The entire realm of official foreign contact with the
Soviet military is directed and controlled by the
General Staff s External Relations Directorate
(UVS).20 Foreign military attaches and visitors to the
USSR must go through the UVS in all their dealings
this directorate serves as the press and public relations
office of the General Staff. It has issued official
Ministry of Defense positions on subjects ranging
from the health of an important general to the
destruction of the Cosmos 954 satellite over North
America.
1Vlilitary Aid
The 10th Main Directorate of the General Staff
oversees the Soviet military assistance program, both
in the Third World and in the Warsaw Pact.Z' It also
coordinates Soviet military aid to Third World clients
with that from other Warsaw Pact members. It
prepares the General Staff's recommendations to the
political leadership on military aid requests from
Third World countries. In certain cases, the Soviet
Ambassador to the country may be asked to comment
on the request, but there is no evidence that the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a formal role in the
military aid process. The Foreign Ministry limits
itself to submitting a general statement of USSR .
relations with the prospective aid recipient.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 : CIA ~RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
Toa Secret
Maintaining Readiness
A primary peacetime function of the General Staff is
the maintenance of sufficient readiness of the Soviet
armed forces, including all command posts down to
Military Science
25X1 25X1
Major developments in Soviet military doctrine dur-
ing the 1960s and 1970s have been tested and retested
in General Staff-controlled exercises and war games.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
Ton Secret 25X1
Figure 8
Military-Science Directorate (VNU)
(Voyennoye Nauchnoye Upravleniye)
Office of the
Chief of
Military Science
Military Political
Department
Military Theory
Department
Military Strategy
Section
Operational Art
Section
Military Tactics
Section
General Theory
Section a
N
Military Technical
Department
Troop Control
Section
Physical Science
Section
Biological Science
Section
Psychological
Science Section
Military Engineering
Section
Probable other
sections
F
F
F
F
N
Military History
Department
Denotes titles that may not be official.
Note: Directorate=Upravleniye; Note: Some evidence suggests that this directorate may be
Department=Otdel; Sector= a subcomponent of the Main Operations Directorate.
Napravleniye; Section=Otdeleniye
Publication
Department
Military History
Institute
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83TOO233ROOO1OO17OOO2-4
Toa Secret
Appendix C
Evolution of the General Staff
names of its chiefs.
Figure 9 shows how the organization of the Soviet
General Staff has changed over time. Table 2 lists the
P. P. Lebedev
M. V. Frunze
S. S. Kamenev
M. N. Tukhachevskiy
B. M. Shaposhnikov
A. I. Yegorov
Feb 1921-Mar 1924
Apr 1924-Jan 1925
Jan 1925-Nov 1925
Nov 1925-May 1928
May 1928-Apr 1931
Apr 1931-Sep 1935
A. I. Yegorov
B. M. Shaposhnikov
K. A. Meretskov
G. K. Zhukov
B. M. Shaposhnikov
A. M. Vasilevskiy
A. I. Antonov
A. M. Vasilevskiy
S. M. Shtemenko
V. D. Sokolovskiy
M. V. Zakharov
S. S. Biryuzov
M. V. Zakharov
V. G. Kulikov
N. V. Ogarkov
Sep 1935-Jun 1937
Jun 1937-Aug 1940
Aug 1940-Jan 1941
Jan 1941-Jul 1941
Jul 1941-May 1942
May 1942-Feb 1945
Feb 1945-Mar 1946
Mar 1946-Nov 1948
Nov 1948-Jun 1952
Jun 1952-Apr 1960
Apr 1960-Mar 1963
Mar 1963-Oct 1964
Oct 1964-Sep 1971
Sep 1971-Jan 1977
Jan 1977-present
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83TOO233ROOO1OO17OOO2-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
Toa Secret
Figure 9
History of the Soviet General Staff
Russian General Staff, Mid-1914
Quartermaster General's Department
Military Topographic Department
Department for Organization and Service
of the Troops
Mobilization Department
Military Shipments Department
Military Transportation Department (VOSO)
Fortress Commission
Commission of the General Staff Committee
Troop Directorate
All-Russian Main Staff, May 1918
Operations Directorate
Organization Directorate
Mobilization Directorate
Directorate for Remount of the Army
Military Transportation Directorate (VOSO)
Directorate for Command Personnel
Main Directorate for Military Educational Institutions
-- - -_ _____--- -1
Military Topographic Directorate
Organization Directorate
Mobilization Directorate
Directorate for Remount of the Army
Directorate for Command Personnel
Main Directorate for Military Educational Institutions
Directorate of Universal Military Training
Field Staff of the Revolutionary Military
Council of the Republic, End 1918
Operations Directorate
Administrative and Registration Directorate
Central Directorate of Military Transportation (VOSO)
Registration Directorate (intelligence)
Directorates of Inspectors
(headed by deputy chiefs of staff)
Infantry Engineers
Cavalry (added in 1919) Military Supply .
Artillery Military Medical
Staff of Workers and Peasants Red Army
(RKKA Staff), 1927
Operations Directorate (1st)
Organization and. Mobilization Directorate(2nd)
Military Transportation Directorate (VOSO)(3rd)
Intelligence Directorate(4th)
Air Defense Directorate (6th) (organized in 1930)
Military Topographic Department
Section for the Preparation of Theaters of Military
Operations
Section for Military History
Science and Regulations Department
Mobilization Committee
Engineer Defenses Committee
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
Figure 9 (Cont.)
General Staff of the Workers and
Peasants Red Army (RKKA), 1935
Operations Directorate
Intelligence Directorate
Communications Directorate
Military Topographic Directorate
Organization Directorate
Mobilization Directorate
Material Planning Directorate
Military Transportation Directorate (VOSO)
Air Defense Directorate
Section for Military History
Section for Science and Technology
Section for Fortified Areas
Academy of the General Staff
Combat Training Directorate
General Staff of the Red Army, 1941
Operations Directorate
Intelligence and Reconnaissance Directorate
Troop Service and Corps of Officers of the General
Staff Directorate
Military Topographic Department
Cipher Department
Department for Generalizing Experience of the War
Section for Military Lines of Communication
Department for Organization of the Rear,
Supply and Transportation
Signals Directorate
Fuel Supply Directorate.
Air Defense Directorate
Academy of the General Staff
General Staff, Latter Part of World War II
Main Operations Directorate
Military Topographic Directorate
Main Organization Directorate
Directorate for Organization of the Rear and
Material Planning
Military Transportation Directorate (VOSO)
Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU)
Communications Directorate
Cryptographic Department
Directorate for Research of War Experience
Military Historical Department
This chart shows the organization of the Tsarist General Staff in 1914, of the early Soviet top-level
military staffs, and of the Soviet General Staff as it had evolved by the latter part of World War II.
The information is based on authoritative Soviet sources and is believed to be comprehensive
and accurate.
Toia Secret
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4
Top Secret
25X1
t~
i
,;
,~,
?~
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/24 :CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4