THE SOVIET LABOR MARKET IN THE 1980S

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83T00233R000100050004-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 29, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: February 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Confidential
Intelligence
The Soviet Labor Market
in the 1980s
Confidential
SOV 82-10017
GI 82-10034
February 1982
Copy 272
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National Security Unauthorized Disclosure
Information Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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Directorate of Confidential
Intelligence
The Soviet Labor Market
in the 1980s
An Intelligence Assessment
Information available as of 1 December 1981
has been used in the preparation of this report.
This assessment was prepared by
Soviet Economy Division, Office of Soviet Analysis;
Policy Analysis Division,
SOYA, Office of Global Issues.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
addressed to the Chief, Soviet Economy Division,
SOVA,
Confidential
SOV 82-10017
G/ 82-10034
February 1982
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in the 1980s
Key Judgments The Soviet labor market will undergo a radical change in the 1980s.
Constrained since the early 1960s by sluggish technological progress, the
USSR has relied more heavily than Western industrialized nations on
increases in the size of the labor force to spur economic development.
During the next decade this will no longer be possible.
Growth of both the working-age population and the labor force will
decelerate sharply during 1981-90. The slowdown will be less pronounced
for the labor force, however, because of changes in the age-sex structure of
the general population and a rising participation rate for pensioners. There
will be a greater concentration of workers in their thirties and forties (the
age group with the highest labor-force participation rates) and an increas-
ing proportion of males. The retirement-age population will increase
rapidly, and the recently revised pension laws will encourage the older
people to continue working.
Despite these changes, labor-force growth in the 1980s will still be less
than half of what it was in the 1970s. The working-age population, which
grew by 23 million between 1971 and 1980, is expected to grow by less
than 5 million between 1981 and 1990. The labor force, which grew by
nearly 20 million during 1971-80, is expected to grow by roughly 9.5
million in 1981-90.
To compensate for this slowdown, Moscow is becoming more directly
involved in allocating scarce labor resources and tightening worker disci-
pline in an effort to assure that priority sectors have adequate manpower
and to increase labor productivity. During the past few years, it has:
? Centralized decisionmaking regarding labor issues under the State
Committee for Labor and Social Questions (Goskomtrud).
? Become more active in steering workers into particular industries.
? Called for tougher action against people who come to work drunk, are il-
legally absent, or avoid employment.
These actions are unlikely to increase productivity much, so the Soviets are
also considering a number of long-term. policies to ease their labor
difficulties. The most promising is the effort to mechanize and automate
labor-intensive industrial processes. This will require massive investment in
modern machinery. Another proposal involves the shift of investment
iii Confidential
SOV 82-10017
GI 82-10034
February 1982
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spending into labor surplus areas like Central Asia to promote development
where the labor is in abundant supply. These schemes can only be
implemented slowly, however, because of the slowdown in overall invest-
ment growth and the competition for new investment rubles. A third
policy-to increase the birth rate-will not speed up labor-force growth
until after the year 2000.
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Key Judgments
iii
The Twofold Problem
1
The Coming Labor Shortage
Decline in Working-Age Population Growth
Changes in the Age Composition of the Labor Force
2
Efforts To Increase Labor-Force Participation, Rates
2
Women,
2
Teenagers
3
Regional Imbalances
3
Slowdown in Labor Productivity Growth
4
Industrial Plant Problems
6
Worker Morale Problems
7
Efforts To Increase Productivity
7
Allocating Labor Resources
7
Cracking Down on Lax Workers
8
.
Refurbishing the.Trade Unions
9
What Lies Ahead
10
Productivity Growth During the 1980s
10
Long-Term Policies: Some Hope for the Future
1 1
Regional Shifting of Capital Investment
11
Increasing the Birth Rate
1 1
Appendixes
A.
Methodology for Projecting the Soviet Labor Force, 1981-90
13
B.
Regional Trends in Soviet Population' Growth
C.
Recent Migration Trends
D.
Legislation Affecting the Labor Force
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1.
Urbanization in the USSR (by Republic, 1970 and 1979)
5
2.
Growth of Soviet Labor Productivity by Plan Period
Period (Average Annual Percent Change)
6
3.
Growth of the Soviet Working-Age Population and Labor Force
(Assuming Constant LFPRs)
13
4.
Growth of the Soviet Labor Force and Population Age 16 Years
and Over
14
5.
Impact of Pensioners on Soviet Labor-Force Growth
6.
Population and Labor-Force Projections, Assuming No Change in
Age Distribution
16
7.
Rates of Participation in the Labor Force by the School-Age
Population
17
8.
Rates of Female Participation in the Labor Force
9.
Comparison of Projections, Using Constant and Changing Labor-
Force Participation Rates
18
10.
Estimated Total Soviet Labor Force, 1981-91, Using Changing
Participation Rates
18
11.
Regional Differences in Birth Rates
20
12.
Estimated Age Composition of the Soviet Population, by Region
and Republic
20
13.
Regional Increases in Soviet Able-Bodied Population
22
14.
Distribution of the Soviet Union's Major Central Asian
Nationalities
24
15.
Legislation Affecting the Labor Force, 1975-81
1. .
Increase in Size of the Soviet Working-Age Population
1
2.
Increments to the Soviet Working-Age Population
3.
Increments to the Soviet Able-Bodied Population and Labor Force
4
4.
Growth of Soviet Labor Productivity in Selected Industrial Sectors
6
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in the 1980s
The Twofold Problem
The Soviet economy, constrained for many years-
but especially recently-by sluggish productivity
growth, now must cope with a second problem-a
sharp slowdown in annual increments to the working-
age population. The prospect of a labor shortage is
especially painful for Soviet planners, because up to
now the share of labor's contribution to growth gener-
ally has been larger than in other developed econo-
mies, while the contribution of productivity has been
smaller. Moscow counts on turning this situation
around in the 1980s, relying more on productivity and
less on numbers to spur economic growth.0
Figure 1
Increase in Size of the Soviet
Working-Age Population'
This assessment describes the nature and magnitude
of the impending labor shortage and assesses Mos-
cow's efforts to limit its impact. It then evaluates the
consequences for economic growth in the 1980s. Ap-
pendixes provide more detail on the methodology used
to derive these estimates; regional trends in population
growth; migration trends within the USSR; and the
major decrees the Soviet Government has issued since
1975 on the allocation, training, and use of man-
power. The study does not address the question of
possible changes in the demand for labor during the
1980s.
Decline in Working-Age Population Growth
The Soviet labor market will undergo a fundamental
change in the 1980s.' After increasing by an average
of 2.3 million persons per year during 1971-80, the
working-age population Z will increase much more
slowly in the first half of this decade, adding less than
300,000 persons in 1986. The annual net increment
will rise slightly thereafter, but at decade's end still
will be extremely small. Thus, during the 11th (1981-
85) and 12th (1986-90) Five-Year Plan periods
(FYPs), the national manpower pool will increase only
one-fourth as much as it did during the 10th (1976-80)
FYP. (Figure 1 shows this trend.) 25X1
Two developments will contribute almost equally to
this precipitous drop: fewer children are reaching
working age and more adults are reaching retirement
age (figure 2). The young group reflects the sharp fall
in birth rates since the early 1960s, and the older
group reflects the high birth rates during the 1920s
and 1930s.' Another factor reducing the size of the
working-age population is the rising mortality rate
among males age 25 to 44 due to an increasing
incidence of alcoholism, industrial accidents, and
cardiovascular disease.'
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Figure 2
Increments to the Soviet
Working-Age Population'
Million persons
Entries (16th birthdays)
0 1970 75 80 85 90
Changes in the Age Composition of the Labor Force
To a limited degree, changes in the age structure of
the labor force will offset some of the sharp drop in
the growth of the working-age population. People in
their thirties and forties are more likely to be in the
work force than people in their twenties and fifties;
and during 1981-90 the share of the population age 30
to 49 will increase by 4 percentage points to 47
percent.. Because this age cohort averages a higher
rate of participation in the labor force than other able-
bodied groups, this demographic change will spur
labor-force growth.
At the same time, Moscow will be able to tap the
growing pension-age population for extra workers.
During the 1980s, 9.5 million people will reach pen-
sion age-more than twice the level of the 1970s.
Consequently, if past participation rates hold, the
share of the. pension-age population in the labor force
will increase from about 10 percent to 12 percent. The
net result of these two factors-a higher concentra-
tion of workers in their thirties and forties and a
Confidential
larger share of pensioners-will be a less precipitous
decline in growth of the labor force than in the growth
of working-age population during the 1980s.
Efforts To Increase Labor-Force Participation Rates
Just how fast the labor force grows in the 1980s,
however, will depend mainly on Moscow's success in
raising labor-force participation rates. They are al-
ready higher in the USSR than in any other industri-
alized country in the world. (Currently, over 90
percent of the able-bodied Soviet citizens work or go
to school.) Nevertheless, the leaders over the past
several years have taken various steps to increase
participation rates. They have:
? Revised pension laws to make it more profitable for
pensioners to continue working beyond retirement
age.
? Expanded child-care services to promote work
among women with small children.
? Emphasized part-time schooling to increase employ-
ment among the school-age population.
These efforts are expected to have only a limited
impact, however. 25X1
Pensioners. According to the pension laws as revised
on 1 January 1980, payments will be increased by 10
rubles per month for each year of work beyond
retirement age.' (This increase is limited to four years,
however-a maximum increase of 40 rubles per
month.) Depending on the type of job, pensioners also
will be allowed to retain all or part of their pension
income as well as receiving wages. The expected
changes in participation rates could add more than
1.6 million persons to the work force during the
1980s. Their contribution to the economy will be
diluted, however, because pensioners generally are
less skilled than the rest of the labor force, and many
work only part-time.
Women. Since 1978, the Council of Ministers has
issued a number of decrees to try to raise female
employment. These call for greater use of part-time
employment, more on-the-job training for women
with young children, and the provision of more house-
hold goods and services to make it easier for such
women to work. Nevertheless, we expect female par-
ticipation rates to decline slightly during the I 980s,
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for two reasons. First, nearly 90 percent of Soviet
women are already working or studying full-time-a
rate that can hardly increase much. And second, most
of the additional female labor supply will come from
Central Asia and Kazakhstan-in fact, over two-
fifths of the entire increment to' the total Soviet able-
bodied population will be females from this region in
the high fertility ages of 20 to 39. These women
historically have had participation rates lower than
the national average, and Moscow probably cannot
make much change in that pattern during the 1980s.
Teenagers. Some government officials have suggested
that an increase in employment among the school-age
population would alleviate the labor shortage. How-
ever, Soviet educational policies in the past decade
have taken the opposite direction-extending the
length of compulsory education and providing for
expanded vocational-technical training.' We expect
this trend to continue. The leadership apparently
believes that the additional training will raise the
productivity of workers enough to justify their delay
in entering the labor market.
Other Sources of Labor. Besides trying to increase
participation rates, Moscow could draw from foreign
labor and from the military. Neither source would be
very helpful. 25X1
Currently the USSR has about 40,000 foreign work-
ers, primarily from Eastern Europe. For the most
part, they are employed on joint projects, such as the
Orenburg gas pipeline, or on projects exclusively in
the interest of their own country (Bulgarians working
in forestry preserves in the USSR for Bulgaria). Such
cooperation is likely to continue, but not to increase.
That is, during the current 11th FYP, foreign workers
will be used in a limited way to relieve bottlenecks and
help balance trade deficits rather than alleviate short-
ages. With the possible exception of Romania, none of
the East European countries is expected to have a
labor surplus over the next decade that could be used
extensively in the USSR.
One other group that Moscow could tap is the mili-
tary, although it is unlikely to do so. Reducing the
number of conscripts would not increase the total
labor supply (which includes the military), but it
would increase civilian employment. Such a move
would have only a one-time impact, however, and
would involve a drastic shift in Soviet military strate-
gy, operating practices, and procurement programs.'
Moreover, many major civilian construction projects
such as the Baikal-Amur railroad are already using
military conscripts, and cutting the armed forces
might jeopardize use of military troops for such
Labor Force Growth in the 1980s
25X1
In summary, we expect that changes in participation
rates will have only a negligible impact on labor-force
growth during the 1980s. Greater employment among
persons of retirement age seems likely, but will prob-
ably be offset by declining participation rates for
teenagers and females age 20 to 39. Significant use of
foreign labor is also unlikely, given the similarly tight
labor market in Eastern Europe. 0 25X1
Because of the greater concentration of workers in the
age categories with the highest participation rates and
the rapid increase in the pension-age population (plus
a somewhat higher participation rate for this group),
we estimate that roughly 4.5 million more persons will
be'added to the labor force than to the working-age
population in the 1980s (figure 3). Despite this differ-
ence, however, the average annual rate of growth for
the labor force during 1981-90 will be only 0.6
percent-less than half of what it was in the previous
Regional Imbalances
Moscow's labor problems, however, go beyond mere
numbers. Over the next decade, the tightness in the
national labor market will be exacerbated by differ-
ences in manpower availability from one region to
another and between urban and rural areas. Because
of wide regional variations in the birth rate, Soviet
population growth during the last 20 years has been
concentrated in the high-fertility republics of Central
Asia and Kazakhstan.' (For a more detailed discussion
of population growth trends by region, see appendix
B.) Of the roughly 9.5 million workers who will be
added to the labor force during the next decade, about
90 percent will come from these five republics. In
25X1
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Figure 3.
Increments to the Soviet Able-Bodied
Population and Labor Force
Central Asians could meet the need for technical
skills in the western USSR over the next decade-
they are not meeting the need in Central Asia
Urban-Rural Imbalances
Differences in urban-rural growth patterns will fur-
ther complicate the regime's efforts to exploit avail-
able manpower reserves in the I 980s. During the past
decade, the pace of urbanization continued unabated
(the urban population increased from 56 percent of
the total to 62 percent)." In the European USSR,
most of the urbanization was due to an influx of
young rural migrants into the larger cities of the
region (table 1). As a result rural areas of the RSFSR
(like the central industrial zone and West. Siberia)
have a labor force that is older, less skilled, and
increasingly female-a serious problem for planners
seeking to increase agricultural productivity
pupu~ai~~n tmales 10-DY anu
females 16-54)
Increment to labor force
contrast, the labor force will grow only slightly in the
heavily industrialized Russian republic (RSFSR) and
will remain essentially unchanged in the western
republics.
Regional differences in labor-force growth will have a
negative impact on the economy. Workers in the
southern-tier republics (which include the republics
with high fertility) generally have less education,
fewer skills, and less capital to work with than those
in other parts of the country. More importantly, the
greatest demand for workers in the 1980s will be in
the highly industrialized western USSR, where the
native labor force is expected to decline, and in the
resource-rich, but climatically severe, area of West
Siberia, which never has enough labor. Several West-
ern scholars have postulated that large-scale migra-
tion from Central Asia to labor-deficit areas in the
European USSR will offset the differing population
growth.rates, but there are no signs of such migra-
tion.10. Even if .there were, it is difficult to see how
In contrast rural Central Asians generally did not
migrate to local urban centers in substantial numbers.
Except in Uzbekistan, most of the urban growth in
these republics during the past decade is attributable
to the high birth rate among urban dwellers-in-
creases which have added to the total urban popula-
tion but not yet to the working-age population. The
tendency of rural Central Asians to stay on the farm
has thus created a growing reservoir of underused
manpower in the countryside and a manpower short-
age in the towns-problems which probably will
worsen over the next decade.
Slowdown in Labor Productivity Growth
The effect of the employment slowdown on the econo-
my's performance could be substantial. More than
any other industrial power, the USSR has relied upon
increases in the size of the labor force to spur
development. Now, however, most economic growth
must come from increased labor productivity. The
11th FYP calls for continued growth (see table 2)-
and according to its guidelines, 90 percent of the
growth in industrial output and the entire growth in
agricultural output are to come, from increased pro-
ductivity.
25X1
25X1
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Urbanization in the USSR (by Republic,-1970 and 1979)
Percent Urban
Urban Population
(in thousands)
Percent Increase in
Urban Population
Percent of Urban Growth
Resulting From
1970
1979
1970
1979
1970-79
Natural Rural-Urban
Increase " Migration b
Ukraine
54
61
25,689
30,512
18.8
42
58
Belorussia
43
55
3,908
5,263
34.7
41
59
Lithuania
50
61
1,572
2,062
31.2
35
65
Latvia
62
68
1,477
1,726
16.9
25
75
Estonia
65
70
881
1,022
16.0
40
60
Armenia
60
66
1,482
1,993-
34.5
52
48
Georgia
48
52
2,240
2,601
16.1
65
35
Azerbaijan
50
53
2,565
3,200
24.8
67
33
Moldavia
32
39
1,130
1,551
37.3
36
64
Kazakhstan
50
54
6,539
7,920
21.1
NA
NA
Kirghiziya
37
39
1,097
1,366
24.5
73
27
Tadjikistan
37
35
1,077
1,325
23.0
NA
NA
.Turkmeniya
48
48
. 1,034
1,323
27.9
85
15
Uzbekistan
37.
41
4,322
6,348
46.9
45.
55
a Births minus deaths.
b Figures include statistical increases due to administrative reclassifica-
tion of rural centers into urban centers.
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Growth of Soviet Labor Productivity, by Plan Period
(Average Annual Percentage Change)
1971-75 1976-80 1981-85
(Actual) (Actual) (Plan Figures)
Total economy 2.1 1.2 3.4
Achieving those goals will be a monumental task,
however. In every economic sector, productivity
growth has declined since 1975, and in some branches
of industry, productivity actually fell during 1979 and
1980 (figure 4).
There are a number of reasons for this sharp down-
turn. Some, such as the rising cost of extracting raw
materials, are related to problems in specific sectors.
Others, such as declining worker morale and a slow-
down in the growth of labor-saving investment, cut
across all economic sectors. Whether general or spe-
cific, their effects are felt throughout the economy.12
Industrial Plant Problems
The general slowness in expanding the quality and
quantity of industrial capacity has had a depressing
effect on labor productivity. Construction delays have
held back expansion and modernization of plants and
equipment for producing a wide array of industrial
products. Equipment shortages and transportation
bottlenecks-occurring with increasing frequency and
intensity-have increased the loss of time. These
delays, together with a lack of replacement invest-
ment and incentives to encourage modernization, have
prolonged the use of obsolete equipment-which in
turn requires frequent, costly, and labor-intensive
repairs. The rate of growth in employment of repair
workers in industry has been nearly three times the
rate of growth in overall industrial employment.
Figure 4
Growth of Soviet Labor Productivity
in Selected Industrial Sectors
O coal
Ferrous metals
Chemicals
25X1
In addition to problems with the industrial infrastruc-
ture, a number of industry-specific problems have
retarded the growth of labor productivity. In many 25X1
extractive industries, particularly coal and iron ore,
the rising labor costs of exploiting natural resources
have virtually wiped out any productivity growth. In
the coal industry, the increasing depth of underground
mines and reduced thickness of coal seams have
hampered output and reduced opportunities for
mechanization, thus raising the labor intensity of
operations. 25X1
Deficiencies in coal mining and the rapidly declining
quality of iron ore deposits, in turn, are taking their
toll on the ferrous metals industry. Shortages of
coking coal caused by lagging production at the
Donetsk and Kuznetsk basins are interrupting steel
production more and more often, most notably in the
Ukraine-the center of over one-third of the country's
crude steel production. 25X1
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In the chemical industry, the share of Western plants
and equipment is increasing, and incompatibility be-
tween Soviet and Western components has resulted in
frequent, shutdowns for repair. A single equipment
breakdown now exacts a greater penalty in terms of
lost productivity than it did in the past because of
Moscow's proclivity for installing large-capacity units.
25X1
Worker Morale Problems
Another major factor underlying poor labor produc-
tivity may have been a serious decline in worker
morale. Until recently, the leadership has relied on
improvements in the standard of living to improve
motivation. Now, however, there is increasing evi-
dence that the Soviet workers' optimism about their
standard of living in the 1960s and early 1970s has
been replaced by a deep pessimism
Among the reasons for this pessimism, the most
visible is the current shortage of quality food. Even
before the recent harvest failures, however, worker
discontent was increasing. Expectations simply have
risen far faster than the government's ability to
provide a consistent improvement in the standard of
living. In addition, Soviet citizens appear to be much
better informed than before about how their standard
of living compares with those in other countries,
especially in Eastern Europe-and much more upset."
25X1
One reflection of Soviet workers' growing discontent
is the increasing rate of alcoholism, which has caused
more serious production slowdowns, shoddier work-
manship, and growing absenteeism." It is difficult to
quantify the effect of this drop in morale upon
production levels, but a saying popular in the USSR
and Eastern Europe captures the probable effect:
"Since the government pretends we live better, we
pretend to work harder."F___1 25X1
Soviet leaders have planned a two-pronged attack for
dealing with their labor problems. Their efforts to
increase labor-force participation rates were discussed
in the section "Efforts To Increase Labor-Force Par-
ticipation Rates." They realize that additional sources
of labor are limited, however, and are focusing most
of their efforts on the second prong-ways to increase
productivity.F__~ 25X1
So far Moscow does not seem prepared to consider a
fundamental reordering of priorities or major reforms
to boost material incentives for workers.15 Indeed, its
actions point in just the opposite direction. During the
11th FYP, Moscow will become more involved in the
direct allocation of labor resources and will tighten
labor discipline in order to ensure that priority sectors
have adequate manpower and to increase labor pro-
ductivity. At the same time, Soviet leaders are trying
to bring the supply and demand for consumer goods
and services into closer balance by reducing the
growth of consumer purchasing power.
Allocating Labor Resources
25X1
In an effort to increase efficiency and to channel
workers into selected industries and regions, the Sovi-
et leadership apparently has decided to become more
directly involved in job placement. A part of the
decree on planning and management in July 1979 16
called for ceilings on the number of workers at
industrial enterprises during the 1 1 th FYP-a throw-
back to the pre-Brezhnev era. The Soviets have also
launched a campaign to increase use of the labor
placement bureaus established in 1967. These bureaus
are intended to provide information on job vacancies
and applicants, reducing the average time spent look-
ing for a job. They also provide a means of channeling
workers into key sectors. 25X1
For a quarter of a century the labor market has been
the resource market least controlled by the govern-
ment. Since the mid-1950s, workers generally have
been free to change jobs in response to higher wages
or better working conditions. The state has not con-
trolled the allocation of labor directly, as it has the
allocation of investment resources. Indirectly, howev-
er-by setting differentiated wage scales among in-
dustries, for example-it has channeled workers into
high-priority projects, such as those in the Far East
and the Virgin Lands. The current emphasis on labor
placement bureaus appears to supplement these indi-
rect methods. F__1 25X1
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Moscow, is also playing a much greater role in the job
`placement of graduates from both vocational-techni-
cal schools and higher and specialized secondary
schools. A Council of Minister's resolution issued in
April 1980 on the role of vocational-technical schools
includes compulsory, two-year work assignments at
enterprises chosen in advance. This is a-departure
from, the earlier, more informaljob placement sys-
tem.18 This resolution comes at a time when the
leadership is attempting to enlarge the vocational-
technical system, as the major vehicle for training
skilled workers.19
An earlier. resolution (1979) on the role of.higher and
specialized secondary schools increased the state's
control over the distribution of highly skilled workers.
Emphasizing the distortions in the supply of labor for
specific industrial branches,. the decree offered un-
specified material incentives to attract students into
particular. specialties. It called for the establishment
of specialized schools in Siberia, the Far East, and the
central industrialized region. of the RSFSR-areas
where the Soviets have had difficulty recruiting and
holding workers. The students, many of whom appar-
ently will be recruited from the heavily populated
areas of Central.Asia, will be required to accept jobs
in the regions where the schools are located.
Another program to steer workers into specific areas
of the country uses tour-of-duty brigades, established
in the early, 1970s. This program entails the construc-
tion of work camps at or near remote project sites to
which work crews are flown from base cities. For
example, tour-of-duty brigades perform all explora-
tory drilling in West Siberia. This eases critical
manpower shortages and avoids the cost of building
permanent facilities in remote areas. Moreover, these
brigades build about 40 percent of the facilities for
Siberian oil and gas industries
The state's growing control over the labor market and
its intention to become more involved in labor alloca-
tion are also reflected in a series of administrative
changes dating from the mid-1970s. In 1976 a Coun-
cil of Ministers' decree placed all agencies dealing
with labor matters under the State Committee for
Labor and Social Problems (Goskomtrud), a union-
republic organ with ministerial status. Two years later
Goskomtrud was given wide-ranging powers over
manpower training, wages and incentives, working
conditions, and social security.
Two organizations under Goskomtrud's umbrella are
now being expanded: the All-Union Resettlement
Committee and the Administration for Organized
Recruitment (Orgnabor). These agencies played a
major role in such mass migrations as the settling of
new lands in Kazakhstan and Siberia in the. 1950s.
More recently, they have been concerned with direct-
ing urban labor to priority projects, such as large 25X1
construction efforts or newly established plants that
are having difficulty obtaining skilled labor.
The current number of workers placed in industrial
jobs through Orgnabor is unknown (in 1976 it handled
only about 3 percent of job placements). A barrage of
recent articles in the Soviet press on the need to
improve labor resource management through orga-
nized redistribution of employed workers suggests,
however, that Orgnabor is expanding its activities. 20
Cracking Down on Lax Workers
Along with taking a more direct hand in allocating
scarce labor resources, the leadership seems,intent on
reducing job turnover and.tightening labor discipline.
A resolution issued jointly in January 1980 by the
Council of Ministers, the Central Committee of the
CPSU, and the All-Union Trade Union Council
harshly criticizes those who do not have jobs, those
who constantly change jobs, and those who do not
work at the jobs they have. 21 The resolution increases
from two weeks to one month the period of notice for
voluntary resignations and advocates tougher disci-
plinary action against people who come to work
drunk, are illegally absent, or avoid employment. It
blames party officials, factory managers, foremen,
and others in responsible positions for not enforcing
the rules and calls for increased vigilance in oversee-
ing job performance.
Although the major thrust of the resolution is on the
increased use of discipline, it also provides some
incentives. These are additional leave time, housing
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construction loans that need not be repayed, and
pension increases from 10 to 20 percent for retirees
with 25 years of continuous service
Meanwhile, Soviet authorities have been expanding
the use of the labor brigade-a longstanding form of
grass-roots autonomy whereby a number of workers
contract collectively for a specific project such as
building a school. Reportedly this arrangement was
revised to raise productivity through a new set of
financial arrangements, but it also enforces labor
discipline on lax workers through group pressure.22
According to Soviet statistics, by August 1980 the
brigade form of organization encompassed 48 percent
of workers in industry as a whole, including 60
percent in ferrous metallurgy and over half in ship-
building, forestry, light industry, and machine build-
ing. The decree on planning and management issued
in July 1979 instructs enterprises to set up brigades in
the hope that they will become the principal form of
labor organization in the 11th FYP.
Against the background of the decree on labor turn-
over and the emphasis on labor brigades, leaders at all
levels have begun to speak out more forcefully on the
need to increase labor discipline. Speaking on prep-
arations for the new five-year plan at the Central
Committee Plenum in 1979, Brezhnev warned:
Discipline and order are always necessary. Now,
when the scale of economic management has ex-
panded tremendously, and when the network of
economic relations is becoming even more complex,
dense, and widespread, [these qualities] become
particularly necessary... for the strict observance
of the laws is one of the unconditional prerequisites
for the functioning of the entire economic mecha-
nism. 25X1
During 1980 and 1981 at least a half dozen promi-
nently featured articles in the Soviet press also have
picked up on the theme of tightening labor controls.23
Over the same period-and undoubtedly with the
events of Poland in mind-the regime has pursued a
campaign emphasizing the state's primacy in labor
matters. Mikhail Suslov, secretary of the CPSU and
chief party theoretician before his death in January
1982, took a hard line in his keynote address to an all-
union ideology conference held in April 1981, stress-
ing the "strictest control" over all aspects of labor and
consumption. Since then a press campaign has 25X1
stressed the need for "heightened vigilance" to
counter the effect of reformist ideas in Poland and in
the USSR.21 25X1
Refurbishing the Trade Unions
Also with an eye toward Poland, Soviet leaders have
sought to refurbish the image of trade unions as the
guarantor of workers' rights. 25 Early in 1981, at the
26th Party Congress, Brezhnev chided the unions for
insufficiently exercising their "wide-ranging" rights
on behalf of the workers, and Trade Union Chief
Shibayev noted "all of this obliges the unions to
strengthen their supervision over the decisions of all
questions concerning labor, the life, and lifestyle of
people... Reports from republic trade union coun-
cil meetings and articles in the press also have called
for increasing worker participation in management.
25X1 25X1
While making a show of response to the needs of the
workers, Moscow has made it clear that to increase
production is still the trade unions' number-one obli-
gation. Since 1975 party and trade union resolutions
have emphasized the unions' production-oriented
functions, and the unions have become more subordi-
nate to the party than ever before.
Material Incentives
Moscow also wants to curb the growth of consumer
purchasing power so as to increase the effectiveness of
so-called financial levers. In theory, the wage and
incentive system should reward higher labor produc-
tivity. Since the mid-1960s Moscow has initiated
numerous reforms intended to boost the salaries of
workers whose performance exceeded norms or to,give
greater bonuses to enterprise managers who use fewer
workers (as in the widely touted Shchekino experi-
ment)." 0 25X1
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These programs have had little effect. Workers gener-
ally have been loath to work harder, because their
money income has already far outstripped the avail-
ability of what they would like to buy.27 And factory
managers continue to hoard workers, because-in
practice, as opposed to theory-the number-one crite-
rion of performance is to meet planned output (re-
gardless of cost).
Although Moscow recognizes these problems, the
gains in living standards or the reforms necessary to
evoke substantial productivity gains are not in the
offing. Even if harvests return to the average during
the next three years, the chances are small that
Moscow can recapture the momentum of the late
1960s and 1970s in improving the diet. Moreover,
gains in the production of other consumer goods,
notably durables, will be limited by the stiff competi-
tion for resources from defense programs and from
As an alternative to increased production, Soviet .
planners are looking for ways to cut down on annual
increments to consumer purchasing power. In mid-
1979 they increased the prices on a number of luxury
goods substantially-automobiles.by 18 percent, im-
ported furniture sets by 30 percent, jewelry by 50
percent, and beer by 48 percent. In September 1981
further price increases on luxury goods went into
effect. Most of these items are scarce and are traded
extensively on the black market, probably at prices far
in excess of the recent increases. In 1981 Nikolay
Glushkov, chairman of the State Price Committee,
said:
The preservation of the stable level of retail prices
for the basic edible and nonedible commodities
cannot mean the administrative freezing of retail
prices for all commodities..... There must be a
different approach to prices of commodities for
which there is a mass, daily demand, on the one
hand, and individual groups of what might be
called prestige commodities, or the other handF_
A good deal of consumer purchasing power could be
absorbed by an increase in the fixed prices of housing
and food. The basic rent has not changed since
1928-although recently there has been public discus-
sion of possible rent increases.28 Maintaining the
constant level of food prices at state retail outlets still
appears to be sacrosanct. Soviet leaders continue to 25X1
promise price stability for basic foodstuffs. The recent
disturbances in Poland are clearly on their minds.29l
Productivity Growth During the 1980s
Workers are likely to perceive the government's cor-
rective measures-a slowdown in wage increases
coupled with strict controls on the factory floor-as a
turning back of the clock to less prosperous times. The
labor disturbances at Tol'yatti and Gor'kiy in 1980
were triggered by food shortages, but they also appar- 25X1
ently involved low pay and poor working conditions.
In such an environment, the leadership is unlikely to
get the worker participation, interest, and effort that
The point at which disappointment over the econo-
my's performance results in serious labor trouble
cannot be predicted, but such a possibility already
worries the leadership.3?
tensions in the work force.
Moving toward the mid-1980s, as the USSR expe-
riences difficulties and failures in achieving the goals
of the 1981-85 plan and the annual increments to the
labor force become smaller, Moscow may have to
adopt even further restrictive measures in an effort to
raise output. For example, it could extend the work-
week or sharply limit workers' ability to change jobs.
The current economy, however, is vastly different in
both scale and complexity from that of the Stalin era,
when strong-arm tactics were the rule. A tough
approach to labor might keep productivity growing at
its present low rate, but it probably would do little to
boost it in the long run and certainly would add to 25X1
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Long-Term Policies: Some Hope for the Future
Because prospects for boosting labor productivity by
improving living standards during the 1980s are not
bright, Soviet leaders are pursuing a number of
policies which, over the longer term, could ease their
labor difficulties 25X1
Automation and Mechanization. The most promising
long-term policy involves an effort to substitute cap-
ital for labor by mechanizing and automating labor-
intensive industrial processes. This has been declared
one of the five major tasks of the 11th FYP.O
Despite the system's poor record, the potential for
drawing upon the "hidden labor reserves" is there.
Roughly half of all industrial workers in the USSR
perform manual labor, and the rate at which this
share declines has been glacial-about one-half a
percentage point each year. Moreover, most of these
manual laborers are engaged not in production but in
such labor-intensive auxiliary processes as loading,
transport, repair work, and storage operations. 0
Increased automation, however, will require an accel-
eration in investment in modern machinery and equip-
ment-which Moscow cannot accomplish quickly.
Mechanization and automation had a high priority in
the 1976-80 plan period, but Soviet industry made
little progress in mechanizing auxiliary processes be-
cause it failed to turn out large quantities of special-
ized materials-handling equipment." Now, with in-
vestment growth slowing (the planned growth rate of
2.5 percent annually during 1981-85 is the lowest for
any FYP), automation and mechanization will have to
fight even harder for their share of investment re-
sources.) 25X1
Regional Shifting of Capital Investment. Some plan-
ners have been advocating a rise in the relative share
of investments in Central Asia and other labor-surplus
areas, and the 1 1 th FYP does schedule several labor-
intensive projects for Central Asia, primarily in the
light and food industries. Nevertheless, any shift in
the regional investment patterns-which historically
have slighted the labor-surplus areas in the southern-
tier republics-will come slowly, if at all.32F--]
During the 1980s Central Asia will face stiff competi-
tion for any new investment rubles from Siberia and
the European USSR. Because of increasing stringen-
cies of supplies of raw materials in the industrial
heartland west of the Urals, massive investments in
Siberia are needed to find, extract, and transport its
energy and other raw materials. In 1979, for example,
investment in energy development, principally in Sibe-
ria, accounted for almost half of the growth in new25X1
investment. In addition, the European USSR has
many existing facilities that can be modernized and
expanded-a more efficient use of investment rubles
than building new plants in Central Asia. The further
slowdown in investment growth during the l 1th FYP,
coupled with these competing needs, means that the
possibility of rapid expansion of new plants and 25X1
equipment in Central Asia is slight.
Increasing the Birth Rate. Finally, in its concern for
labor shortages the government is formulating a
pronatalist demographic policy-clearly a long-term
corrective measure. It has moved slowly in imple- 25X1
menting this policy, however, because of the enormous
costs of developing the necessary infrastructure-
expanded day-care facilities, increased housing, im-
proved social amenities, and consumer services. The
government has also moved slowly because of political
sensitivity over whether to adopt a uniform policy for
the entire USSR or one aimed at boosting birth rates
only in low-fertility regions-which are predominant-
ly Slavic. The reports by President Brezhnev and
Premier Tikhonov at the 26th Party Congress seem to
endorse the regional approach. Their proposals, which
call for lump-sum grants for first, second, and third
births and one-year partially paid maternity leave for
working mothers, will be introduced gradually-first
in the Soviet Far East and Siberia. These are pre-
dominantly Slavic regions characterized by low fertil-
ity and high female employment." F_~ 25X1
Any successful pronatal campaign, however, would
mean at least temporary withdrawal of more women
from the labor force and thus some short-term costs to
the economy. The gains would not be realized until
after the year 2000, when the new persons would
begin to reach working age.
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Appendix A
Methodology for Projecting
the Soviet Labor Force,
1981-90
We estimate that during 1981-90 the growth of the
Soviet labor force will be nearly twice the growth of
the working-age population (males age 16 to 59,
females age 16 to 54). This appendix summarizes the
estimating procedures. It presents two estimates of
labor-force growth, incorporating two different as-
sumptions about Soviet labor-force participation rates
(LFPRs) during the decade.F_-]
Growth of the Soviet Working-Age Population and
Labor Force (Assuming Constant LFPRs)
Total working-age 132,794 156,087 161,03425X1
population
The first (method I) is derived by maintaining the
1980 rates for specific age and sex categories during
1981-90 (tables 3 and 4). This estimate isolates the
substantial positive impact that the changing age
composition of the population will have on labor-force
growth during this period. F_~
The second estimate (method II) incorporates the
same changes in age composition but includes changes
in LFPRs that will probably occur over time. There
are two main factors for change:
? The adoption of new government policies (for exam-
ple, the 1980 revision in pension laws designed to
encourage more people of retirement age to remain
in the labor force).
? The changing regional composition of population
growth (for example, an increasing share coming
from the southern-tier republics).
In both methods, estimates of LFPRs for the base
year (1980) are derived from analysis in Foreign
Economic Report No. 10, Department of Commerce,
September 1976, by Stephen Rapawy, Estimates and
Projections of the Labor Force and Civilian Employ-
ment in the USSR, 1950 to 1990. The last officially
reported data on LFPRs are in the 1970 census=
Table 4 provides a detailed breakdown of the data by
age and sex. Under both sets of assumptions, labor-
force growth during the 1980s is higher than the
growth of the working-age population.)
Male 65,306 79,066 82,607
67,488 77,021 78,427
Net 10-year increment 23,294 4,947
Average annual rate of (1.6 percent) (0.3 percent)
growth 25X1
Total labor force 126,656 146,569 155,937
Male 61,909 73,930 80,038
Female 64,747 72,639 75,899
Net 10-year increment 19,913 9,368
Average annual rate of (1.5 percent) (0.6 percent)
growth
These calculations assume that there is no change in labor-force
participation rates during 1981-90 for age- and sex-specific
categories.
Growth, Assuming No Change in LFPRs During 1981-
90 25X1
Table 3 shows the growth of the able-bodied popula-
tion and labor force during 1971-90. The average 25X1
annual rate of growth (AARG) of the working-age
population and of the labor force during 1971-80 were
roughly equal (1.6 percent and 1.5 percent). During
1981-90, the AARG of both will fall sharply, but the
fall in the labor force will be much less pronounced
because of the changes in the age and sex structure of
the population. 25X1
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Growth of the Soviet Labor Force and Population Age 16 Years and Over
Population a
(1)
LFPR b
(2)
Labor
Force d
(3)
Population a
(4)
LFPR c
(5)
Labor
Forced
(6)
Population a
(7)
Labor
Force d
(8)
Male (16 and over)
74,807
61,909
89,527
73,930
97,495
80,038
16 to 19
9,066
53.3
4,832
9,711
48.4
4,700
8,603
4,164
20 to 29
15,605
89.7
13,998
24,017
89.5
21,495
21,617
19,347
30 to 39
18,605
97.6
18,158
15,016
97.6
14,656
23,022
22,469
40 to 49
14,526
95.9
13,930
17,407
95.9
16,693
14,006
13,432
50 to 54
3,370
90.0
3,033
8,275
90.0
7,448
9,016
8,114
55 to 59
4,134
79.9
3,303
4,640
79.9
3,707
6,343
5,068
60 and over
9,501
49.0
4,655
10,461
50.0
5,231
14,888
7,444
Female (16 and over)
94,988
64,747
72,639
114,580
75,899
16 to 19
8,697
47.8
4,157
9,390
40.8
3,831
8,371
3,415
20 to 29
15,501
86.3
13,377
23,451
86.1
20,191
21,299
18,338
30 to 39
19,240
92.7
17,835
15,368
92.7
14,246
23,221
21,526
40 to 49
18,470
90.6
16,734
18,882
90.6
17,107
15,072
13,655
50 to 54
5,580
77.3
4,313
9,930
77.3
7,676
10,464
8,089
55 to 59
7,505
44.4
3,332
7,754
45.4
3,520
7,610
3,455
60 and over
19,995
25.0
4,999
23,337
26.0
6,068
28,543
7,421
a The population figures in columns 1, 4, and 7 are estimates
prepared by the Foreign Demographic Analysis Division, US Bureau
of the Census, in May 1980. They are based on the age-sex
distributions reported in the 1970 Soviet census and the official
Soviet figures for total population, births, and deaths for the years
1970-75.
b To derive the labor-force participation rates (LFPRs) in column 2,
the 1970 census figures on labor force by age and sex (reported in
Vestnik statistiki, No. 12, 1974, p. 90) were divided by the
corresponding population groups estimated by the US Census
Bureau.
We have had to adjust the participation rates of the pension-age
population substantially, however, because the census data include
only a small portion of the working pensioners. Soviet census
methodology includes in the labor force those who are working on a
permanent job basis at the time of the census and excludes those in
temporary or part-time jobs. Because much of agricultural employ-
ment is seasonal, pensioners may work for limited periods; thus they
would be excluded from the census data on the labor force.
To make our estimates of the labor force approximate the actual
total labor input of the USSR (expressed in fully employed manyear
equivalents), we added an allowance for pensioners. Rates were
Adjusted upward by 29 percentage points for males and 18
percentage points for females over those implied by the official data.
This adjusted 1970 LFPR for the pension-age population is assumed
to remain constant for the entire period shown in the table.
To derive the LFPRs shown in column 5:
16-19 years Participation rates between 1970 and 1980 were
decreased annually at one-third the annual rate of
decrease between 1959 and 1970 to reflect the
continued trend toward extending the length of
compulsory education.
20-29 years The 1970 rates were decreased by 0.2 percentage
points to allow for the delay in entering labor force
caused by continued schooling.
30-54 years The 1970 rates were held constant.
55-59 years The 1970 rates were held constant for males and
increased by I percentage point for females.
Women will be encouraged to remain in the labor
force longer because of the slow growth in the
supply of manpower.
60 years and The 1970 rates were increased by I percentage
over point.
d We derived the labor force figures in columns 3, 6, and 8 by
multiplying the US Census Bureau's population figures by the
appropriate participation rate. For the 1991 calculations we use the
1981 LFPR in column 5.
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Overall, in the 1980s roughly 4.5 million more persons
will be added to the labor force than to the working-
age population. The reasons for this difference lie in
the changing age and sex structure of the population.
Impact of Pensioners on Soviet
Labor-Force Growth
During the next decade, the pension-age population
will increase by 9.5 million persons (it was only 4.6
million persons during 1971-80). Holding participa-
tion rates constant, the share of pensioners in the
labor force will increase from 10.1 percent to 11.7
percent of the work force. By definition, these pen-
sioners are dropped from the Soviets' count of the
working-age population-but those who keep working
are included in the labor-force count. Without work-
ing pensioners, the increment to the labor force would
be reduced by 3.5 million persons, as shown in table 5.
25X1
Another factor contributing to the higher rate of
labor-force growth is the changing age structure of
the labor force. During 1981-90, the share of working-
age people in their thirties and forties will increase by
about 4 percentage points (from 42.7 percent to 46.8
percent) as a result of the increase in the birth rate in
the post-World War II period. Participation rates for
these age cohorts average about 94 percent, higher
than the rates for older or younger groups. This 1980s
concentration of workers in the age cohorts with the
highest participation rates implies that there will be
roughly 1.6 million more persons in the labor force.
The effect of the changing age structure is shown in
A third (but less significant) factor explaining some of
the difference in growth between labor force and
working-age population is the change in the sex
structure of the labor force. During the 1980s the
number of males in the able-bodied ages of the labor
force will rise by 5.7 percent and that of females by
only 3.1 percent. The differential growth rates for the
two groups reflect the gradual recovery from the sex
imbalance caused by wars and internal conflicts in
earlier years, with the attendant differential death
rates. In 1950 the Soviet Union had 77 males per 100
females in the able-bodied ages, but by 1990 the rate
will have increased to 105 males per 100 females.
Total labor force 131,750 137,617 5,867
excluding old-age
pensioners a
Participation rates of males in the labor force are
higher than those for females in all age cohorts. The
changing sex structure will contribute about 100,000
persons to the labor-force increment during 1981-90.
25X1
Growth, Projecting Changes in Participation Rates for
Specific Age-Sex Categories
In the foregoing analysis, labor-force participation
rates have been held constant for specific age-sex
categories throughout 198 1-90. This assumption is
probably too rigid, however-changes in the regional
composition of population growth and in government
policies are bound to have an effect by the end of the
decade. This section incorporates changes in labc25X1
force participation rates among:
? Teenagers, whose. participation rates will probably
continue falling (as they have since 1970) as compul-
sory education is prolonged.
? Females between 20 and 39, whose participation
rates probably will decline as the share of women
from Central Asia in this age group increases.
? Old-age pensioners, whose participation rates will
probably increase because of recent changes in
pension laws.
Our analysis demonstrates, however, that these
changes in LFPR will tend to offset each other, so
that their combined impact on labor-force growth will
be negligible. The "hidden labor reserves" so fre-
quently referred to by Soviet economists and govern-
ment officials are simply not available.'?F___-]
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Population and Labor Force Projections,
Assuming No Change in Age Distribution
Population- Percent
Labor
Population a
1991 Population Standardized
Unstandardi
d
(1)
Distribution b Force c
(4)
Standardized by C
abor Force ~
ze
Labor Forc
(2)
(3)
.
1981 Age (6)
Distribution a
(5)
es
(7)
Male (16-59)
79,066
68,699
82,607
82,607 71,776
72,594
16 to 19
9,711
.1228
4,700
8,603
10,144 4,910
4,164
20 to 29
24,017
.3038
21,495
21,617
25,096 22,461
19,347
30 to 39
15,016
.1899
14,656
23,022
15,687 15,311
22,469
40 to 49
17,407
.2201
16,693
14,006
18,182 17,436
13,342
50 to 54
8,275
.1047
7,448
9,016
8,649 7,784
8,114
55 to 59
4,640
.0587
3,707
6,343
4,849 3,874
5,068
Female (16-54)
77,021
1.000
63,051
78,427
78,427 64,204
65,023
16 to 19
9,390
.1219
3,831
8,371
9,561 3,901
3,415
20 to 29
23,451
.3045
20,191
21,299
23,881 20,562
18,338
30 to 39
15,368
.1995
14,246
23,221
15,646 14,504
21,526
40 to 49
18,882
.2452
17,107
15,072
19,230 17,423
13,655
50 to 54
9,930
.1289
7,676
10,464
10,109 7,814
8,089
Total
156,087
131,750
161,034
161,034 135,980
137,617
a See table 4, columns 4 and 7.
b Percent distribution of column 1.
C See table 4, columns 6 and 8.
a Totals for column 4 multiplied by distribution in column 2.
e Column 5 multiplied by participation rates in table 4, column 5.
Sources and Methodology: To isolate the impact the changing age
structure will have on labor-force growth during 1981-90, the
I January 1991 population has been converted to an age distribution
that prevailed on 1 January 1981. The standardized labor force
shown in column 6 is the size of the labor force if there were no
change in age structure during the decade and pensioners were
excluded from the labor force.
Teenagers
Even though population growth slowed during the
1970s, the USSR extended the length of compulsory
education and expanded technical training, keeping
the scarcer young people in school for a longer time.
According to Soviet estimates, those who entered the
labor force in the late 1970s were 19 or 20 years old-
two to three years older than those who entered in the
late 1960s.35 Because we expect this trend to continue,
we estimate that participation rates among the school-
age population (16 to 19 years) will decrease by about
5 percentage points over the next decade. Table 7
shows the data in the 1959 and 1970 census and our
projections to 1990 following the same pattern.
25X1
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Rates of Participation in the Labor Force by the
School-Age Population
Males 16-19 64.4 53.3 48.4 43.9
Females 16-19 71.0 47.8 40.8 35.0
Source: See Rapawy, Federal Economic Report 10, pp. 15-16 for a
derivation of these rates.
The Soviet leadership appears to be gambling that
additional technical training will raise the productiv-
ity of new workers sufficiently to offset the production
forgone by their delay in entering the labor force. The
5-percentage point decline in LFPR projected for
1980-90 means that roughly 850,000 fewer workers
will enter the labor force than the.overall school-age
population would suggest. 25X1
Women
During the 1980s, over two-fifths of the increment to
the total working-age population will be made up of
females in their twenties and thirties from Central
Asia and Kazakhstan (roughly 2 million of the 5
million shown in table 3). The Soviets have not
released age-specific participation rates for women in
these regions in the past two censuses, but it is
estimated that whatever their ages, their LFPRs are
substantially below the national average. Indeed, the
regional variations became more marked in the 1970s,
if the estimates in table 8 are credible and participa-
tion by Central Asian women fell slightly.F_~
Nonetheless, for the 1980s we expect only a relatively
small decline in participation rates among females in
their twenties and thirties. The share for females age
20 to 39 from Central Asia and Kazakhstan looms
large in the 10-year increment, but they will still
comprise less than 20 percent of all Soviet females of
that age group in 1990. Moreover, two factors suggest
that the LFPR among women age 20 to 39 in Central
Asia and Kazakhstan might increase:
? The Soviet Government.is trying to increase female
employment and educational attainment in general.
Table 8
76.0 85.1 86.9
Kazakhstan 63.0 71.8 72.5
Central Asia 67.4 66.5 65.4
Source: Alastair McAuley, Women :s Work and Wages in the Soviet
Union, London, 1981, p. 37. McAuley explains that women in
Central Asian communitiesfparticipate to a high degree in farm
work. As industry has increased in that region, women have
participated in it less than men.
? There is some evidence of declining fertility among
these women-and thus more likelihood of their
working outside the home.
Even so, their LFPR will probably remain far below
the national average. F____1 25X1
As a result of these calculations, we have decreased
the LFPR for all females age 20 to 39 by 2 percentage
points during 1981-90, which means roughly 900,000
fewer females in this age group will enter the labor
force than the previous pattern would suggestF_~
Pensioners
One of Moscow's few possible sources of additional
labor is the retirement-age population. Currently the
retirement age in the USSR is the lowest in the
industrialized world (55 years for women and 60 years
for men), sending home large numbers of potentially
productive workers. In an effort to tap this group, 25X1
pension laws were revised on 1 January 1980 to
encourage workers to stay on the job beyond retire-
ment age. The new regulations increased pensions by
10 rubles per month (to a 40-ruble maximum increase)
for each year of work beyond retirement age. More-
over, depending on the type of job, pensioners will be
paid all or part of their pension income for as long as
they continue to work. This incentive is likely to
increase the LFPR of this cohort.
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Thousand Persons as of 1 January Table 10. Thousand Persons as of 1 January
Comparison of Projections,
Using Constant and Changing
Labor-Force Participation Rates
1981
1991
Constant LFPRs
Total labor force
146,569
155,937
Male
73,930
80,038
Female
72,639
75,899
Net 10-year. increment
Changing LFPRs
Total labor force
146,569
155,812
Male
73,930
80,394
Female
72,639
75,418
9,243
Another factor that will tend to increase the pension-
ers' LFPR is their changing age structure. Of the 9.5-
million person increment to the retirement-age popu-
lation in the 1980s, roughly 4 million will be males
between 60 and 64 (table 4). The Soviets have not
published a breakdown by age of LFPR for retirees in
the last two censuses, but a substantial number of
them apparently continue to work. According to one
survey, the LFPR for highly skilled scientific workers
and medical personnel between 60 and 64 averaged
almost 70 percent, and another source indicated that
for all workers and employees the figure was 60
percent.36F---]
Taking into account both the changing age structure
and the added incentive to continue working, we have
increased the LFPR for males by 5 percentage points
in our projection and that for females by 2.5 percent-
age points. This change adds roughly 1.7 million
persons to the labor force.
Estimated Total Soviet Labor Force, 1981-91,
Using Changing Participation Rates
1981
146,569 73,930
72,639
1982
147,797 74,696
73,101
1983
149,063 75,579
73,484
1984
150,164 76,349
73,815
1985
151,115 77,041
74,074
1986
151,885 77,633
74,252
1987
152,554 78,162
74,392
1988
153,187 78,651
74,536
1989
153,936 79,152
74,784
1990
154,608 79,655
74,953
1991
155,812 80,394
75,418
Impact of Projected Changes in LFPR
Table 9 shows that the net effect of the increases and
decreases discussed above is almost negligible. (Table
10 provides a year-by-year estimate of labor-force
growth during 1981-90.) The greater employment
among pensioners (calculated as up by 1,700,000) is
likely to be offset by declining participation rates for
teenagers and females age 20 to 39 (down by 900,000
in each group).
ity.
Even if the Soviets were able to maintain participation
rates among the groups where we expect a decline,
however, the average annual growth of the labor force
would still be less than 1 percent. The same situation
would exist if LFPRs for pensioners increased during
the 1980s by 10 percent for males and 5 percent for
females-double our current estimate. That would
add another 1.7 million persons to this cohort, but the
average annual growth of the total labor force would
be increased by only 0.1 percent per year. In short, the
USSR will be unable to avoid severe labor shortages
during the next decade. Therefore, most economic
progress must come from increased labor productiv-
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Appendix B
Regional Trends in Soviet
Population Growth.
Birth rates throughout the USSR have fallen since
1960. The differences among regions have increased,
however, because the drop has been more n-^^ounced
in the European region. 25X1
Variations among union republics in levels of fertility
have become so pronounced that Soviet researchers
have begun to refer to three "demoregions" in the
USSR. The European demoregion, comprising the
Slavic and Baltic republics, is the most demographi-
cally "advanced"-both birth and death rates are low,
so that natural increase (the excess of births over
deaths) is low. The Transitional demoregion, compris-
ing the Transcaucasus republics plus Moldavia, has
declining birth rates and low mortality, resulting in a
moderate (and slowing) natural increase. The Central
Asian demoregion, the least demographically ad-
vanced of the three, shows high birth rates (which
have only just begun to decline) and low mortality, so
that population growth is rapid
The causes of this regional differentiation have been
debated at length by both Soviet and Western re-
searchers. Probable factors include differences in the
levels of urbanization, female labor-force participa-
tion, and availability of housing, as well as differences
in attitudes toward family size among the USSR's
nationalities.
In 1960 the birth rates for the Central Asian demore-
gion as a whole and for the Transcaucasus were about
80 percent higher than that for the European demore-
gion (table 11). By 1975 the differential had increased
sharply; the Central Asian rate was 1.4 times that of
the Transcaucasus region and more than double that
of the European region.
The divergence in birth rates has caused major differ-
ences in age structure among the union republics,
with important consequences for the distribution of
labor resources. The republics in which fertility de-
clined only slightly during the last 15 to 20 years have
entered the 1980s with young populations. This means
that a large proportion of the people (generally one-
third to one-half) are in the preworking ages; about
half are in the prime working ages; and relatively few
(only about 10 percent) are in the postworking ages
(table l2).F---] 25X1
In contrast, those republics in which fertility declined
sharply now have older populations. In these cases,
the preworking ages generally account for less than
one-fourth of the population, the prime working ages
for a large (about 60 percent) but declining share, and
the postworking ages a substantial (nearly 20 percent)
and increasing share. In the transitional demoregion,
where the decline in fertility has been between those
of the others, the proportion in both the prime work-
ing ages and the postworking ages will generally
increase slightly at the expense of the younger ages.
25X1 25X1
The number of individuals entering and leaving the
working ages determine the dynamics of the labor
pool. Thus, regional differences in population age
structure will directly influence the geographic source
of net increase to the national labor pool in the 1980s
(table 13). In Central Asia and Kazakhstan, entrants
are expected to outnumber retirees by 3 to 1, on
average, during the decade. By contrast, in the
RSFSR the entrants will be fewer than the retirees
(only 90 percent). Consequently, in Central Asia and
Kazakhstan the manpower pool will grow by an
average 2.4 percent annually, and the RSFSR will
experience an absolute manpower decline.
Clearly, the high-fertility republics must make up the
shortfall in new workers in the low-fertility republics
and will contribute almost all of the net increase in
the manpower pool at the national level]
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23.2
15.7
14.6
15.7
15.9
20.5
15.3
15.2
15.1
14.8
24.4
17.9
16.2
15.7
16.0
22.5
18.1
17.6
15.7
15.2
16.6
14.6
15.8
14.9
14.9
Transitional Demoregion
34.2
26.7
22.5
21.6
21.4
Transcaucasus
Azerbaijan
42.6
36.6
29.2
25.1
25.2
Georgia
24.7
21.2
19.2
18.2
17.7
Armenia
40.1
28.6
22.1
22.4
22.7
Moldavia
29.3
20.4
19.4
20.7
20.0
Central Asian Demoregion
38.0
33.4
31.5
32.1
31.7
Central Asia
Uzbekistan
39.8
34.7
33.6
34.5
33.8
Kirghiziya
36.9
31.4
30.5
30.4
29.6
Tadjikistan
33.5
36.8
34.8
37.1
37.0
Turkmeniya
42.4
37.2
35.2
34.4
34.3
Kazakhstan
37.2
26.9
23.4
24.1
23.8
Sources:
1960-70: Naseleniye SSSR / 973, Moscow, Statistika, 1974, pp. 69-83.
1975: Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1975 godu, Moscow, Statistika, 1976, pp. 42-43.
1980: Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1980 godu, Moscow, Statistika, 1981, pp. 32-33.
Confidential 20
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Table 12 Percent of Population in Given Age Group
Estimated Age Composition of the Soviet Population, by Region and Republic
0-15
Years
16-59/54
Years
60/55+
Years
0-15
Years
16-59/54
Years
60/55+
Years
0-15
Years
16-59/54
Years
60/55+
Years
RSFSR
22.6
60.9
16.5
23.3
58.8
17.9
22.3
58.3
19.4
Ukraine
22.8
58.5
18.7
22.9
57.1
20.0
22.9
56.1
21.0
Belorussia
24.5
59.2
16.3
24.4
58.1
17.5
24.7
56.2
19.1
Baltic Republics
21.5
57.8
20.7
21.6
56.8
21.6
21.3
55.9
22.8
25.1
57.8
17.1
24.4
57.5
18.1
24.0
56.6
19.4
22.7
57.3
20.0
22.7
56.5
20.8
22.0
55.8
22.2
37.6
53.8
8.6
35.7
55.6
8.7
36.0
54.4
9.6
32.5
58.3
9.2
31.8
58.1
10.1
31.8
56.5
11.7
27.4
58.0
14.6
27.1
57.3
15.6
27.1
55.7
17.2
28.8
57.6
13.6
28.9
56.5
14.6
28.8
55.8
15.4
Uzbekistan
43.7
48.0
8.3
43.4
48.7
7.9
43.4
48.7
7.9
Kirghiziya
39.9
50.8
9.3
39.7
50.9
9.4
39.3
50.9
9.8
Tadjikistan
45.6
47.0
7.4
44.6
48.2
7.2
44.3
48.2
7.5
Turkmeniya
43.6
48.4
8.0
43.0
49.2
7.8
42.7
49.4
7.9
a 0-15 years: pre-working-age population.
16-59/54 years: working-age population (males 16-59; females
16-54).
60/55+: retirement-age population (males 60 and over; females 55
and over).
Source: US Bureau of the Census, Population Projections by Age
and Sex for the Republics and Major Economic Regions of the
USSR 1970 to 2000, Series 91, No. 26, US Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C., 1979.
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Table 13 Million Persons as of 1 January
Regional Increases in Soviet
Able-Bodied Population
Year RSFSR Central Asia and
Kazakhstan
Able-Bodied Average Able-Bodied Average
Population Annual Population Annual
Rate of Rate of
Growth Growth
(percent) (percent)
1970 73,565
15,214
1975 78,835 1.4
17,908 3.3
1980 83,791 1.2
21,347 3.6
1985 83,543 -0.1
24,225 2.6
1990 82,462 -0.3
27,025 2.2
1995 81,817 -0.2
30,268 2.3
2000 83,449 0.4
34,437 2.6
Source: US Bureau of the Census, Population Projections by Age
and Sex for the Republics and Major Economic Regions of the
USSR 1970 to 2000. Series 91, No. 26, US Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C., 1979. 25X1
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Appendix C
Recent Migration Trends
Several leading Soviet and Western scholars have
postulated that large-scale migration by indigenous
nationalities from the high-fertility southern tier of
republics to labor-deficit areas in the European USSR
and Siberia will occur and offset the impact of
differing population growth rates. There are no signs
that such movement is developing, however, and the
Soviet leadership apparently is not counting on it.F_
Migration Between Republics
There has been a slight net migration into the RSFSR
since 1975, but it apparently does not signal the
beginning of a massive wave of migration out of high-
fertility regions. Instead, it seems to indicate a trend
toward increasing regional segregation of nationali-
ties. Available census data " show, for example, that
the major indigenous Central Asian nationalities be-
came even more highly concentrated in their republics
and region during the 1970s (see table 14). In 1979,
more than 98 percent of all Uzbeks, Tadjiks, Kirghiz,
and Turkmens lived in Central Asia and Kazakhstan.
Only Kazakhs resided outside the region in substan-
tial numbers, and their proportion declined between
1970 and 1979. Moreover, the majority of those living
in other parts of the USSR had gone no farther from
home than the five RSFSR oblasts bordering Kazakh-
stan.0 25X1
Four of the republics in the southern tier-Georgia,
Azerbaijan, Kirghiziya, and Kazakhstan-did expe-
rience a net loss of migrants during the period 1970-
79. According to 1979 census data, however, in
Georgia and Azerbaijan the absolute number of Rus-
sians declined, while in Kirghiziya and Kazakhstan,
Russians declined in relative terms. Thus, most of the
positive migration flow the RSFSR has recently
experienced is probably made up of returning Rus-
sians-not an influx of native Central Asians.)
During the 1980s, natives from Central Asia and
Kazakhstan are unlikely to migrate to the urban
industrial centers of European Russia on a scale large
enough to offset the numerical shrinking of the labor
pool. They have a number of reasons for staying at 25X1
home:
? Although wages in European Russia are generally
higher, living costs are also greater, nullifying the
apparent advantage.
? The language problem would probably inhibit large-
scale movement of Central Asians and Kazakhs to
European Russia and Siberia, even if material
'incentives were increased.
? Central Asians are culturally attached to their
homelands.
? The cities of European Russia have no established
Central Asian neighborhoods and thus no ethni--,,,
The Soviets are trying to overcome some of these
barriers-for instance, in recent years they have given
heavy emphasis to Russian-language training in the'
southern republics-but rapid change is unlikely in
the 1980s. Cultural barriers may well prove insur-
mountable, as the recent experimental use of Central
Asian labor in the redevelopment of the noncherno-
zem zone of the USSR suggests. Entire Uzbek and
Kirghiz collective farms were transplanted, with all
their families and equipment, but even so widespread
dissatisfaction and substantial return migration has
been reported.39
Migration Within the RSFSR
On an intrarepublic level, migration. is also not expect-
ed to equate labor supply and demand. Migration
patterns within republics have not changed in a major
way in the last 20 years. In particular, East Siberia
continues to be a labor-deficit area with a high rate of
net outmigration, despite higher wages and other
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Distribution of the Soviet Union's Major Central Asian Nationalities
Uzbeks
Tadjiks
Kirghiz
Turkmens
Kazakhs
1970 1979
Own Republic or Elsewhere in
Central Asia
9,195
12,456
84.0
84.8
96.8
97.2
2,136
2,898
76.3
77.2
98.4
98.5
1,452
1,906
88.5
88.5
98.5
98.5
1,525
2,028
92.9
93.3
98.3
98.5
5,299
6,556
79.9
90.7
90.8
91.8
Source: 1970: Itogi Vesesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniva SSSR 1970
goda, vol. IV, Natsional'niy sostav naseleniya SSSR, pp. 9-15,
1979; Naseleniye SSSR po dannym Vsesoyuznoy perepisi naselen-
iya 1979 goda, Politizdat, 1980, pp. 23-30.
economic incentives given to workers there. Of the
eastern regions of the RSFSR, only the Far East has
managed to sustain a positive migration balance. This
appears to be due in part to an eastward drift of
migrants from European Russia via West and East
Siberia. In recent years, however, net outmigration
has diminished markedly in East Siberia and to a
lesser extent in West Siberia.
The Urals region has consistently generated net out-
migration since the late 1950s, experiencing the larg-
est net loss of any of the 10 economic regions in the
RSFSR in the first half of the 1970s. The outmigra-
tion of both urban and rural inhabitants from the
Urals has created severe labor shortages. In the
European USSR, the Volga-Vyatka and central cher-
nozem regions have been losing population through
outmigration for many years, suffering a drastic rural
depopulation. The 1970 census data suggest that
migrants from the Volga-Vyatka region settle tempo-
rarily in the Urals before moving farther east, while
the migrant stream from the central chernozem re-
gion is predominantly toward Central Russia or
southward to the Ukrainian SSR.
In the European RSFSR, only the North Caucasus
region has consistently shown a net gain of migrants;
in 1970, over 40 percent of these were headed for
rural destinations, and many appear to have been 25X1
returnees from the Urals and Western Siberia. This
"irrational" migration pattern must concern the Sovi-
et leadership, since people are leaving labor-deficit
areas to settle in an area of growing labor surpluses.
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Appendix D
Legislation Affecting
the Labor Force
The USSR has issued numerous decrees since Decem-
ber 1975 to cope with the tightening labor market and
to increase the effectiveness of the labor force. The
compilation (table 15) presented here is lengthy, but
not all-inclusive. It groups the decrees into four
categories-training, supply, productivity, and alloca-
tion-and provides the title, date, issuing authority,
and a brief summary of major provisions.
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Legislation Affecting the Labor Force, 1975-81
On the Further Improvement of
the Training Process and Edu-
cation of Pupils in the Vocation-
al and Technical System
September 1977 Central Committee Expands vocational and technical school training,
CPSU, Council of Min- particularly at the secondary level.
isters, USSR
Stipulates vocational/technical schools as major vehi-
cle for training future workers.
Provides three-year course of study for eighth-grade
graduates; to include occupational training and gener-
al secondary training.
Establishes one- to two-year course of occupational
training for 10th-grade graduates of general second-
ary schools.
List of occupations for workers September 1977 Goskomtrud
in upper wage-skill categories
which require specialized
secondary education
On Further Improving the
Training and Education of Pu-
pils in General Education
Schools and Their Preparation
for Work
Calls for growth of a "wage earner-intellectual" class
of people with specialist training doing blue-collar
jobs, albeit at a higher pay scale.
December 1977 Central Committee Increases vocational training in grades 9-10 from two
CPSU, Council of Min- to four hours weekly.
isters, USSR
Emphasizes practical labor education at enterprises,
collectives, and state farms near the school.
Changes curriculum, study programs, and textbooks
to ensure polytechnical or labor orientation of
education.
Arranges for planned integration into labor force of
general secondary school graduates who do not
continue their education.
Improving the Planning and
January 1978
Council of Ministers,
Seeks to improve the training, distribution, and use of
Training of Specialists and the
USSR
specialists by:
Utilization of Graduates of
1) Using labor balances more extensively in devising
Higher and Specialized Second-
annual and five-year plans.
ary Schools in the National
2) Locating specialized secondary schools near territo-
Economy
rial-production complexes.
3) Centralizing training on basis of available equip-
ment and personnel.
4) Establishing sectoral plans based on need for
specialists.
5) Establishing model schedules for specialist posi-
tions, particularly correlating relationship of engi-
neers and technicians.
6) Improving allocation plans for graduates.
7) Ensuring that job assignments are based on training
and qualifications.
On Measures for Further Im- October 1978
proving the Study and Teaching
of Russian Language in Union
Republics
Grants republic education ministries latitude in ex-
panding Russian-language instruction at the expense
of the rest of the curriculum.
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USSR sian-language classes in non-Russian schools.
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Table 15 (continued)
Title
Date Issued
Issuing Authority
Further Development of Higher
July 1979
Central Committee
Education and Raising the
CPSU, Council of Min-
Quality of Specialists' Training
isters, USSR
On Measures for Further Im- October 1979 Central Committee
proving the Training and Rais- CPSU, Council of Min-
ing the Qualifications of Work- isters, USSR
ers at Their Place of Work
al-technical schools of the
USSR
On Additional Measures for July 1978 Council of Ministers,
Improving Working Conditions USSR and Union Re-
for Women Employed in the publics, Goskomtrud,
National Economy Presidium of All-Union
Central Council of Trade
Unions
On Measures for Increasing October 1979 Goskomtrud, Secretariat
Pension Benefits for Those of All-Union Central
Working After Reaching Pen- Council of Trade Unions
sion Age
Major Provisions/ Comments
Improves the quality of technical training.
Establishes training centers in Siberia, Far East, and
nonchernozem zone of RSFSR.
Assigns graduates to jobs in local areas to reduce
turnover.
Offers unspecified material incentives to woo students
to less popular specialities.
Permits secondary school graduates to enter higher
schools in certain specialities on the basis of two
instead of four entrance examinations.
Assigns higher school graduates to jobs one to three
years before graduation. Plans call for eventually
assigning jobs five years before graduation.
Provides for intensive management training for ad-
ministrators of on-the-job training programs.
Emphasizes the training of female workers, including
full-time training programs with pay for women with
young children.
Requires vocational-technical school graduates to
accept compulsory two-year work assignments chosen
before their graduation.
Reaffirms primacy of vocational-technical schools as
major vehicle for training labor force.
Excludes women from dangerous or heavy work as of
l January 1981.
Provides retraining without loss of pay or pension
benefits.
Unlikely to be implemented fully, since a large share
of these dangerous or heavy jobs-80 percent of all
manual construction jobs, for example-are held by
women.
Increases pensions by 10 rubles monthly (up to 40
rubles) for each year worked beyond retirement age,
effective January 1980.
Broadens eligibility of groups able to retain all or part
of pension while continuing to work.
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Legislation Affecting the Labor Force, 1975-81
Improving Working Conditions April 1980
for Women Having Children
and for Those Working Part-
Time
On Measures To Further Im- March 1981
prove the Population's Social
Security
Goskomtrud, Secretariat
of All-Union Central
Council of Trade Unions
Central Committee
CPSU, Council of Min-
isters, USSR
Encourages women with young children to work part-
time.
Guarantees pay and all benefits on prorated basis.
Increases minimum monthly pension rate to 50 rubles
for workers and employees and 40 rubles for farmers.
Raises annuity for those who have been retired more
than 20 years to make it more comparable with
current standards.
Requests union republic authorities, USSR ministers,
and departments to expand opportunities for pension-
er participation in economy, emphasizing flexible
work schedules.
On Measures To Increase State March 1981
Assistance to Families With
Children
Central Committee
CPSU and Council of
Ministers, USSR
Provides 12-month partially paid maternity leave of
50 rubles for working mothers in Siberia and the Far
East and 35 rubles per month for those in other
regions.
Provides additional leave on request (without pay)
until child is 18 months.
Increases and upgrades all types of child-care facili-
ties, particularly those in areas with a high level of
female employment.
Provides wider implementation of part-time work
schedule for working women.
Grants working mothers with children below age 12:
1) Additional three days' paid leave.
2) Priority in scheduling vacation time.
3) Two weeks additional unpaid leave to care for
children.
4) Fourteen days paid leave to care for sick children.
Preferential treatment for newlyweds and families
with children in obtaining individual or cooperative
housing.
Standard regulation on the pro- December 1975
duction brigade and team leader
Goskomtrud, Secretariat Bases all pay and bonuses on final result of work.
of All-Union Central
Council of Trade Unions Calls for reducing turnover by collective discipline.
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Table 15 (continued)
Procedure for Using the Shche-
kino Method of Improving the
Organization of Labor, Materi-
al Stimulation, and Planning
Issuing Authority
Major Provisions/ Comments
April 1978
Goskomtrud, Gosplan
Encourages expansion of the Shchekino experiment to
Ministry of Finance, All-
increase labor productivity (in an effort to reduce
Union Central Council
number of workers and save on wage fund). Enter-
of Trade Unions
prises can use the following as incentives for introduc-
ing Shchekino:
1) Additional payment of up to 30 percent of wage
rate or salary for all workers, employees, and
management personnel who exceed planned pro-
duction with decreased work staff.
2) Pay bonuses to those who devise labor-saving ideas.
3) Distribute savings in wage fund obtained by freeing
workers.
Recommendations for the De-
January 1979
Goskomtrud, Secretariat
velopment of the Brigade Form
of All-Union Central
of Organizing Labor and Pro-
Council of Trade Unions
viding Incentives to Workers at
Machine. Building and Metal
Working Enterprises
On the Improvement of Plan-
July 1979
Central Committee
ning and the Intensification of
CPSU, Council of Min-
the Influence of the Economic
isters, USSR
Mechanism on the Increase of
Production Efficiency and
Work Quality
On the Further Strengthening of
December 1979
Central Committee,
Labor Discipline and Decreas-
CPSU, Council of Min-
ing Turnover of Cadres in the
isters, USSR, All-Union
National Economy
Central Council of Trade
Unions
Advocates disciplinary action against people who
come to work drunk, are illegally absent, or avoid
employment.
Increases increments to pension for continuous service
of 25 years from 10 to 20 percent.
Adds leave time for continuous service for blue- and
white-collar workers with 15 days of vacation.
Provides nonrepayable loans for cooperative and
individual housing construction for those who have
worked for five years or newlyweds who have worked
for two years.
Emphasizes increasing labor productivity by improv-
ing planning and management, reducing production
times, and increasing labor discipline.
Distributes bonus payments on basis of brigade's
performance and individual productivity, rather than
on basis of individual's wage rate. (Standard regula-
tions based on these recommendations were adopted
in December 1980.)
Most comprehensive decree in past decade. Touches
on all facets of the economy. (Numerous subsequent
decrees were required to implement all its provisions.)
It calls for:
1) Emphasizing productivity in planning.
2) Placing ceilings on enterprise staff rosters.
3) Tying wage fund to normal outlay of wages per
ruble of sold output.
4) Linking size of incentive fund to productivity and
product quality.
Stresses reducing turnover and galvanizing and put-
ting pressure on work force.
Requires one month's written notice of intent to resign
from job.
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Legislation Affecting the Labor Force, 1975-81
Title Date Issued
Instructions on determining the March 1980
index for reducing the use of
manual labor in industry in ac-
cordance with the draft plan of
economic and social develop-
ment for 1981-85
Issuing Authority
Confirmed by Gosplan,
USSR, Central Statisti-
cal Administration
(TsSU), USSR
Instructions on establishing ceil- February 1980 Confirmed by Gosplan,
ings on the number of workers USSR, and TsSU,
and employees for the 1980 USSR
labor plan
Major Provisions/Comments
Implementing instructions based on July 1979 decree
on organization and management. Seeks to mechanize
particularly dangerous or labor-intensive work.
Calculates norms for reducing manual labor in
industry on proportion of manual workers to total
workers at the end of each year.
Implementing instructions for 1980 plan. Seeks to
limit the number of workers and employees at
production enterprises. Establishes monthly quotas in
conformity with quarterly and annual limits.
Requires part-timers and those who work at home to
be counted against the annual quotas. (This provision
undermines previous decrees aimed at increasing part-.
time employment.)
crease and To Reduce the Num-
ber of Personnel in the Manage-
ment Apparatus and Certain
Sectors of the Nonproduction
Sphere
On the Timely and Systematic June 1978
Attraction of Graduates of Gen-
eral Secondary Schools into
Work in the National Economy
in 1978
Goskomtrud, Central
Committee, Komsomol
Reduces to 1980 levels employment in scientific,
research, and design organizations, educational and
other cultural institutions, and supply enterprises.
Stipulates that growth in employment in trade,
housing, and the government bureaucracy will be
restricted.
Improves job placement and labor education of young
people in order to attract general secondary school
graduates to production and service areas.
Seeks compulsory job placement for those not con-
tinuing schooling.
Assures that majority of those going to work in
production learn a trade in technical school.
Summary of job placement of January 1979
graduates of general secondary March 1980
schools in 1979 and tasks of
organs of labor, vocational-tech-
nical and general education
schools, Komsomol committees
for directing youth to the na-
tional economy and vocational-
technical schools in 1980
Goskomtrud State Com-
mittee for Vocational-
Technical Education,
Ministry of Education,
Secretariat of All-Union
Central Council of Trade
Unions, USSR
Provides followup summary of placement of general
secondary school graduates by branch of economy.
Calls for increased use of technical programs for
training young people.
Instructs Goskomtrud to control job placement of
graduates.
Increases informational role for Komsomol to reduce
high turnover rates among young people.
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Table 15 (continued)
Title
Date Issued
Issuing Authority
Acting regulations on state con-
September 1978
Goskomtrud
trol of the use of the work force
Con irmation of Instructions on
May 1979
Goskomtrud
Resettlement of Collective and
State Farm Families Involved
in Livestock Products
Production
Major Provisions/Comments
Gives Goskomtrud expanded control over labor force,
including authority to change labor plans for use of
workers and employees, to reduce turnover, and to
increase productivity.
Provides for resettlement of families involved in
agriculture to areas experiencing shortages of
workers.
Stipulates size of agricultural settlements.
Awards monetary bonuses on arrival and after com-
pletion of one year of work, depending on location
chosen.
Grants housing credits based on location; Far East
needs greatest number of settlers, but Kazakhstan and
nonchernozem zone of RSFSR are now on a par with
Siberian economic regions.
On the Conditions for Bureaus December 1980 Goskomtrud Increases use of job placement bureaus. Places them
of Job Placement for the under authority of Goskomtrud of union republics.
Expands the bureaus' function to include job informa-
tion, placement, resettlement, and counseling for
those out of labor force.
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' The data on population and on labor-force size used in this paper
were derived primarily from unpublished estimates prepared by the
Foreign Demographic Analysis Division, US Bureau of the Census,
US Department of Commerce, May 1980; Foreign Economic
Report No. 10, US Department of Commerce, September 1976,
Stephen Rapawy, Estimates and Projections of the Labor Force
and Civilian Employment in the USSR, 1950 to 1990; and various
issues of the USSR's annual statistical handbook Narodnove
khozyaystvo SSSR.F_~ 25X1
These data have been supplemented where possible with informa-
tion from the USSR's All-Union Census of January 1979. Only
limited information from the census has been released so far,
however, and data useful in labor-force analysis are noticeably
scarce. Although final census results are still to be published, the
Soviets have not announced officially (as they did with previous
censuses) the publication format or what data will be released.
According to one source, however, they intend to publish only two
volumes of census data (seven volumes were release'' r-- ~'-- 1970
census).F_~ 25X1
3 The Soviets define the working-age or able-bodied population as
males between 16 and 59 and females between 16 and 54. They
define the labor force as all those who claim an occupation at the
time of the census, regardless of age or how long they have been
working. It excludes partially employed pensioners, full-time stu-
dents, and people engaged in the private subsidiary economyC
' The new workers of the 1980s-those who will turn 16 years old
during the decade-were born between 1964 and 1973, when the
birth rate was at its lowest point. This small cohort will be replacing
older workers-women reaching age 55 and men reaching age 60-
who were born when birth rates were much higher. Available data
indicate that in the mid-1960s the national birth rate (expressed as
live births per 1,000 population) was about 42 percent that of the
mid-1920s and in the early 1970s it was 40 percent.025X1
Between 1964 and 1974, for example, the mortality rate among
men between 35 and 39 increased by 20 percent. The Soviets no
longer publish such data, but Western researchers believe the rising
trend is continuing. See Wall Street Journal, 20 June 1978,
Christopher Davis and Murray Feshbach, "Life Expectancy in the
Soviet Union"; and Naseleni a SSSR 1973, Statistic"-"
sbornik, 1974, Moscow 25X1
' By international standards, the eligibility ages for retirement in
the USSR (60 years for men and 55 years for women) are extremely
low. Pensions are also very low, however; the minimum legal
pension was raised to 50 rubles per month for industrial workers
(less than one-third the monthly industrial wage) and 40 rubles per
month for collective farmers in March 1981. As a result, about 70
percent of pension-age workers continue working, at least part-
time, for the first five years beyond retirement age0
Reflecting the increased emphasis on vocational rather than
general training, the share of full-time general secondary school
graduates admitted to full-time programs in higher schools has
declined from 41 percent in 1965 to 23 percent in 1980.
To free I million persons for civilian labor would require a 20-
percent reduction in military manpower. For a discussion of
military manpower in the USSR, see Alan Smith, Military Man-
power Supply and Demand in the Soviet Union, August 1980,
prepared for the 1980 US Air Force Conference on the Soviet
Union: "What Lies Ahead?'
For a detailed methodological description of how our labor-force
estimate was derived and of the impact that changing participation
rates will have on labor-force growth, see appendix A= 25X1
Birth rates throughout the country have fallen since 1960. The 25X1
differential among the regions has increased, however, because the
drop has been much more pronounced in the European regions and
the Transcaucasus.
0 For a more detailed discussion of recent and future migration 25X1
trends, see appendix C.= 25X1 25X1
" There are, however, wide divergences in the level of urbanization
among republics. Estonia, the RSFSR, Latvia, and Armenia are by
far the most highly urbanized (66 to 70 percent urban), followed by
Lithuania and the Ukraine (61 to 65 percent). Several other
republics-Belorussia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia-are
more than 50-percent urban, and the Central Asian republics and
"IEkonomika i organizatsiya promyshlennogo proizvodstvo (EKO),
No. 12, December 1980, pp. 58-72, L. A. Kostin, "Labor Produc-
" For a more detailed discussion of Soviet workers' attitudes, see
Survey, Spring 1979, pp. 1-18, John Bushnell, "The Soviet Man
Turns Pessimistic," and Harpers, February 1981, pp. 41-55,
George Feifer, "Russian Disorders 25X1
force is absent on Mondays and Fridays in major industrial areas,
primarily because of alcohol abuse.,For a detailed discussion of
these problems in the Soviet industrial labor force, see Industrial
Labor in the USSR, edited by Arcadius Kahan and Blair Ruble,
New York, Pergamon Press, 1979, pp. 3-18, Murray Feshbach,
"The Structure and Composition of the Industrial Labor Force." L
25X1
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" Probably the most direct acknowledgment of a link between
consumer welfare and labor productivity came in an unusually
frank article by a prominent Soviet sociologist last year. After
reviewing the current economic situation, the author concludes that
it is "not accidental" that the current decline in the growth of labor
productivity has taken place against a background of food and other
consumer goods shortages. She adds that large investments in
productive machinery will fail to increase productivity unless they
are accompanied by large increases in the production of consumer
goods. See Ekonomika i organizatsiya promyshlennogo proiz-
vodstva (EKO), March 1980, pp. 15-33, T. I. Zaslavskaya, "Eco-
nomic Behavior and Economic Development.'
16 In recent years, the Soviet Government has issued a large number
of decrees that affect all facets of the labor market-participation
rates, training levels, allocation, and so forth. For a list of these
decrees and their major points, see appendix Dl
" Reflecting their growing importance, the number of labor
placement bureaus increased from roughly 370 in 1977 to over 650
in 1980. In 1977 they placed over 2 million workers, but no
comparable figure has been published for 1980. See Sotsialistiches-
kiy trud, No. 7, 1981, pp. 64-70, 1. Maslova, "Labor Placement
Service: Development Trends and Methods of lmprovement._~
1B Most vocational-technical schools are operated and supported by
particular ministries and enterprises. In theory, the latter hire the
workers graduating from the feeder schools. Assignments for the
most part were not mandatory, however, and many students found
jobs in enterprises other than those sponsoring their educatio~__
" Numerous recent speeches and articles have called for this
enlargement. The Soviets trained 11 million workers in vocational-
technical schools during 1976-80 and plan to train 13 million
during 1981-85. This is further emphasized by the 10-fold increase
in enrollments in secondary vocational-technical schools since 1970.
20 See Planovoye khozyaystvo, No. 10, October 1979, pp. 38-46,
N. Rogovskiy, "Problems of Increasing Labor Efficiency"; Plano-
voye khozyaystvo, No. 9, September 1980, pp. 34-43, Ye. Voronin,
"Better Utilization of Labor Resources"; and Voprosy ekonomiki,
21 Since 1956, when Soviet workers were first permitted to change
jobs without state approval, the rate of annual turnover for
industrial workers has been about 20 percent. In some industries,
such as construction, the rate is 40 to 60 percent
22 Brigades receive bonuses for economizing on materials or work-
ers, or for completing a project ahead of schedule. The members
themselves decide how they will divide the bonus. See Voprosy
ekonomiki, No. 3, 1981, pp. 131-142, D. Karpukhin, "The Econom-
ic Mechanism and Labor"; and Voprosy ekonomiki, No. 10, 1980,
pp. 26-36, S. Shkurko, "New Forms of Team Organization and
Stimulation of Labor)
2' Two articles stand out in particular. Khozyaystvo i pravo, No. 3,
1980, pp. 26-31, L. Kostin, "Strengthening Labor Discipline"
emphasizes the need for increased labor discipline and cites the
implementation of the January 1979 decree as essential to it.
Similarly, a major editorial in Sotsialisticheskaya industriya on 4
July 1980 quotes the Brezhnev statement on labor discipline and
calls on factory managers to take a much harder line against 25X1
slovenly workersr
24 Pravda, 27 April 1981, 27 May 1981, 9 June 1981; Izvestiya, 28
April 1981; Kommunist (No. 7), May 1981; Trud, 1 5 Ma" 1981;
and Molodoy Kommunist, April 1981.1 25X1 25X1
26 Indicative of Moscow's concern is the change in Soviet press
treatment of workers' welfare. In the spring of 1980 the press
ignored strikes by auto workers in Tol'yatti and Gor'kiy, but there
has been a spate of articles since the Polish strikes began in mid-
1980 on the importance of settling workers' grievances. In August
1980, for example, Pravda published a number of articles sympa-
thetic to workers and warned trade union officials to heed letters
from workers as "barometers of public opinion." In April 1981 a
CPSU Central Committee resolution called for a survey of worker
attitudes-no doubt an effort to show sympathy for grievances and
complaints= 25X1
26 For a detailed discussion of these reforms, see the Joint Economic
Committee study "Soviet Economy in a Time of Change, vol. 1,
Washington, D.C., 1979 312-340, "The Soviet Economy on a
Treadmill of Reforms."= 25X1
27 An indicator of the growth of money income is the buildup of
savings deposits. At the end of 1970, savings deposits totaled 46.6
billion rubles, 30 percent of retail sales. At the end of 1980, they
totaled roughly 156.5 billion rubles, equivalent to 58 percent of
annual retail sales.)
28 Subsidies to cover the difference between rents actually paid and
housing costs to the state stand at 3 billion rublesF__-] 25X1
20 It currently costs the Soviet Government 25 billion rubles a year
in subsidies to maintain the official food prices. The subsidies cover
the difference between the higher "farm gate" price and the lower
price charged in state retail outlets. Prices at collective farm
markets, however, have more than doubled since 1970.
'? Evidence of this concern has been the widespread use of special 25X1
food distribution systems at the factory level in recent years. These
systems please the workers, who are most likely to demonstrate 25X1
their dissatisfaction, and shift the pressure to roups who are less
likely to demonstrate, like the elderly.~~
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" To cite two examples, in 1975 the Ministry of Electrical
Equipment Industry was slated to produce 7,000 electrical forklifts,
with output scheduled to climb to between 24,000 and 27,000 by
1980. In fact, the Ministry produced fewer than 5,800 electric
forklifts in 1975, and its 1980 plan had to be revised downward to
less than 9,400. The Ministry of Automobile Industry has a record
almost as bad. According to an official of the State Committee on
Materials and Technical Supply, the Ministry satisfies only 50
percent of the plan for auto-forklifts annually, with the figure for
s m s ecialized types of loading equipment as low as 11 percent.
25X1
Jz For a discussion of Central Asian regional development, see Rand
Corporation, 1979, S. Enders Wimbush and Dimitry Ponomareff,
Alternativesfor Mobilizing Soviet Central Asian Labor: Outmigra-
tion and Regional Development; and the Joint Economic Commit-
tee, Soviet Economy in a Time of Change, vol. 1, Washington,
D.C., 1979, pp. 656-709, "Prospects for Outmigration From Cen-
tral Asia and Kazakhstan in the Next Decade.0
" Boris Urlanis, the late Soviet demographer, suggested economic
measures favoring urban over rural areas for child-support pay-
ments, increases in the share of wages paid during maternity leave
for second and third children, and additional incentives for raising
large families in certain areas-measures which would mostly
benefit Slavic women. He also called for a migration policy using
the "entire system of social, economic, legal, and administrative
levers" to stimulate an exodus from rural areas with relatively
unproductive labor surpluses. See Vestnik Akademiya Nauk SSSR,
No. 1, January 1980, pp. 41-49, "Demographic Science and
Demographic Policy"; see also , Population and Development
Review, vol. 7, June 1981, pp. 279-295, "The Demographic Policy
Debate in the USSR." Guidelines for the 1 Ith FYP also echo many
of these suggestions, in addition to calling for greater use of part-
time employment for women with young children and increasing
the network of extended day-school programs, kindergartens, and
creches in areas of high female employment. F_~
" Participation rates for males and females in the remaining age
categories are held constant in this section. These rates are unlikely
to rise, because they are already extremely high by international
standards and probably have reached a natural ceiling. They are
also unlikely to decline given the labor shortages expected during
" Sotsial'noye obespecheniye v SSSR, pp. 116-142, M. S. Lantsev;
and Sotsialisticheskiy trud, No. 9, 1977, pp. 40-47, A. Solov'ev.
"Social Welfare at the Present Time."F--] 25X1
" Unlike the previous census, the 1979 census asked no questions
about population mobility. Any insight into migration during the
1970s must be derived through estimating techniques or the use of
indirect data (such as changes in the distribution of nationalities).
For a full treatment of this subject, see Praeger, 1979, Robert
Lewis and Richard Roland, Population Redistribution in the
USSR. F___] 25X1
" For a more detailed discussion of the reasons why large-scale
migration is unlikely to occur, see the Joint Economic Committee,
Soviet Economy in a Time of Change, vol. 1, 1979, "Prospects for
Outmigration From Central Asia and Kazakhstan in the Next
Decade.'
25X1 25X1
25X1
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