HAITI: PROSPECTS FOR THE DUVALIER REGIME

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83S00855R000200100002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Haiti: Prospects for
the Duvalier Regime
State Dept. review completed
DIA review
completed.
USAID review completed
Secret
ALA 82-10156
December 1982
277
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Directorate of Secret
Haiti: Prospects for
the Duvalier Regime
American Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be addressed to the Chief,
Middle American-Caribbean Division ALA, on
This paper has been coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations and the National
Intelligence Council.
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Secret
ALA 82-10156
December1982
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Haiti: Prospects for
the Duvalier Regime
Key Judgments Haitian President-for-Life Jean-Claude Duvalier's indecisive attempts to
Information available initiate even cosmetic political and economic reforms have begun to stir
as of 30 November 1982 latent domestic forces that he will probably find less and less manageable
was used in this report.
over the next few years. His halting moves toward political liberalization
and fiscal responsibility, his tolerance for the excesses of his wife and her
family, and his perceived sellout to the United States on the boat-people is-
sue are among the signals of weakness being detected by influential sectors
of Haitian society. The underpinnings of the Duvalierist power structure-
conspiracy, corruption, patronage, and fear-are slowly being undermined
by Jean-Claude's vacillating style of rule.
Jean-Claude is not under any immediate threat. He is still served by
zealously loyal leaders of the military services and their elaborate network
of informants. Haiti's major interest groups, moreover, have not yet
become so vexed by Duvalier's loosely implemented reforms that open
opposition is to their advantage. The chronically plotting exile communi-
ty-while a source of concern to Duvalier-is a feckless lot and poses little
danger. Most of the impoverished and illiterate masses focus on simple
survival, with the more enterprising ones looking for ways to escape to the
United States or the Bahamas.
The country's rival interest groups, however, have had their hopes-or
fears-piqued by Jean-Claude's rhetoric. Duvalier has now moved beyond
lifting the reign of terror imposed by his late father, "Papa Doc," Francois
Duvalier, and is publicly talking of possible local elections. This and his
moves in the direction of fiscal rationality have heartened the would-be
modernizers who will be pushing for reforms beyond the government's
tolerance. These same actions have alarmed other, more numerous compo-
nents of the power structure, whose vested interests would be threatened by
tightened fiscal accountability or the development of a more open political
process.
At the same time that these pressures are increasing, Haiti-the poorest
country in the hemisphere-is becoming relatively poorer and is creating
new challenges to test Duvalier's leadership. We expect Duvalier to have
Secret
ALA 82-10156
December1982
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increasing difficulty coping with Haiti's economic problems while attempt-
ing to balance demands for reform against pressures for maintenance of
the status quo. If, as we expect, he continues to demonstrate wavering
leadership, the competition for power by conflicting interest groups will
pose, over the longer term, an unprecedented challenge to the Duvalier
dynasty.
In this environment, we expect Duvalier to maintain an ambivalent
attitude toward the United States. The young President recognizes Haiti's
dependence on Washington, but believes his country has not been suffi-
ciently rewarded for its cooperation. This view, and Duvalier's own
domestic political constraints, will continue to thwart US efforts to
promote economic and political reform in Haiti.
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The Political Maturing of Jean-Claude
Breaking Loose and Taking Hold 3
New Slogans and Promises 5
Deepening Economic Problems 6
Impact of Global Recession 7
Prospects for the Near Term 9
Meeting Economic Needs 9
Securing Political Stability 10
Long-Term Prospects 11
Implications for the United States 14
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 Republic of Haiti
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Haiti: Prospects for
the Duvalier Regime
Corruption and arbitrariness are still rampant in
Haiti, but Duvalier's government generally is distin-
guished from his father's by its lack of violent repres-
sion and its attempt to give some attention to the
country's desperate economic shortcomings. Although
reasonably intelligent, Duvalier lacks the decisiveness
that might provide a sense of direction and leadership.
In recent years he has taken erratic but well-meaning
steps to deal with economic problems and political
pressures. His dabbling at reform appears to us
inspired by his concern over the long-term prospects
of his regime and a vague desire to improve the
nation's dismal quality of life. Limited though they
are, Duvalier's reform measures nonetheless are more
than most Haitians have come to expect during the
25-year reign of the Duvaliers.
The political impact of these reforms-especially on
those Haitians imbued with Papa Doc's ruthless phi-
losophy of government-and the increasingly tenuous
state of Haiti's economy raise questions about
Duvalier's ability to remain in power. This paper
seeks to describe Jean-Claude Duvalier's political
maturation, identify problems currently confronting
the regime, outline Duvalier's amorphous attempts to
deal with them, and analyze how the measures chosen
will strike selected interest groups and how they could
produce challenges to authority. In the light of this
ferment, it also looks at prospective patterns in US-
Haitian relations
The Political Maturing of Jean-Claude
The Early Years
Jean-Claude Duvalier became Haiti's President-for-
Life at age 19 after his father's death in April 1971.
He received his presidential grooming from advisers
selected by his father and for some years he remained
a faithful adherent to their guidance. At the outset, he
demonstrated a preference-and quickly earned a
reputation-for the pursuit of women and aquisition
the young President readily accepted advice from his
inherited palace clique, often implementing the rec-
ommendations of the last person to speak with him.
His mother Simone, who held his trust and confi-
dence, served as the principal conduit for the palace
clique's interests. 25X1
By the mid-to-late 1970s, Duvalier became more
comfortable with the reins of power, and the govern-
ment's sporadic implementation of more liberal poli-
cies reflected his erratic assertions of independence.
Although still manipulable, he increasingly began to
use his palace clique as a source of advice, not
decisions. It is our view that, except when Duvalier's
lingering insecurity has been fueled by reports of plots
to overthrow him, he has tended to favor a political
loosening of the system. These years were character-
ized by wide pendulum swings in policies, from tried-
and-true repression to experiments in.political open-
ness. On his liberal arc, Duvalier would dismiss his
Cabinet and bring in new personalities. Then, inevita-
bly, rumors of exile or Cuban threats-usually in-
spired by hardline elements-would surface, unnerve
Duvalier, and convince him to reinstate the hardliners
to positions of power.
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In the past several years Duvalier's frequent policy
shifts and associated cabinet shuffles caused the
division of the power structure into two distinct
advisory groups. A so-called old guard comprises
holdovers from the regime of Francois Duvalier-
including former armed thugs-who believe that or-
der requires repression. As the younger Duvalier
gradually assumed the role of Haiti's chief decision-
maker in the late 1970s, this group found itself being
pushed aside by a second group, the "Jean-Clau-
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When he assumed the presidency in 1971, Jean-
Claude Duvalier inherited a corrupt and politically
primitive regime whose reputation for repression was
exceeded only by its economic failings. For almost 14
years, Jean-Claude's father, Francois Duvalier, ruled
Haiti by effectively manipulating the nation's two
historical centers of power-the military and the
mulatto elite-and by building a base of support
among the black masses. The elder Duvalier's politi-
cal supremacy was achieved by employing the tradi-
tional elements of Haitian sociopolitical culture-
violence, corruption, intrigue, racism, voodoo mysti-
cism, and nationalism.
Francois Duvalier recognized early that the mili-
tary-as the nation's only broadly based institu-
tion-was crucial to the control of Haiti and he
moved quickly to dominate it. He decentralized
military authority, forcibly retired certain officers,
and constantly shifted the assignments of those who
remained. All vacancies were filled with loyal
Duvalierists, predominantly blacks. Duvalier estab-
lished special units to serve as counterweights to the
rest of the military and to each other, which prevent-
ed the emergence of a potentially challenging military
clique.
Duvalier's concept of "Negritude "stressed black
African cultural achievements while vilifying the
West European preferences exhibited by the mulatto
upper class-a small group of leading merchant and
intellectual families of mulatto, European, and Leba-
nese-Arab extraction. He used this concept to develop
mass support by playing on the natural hostility of
the large, impoverished black peasantry toward the
small but wealthy mulatto class. He employed thugs,
most often the dreaded Tonton Macoutes, to terrorize
the elite's leading members and extort financial
contributions. The elite, which had shared power with
the military in the past, finally fled into exile or gave
in to Duvalier. Although the remaining members of
the mulatto elite lost dll political clout, they retained
their economic position and later benefited substan-
tially from some of Duvalier's policies, such as the
suppression of labor unions. Today the term "mulat-
to elite" encompasses both light- and dark-skinned
wealthy Haitians who, although co-opted by Francois
Duvalier, still profess to oppose the Duvalier regime.
Francois Duvalier surrounded himself with loyalists,
known as the palace clique, who served as govern-
ment ministers, military leaders, and behind-the-
scenes advisers. As with the military, Duvalier made
individual members of the clique absolutely depend-
ent upon him, rewarding competition rather than
teamwork, which in the Haitian context is viewed as
conspiratorial. By fostering rivalries, he effectively
neutralized political opponents; fear and corruption
were other important tools for controlling this
coterie.
The Haitian peasant culture facilitated popular ac-
ceptance of the Duvalier regime. The elder Duvalier,
appealing to the superstitions of the black masses,
used voodoo to sanctify his position as President-for-
Life and to ordain his only son as his successor. He
successfully exploited nationalist sentiment as a ral-
lying cry for mass support and manipulated this
concept to equate anti-Duvalier sentiments with dis-
loyalty to the nation.
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Breaking Lose and Taking Hold
Jean-Claude's departure from Papa Doc's legacy has
been gradual and frequently inconsistent, so that
definitive lines cannot be drawn between the old
guard and the Jean-Claudistes, nor can Duvalier's
policies be neatly categorized. Nevertheless, a general
trend toward new personalities and some fresh ideas is
discernable within the labyrinthine Haitian polity.
His Own Group.
the Jean-Claudistes are characteristically
pragmatic, professionally competent, and overridingly
nationalistic. They generally share with the President
an aversion to repression and an awareness of Haitian
society's many shortcomings. Like their old guard
brethren, some individual members of the group seek
to manipulate the system for their own benefit. As a
group, however, they seem intent on breaking Haiti
out of its centuries-old isolation while aggressively
defending its national identity and sovereignty-
sometimes to the point of alienating friendly nations.
Duvalier has been increasingly selecting his advisers
on the basis of their professional skills. Although some
of his choices were lesser figures in his father's palace
clique, the newcomers admitted by Jean-Claude are
generally younger, well educated, and ambitious. Loy-
alty, however, remains the most important factor.
Duvalier's record clearly demonstrates that he will
dismiss any official who shows even a modicum of
independence. The most recent example of this was
the dismissal in July 1982 of Finance Minister Bazin
Duvalier's marriage to Michele Bennett in May 1980
was, in our view, a dramatic symbol of his disengage-
ment from the circle of his father's advisers. Michele
represents everything that was anathema to the elder
Duvalier: she is a mulatto, born to a wealthy family, is
US educated, the former daughter-in-law of a man
who attempted to overthrow Duvalier in 1958, and an
outspoken advocate of social reform.
Michele has replaced Simone Duvalier as
Jean-Claude's closest adviser and confidante. His
mother's loss of status was formalized in April 1981
25X1
when the legislature-on instructions from Jean-
Claude-decreed that Michele would become "First
Lady of the Republic" in place of Simone, who was
designated "Guardian of the Revolution."
Michele's presence, however, has proved to be a two-
edged sword politically. In effect, Duvalier's marriage
to her was a symbolic declaration of his independence
from the old guard. Initially, it seemed he had also
gained in Michele an activist in his effort to improve
Haiti's image. For example, she established the
Michele B. Duvalier Foundation to administer socia25X1
welfare programs for needy women and children.
Lately, however, Michele Duvalier appears to have 25X1
been inserting her influence adversely into politics to
The US Embassy also reports that many Haitians-
both upper and lower class-view and criticize
Michele and her family as opportunists. Moreover,
public allusions to parallels with Argentina's Evita
Peron are inevitable when Michele's activities are
discussed-the foundation bearing her name, her
expensive taste in clothes and jewelry, her attendance
at cabinet meetings, and her populist forays into the25X1
countryside to distribute money. We believe that she
may, in time, become a liability to Jean-Claude.
Cautious Experiments. US Embassy reporting indi- 25X1
cates that a group of Jean-Claudiste ministers were
responsible for Duvalier's "liberalization" program
that in 1980 legitimized some opposition parties and
relaxed restrictions on the Haitian media. It is our
assessment that these moves were spurred by the
linkage between human rights and concessional aid 25X1
made by the Carter administration and only second-
arily by a genuine desire to improve Haiti's image
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The press-Within and outside Haiti-has speculated
about the political prospects of Michele Bennett
Duvalier. She already has demonstrated considerable
influence over her husband's decisions
Although Michele entered the
palace sounding like a determined social reformer,
her later track record shows her to be more interested
in gaining privileges for her relatives.
It is our assessment that Michele will never attain the
power base or respect that would allow her to succeed
Duvalier. Nevertheless, Michele has several attri-
butes that-if properly exploited-will allow her to
have significant input into governing Haiti.
Factors Working Against Michele
? The Bennetts are not representative of any major
sector in Haiti. As mulattoes, they are not accepted
by the black majority, and the mulatto elite consid-
ers the family to be newly rich opportunists of lower
social rank.
? Michele's extravagant taste in clothes and jewelry
has earned her an unfavorable reputation within
Haiti; she has been the subject of several popular
but crude songs during Carnival. Often compared to
Argentina's Evita Peron for her mixture of pageant-
ry and charitable works, Michele lacks the lower
class roots that Evita Peron effectively used to
support her claims that she represented the hopes
and aspirations of the downtrodden masses.
? It is our assessment that much of Michele's power
and influence within the palace clique stems solely
.from her marriage to the President. It is doubtful
that Michele could retain her position or clout if
Duvalier left the scene in the medium term.
? Unlike Imelda Marcos, the wife of Philippine Presi-
dent Marcos, who has frequently been touted as a
successor to her husband, Michele holds no official 25X1
government position in Haiti that could serve as a
steppingstone to the presidency. 25X1 25X1
Michele's Assets
? Michele is an intelligent, articulate individual. Her
charm and fluency in English could be used to
enhance Haiti's diplomatic relations and interna-
tional image if channeled properly. This role would
probably earn her respect and acceptance within
some sectors in Haiti.
? From all indications, Duvalier is blindly in love
with his wife. This devotion allows Michele to
manipulate palace politics to her family's personal
advantage. In time, Michele may use her husband's
devotion to enhance her own political fortunes and
to acquire official powers and/or positions.
? The Michele B. Duvalier Foundation and the First
Lady's personal charisma could serve in the future
as a base for a personality cult. The Foundation
serves primarily young women and mothers who
could be cultivated to identify with and support
Michele.
? Finally, the US Embassy reports that Michele will
give birth to an heir in the near future. Michele will
be able to extend her influence and power through
her child one day just as Simone Duvalier did-if
the regime survives that long.
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ana most were re eased within hours, but a few were
subject to personal indignities and were kept impris-
inspired terrorist incident in July 1982.
permitted, offering some outlet for dissenting views,
although the media generally are prudent in practic-
ing self-censorship. 25X1
There have been some reversals in the liberalizing
process, although the use of force reminiscent of 25X1
Francois Duvalier's era has been limited to one
incident in the ast year.
11 eight o the exiles cap- 25X1
tured in an invasion of Tortuga Island in January
1982 were killed while in custody. Whether the
security forces acted on their own or at the President's
direction is still undetermined. Less serious examples
were the arrests of several suspected accomplices of
the Tortuga invaders in January 1982 and the roun25X1
those detained were not tortured 25X1
Nonetheless, the regime has modified its manner of
dealing with political opponents. For example, trials
of dissidents now accord fully with Haitian due
process. Moreover, Duvalier recently granted a group
of jailed dissidents limited clemency-they were al-
lowed to leave prison, although a selected few remain
under house arrest. Jean-Claude also has allowed
several international agencies to inspect prison condi-
tions and interview prisoners. The UN Human Rights
Commission reports no evidence of brutality inflicted
on the remaining political prisoners in the penitentia-
ry, now estimated at about a dozen persons. Duvalier
also has decreed that such prisoners are to receive
better treatment than common criminals
The easing of political repression, while uneven, has
generated some benefits for the man on the street. In
Port-au-Prince, for example, police and security per-
sonnel are rarely in evidence, and US Embassy
officials report that the police try to avoid needless
violence even when quelling civil disturbances. Press
items that are mildly critical of the regime are
oned for several days. These episodes, nevertheless,
contrast with the wholesale massacres of suspected
sympathizers that sometimes followed exile raids dur-
ing Francois Duvalier's era 25X1
New Slogans and Promises
In his 10th anniversary speech in April 1981, Duvalier
announced the inception of the "Decade of Jean-
Claudisme." In our view, Jean-Claudisme is a vague,
public relations slogan that involves at most carefully
manipulated political relaxation and modest fiscal
reform. The President himself has outlined no definite
philosophy of rule. We believe that the concept of
Jean-Claudisme is designed mainly to close the book
on the unsavory aspects of Papa Doc's era, to brinQ5X1
some life to the economy, and to win Haiti a modicum
of international respectability.
Duvalier Q5X1
he intends hift economic power to a new genera-
tion of truly nationalist businessmen who-unlike the
traditional wealthy families-are committed to devel-
oping the country. Duvalier, who-as indicated earli-
er-fears for his own physical security, may also
believe, in our view, that his superficial political and
economic reforms will ensure his regime against a
violent demise 25X1
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In recent months Duvalier has made new promises of
political liberalization. In his 11th anniversary speech
last April, Duvalier announced his intention to hold-
for the first time in decades-municipal elections
throughout Haiti in 1983. Recently he also appointed
a National Commission on Human Rights. Moreover,
he has called on Haitian exiles to return to the island
and contribute their skills and ideas to Haiti's future;
he vowed that they would not be persecuted. Two
somewhat more tangible indications of his good will
are his request for Jamaican assistance in setting up
the municipal elections and his campaign to discipline
some of the most disreputable thugs belonging to the
paramilitary militia, the Volunteers for National Se-
We believe that in the economic sphere, the an-
nouncement of Jean-Claudisme represents a revival of
the economic liberalization begun in 1978 as part of
an IMF Extended Fund Facility agreement. Because
Haiti's deteriorating economic situation had reached
crisis proportions, however, Port-au-Prince also was
forced to take protectionist measures. In an effort to
maintain aid flows, President Duvalier issued a series
of decrees during 1981 aimed at redressing current
account and budget imbalances. As has been the case
with his political changes, however, commitment has
wavered, and enforcement has been spotty.
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Duvalier's rhetorical emphasis on economic and fiscal
reform has shown few results, but it does indicate a
realization that the economy is one of his major
vulnerabilities. Haiti, a UN-designated "least devel-
oped country," has, we calculate, a per capita income
of less than $375. This is the lowest in the Western
Hemisphere and is comparable to such African coun-
tries as Djibouti, Benin, or Togo. According to the
World Bank, 75 percent of the population lives below
the poverty line.
Haiti has few resources upon which to base its
development, and the economy remains vulnerable to
changing global economic conditions. The agricultur-
al sector, which accounts for over 30 percent of GDP
and employs about two-thirds of the labor force,
according to the IMF, is burdened by low labor
productivity and the highest population density on
cultivated land in Latin America. The IMF also states
that, although only 15 percent of the land is suitable
for cropping, about 30 percent is actually under
cultivation. Attempts to farm mountainous slopes
have made soil erosion irreversible in some cases, and
an estimated 2 to 3 percent of the topsoil washes into
the ocean annually. Agricultural technology is primi-
tive, internal distribution of goods is inadequate, and
government monopolies and tax policies have tended
to discourage production. As a result, Haitian statis-
tics indicate that the production of high-value export
crops-the source of much-needed foreign ex-
change-has tended to decline since the mid-1970s.
At the same time, food production is insufficient to
meet domestic demand, leading to local shortages,
wide price fluctuations, and the continued need to
spend scarce foreign exchange on food imports.
Industry, after a performance in the 1970s that
boosted manufacturing's share of GDP to slightly
over 15 percent, according to IMF statistics, has been
unable to offset poor agricultural performance or
provide enough employment opportunities to keep
pace with the growth in the urban labor force. Other
sectors, such as mining and tourism-vulnerable to
global economic trends-have provided few jobs. Past
growth in the manufacturing sector, concentrated in
Port-au-Prince, has encouraged population inflows
from the extremely poor and densely populated rural
areas into the capital, straining social services and
worsening an already difficult unemployment situa-
tion. Thus, as reported by the US AID representative,
Port-au-Prince has grown at an estimated annual rate
of almost 10 percent since the early 1970s. He also
stated that the figure probably would have reached
nearly 15 percent without the continued emigration of
many Haitians to the Dominican Republic, The Baha-
mas, and the United States.
Economic development has been made even more
difficult because of endemic corruption and misman-
agement. Moreover, Haiti's lack of technical expertise
means that the country remains dependent on foreign
institutions to promote economic development.
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revenues. Increased private transfer payments, includ-
ing remittances, have been insufficient to close the
trade gap. 25X1
Impact of Global Recession
Against this backdrop, we judge that Haiti's economic
problems have intensified markedly over the past two
to three years as a result of the global economic
recession. After a decade of growth that was strong by
Haitian standards-the result of a surge in foreign
.capital inflows, an expansion of the manufactures'
trade, and a periodic buoyancy in commodity mar-
kets-economic activity has, at best, stagnated since
1980, according to the latest Central Bank figures,
and real per capita income, therefore, has declined. In
addition, both the current account and budget deficits
have ballooned
The most recent official Haitian data indicate that the
slowdown in the economy mirrors a deterioration of
the current account, which reached an unprecedented
deficit of $167 million, or close to 10 percent of GDP,
in the fiscal year ending 30 September 1982. Coffee
earnings, hit by both lower prices and poor harvests,
have remained depressed since 1980. The continued
economic slowdown in the United States has hurt
manufacturing exports and tourism. Moreover, de-
spite decreed restrictions, government statistics show
that Port-au-Prince has been unable to hold down
imports enough to offset the drop in foreign exchange
We judge that access to foreign capital has been
insufficient to offset the current deficit. Investor
confidence has fallen, and local businessmen have sent
capital out of the country on a scale large by Haitian
standards. External arrears, which, according to the
IMF, had not developed in the past, mounted to an
estimated $24 million by June 1982, as reported by
the US Embassy, and the small black market in US
dollars has become more noticeable. As a result, the
Haitians have been forced to turn to multilateral
lenders to finance the deficit, including a loan of
$19.7 million in December 1981 under an IMF
Compensatory Financing Facility used to alleviate
export earnings shortfalls. Despite this aid, however,
official Haitian data show that the country still has
found it necessary to draw down its foreign reserves.
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Unsettled Policies
In response to these trends and to demands from the
IMF, the Duvalier regime initiated, and then backed
away from, a spate of fiscal measures in the past 22
months. US Embassy reporting indicates that many of
these moves were not fully implemented because, we
judge, of corruption and the lack of skilled technicians
and administrators. 25X1
President Duvalier issued a series of decrees begin-
ning in March 1981 directed at redressing the severe
balance of payments and budget deficits. These ac-
tions-many of them demanded by the IMF-
included:
? Import restrictions on selected consumer goods.
? A 20-percent increase in the import taxes on luxury
goods and in existing taxes on alcoholic beverages
and an increase in the gasoline and cigarette taxes.
? An average 20-percent reduction in budgetary ex-
penditures other than wages and salaries.
? Postponement of some investment outlays and pro-
hibition of further extrabudgetary expenditures
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In a further attempt to cultivate the multilateral
financial institutions, the Duvalier regime also under-
took some actions aimed at reducing government
corruption. The most significant step-making the
Regie du Tabac (the state tobacco monopoly), which
collects duties on a wide variety of domestic products,
responsible to the national treasury-was taken in
February 1981. All of the Regie's receipts-which
previously were used by the palace clique as a slush
fund-were henceforth to be deposited directly in the
Central Bank. The regime also expressed its willing-
ness to cooperate in a major independent audit of its
finances; the last audit of the Central Bank took place
before Francois Duvalier took power in 1957<
These measures, however, were not sufficient to at-
tract major new sources of foreign capital. In an
attempt to qualify for an IMF standby arrangement,
therefore, Haiti agreed to a "shadow program" in
September 1981 that targeted the size of the public-
sector deficit and Central Bank credit. Performance
under the program, however, was poor at first. The
public-sector deficit was chronically over monthly
targets despite the government's reasonably successful
effort to limit public expenditures. Revenues were
below levels necessary for target compliance, partly
because of unanticipated delays in obtaining coffee
receipts. We believe, however, that another major
cause was the regime's unwillingness to implement
the required fiscal actions. In our judgment, Duvalier
was concerned that many of the measures would
impinge directly on the vested interests of the palace
clique-individuals whose loyalty to the regime is
essential
A new government resolve to undertake needed eco-
nomic changes seemed to appear in February 1982,
when Duvalier named a new economic team headed
by Marc Bazin, a highly capable technocrat and
former senior World Bank economist. In a move long
advocated by the IMF, Bazin soon adjusted the
taxation of coffee exports to the world reference price,
resulting in increased revenues. In addition, some of
the import restrictions decreed a year earlier were
lifted. Bazin also announced plans to further reduce
public expenditures, completely overhaul the tax col-
lection system, and supervise all government foreign
exchange expenditures.
25X1
Secret
A mere five months after his appointment, however,
Duvalier fired Bazin. This move, we believe, is yet
another sign that Duvalier's resolve to pursue respon-
sible economic management policies is easily under-
mined by short-term political exigencies. Despite
warnings that Bazin's removal would seriously jeop-
ardize inflows of desperately needed IMF support, 25X1
Duvalier felt threat-
ened by Bazin's independence and success and re-
placed him with Frantz Merceron, a less capable but
more pliant official.
Thus far, the performance of the new economic team
has been mixed. US Embassy reporting, for example,
indicates that Merceron has managed to remain
within IMF-mandated expenditure and credit guide-
lines, has allowed an audit of the commercial branch
of the Central Bank, and has pushed through a value-
added tax long advocated by the IMF. The team,
however, apparently has not been as determined to
resist extrabudgetary expenditures by Duvalier and 25X1
Despite these unsettled policies, Port-au-Prince man-
aged to obtain a $37 million, 13-and-a-half-month
standby arrangement with the IMF in mid-August.
The accord identifies reduction of the fiscal deficit
and reactivation of the economy as major goals.
Performance criteria include limits on the public-
sector deficit, limits on government expenditures, and
the elimination of arrears. The US Embassy reports
that Haiti's first disbursement of $11 million, received
in August, was to have been used almost entirely to
pay arrears to the local oil companies and to the
Banque National de Paris. The next payment of $2.2
million, to be made by the end of 1982, is contingent
upon Haitian compliance with the performance crite-
ria.
In our judgment, Duvalier's slow and tentative pace
on reform indicates a recognition that the very
changes designed to prolong the life of his regime
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could also generate serious challenges to it. Although
Jean-Claude has done away with or modified many of
the worst features of his father's system of rule, he
still relies heavily on the essential tools of patronage
and corruption-rewarding loyalty with influential
positions, gifts, or, more often, access to funds. Re-
form of any meaningful kind will undercut these
mutually beneficial relationships that sustain support
for the regime.
We believe that fiscal reform, if implemented effec-
tively, would provoke adverse reactions primarily
from the old, guard faction of the palace clique.
Analysis of his policies and actions during his presi-
dency indicates that because Jean-Claude's ruling
style has played down the tactics of fear, voodoo, and
racism, the support of the old guard is now won
predominantly by payoffs. If Duvalier actually makes
funds more accountable, he will lose his primary
means of controlling this faction of the palace clique.
We estimate that their response in the near term
would be to undercut and discredit the Jean-
Claudistes. Likely tactics would include blaming the
Jean-Claudistes for acceding to US demands-for
example, on the issue of the boat people-while
obtaining no return for Haiti. The old guard probably
also would play on Duvalier's fears of Cuban subver-
sion and exile plotting in an attempt to draw him back
to their side-a tactic they have used successfully in
the mulattoes by requiring increased taxation of
imports, income tax collection, and restrictions on
foreign exchange transactions.
Mixed reactions to Jean-Claudisme will come also 25X1
from a relatively new sector in Haiti-a small black
middle class that has emerged with the development
of light, export-oriented industry.
this group is jealous of the economic25X1
perquisites that the mulatto elite has enjoyed over the
years. Predominantly US educated, the black middle
class recognizes-as one of its members told a State
Department officer-that Haiti's poor international
image and inefficient bureaucracy deter foreign in-
vestment. This group strongly advocates fiscal reform
and, in our view, almost certainly would welcome
more responsible, participatory government
25X1
The black middle class could become either the ally or
foe of Duvalier, who depends to a certain extent on its
continued willingness to invest in Haiti. Some ele-
ments of this black middle class are highly educated
individuals journalists, radio commentators, and
politicians-who have been openly critical of the
regime. Although its members usually have been
silenced-by intimidation, jailing, or expulsion-the
group has been quick to take full advantage of any
relaxation of the regime's curbs against dissent. 25X1
the past.
The mulatto elite, for their part, have reason simulta-
neously to applaud and to abhor the promised re-
forms. Embassy reporting indicates that they are
distressed by the chronic foreign exchange shortages
and see a need for reform in Haiti's fiscal policies.
Duvalier's promises and appointment of the widely
respected Marc Bazin as Finance Minister raised this
group's expectations for substantial fiscal changes-
which they believed would attract significant amounts
of foreign assistance from international donors-only
for these hopes to be dashed by Bazin's dismissal and
the snail's pace of Duvalier's reforms. At the same
time, the pattern of behavior exhibited by the mulatto
elite suggests that they are unwilling to pay the full
price of effecting change. Many of the intended
measures threaten the privileged economic position of
Meeting Economic Needs
In our view, the economic reforms of the Duvalier
regime will not be enough, even if fully and effectively
implemented, to overcome the deleterious effects of
the world recession on Haiti's economy. We estimate
that, despite the recent approval of Haiti's standby
arrangement and the possibility of a negotiated struc-
tural adjustment loan from the World Bank, econom-
ic activity will continue to stagnate over the coming
year. We judge that investor confidence is unlikely to
improve significantly, and foreign capital inflows will
continue to be weak.
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We believe that the current account deficit will still
be large by Haitian standards, although it could
moderate from this year's record if the government is
able to restrict imports and renegotiate some of its
debt. Although the government plans to curtail im-
ports, it probably cannot cut them enough to close the
trade gap.
Despite a Haitian-predicted increase in crop size,
coffee earnings will be affected by expected continued
weak prices. Manufacturing exports and tourism
earnings will be hit by the protracted economic
recession in the United States. Moreover, the
Reynolds Corporation has closed Haiti's only produc-
ing bauxite mine because of the declining alumina
content of the ore and the poor outlook for the
international aluminum industry.
Foreign capital inflows are likely to remain poor,
despite the possibility of a temporary surge if the
government follows through on stated intentions to
liberalize interest rate policies. Chances for meeting
performance criteria and gaining more disbursements
under the standby arrangement, however, are tem-
pered by skepticism concerning the government's
commitment to the performance standards. Even with
the recent IMF agreement and the appearance of an
improved political climate, continued underlying un-
certainties about the government's corruption and
erratic actions will dampen investor confidence and
slow private capital inflows
On the domestic front, the austerity measures imple-
mented to gain IMF support will prevent any offset=
ting expansion in the public sector. Indeed, the gov-
ernment has promised to continue reducing budgetary
expenditures in absolute terms over the coming fiscal
year. Although we doubt Port-au-Prince's resolve to
cut outlays this much, we judge that the need for IMF
financing will force the government to maintain some
control over expenditures.
Securing Political Stability
We believe Duvalier's goal of ensuring his regime's
security through the vague program he has dubbed
Jean-Claudisme will not be met over the near term.
Given the nature of the Duvalierist power structure-
the narrow base of loyal supporters, lack of sufficient
technical expertise, and solidly entrenched manipula-
tive mechanisms-any changes Duvalier makes will
be necessarily tentative and at the margin. The young
President is especially unlikely to make any wholesale
revisions in the spoils system for fear of provoking
opposition from within the palace clique. Similarly,
any of Jean-Claude's promised reforms that actually
are implemented could easily be derailed by new
rounds of political infighting or threats of exile at-
tacks.
Nonetheless, Haiti's political stability will-over the
near term-continue to be supported by the power
structure and its inherent checks and balances. Fol-
lowing a policy of frequent cabinet changes, shuffling
of military commanders, and the division of power
bases-especially in the armed forces-Duvalier has
kept potential challengers off balance and unable to
consolidate support. He has gone a long way toward
mastering Haiti's system of political control, and his
efforts are aided substantially by the continued pas-
sivity of the majority of the population. As demon-
strated during the exile invasion of Tortuga Island in
early 1982-when the confusion of events provided an
optimal period for a coup d'etat-Duvalier commands
the support of the principal elements of the power
structure.
Over the near term, therefore, Duvalier probably will
face minimal threats to his power. In our judgment,
the old guard is unlikely to react drastically against
the cosmetic reforms Duvalier is likely to implement.
In any event, the old guard would need military
support to attempt a coup, and we believe such
support is increasingly unlikely as older officers are
phased out of the military. The increasing number of
younger and US-trained officers probably would not
be provoked into action against Duvalier by the
implementation of reform measures that do not ad-
versely affect the more professionally oriented inter-
ests of the military. Moreover, these younger officers
owe little loyalty to the remnants of Papa Doc's
entourage. In our view, the mulattoes also are in no
position to openly defy the regime. Although some
probably would attempt to cultivate allies within the
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military or palace clique, we believe that the predomi-
nantly black composition of the latter two argue
against an alliance with the mulattoes. It is likely,
however, that some members of the mulatto elite may
seek to fund exile groups covertly, as they did in Papa
Doc's era. The current disarray among the exiles
makes it unlikely that this tactic would generate a
significant threat in the short term.
Lasting Economic Problems
The economy will become a greater liability to the
Duvalier regime over the longer run because Port-au-
Prince has little chance of promoting sustained expan-
sion in economic activity. In coming years, world
economic conditions will not be conducive to growth
because the trend in the rate of growth in the Western
industrialized countries-the source of most of Haiti's
imports and the destination for most of its exports-
has declined. Domestically, Haiti's traditional prob-
lems of low investment, limited resources, lack of
infrastructure, and pervasive corruption are too great
to be resolved without substantial foreign financial
and technical assistance.
As a result of Port-au-Prince's inability to spur long-
term growth, real per capita income could continue
declining, and the economy will be less able to fulfill
the needs of the population. In our view, rising
expectations, which could result from publicity for
Jean-Claudisme, will be frustrated, and internal dis-
satisfaction, particularly in the overcrowded urban
area of Port-au-Prince, could increase. Pressures for
illegal migration could grow.
Risky Political Choices
We believe Duvalier probably will remain in control
over the next two to five years, but political and
economic pressures for and against reform probably
will increase and threaten the regime's survival over
the longer term no matter what course Jean-Claude
chooses. Should Duvalier abandon all notions of re-
form in favor of obtaining short-term security, the
continuing economic decline and external political
pressures from exile groups and international critics
would sharpen rapidly and could provoke internal
dissension. We believe the most likely sources of
disruption would be the burgeoning middle class, the
economic elite, and the more ambitious members of
the Jean-Claudistes.
By the same token, if Duvalier actually implements
reforms that alter the political and economic status
quo in any significant fashion, he then risks upsetting
the system of checks and balances that have served
him so well, at least in the past. The young leader
would then appear most vulnerable to the old guard,
who understand the subtleties of the power structure.
Over the longer run, this group could influence mili-
tary attitudes if political dissent or exile activity
seemed to be growing. The old guard could use such
trends to argue that Jean-Claude was losing control
and that a move against him was essential for the
preservation of stability.
Unproven Leadership
Duvalier, initially carried by the momentum of his
father's regime and by his own ability to manipulate
the power structure, has yet to demonstrate that he
can provide strong leadership over the long term.
During the 1970s this deficiency was masked some-
what by modest economic growth and a general public
perception that Duvalier's leadership was preferable
to any alternative. But as economic and political
difficulties increase, Duvalier will have to demon-
strate that he is willing to confront the challenge and
dispel doubts about his ability to rule. If he is to
survive, he must demonstrate his leadership, particu-
larly to:
? Individual members of the palace clique and mili-
tary who might view themselves as replacements for
Duvalier.
? The mulatto elite who will tolerate Duvalier's lead-
ership as long as they are. able to receive economic
privileges.
? The black peasantry who have traditionally viewed
Duvalier as the defender of their interests.
? Exiles who are waiting in the wings for a leadership
crisis.
? Foreign donors and investors who would withhold
assistance if they believed that serious instability
was inevitable.
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The US Embassy reports that Duvalier's image within
Haiti-predominantly with the elite but also with the
general populace-as a forceful leader already has
been weakened somewhat by his marriage and his
physical appearance-less formidable since he lost
over 60 pounds. In addition to his wife's unpopular,
flamboyant style, her family is notorious for a range
of misdeeds from tax evasion to drug smuggling. In
certain instances, Duvalier has appeared ignorant
of-or willing to overlook-their behavior, causing
some Haitians-mostly within the business communi-
ty, according to the Embassy-to question his control.
Although the arrest of his brother-in-law on drug
charges in Puerto Rico last March and Duvalier's
refusal to bail him out appeared to dispel some of this
uncertainty, current reporting indicates that Mi-
chele's suspected role in recent cabinet changes has
revived such speculation. In early 1982 unfounded
rumors that Duvalier was seriously ill-prompted
primarily by his weight loss on a diet prescribed for a
mild case of diabetes-also encouraged the popular
supposition voiced on the streets of Port-au-Prince
that he had weakened considerably, a perception that,
in our opinion, can undermine his authority.
25X1
Internal and External Threats
The secretive nature of the power structure, the
propensity for intrigue, and renewed exile activity
make an assassination attempt or palace coup ever-
present possibilities. Such a likelihood is lessened by
the tight security around Duvalier and his extensive,
though primitive, intelligence network. But, as the
economic and political fortunes of key actors deterio-
rate, we judge that the networks that protect Jean-
Claude may become dangerously frayed.
Haitian exiles currently do not present a credible
threat, but they have accelerated their activities and
may become a viable force in the future. The failed
invasion last January by exile Bernard Sansaricq is an
example of the general ineptitude and naivete that
currently characterize the exile community. More-
over, the exiles lack unity and leadership,
Their sheer numbers-swelled by the influx of
boat people-gives them some potential, especially if
a better organized attempt occurs in conjunction with
a political crisis in Haiti. In our view the development
of an effective anti-Duvalier movement will probably
result if strong links are developed between the exiles
and dissident members of the palace clique, the
military, or the mulatto business community (see
appendix)
Havana and Moscow have provided limited financial
support and military training to some exiles, but for
the present Havana's interests do not appear to us to
extend beyond maintaining and cultivating ties with
the expatriates. Although the Castro government
continues broadcasting in Creole to Haiti and persists
in its anti-Duvalier line, its minimal contacts with
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The fractionalization of interest groups in Haiti has
hampered identification of possible successors to
Duvalier. If any independent political leader were to
arise-either as a positive result of Jean-Claudisme
or because of a weakening of the Duvalier power
structure-we believe likely candidates would come
from the Jean-Claudistes or the emerging black
middle class. Sufficient evidence is not available on
individuals in -the middle class, but we can identify
potential leaders within the palace circle. Frequent
cabinet changes, however, increase the difficulty of
predicting whose star may rise at any given time.
Henri Bayard
Long considered Duvalier's closest adviser, Bayard
held various government positions from 1973 to 1982.
Generally credited as the architect ofDuvalier's 1980
liberalization efforts, Bayard maintained a favorable
attitude toward the United States. He reportedly lost
his position as a result of Michele Duvalier's influ-
ence. A mulatto of Lebanese extraction, Bayard may
not be accepted as a successor to Duvalier by the
black majority.
Theodore Achille
A cabinet minister since 1979, Achille is currently
Secretary of State for Social Affairs. Highly nation-
alistic and somewhat anti-US, he is one of the more
influential Jean-Claudiste political ministers. Achille
is an intelligent, ambitious lawyer and has demon-
strated a streak of opportunism-aggrandizing his
Haitian exiles are in stark contrast to its ties with
dissidents from other Latin American nations. Ha-
vana currently does not publicly identify any revolu-
tionary movement as a viable alternative to the
Duvaliers and probably recognizes the problems that
would have to be tackled should some revolutionary
group succeed in ousting the present regime. More-
over, Havana's propaganda does not show any sharp
position at the expense of other ministers; as an
intelligent, black Haitian in his late twenties, he
could emerge as a rival to Duvalier over time.
Marc Bazin
A highly capable and respected economist, Bazin held
the post of Secretary of State for Finance and
Economic Affairs from February to July 1982. His
vigorous pursuit of the fiscal reform program-which
affected the personal interests of some within the
palace clique-and his growing popularity compelled
Duvalier to replace him. Bazin worked closely with
IMF and US Embassy officials during his short .
tenure. He has the respect of the business community
but lacks a political entre to the palace.
Jean-Marie Chanoine
In the cabinet since 1980, Chanoine replaced Bayard
as Secretary of State for the Presidency in April
1982; he also controls the portfolios of Information
and Public Relations. Generally regarded as hard-
working and ambitious, he shares Achilles national-
istic views but is not considered to be anti-US.
Roger LaFontant
A close friend of the President and member of the 25X1
inner advisory circle at the palace, LaFontant was
named Interior Minister in July 1982-a post he held
fluctuations that would suggest to us a_heightened
interest in taking advantage of Haiti's political and
economic problems. Radio Havana's broadcasts re-
main rife with revolutionary rhetoric, but an analysis
of their content reveals considerable ignorance of the
basic elements of the Haitian situation-a sign that
Haiti is not among Cuba's top candidates for subver-
sion. 25X1
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Implications for the United States
Haiti, because of its extreme poverty, poor human
rights reputation, and endemic corruption, will remain
an international outcast and a nuisance for US policy
interests in the Caribbean for the foreseeable future.
We believe that Port-au-Prince will try to keep its
relations with Washington correct but somewhat am-
bivalent-as it seeks more financial aid and tries to
avoid charges by nationalists that it is bending to US
pressure.
her is particularly frustrated and disappointed with
the level of the US financial assistance and what he
perceives to be an unwarranted US focus on the
problems of Jamaica. We believe that to. gain Wash-
ington's attention Duvalier will continue to play up
the dangers he faces from Havana and the exile
groups.
Duvalier and
many Haitians share the view expressed in the Port-
au-Prince press that the proposed Caribbean Basin
Initiative discriminates against Haiti. Haitian offi-
cials have cited Haiti's planned share-inadequate, in
their view-of supplementary development assistance
and the projected quotas for textile exports to the
United States to back up their charges
Duvalier and his aides will occasionally use the
United States as a whipping boy, particularly when
the appearance of cooperation with Washington can
become a political liability. For example, the US
Embassy reported that rumormongers in the palace
last summer accused the United States of supporting
former Finance Minister Bazin against the President
and thereby undermining Duvalier's authority. In this
environment, Duvalier and his aides have taken a
certain risk in heeding advice from US officials and
the IMF on fiscal policies. Nationalist members of the
palace clique may characterize such guidance as
intervention in an effort to persuade Duvalier to
abandon reforms.
Similarly, implementation of the US-Haitian migrant
interdiction agreement over a year ago has provoked
other problems for Duvalier and may create future
difficulties. According to press reports, regime critics,
some ambitious palace clique members, and national-
ists in the black middle class argue that the negotia-
tors of the agreement probably were paid off by
Washington because the Haitian people received no
quid pro quo for "surrendering Haitian sovereignty."
This criticism may induce Duvalier to limit Haiti's
cooperation with the United States on this issue,
especially if he sees no tangible increase in bilateral
aid or security assistance. In addition, the economy
cannot easily absorb the return of large numbers of 25X1
emigrants. Returning Haitians-having sold their
land and possessions to finance their escape-proba-
bly would settle in the already congested urban areas.
Swelling the ranks of the unemployed, especially in
Port-au-Prince, could be potentially destabilizing to 25X1
F_ I
We believe that domestic political concerns will con-
tinue to dictate the intensity of Duvalier's commit-
ment to both his domestic and foreign policy initia-
tives. If he perceives that continuation of any given
program such as the liberalization measures or the
interdiction agreement is generating significant anti-
regime pressures, Duvalier will abandon the main
elements of the policy even at the expense of his
25X1
25X1
longer term objectives. He already has demonstrat- 25X1
ed-by firing a highly qualified and respected eco-
nomic team on the verge of an IMF agreement-that
he is willing to risk much-needed foreign exchange
and an enhanced public image in order to keep his
domestic position secure. It is likely, therefore, that
Duvalier will continue his zig-zag approach to modi-
fying the more Byzantine features of his government.
Because no economic miracles or viable leadership
alternatives are on the horizon, we judge that the
Duvalier regime will continue in essentially its present
form over the next several years
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Appendix
The Haitian Diaspora
Most prominent Haitian exiles have made a career of verbally harassing the
Duvalier regime, but few have had sufficient organization, funds, or followers to
attempt an overthrow. Few exile leaders are informed about the current situation
in their homeland; for them jockeying for position within the exile community
usually takes a higher priority. It is unlikely that the disparate leaders and groups
will coalesce into a formidable force in the near term. Nevertheless, several may
become a real danger to the regime in the future if Duvalier's fortunes decline and
if the exiled leaders develop contacts within Haiti. 25X1
Leader Organization/
Location
Bernard Sansaricq President of the
Haitian National
Popular Party;
Miami, Florida
Leslie Manigat Secretary General
of the "Rassemble-
ment des Demo-
crates Nationaux
Progressives
d'Haiti; Caracas,
Venezuela
This self-styled "Haitian Liberator"
probably the most active Haitian
exile leader. His invasion of Tortuga
Island in January 1982 was
ill equipped and foolhardy, ultimate-
ly resulting in the death of eight
exiles and four Haitian soldiers. His
obsessive desire to destroy the Duva-
lier regime will probably lead him to
attempt subsequent adventures. 25X1
Firmly anti-Communist, Manigat is
a professor at Simon Bolivar Univer-
sity in Caracas. He claims to have
active organizations in several Euro-
pean and Latin American nations, as
well as support of the Socialist Inter-
national. His group appears to have
no active plans for the overthrow of
Duvalier. 25X1
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Rene Theodore Secretary General Theodore's group has representatives
(aka Joseph Leslie) of the United Hai- - and contacts in the Dominican Re-
tian Communist public, France, Mexico, Canada,
Party; Paris, Cuba, and Switzerland. They report-
France edly have received Soviet funding
channeled through the Dominican
Communist Party. Theodore has
traveled to the Soviet Union at least
twice and on several occasions to
Cuba. Although chronic plotters,
Theodore and his supporters appar-
ently have no immediate plans for
direct action against Duvalier.
Alphonse Lahens Head of the United Lahens's exile umbrella organization
Forces for Haitian is not prepared to undertake any
Liberation; Miami, hostile action against the Duvalier
Florida regime. The various groups in his
organization apparently are bound
only by a common antipathy for the
Duvalier regime and respect for
L,Ihens. Lahens also heads his own
group within his umbrella organiza-
tion-the Haitian National Progres-
sive Movement. Unlike some of his
fellow exiles, Lahens has a general
social, political, and economic pro-
gram for post-Duvalier Haiti, but he
does not address the means by which
the regime would be removed.
25X1
Yvon Desulme Probable leader of Desulme's group advocates the vio-
the Hector Riobe lent overthrow of the Duvalier re-
Brigade; Miami, gime, but has no political plans or
Florida platform for post-Duvalier Haiti.
The Hector Riobe Brigade has
claimed responsibility for a terrorist
incident in Haiti in July 1982, which
unnerved Duvalier. Desulme proba-
bly has aspirations to Haiti's presi-
dency. He apparently draws upon his
father's wealth-earned as an exile
in Jamaica-to underwrite the Bri-
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Roland Magloire Haitian National Magloire and members of his group
Liberation Council; took part in an abortive invasion of25X1
Miami, Florida Haiti which never got beyond the
Magloire has been in exile since the
mid-to-late 1960s, but has demon-
strated little leadership potential.
17 Secret
Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP83SO0855R000200100002-1
 Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP83SO0855R000200100002-1
Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP83SO0855R000200100002-1