VENEZUELA-CUBA: MENDING FENCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83S00855R000100050003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 29, 2008
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 30, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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"HVU1u1dic UI
Intelligence
Venezuela-Cuba:
Mending Fences
State Dept. review completed
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ALA 82-10107
July 1982
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Venezuela-Cuba:
Mending Fences
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by
South America Division, Office of African and Lati
American Analysis and was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations and the National
Intelligence Council. Questions and comments may
be directed to the Chief, South America Division,
ALA,
Secret
ALA 82-10107
July 1982
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Venezuela-Cuba:
Mending Fences
Key Judgments Two recent events-the Falklands crisis and Venezuela's renewed efforts
to press its claims to the Essequibo region of Guyana-have caused
Havana and Caracas to reconsider improving their strained diplomatic
relationship. The Herrera administration has declared that it would like to
improve ties, and the Cubans are reciprocating. We believe that Caracas
hopes to reduce Cuba's outspoken support for Guyana in the Essequibo
dispute. Hard-pressed administration politicians also apparently hope to25X1
use the issue to gain votes next year. But such a move could backfire
because many in the security forces and the conservative business commu-
nity lack enthusiasm for a rapprochement. Beyond its potential dividends,
Caracas's effort conforms with its general emphasis on greater regional
solidarity and North-South issues.
We expect a gradual warming of relations and the reexchange of ambassa-
dors. We doubt, however, that a cooperative relationship will develop 25X1
because the two countries are natural competitors in the Caribbean Basin
and because Venezuela remains deeply suspicious of Cuba's subversion in
the area. Normalized relations between the two are, therefore, unlikely to
presage significant changes in Venezuela's foreign policy line in the region,
although we do expect Caracas will try to distance itself somewhat from
the United States and to be less openly enthusiastic about cooperating in
ventures such as the Caribbean Basin Initiative. On a wider plane, Caracas
is likely to proceed with a corollary move to gain full membership in the
nonaligned movement this fall, but here, too, we expect this to cause little
change in Venezuela's basically pro-Western foreign policy.
Information available as of 14 July 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.
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ALA 82-10107
July 1982
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Venezuela-Cuba:
Mending Fences
Background
Relations between Venezuela and Cuba were severed
in November 1961, and Venezuelan hostility toward
Cuba was heightened by Havana's support for hemi-
spheric revolution, including insurgents in Venezuela
itself. By the mid-1970s, however, then-Venezuelan
President Carlos Andres Perez was apparently per-
suaded that his own warm relationship with President
Fidel Castro as well as Venezuela's successful absorp-
tion of its insurgents into the political system had
made conditions right for renewing ties, a step accom-
plished on 29 December 1974
Commercial dealings increased, although they never
reached significant levels. Venezuela did, however,
agree to supply Cuba with about 5 percent of its oil
needs as the result of a quadripartite swap agreement
whereby the Soviet Union similarly supplies oil to
Venezuelan customers in Western Europe
Relations began to cool in 1979 when Cuban citizens
on several occasions sought political asylum in the
Venezuelan Embassy in Havana, sometimes forcing
their way past Cuban guards and causing injuries.
These incidents led to serious disagreements between
the two countries regarding the rights of asylum and
the integrity of diplomatic missions. When 10,000
Cubans seeking asylum stormed the Peruvian Embas-
sy in Havana in April 1980, Castro not only vilified
Peru but also Venezuela, which was harboring asy-
lum-seekers in its embassy. The Herrera administra-
tion responded with moderation to these attacks,
although some Cuban diplomats were harassed in
Caracas.
In a more serious incident in September 1980, a
Venezuelan military prosecutor decided to drop
charges, for alleged lack of evidence, against Orlando
Bosch and three other Cuban exiles accused of bomb-
ing a Cubana airliner in October 1976. The crash,
which killed all 73 aboard, is still a highly emotional
issue in Cuba. In protest-and reportedly for securi-
ty-Cuba pulled all of its diplomats out of Caracas,
leaving behind only a Prensa Latina office. Venezue-
la, however, has maintained a charge at its embassy in
Havana, largely as a caretaker for some 20 Cubans in
asylum there since 1979. 25X1
Ideological Roots
These two specific irritants were only the proximate25X1
cause of the prolonged discord between Cuba and
Venezuela. We believe that the underlying factors are
ideological and difficult to resolve. Venezuelan offi-
cials have for many years publicly cited Cuba both as
the principal threat to their own democracy and as
their prime competitor for influence in the Caribbean
Basin. 25X1
According to US Embassy reporting, Venezuelans
remember clearly their troubles with Cuban-support-
ed insurgency, and they have a deep-seated antipathy
toward Communism. They have been alarmed by the
spread of revolutionary movements in Central Ameri-
ca and by Cuban inroads in the Caribbean. Even 25X1
though their own revolutionaries have been largely co-
opted into the system, Venezuelans, as evidenced by
published military and civilian writing, remain appre-
hensive that their democracy would be vulnerable to
renewed subversion backed from outside
We believe the Herrera government also sees Cuba as
a threat to its long-term interests in the Caribbean 25X1
Basin. It has attempted to challenge Havana's influ-
ence by giving strong support to non-Marxist forces in
Central America and the islands. El Salvador has 25X1
been a articular) favored recipient of Venezuelan
aid
Herrera has repeatedly stated publicly that
Venezuela must try to stop the radicalization of 25X1
Central America. Another policy tool for achieving
stability in the region is the joint oil-financing facility
supported by Venezuela and Mexico to allow Carib-
bean Basin nations to put their scarce resources into
much needed development programs
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That all such Venezuelan activities deeply disturb
Havana is apparent by Castro's having branded Her-
rera a surrogate of the United States, a charge
Venezuela rejects vigorously. While Venezuelan and
US goals, in the region often do coincide, we and the
US Mission believe that Caracas has been determined
to follow its own path, and it traditionally has been
reluctant to be seen as doing Washington's bidding. In
fact, over the last several years, Caracas has taken a
number of initiatives aimed precisely at strengthening
Latin America's unity via initiatives to coordinate
positions and to foster interest in a Latin American
organization that would exclude the United States.
Renewed Contacts
Since at least August 1981, the Herrera administra-
tion has had informal contacts with Cuban officials in
efforts to reduce tensions.
T he
Embassy reports that low-level delegations have since
met; a Venezuelan commercial mission may visit
Cuba soon; and a high-ranking delegation of the
governing Social Christian Party (COPEI) may meet
with Cuban officials. Moreover, after some delay
Caracas has now formally renewed for 1982 the oil
swap agreement-which continued to be honored
although it had technically lapsed in 1980. Even the
triple hijacking in December 1981 by an extreme
leftist group-the hijackers are still awaiting trial in
Cuba-has been downplayed, despite the fact that
Venezuelan security services have publicly charged
Cuba was involved in planning the event.
Two recent events have prompted Caracas to distance
itself somewhat from the United States, and to im-
prove relations with Havana. The first was the Falk-
lands crisis, which placed Venezuela and Cuba
against the United States in an important hemispheric
dispute. Venezuela was an early and vociferous sup-
porter of Argentina, and Venezuelan officials publicly
encouraged Cuba's growing tilt toward Buenos Aires.
Moreover, the Venezuelan Ambassador to the OAS
openly suggested reincorporating Cuba into the Latin
American brotherhood as a counterweight to the
Far more importantly, the renewed dialogue with
Cuba over the Falklands gave Venezuela a channel in
which to discuss one of its most pressing foreign policy
concerns.
Caracas clearly saw parallels between Argentina's
claims in the Falklands and its own boundary dispute
with Guyana over the Essequibo territory-land that
comprises five-eighths of Guyana. Although Caracas
signed an agreement in 1899 that was supposed to
delineate the border, it subsequently denounced the
treaty, alleging that the British-Guyana's colonial
rulers-had bribed one of the judges. A subsequent
accord was reached in Geneva in 1966 committing
both sides to resolving the dispute peacefully. A
protracted stalemate ensued, and Venezuela has now 25X1
refused to renew an interim protocol that had estab-
lished a 12-year cooling-off period.
The post-Falklands environment and the lapsing of
the protocol have once again pushed the Essequibo
dispute into the forefront of Venezuelan foreign policy
concerns. Caracas is
searching for allies, attempting to build international
support for its case, and trying to cut into Guyana's
much larger base of support. For example, the
Herrera administration has publicly noted it is consid-
ering upgrading its current observer status in the
nonaligned movement to that of a full member so that
it will have a better forum for more forcefully stating
its case.
In this context, Cuba would have seemed an unlikely
ally at best because of its frequent outspoken support
for the Guyanese position on the Essequibo. Caracas, 25X1
however, appears to have had some success in getting
Havana to moderate its position. Venezuelan officials
have publicly expressed their pleasure in what they
see as Cuba's "constructive role" in drafting a more
balanced statement on the dispute in a recent non-
aligned movement meeting in Havana. While the shift
was not major, the statement did not come out
unequivocally for Guyana as has often been the case.
Even this limited accomplishment has been much
trumpeted in the Venezuelan press.
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Secret
are becoming entangled in the campaign.
relationship, and its impact on the Essequibo dispute,
Domestic Political Implications
Although Venezuela's presidential elections will not
be held until December 1983-and not all the candi-
dates have yet been officially selected-partisan poli-
tics are already in full swing. The Venezuelan-Cuban
Falklands crisis.
Officials of both the governing COPEI party and the
major opposition party, Democratic Action (AD), are
among those urging that relations be upgraded. For'
many in the left wing of AD, better relations with
Cuba are naturally in line with the party's left-of-
center, Socialist International philosophy. The major-
ity of the party is more wary, however, as shown in
public statements. For COPEI, Cuba presents a more
difficult problem, particularly because the govern-
ment has so clearly identified Havana as a threat to
regional stability. According to the US Mission, some
party officials favor a rapprochement as a way to
better balance Venezuela's foreign relations and to
reduce the government's close identification with the
United States-particularly in the aftermath of the
Another, and perhaps more compelling, reason to
improve ties with Havana is that many COPEI
politicians probably think they can use better relations
with Cuba to improve their chances in the elections.
They recognize that the Herrera administration is
highly unpopular-largely because of its inefficient
management of the economy. According to embassy
sources, they believe that moderating Cuba's position
on the Essequibo issue would be a major foreign
policy triumph, one that they hope would divert
popular attention from domestic economic distress.
They also hope that by seeming to move leftward,
COPEI would attract some leftist and AD votes. Both
arguments, however, are more indicative of COPEI's
electoral concerns than of the true popular appeal of
better relations with Cuba.
Remaining Obstacles To Improving Relations
There are still a number of obstacles to a major
improvement in relations:
? The Bosch case is still stalled in review in the higher
courts. Recent embassy reporting indicates that it
may be moving again, but Venezuela's military
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judicial system is traditionally independent, and its
eventual verdict unpredictable.
The problems of the asylees in the Venezuelan 25X1
Embassy in Havana as well as the situation of the
still-untried perpetrators of the triple hijacking re-
main. While Havana could resolve both issues, they
are for now readily exploitable in Venezuela by both
the nationalistic right and the large and influential
Cuban exile community.
? Seeking Cuban support on the Essequibo dispute 25X1
could prove less thanl~roductive for Venezuelan 25X1
politicians if, as we believe is likely, Cuba is trying
believe it unlikely, however, that it would openly
abandon Guyana in favor of Caracas-a step that
would open it to charges of duplicity. The best that
the Venezuelan Government probably can realisti-
cally hope for is that Havana-as well as the
nonaligned movement-will take a more balanced
position on the dispute. Whether this would trans-
late into a vote-producing issue for COPEI politi-
cians is uncertain.
We 25
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? Finally, Venezuelan distrust of Cuba and its subver-
sive intentions in the Caribbean Basin has had a
long time to build up, and we believe the public
not be quickly "reeducated" to new views.
Outlook
In sum, we judge that relations between Havana and
Caracas will improve over the next several months-
probably to include restoring their respective ambas-
sadors. Nonetheless, such a rapprochement is likely to
be gradual, and it could be derailed by a number of
factors-such as the Bosch case or events in Central
America-that neither government can fully control.
Moreover, we believe that most Venezuelans see their
democratic government as incompatible with Cuban-
style Communism and that they view Cuba as the
principal threat to stability in the Caribbean Basin.
We also judge that any rapprochement is unlikely to
be accompanied by a significant shift in Venezuela's
foreign policy. Although Venezuela will probably try
to emphasize its role as a Third World leader-
largely to improve its standing in the Essequibo
dispute-it is unlikely to abandon its pro-Western
orientation or its support for the non-Marxist forces in
the Caribbean Basin. Venezuela may, however, be
even more wary about being seen as a US policy
surrogate, and its open cooperation in efforts such as
the Caribbean Basin Initiative may accordingly be
more restrained.
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