SUDAN: CAPABILITIES AND LOYALTIES OF THE MILITARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83S00854R000200170003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Sudan: Capabilities
and Loyalties
of the Military
NESA 82-10627
December 1982
coPY266
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Sudan: Capabilities
and Loyalties
of the Military
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper has been prepared by
Office of Near East-South Asia Analysis, with the
appendixes prepared by~ Office of
Central Reference. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be addressed to the Chief, Arab-
Israeli Division, NESA,
This paper has been coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations and the National
Intelligence Council.
Secret
NESA 82-10627
December 1982
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Sudan: Capabilities
and Loyalties
of the Military
Key Judgments The cohesiveness of the Sudanese military is weakened by a number of
Information available internal factors, but it remains the best organized institution in a country
as oft December 1982 where ethnic, tribal, geographic, and sectarian divisions threaten national
was used in this report.
unity. Sudanese military capabilities, moreover, are seriously hampered by
obsolete equipment, logistic and maintenance deficiencies, and basic
weaknesses in training, leadership, and organization. Little real improve-
ment is likely in the next few years.
Sudanese military forces can contain current levels of Libyan and
Ethiopian-backed insurgent activity, but they would be severely taxed if
the number of dissidents and their attacks escalated dramatically. More
importantly, an escalation of subversive activities by southern dissidents
would exacerbate already tense north-south relations and might encourage
mutinies by southern troops.
Although there is growing criticism of President Gaafar Nimeiri within the
armed forces, he appears to retain the support of most of the Sudanese mil-
itary. He faces a formidable array of domestic problems, however, and the
overthrow of his regime cannot be ruled out, particularly if deteriorating
economic conditions spark extensive civil unrest. In the event of massive
civilian disturbances over economic grievances, senior Army officers might
refuse to intervene, leading to Nimeiri's fall. If growing economic and
social grievances produce anti-Nimeiri conspiracies within the junior
officer corps, a preemptive coup might be launched by more senior officers.
Any military government that replaced Nimeiri would be less likely to
maintain Sudan's present close working relationship with the United
States, although we would not expect a complete turnaround by the
Sudanese. Even a military government run by senior or older middle-grade
officers-thought to be generally pro-United States and pro-Egyptian-
would need to project an image of independence from foreign influence in
order to consolidate its political position. Sudan's support for US positions
on regional issues-including the peace process with Israel-might wane,
and Nimeiri's offer of military facilities to the United States might be
withdrawn, if only temporarily. Outward displays of cooperation with
Egypt would probably be cut back for a time. Nonetheless, a new
government probably would still need US economic and military aid and
would continue to look to Egypt for assistance against Libyan and
Ethiopian threats.
Secret
NESA 82-10627
December 1982
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LIBYA
Wadi Halfa
"Lake
Nasser
Administrative
Boundary-44"\
North rn
AlJunaynah
Kdrdofan
Kadugli
CENTRAL
AFRICAN
REPUBLIC
-?- Region boundary
Railroad
Road
- - - - Track
Region names and international boundary
representation are not necessarily authonitali
c
NX-dani
Ad
uway
Tana
Mayk'('
ETHIONA
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Sudan: Capabilities
and Loyalties
of the Military t
Sudan in recent years has become more strategically
significant to the United States and other Western
countries as a result of growing Soviet and Cuban
influence in the Horn of Africa and Libyan leader
Qadhafi's meddling in the region. In addition, Sudan
is of considerable strategic interest to Egypt, and the
two countries recently signed an integration charter to
enhance economic, political, and military ties. Presi-
dent Gaafar Nimeiri's willingness to support moder-
ate positions in regional and international forums has
added to Sudan's importance to the United States.
For example, Sudan backed the Camp David accords
in 1978 and has strongly endorsed President Reagan's
Middle East peace initiative of September 1982.
Nimeiri followed Egyptian President Sadat's lead by
breaking with Moscow in 1976. In the same year he
also signed a mutual defense pact with Egypt. There-
after, he sought economic aid from Saudi Arabia and
the Persian Gulf states while looking to the West for
military assistance. In recent years Nimeiri has in-
creasingly aligned Sudan with Washington and Cairo,
in part because of security concerns caused by Soviet-
supported regimes in neighboring Libya and Ethiopia.
The Sudanese also participated in joint military exer-
cises with Egypt and the United States in 1981 and
1982.
Nimeiri's offer to allow US access to Sudanese mili-
tary facilities and to pre-position US military equip-
ment in Sudan has made the country an important
element in US plans to establish a military capability
in the region. Access to such military facilities would
provide increased flexibility to the United States in
Table 1
Sudanese Armed Forces
Personnel Strength
Total
3,740
55,650
59,390
Army
3,000
48,000
51,000
Air Force
280
2,750
3,030
Air Defense
300
2,900
3,200
Navy
160
2,000
2,160
responding to crises in the Middle East and Southwest
Asia. The continued, political stability of Sudan,
therefore, is an important US objective.
Status of Forces
The Sudanese armed forces remain the key to the
country's stability. They currently number some
59,000 men '-compared to fewer than 10,000 in
1956 when formal independence was attained from
Great Britain and Egypt (see table 1). Most of this
expansion took place between 1966 and 1972 when
the government accelerated efforts to suppress the
insurgency in the south. When the civil war ended in
1972, many of the former southern rebels were inte-
grated into the armed forces. 0
The structure and organization of the Sudanese
armed forces reflect both British and Soviet influence.
For example, the training system follows a modified
British pattern, but the existence of air defense as a
separate service is a Soviet innovation. The Sudanese
military command structure resembles that of the
2 In addition to the four armed services-Army, Air Force, Air
Defense, and Navy-Sudan has a national police force of about
27,000 men. The national police and the Army share responsibility
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Figure 2
Sudanese People's Armed Forces High Command
Deputy j Deputy
Chief of Staff Chief of Staff
for Operationsd for Administration
President and Supreme
Commander of the
Armed Forces a
Minister of Defense
and Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forcesb
Armed Forces
Chief of Staff and
Commander of the Armyb
Deputy Director of
Chief of Staff Military
for Logistics Intelligencee
Commander of Commander of Commander of
the Air Force i Air Defense the Navy
b Both posts are normally held by a single officer. e Director of Military Intelligence often reports directly to the President.
cThe current Deputy Minister of Defense, General Suwar Dahab, is also
the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics.
senior service and its overwhelming size have kept Air Defense, and lastly the Navy.
interservice rivalries to a minimum. Key posts held by
the Army include the Minister of Defense, Chief of
Egyptian armed forces in that there is no Joint Chiefs Staff-both posts currently held by Nimeiri-Deputy
of Staff and the Army usually staffs the higher Chief of Staff for Operations, and Director of Mili-
command positions (see figure 2). A general accept- tary Intelligence. The Army also dominates in re-
ance of the Army's traditional dominance as the source allocation, normally followed by the Air Force,
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There is a longstanding warrior tradition among many
Sudanese ethnic groups, and the performance of
Sudanese soldiers during World War II was com-
mended by most Western observers. Since independ-
ence, the armed forces have gained combat experience
in counterinsurgency operations during the civil war
in the south (1955-72). Small contingents also were
sent to Congo (1960-61), to Kuwait with an Arab
League Force (1961-63), and to Egypt during the
Arab-Israeli wars (1967-74).
Army. The Sudanese Army is responsible for internal
security and protection of the country's borders. The
Army has an infantry division deployed in each of the
country's four regional military commands and one
armored division in Khartoum (see figure 3), accord-
ing to US defense attache reporting. Other combat
and support units include an airborne brigade, a
republican and a presidential guard in Khartoum, and
a border guard contingent. Most combat units are
under the operational control of the four regional
divisions, although the different branches of the Army
have separate and apparently distinct administrative
and logistic systems. Most Army equipment is old,
much of it Soviet in origin, and spare parts are
increasingly difficult to acquire (see table 2).
Sporadic attacks by Sudanese insurgents based in
Ethiopia in mid-1982 caused Khartoum to deploy
some units and equipment to the Ethiopian border
area. le-
ments o both e Eastern and Southern Military
Regions near the border are severely under strength,
and morale is low because of poor equipment. Confu-
sion over operational responsibility for large segments
of territory between the 1st and 2nd Divisions report-
edly has created defensive gaps on the eastern border.
Sudanese military authorities are aware of these
deficiencies, an they are
attempting to correct them.
Air Force. The Air Force is responsible for the defense
of territorial airspace, logistic and reconnaissance
support to regional commands, and close air support
to ground units in the event of hostilities. It has an
inventory of 89 aircraft of Soviet, Chinese, and
Western origin (see table 3), and some 100 active-duty
pilots. There are seven Air Force flying units (three
fighter squadrons, one fighter-training unit, one trans-
port squadron, and two helicopter squadrons) de-
ployed at the country's two major airfields near
Khartoum-Wadi Seidna Military Airbase and
Khartoum International Airport (see figure 4).{
Air Defense. The Air Defense Command is a separate
service headquartered near Port Sudan. Air defense is
divided into two major sectors: the central sector
including Khartoum, and the eastern sector including
Port Sudan. Outside of these two areas, protection of
important targets is handled by local infantry com-
The SA-2 brigade is based near Port Sudan. Two
other air defense artillery brigades are deployed near
Khartoum and in eastern Sudan for the protection of
airfields, government buildings, and hydroelectric fa-
cilities (see figure 3). In response to the Libyan
intervention in Chad, a battalion-sized air defense
unit was assigned to the Western Regional Command
in 1980. Virtually all major air defense equipment is
of Soviet origin, and most is nonoperational because
of age and lack of spare parts (see table 4)
Navy. The Navy is organized into six squadrons-four
with patrol responsibilities, one a landing craft squad-
ron, and one an auxiliary and service squadron. Naval
headquarters is located in Port Sudan at the Flamingo
Bay Naval Base. Four coastal observation stations are
manned by two shore battalions. The Navy has no
marine corps or air component.
All naval craft have been acquired from Yugoslavia
and prerevolutionary Iran with the exception of one
Sudanese-built launch (see table 5). The country has
only one operational patrol boat out of an inventory of
19 assorted craft. The Navy cannot currently patrol
its coastline, prevent smuggling, or even guard territo-
' In the past, military aircraft occasionally have been deployed to
other airports in the following pattern: MIG-17/21s to Kassala,
Provosts to El Fasher and Malakal, MI-8 helicopters to El Fasher.
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Figure 3
Major Army and Air Defense Commands and Combat Ground Units
e1
ake
Nasser
Novi thern
Military\Com
)111- Ow-
7th
.AI Fashir
Red \
Sea
Air Defense
42nd Headquarters
SA-21 Port
Sudan
Eastern
Army
45th 7th Headq= ers KgCARTOUM Military
Western Military Command
SUDAN
N
Infantry division
Infantry brigade
WNW-Armored division
Armored brigade
Air defense brigade (missile)
Air defense brigade (artillery)
a Brigade is equipped with SA-7 missiles
and artillery.
0 150 Kilometers
T 60 Miles
12th1y~ So t ern
Waw. f1
Military mmand
1st 11th
Juba
Al Qadarif.4th
Command
Ad
Damazi
AAUD1
ASIA
ADOIS
ABABA,
ETHIG">' A
T'ant
Hayti
Administrative
Bounds y-
tepresetspt~ :t5:
,R 55irdI.30tr or tativf
Kha m
2nd al Ian
43rd 2nd
~ K.ENVA
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25-pdr gun howitzer United Kingdom 12
100-mm field gun, M 1955 USSR 12
105-mm pack howitzer Italy 6
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Figure 4
Air Force Units and Major Airfields
Airfields
Hard- surface runways
More than 3,000 meters
2,000-3,000 meters
Less than 2,000 meters
Natural-surface runways
+ Less than 2,500 meters
0 150 Kilometers
0 150 Miles
FIGHTING TRAINING UNIT
2 MIG-15 (Midget)
4 Jet Provost (T-5)
24th FIGHTER SQUADRON
9 MIG-17 (Fresco)
22nd FIGHTER SQUADRON
12 Chinese F-6
7 Chinese F-5
16th FIGHTER SQUADRON
8 MIG-21 (Fishbed)
2 MIG-21 (Mongol)
HELICOPTER SQUADRON (2)
14 MI-8 (HIP)
10 BO-105
Boundary representation is Lake
not necessarily authoritafiva3,0 Albe~
AIR TRAW SPO T SQUADRON
4 OHC-5 (puffalo)
U D I
AR BIA
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Table 3
Sudanese Air Force Inventory
MIG-21 Fishbed
8
Chinese F-6 MIG-19
10
MIG-17 Fresco
9
MIG-15 Midget
2
Jet Provost T-55
4
F-5F a
2
Medium range: C-130 Hercules
6
Short range: DHC-5 Buffalo
4
VIP jet
1
PumA
AB-212 d
a The F-5F trainers have recently arrived in Sudan but as of late No-
vember 1982 had not yet been flown or placed in a flying unit,
C-130s and three DHC-5 Buffalos were out of commission in late
November 1982.
All MI-8 HIP helicopters were out of commission in late November
1982,
d The Italian s, a gilt from u Dhabi, are being assembled
and should soon enter the inventory
Estimated mid-1982 Table 4
Sudan's Air Defense Units and Equipment
Three surface-to-air missile battalions 18 launchers (68
(SA-2) missiles)
Two Air defense artillery battalions 24
(100-mm guns)
Two air defense artillery battalions 36
(40-mm guns)
Three air defense artillery battalions
37-mm guns, twin and single
12.7-mm HMG
Three platoons (SA-7) b
Five radar companies (Soviet radar)
73
Unknown
Unknown
30
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b Serviceability of SA-7 missiles is unknown; some are reportedly in
the Khartoum area. 25X1
c All these radars are reportedly inoperable.
three-year tours. Since the armed forces, especially
the Air Force, has had difficulty retaining trained
specialists and technicians because of higher civilian
salaries available in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states,
skilled personnel must serve a minimum of nine years. 25X1
additional
manning problems are generated by selective military
security concerns.
recruitment practices that limit the induction of larg- 25X1
en numbers of westerners and southerners because of
Manpower
A conscription law was adopted in 1971 but never
implemented, and all four services continue to be
composed largely of volunteers.' They serve a mini-
mum of three years, and reenlistment is limited to six
' Recent Embassy reporting quoted First Vice President Tayyib as
stating that a new conscription law would soon be passed. He
indicated that service of about one year has been considered for
men between 18 and 30. The purpose of the new conscription law is
to train young men for civic action and not to increase the size of
Despite reports of planning for a national reserve
program, none exists, and we know of no national 25X1
mobilization plan. In the event of a national emergen-
cy, former military men and civilian assets could be
recruited, but insufficient military equipment and a
poor logistics system would hinder their effectiveness.
US military observers agree that the professional
standards of the Sudanese armed forces compare
favorably with most other African countries. Al-
though not the best educated or prestigious profession
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Table 5 Estimated mid-1982
Sudanese Naval Craft Inventory
Patrol craft
2
Coastal patrol boats
7
Harbor patrol boats
4
a All naval craft are nonoperational with the exception of one coastal
patrol boat according to the latest available information from the
defense attache.
in Sudan, the military tends to be the only group that
instills a sense of national unity and accountability to
the nation. The British colonial legacy of discipline
still lingers in Sudan's military training and educa-
tion
The Army's education and training system is better
than in most African countries. There are basic
training facilities, an officer candidate college, a
command and staff school, and various branch and
occupational schools for commissioned and noncom-
missioned officers and enlisted men. Egypt, the Unit-
ed Kingdom, the United States, and China currently
provide the bulk of in-country training assistance.
Advanced technical training for enlisted men and
higher staff training for officers are provided by
Egypt and at least 20 other countries, including the
United States. Significant numbers of commissioned
and noncommissioned officers have been sent to staff,
branch, and technical schools abroad.
Volunteers for the Army, Air Defense, and Navy
must undergo six months of basic infantry training.
Thereafter, naval and air defense personnel spend at
least one year being trained in their various specialties
at branch schools. Unlike the other three services, Air
Force pilots and maintenance technicians must attend
basic training schools abroad. A national flight train-
ing school has been under discussion in recent years,
but lack of funding has prevented its formation.
Budgetary constraints have severely limited practical
training experience in all the services. There are
serious shortages of training aids, ammunition, equip-
ment, and fuel. According to US defense attache
reporting, fuel shortages have limited flying time for
pilots, causing a serious erosion in flying proficiency.
The Air Force's MIG-21s are reportedly flown only
three times w o conserve fuel.
the most experienced naval offi-
cers and men are seconded to the United Arab
Emirates Navy in order to keep skills current on
modern equipment. Air defense personnel are consid-
ered ineffective because of limited use of live-fire
training.
US military observers note that the Sudanese make
tough, well-disciplined individual soldiers for counter-
insurgency or small unit ground operations. They
point out, however, that Sudanese fighting capabili-
ties erode considerably when more sophisticated
equipment and larger units are involved.
Domestic and Foreign Economic Support
Sudan has few domestic resources to support the
modernization of its military forces. All armaments
and spare parts must be imported since Sudanese
industries are capable of producing only small quanti-
ties of ammunition and assorted quartermaster mate-
riel. Additionally, Sudan's labor force has a very
limited managerial and technical base from which the
military can draw. Given the need to deal with the
country's serious economic difficulties-inadequate
transportation and communication, stagnant real
growth, and a massive foreign debt burden it cannot
service-there are few prospects for Sudan increasing
domestic production of military materiel in the fore-
seeable future.
While government finances are severely restricted, 10
to 12 percent of the central government budget is
allocated to defense operating expenditures. If capital
expenditures financed by foreign loans were added to
this figure, it would be well over 20 percent (see table
6). Although the share of the budget going to defense
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Table 6
Sudan: Operating Defense Expenditures a
Million US $
228.5
213.2
272.1
279.8
220.8
Million Sudanese pounds
82.6
85
125.0
144.6
155
Percentage of GDP
2.9
2.6
3.1
3.3
Percentage of central government budget
10.6
10.6
12.9
capital expenditures for defense, financed almost entirely by foreign
loans, are not included in the budget: such expenditures were
estimated o reach $200 million in 1981/82.
b The Sudanese fiscal year begins on 1 July.
is not out of proportion to spending by other LDCs, it
is a heavy burden for the government to carry, given
Sudan's extremely poor financial situation.
Since the termination of Soviet military aid in the
mid-1970s, Sudan has depended on the West and
moderate Arab states for assistance. Saudi Arabia
and the Gulf states have provided cash grants for
equipment. Egypt has given extensive grant training
and some equipment. Other non-US donors that have
provided equipment and training either through credit
or grant aid are Britain, France, West Germany,
Yugoslavia, and China. Total military assistance from
non-US sources amounted to some $200 million in
1980-81.
The United States resumed military assistance to
Sudan in late 1977 with the sale of six C-130
transport aircraft, and since then the US program has
steadily expanded. At the request of President
Nimeiri, moreover, US military survey teams have
examined selected organizational and equipment
problems of the Sudanese armed forces. To date,
Sudan has received more than $150 million in US
military aid including credits, grants, and training
programs (see table 7).
Force Modernization
The Army's modernization plans have included the
acquisition of additional arms and equipment to im-
prove armor, firepower, mobility, communications,
and engineering capabilities. The purpose of the mod-
ernization program has been to develop a light, mobile
force capable of defending borders and containing
insurgency. According to Defense Department publi-
cations and reports from the US defense attache and
Embassy in Khartoum, equipment delivered or or-
dered in recent years includes the following:
? The United States has provided 36 M-113A2 ar-
mored personnel carriers, 20 M-60A3 tanks, six
M-125A2 81-mm armored mortar carriers, and 12
155-mm howitzers. Plans exist for future acquisition
of US trucks, armored fighting vehicles, and addi-
tional armored personnel carriers, artillery, and
howitzers.
? Since 1976 the Saudis have provided some $420
million for more than 2,400 German trucks and
spare parts. In 1981 Saudi Arabia also transferred
to Sudan 50 US-built M-47 and 15 M-41 tanks
(with spare parts for two years), machineguns, am-
munition, and uniforms.
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Table 7
Sudan: US Military and
Economic Aid Commitments a
5.0 25.0 30.0 50.0
Credit financing 5.0 25.0 30.0 50.0
Grants 0.2 0.3 0.4 2.3 51.2
MAP grants 1.7
International military 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 1.2
education and training
Total economic assistance b 20.3 37.9 99.6 109.4 154.0
(grants)
a US fiscal years.
b All kinds of economic assistance, including PL-480.
Air Force modernization efforts have concentrated on
refurbishing older aircraft and the acquisition of
newer ones. Since 1979 the Yugoslavs have over-
hauled most of Sudan's MIG-21 fighters, which will
extend their operational life to about 1985.
he Sudanese are interested in
replacing or supplementing their MIG-21s with US
F-5s by 1985, but hoped-for Saudi funding has not yet
been forthcoming. Khartoum has recently acquired
two F-5F trainers with the option of 10 more when
funds become available.
the inese P-5 fiLyhters delivered
problems, but the 12 F-6 fighter-trainer aircraft
acquired from China in 1981-82 have improved the
country's ground attack capability.
plans to acquire British BA -167
tri emasters have been delayed because of Sudan's
inability to obtain a funding guarantee from Saudi
? West Germany has contributed through grant aid to
the construction of a basic training facility and
provided military support equipment.
? Egypt sold 20 "al-Walid" wheeled armored person-
nel carriers in 1981, and 80 more are on order.
Grant aid from Egypt has included a small number
of T-54 and T-55 tanks, BM-21 rocket launchers,
Swingfire antitank missiles, and 122-mm multiple
rocket launchers.
? China has provided grants, credits, and commercial
sales since 1972. Military equipment on order or
partially delivered include 31 Type 62 light tanks,
30 Type 59 tanks, 18 130-mm field guns, 360
trucks, field artillery, and support equipment.
? In 1980 France financed a $33 million sale of 38
AMX armored vehicles. Deliveries are continuing.
? Deliveries are continuing under a commercial sale
from the United Kingdom of 100 Landrovers, ar-
mored reconnaissance vehicles, and spare parts.
Britain has also provided grant training assistance
worth well over $150 million.
In recent years the Air Force has obtained six C-130
medium-range transports from the United States and
four DHC-5 Buffalo short-range transports from
Canada. Although these have significantly improved
transport capabilities, the Air Force's ability to pro-
vide logistic support to ground units throughout the
country remains limited. We know of no plans to
acquire additional transport aircraft in the near fu-
ture.
Since the late 1970s the Air Force has acquired two
Puma transport helicopters as a gift from France, 10
German BO-105 utility helicopters funded by the
Saudis and Kuwaitis, and six Italian Augusta Bell
212s recently received as a gift from Abu Dhabi.C
the Sudanese
are critical for transporting troops quickly during
counterinsurgency operations.
Khartoum hopes to replace its Soviet MI-8
transport helicopters in the next few years.
the Sudanese are trying to
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helicopters from Romania. If these plans fail, the Air
Force hopes to acquire US Bell UH-1H transport
helicopters after 1984.
The Air Force cannot perform its mission to defend
territorial airspace because it lacks an adequate sys-
tem of early warning, command and control, fire
control, and firepower. If Sudanese plans to acquire
the US TPS-43 radar materialize, the Air Force's air
defense capability would improve considerably. Ac-
cording to reports from the US Embassy in Khar-
toum, modest efforts are under way to upgrade the
Wadi Seidna Military Airbase to prepare for US
F-5s. US military observers also have noted Sudan's
need to improve other existing airfields for use as
forward fighter airbases, especially those along the
eastern border with Ethiopia and toward the country's
border with Chad and Libya.
The Sudanese also would like to replace most of their
Soviet air defense equipment since much of it is
nonoperational, according to US military observers.
Sudan has virtually no capability to detect an air
attack or defend against one. US Vulcan 20-mm guns
are on order and will be delivered in 1984. These
should help improve air defense capability since a
significant number of strategic sites are being de-
fended by old Soviet antiaircraft artillery whose reli-
ability is questionable. Further improvements in air
defense will depend on available funding.
The naval budget has had the lowest priority in
Sudan's defense allocations, and the Navy has been
neglected for a number of years. Some $30 million of
US foreign military sales credit for 1981-82, however,
have been set aside for naval modernization. Most of
these funds will be used to build and repair dockside
support facilities at Flamingo Bay. Sudan has also
agreed with US Navy survey team recommendations
to refurbish their small patrol craft and to purchase
additional ones if funding remains available.
Logistics and Maintenance
The root causes of logistic and maintenance problems
include shortages of foreign exchange to purchase
spare parts, ammunition, and fuel; extreme weapons
diversification since the late 1960s; an insufficient
transportation and communication network;. and an
inefficient supply system. Just as serious, however, is
the lack of personnel with managerial and technical
skills. Despite the extensive overseas training given
commissioned and noncommissioned officers in recent
years, US military observers believe there has been
little improvement in the lax Sudanese attitude to-
ward the maintenance of sophisticated equipment.
The armed forces have particular difficulty in main-
taining a dependable and affordable source of spare
parts for aging Soviet equipment. This problem is
largely responsible for the fact that Sudan's Soviet
tanks were less than 30 percent operational in 1981
according to US military officials.
he Air Force can no longer
acquire batteries from Yugoslavia because
the Soviets have blocked their transfer. A set of
MIG-21 batteries from the Soviet Union is about
$6,000, while a similar set from Egypt costs around
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$11,000. The US defense attache reports that spare
parts shortages are responsible for the nonoperational
status of all air defense radars, SA-2 surface-to-air
missiles, and most artillery.
Although existing armed forces maintenance and
repair shops are generally well-organized, US military
officials have noted a shortage in the number of
facilities and the amount of available maintenance
equipment. For example, while the SA-2 surface-to-
air maintenance and repair facility near Port Sudan is
considered good by US military observers, air defense
artillery units in the Khartoum area have only minor
repair capabilities. Maintenance of artillery outside
the Khartoum area, moreover, depends on the avail-
ability of local technicians, and equipment normally is
sent to the capital for repair. The naval shops and
repair facilities at Flamingo Bay are not functioning,
and harbor facilities are grossly inadequate, according
to US military officials. With help provided by the
US military aid program, these facilities should im- 25X1
prove considerably over the next few years.
shortages of person- 25X1
net with technical and management skills are adding
to maintenance and logistics problems. The Army, for
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example, remains heavily dependent on foreign tech-
nicians to maintain even its overall equipment opera-
tional rate of less than 50 percent. The fairly high
operational rates for aircraft reported by the US
defense attache in 1981-51 percent for fighters and
transports and 42 percent for helicopters-were large-
ly due to the presence of foreign advisers. F___-]
these operational rates have fallen sig-
nificantly during 1982 as spare parts shortages have
taken their toll.
There is, moreover, no unified logistic management
structure to coordinate support for the multinational
equipment in Sudan's weapons inventory. In the case
of the Army, each branch is responsible for the
logistic support of all equipment in its possession. The
duplication inherent in such a system creates gross
inefficiencies. US technical assistance teams assigned
to Sudan see the overall restructuring of the logistic
management system as a major goal for improving
combat readiness.
Capabilities Outlook
Little improvement in Sudanese military capabilities
is likely over the next few years without the acquisi-
tion of significant amounts of newer equipment and
spare parts for existing older equipment. Even if this
occurs, however, improvements will be slow because
of the time the military will require to absorb opera-
tional and maintenance procedures for newer equip-
ment.
The continuing weakness of Sudan's military capabili-
ties means that the country will remain vulnerable to
militarily superior neighbors (see table 8). Fortunately
for Sudan, the threat of a conventional ground attack
from either Libya or Ethiopia probably will remain
slight. Neither country could sustain an offensive for
any length of time because of the inhospitable terrain,
long distances, and difficulties in sustaining lines of
communications. Additionally, neither country wishes
to risk activating the Egyptian-Sudanese mutual de-
fense pact signed in 1976 and be forced to engage
Egyptian military forces.
Although the threat of a massive ground attack
appears remote, Sudan is vulnerable to air attack
from Libya and Ethiopia. Military and commercial
targets in eastern Sudan are well within range of
Ethiopian military aircraft, and some Libyan aircraft
could reach the Sudanese capital of Khartoum. Suda-
nese air defense capabilities are negligible and could
neither effectively detect nor defend against an air
attack.
Sudanese military forces can contain Libyan- and
Ethiopian-backed insurgent activity by Sudanese dis-
sidents as long as it continues at present levels. If the
Sudanese are able to complete existing ground and air
modernization plans, their military forces should im-
prove considerably current proficiency in counterin-
surgency and small unit operations. A dramatic
growth in insurgent activity, however, would severely
tax the military's manpower and limited equipment
and logistic resources. The escalation of southern
dissident activity also would create new north-south
tensions particularly within the military's 1st Division
(Southern Command).
Political and Social Factors
The Sudanese military is beset by a variety of internal
problems but is the best organized institution in a
country where ethnic, tribal, geographic, and sectari-
an divisions threaten national unity. According to
Sudanese scholars, this sense of group identity stems
from a proud fighting tradition and is further en-
hanced by a sense of distinction from the civilian
sector that is blamed for most of the country's
problems. A frequently cited example of the military's
unity was its willingness to support the Nimeiri
regime against an Ansar Muslim rebellion in 1970
even though a large percentage of military personnel
are of Ansar heritage.
The key political roles played by the Sudanese armed
forces-political power base for the regime, guarantor
of political order, and symbol of national unity-are
an integral part of the military's corporate identity.
Nimeiri has ratified the armed forces' political role
both in the constitution of 1973 and in public pro-
nouncements that the military is the protector of the
1969 revolution and an active participant in Sudan's
national development. Despite extensive efforts by
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Table 8
Sudan, Ethiopia, and Libya:
Force Levels and Equipment Inventories
Estimated personnel strengths and
major equipment for mid-1982
Personnel
54,000
240,000 C
60,000 a
Tanks
255
525-625 d
2,500
Artillery (over 100-mm)
143
500-600 d
950
Mortars (over 100-mm)
165
1,100-1,300
435
Air defense guns
133
500-550 d
Unknown
Armored vehicles
275
500-600 d
2,335
SAM battalions
3
8
65
2,000
0
3,000
3,500-4,000
7,000
Jet fighters
34
112
500
Reconnaissance
0
12
20
Helicopters
25
30
125
Transports
27
a Total includes personnel from Air Defense, which is a separate
service in Sudan and Libya.
b Only one is operational.
Total includes personnel from Air Defense Commands subordinate
to Army Headquarters.
d Figures exclude some 200 tanks, about 135 field artillery pieces,
nearly 200 armored vehicles, and some 40 air defense guns
purchased by the Ethiopians from the Soviet Union but assigned to
Cuban forces.
Nimeiri to increase civilian participation in the politi-
cal process, the military remains his main power base,
and it is well represented at all levels of the country's
only party, the Sudanese Socialist Union.
Military leaders have predominated for 19 out of the
26 years since independence in 1956-Ibrahim
Abboud in 1958-64 and Gaafar Nimeiri since 1969.
They have not proved any more successful than
civilians, however, at solving the country's overwhelm-
ing economic, political, and social problems.
most Sudanese
provides the most viable source of leadership.
Despite its traditional dominance, the unity of the
military is weakened by the country's ethnic, tribal,
sectarian, and geographic divisions. There are 56
separate ethnic groups that are subdivided into 597
smaller affiliations. Although Arabic has been the
official language since 1956, 115 different languages
are spoken. English-reflecting the colonial British
experience-is still predominant as the lingua franca
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percent of the total population is Muslim and about
4 percent Christian. The remainder is animist. Most
Christians live in the south, although the southern
population is largely animist.
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The "southern problem" remains another major
threat to the military's unity and to the cohesion of
the country as a whole.' Southerners comprise less
than 20 percent of military personnel but have consti-
tuted about half of the soldiers in the Southern
Command (1st Division) since the end of the civil war
in 1972. They represent a potential security problem
for the military, particularly if their grievances in-
crease and they support or join Sudanese dissident
groups such as the New Anya Nya (NAN).
Sudanese dissidents, including the NAN, mounted a
series of attacks on Sudanese towns, army garrisons,
and police stations from Ethiopian territory in mid-
1982.
Since 1972 southerners in the military have suffered
from two major types of discrimination: enforced
ensuring that the troops are paid properly and that
visits by high-ranking officers to remote encampments
are more frequent.
[:::::)nilitary leaders have little confidence in the
1st Division's ability to deal with insurgent activity
and have sent northern units into the south to conduct
southern civilians while carrying out operations.
=the presence of northern troops exacerbates
north-south tensions, which could escalate significant-
ly if northern troops inadvertently killed innocent
antidissident operations.
Senior officers-brigadier
to lieutenant general-are considered the most loyal
to President Nimeiri. Despite Nimeiri's falling out
with the senior command in early 1982 and the
dismissal of several high-ranking officers, little oppo-
sition is evident among remaining senior officers.
Arabization and the preference accorded northerners
in promotions and assignments. The decision in 1980 Most senior officers appear moderately pro-Western
to require that the senior staff officers' course-a and pro-Egyptian.
requirement for promotion to colonel-be taught in most Sudanese, including officers, are wary of
Arabic has virtually excluded English-speaking south- becoming too closely tied to Egypt. Having once been
ern officers from higher rank. According to US under Egyptian domination, the Sudanese are sensi-
Embassy Khartoum reporting, southerners complain, tive about current links to Cairo and perceive that
with justification, that northerners are promoted over Egyptians are condescending in their relationships
them and that they rarely receive foreign military with the Sudanese.
school and professional assignments.
unrest among southern military personnel were more
widespread than at any time since the end of the civil
war. In an effort to limit organized opposition, the US
defense attache in Khartoum notes that military
leaders have begun efforts to improve morale by
Nearly all senior officers have had overseas assign-
ments-many in the West-either as students, mili-
tary attaches, or seconded officers. On average only a
few years younger than Nimeiri himself, the senior
.officer corps has shared with the President the experi-
ences of the civil war in the south (1955-72), the
Nimeiri coup of 1969, the Soviet Bloc presence (1969-
72), and coup attempts by Communists and Ansars in
1971 and 1976, respectively. Most senior officers
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belong to the Sudanese Socialist Union, and those
with the rank of major general (about 20) automati-
cally became members of the SSU Central Commit-
tee prior to its dissolution in early 1982.
Middle-grade officers (major to colonel) present a
more mixed picture. Like senior officers, older colo-
nels are considered basically loyal to the Nimeiri
regime, and their morale appears to range from fair to
good. Most middle-grade officers tend to be rank
conscious since they serve as a buffer between senior
and junior officers. According to the former US
defense attache in Khartoum, they generally regard
themselves as professionals and apparently shun poli-
tics. Many belong to the SSU mainly for appearances,
and few apparently participate in party functions.
Most senior middle-grade officers shared the experi-
ences of the postcolonial period along with senior
officers, and many have also served abroad or are
Junior officers are the least understood by the Suda-
nese military leadership or Western observers. Very
few experienced the civil war, the Soviet Bloc pres-
ence, or the Communist coup attempt of 1971. Their
attitudes toward the West remain unclear. US mili-
tary observers believe that junior officers-like the
young majors-are the most vulnerable to recruit-
ment by opposition groups
Junior officers appear to be the most impatient with
low pay, infrequent promotions, poor equipment, parts
shortages, and inflation.
they
actively seeking such an assignment. Attitudes toward
the West appear to range from strongly positive to
neutral. Most older middle-grade officers appear dis-
trustful of the Soviet Bloc, in part because of the
attempted Communist coup in 1971. Many, especially
the younger middle-grade officers, however, may fa-
vor a nonaligned foreign policy.
The most discontented of the middle-grade officers
are a group known as the young majors. They all
graduated from the military academy between 1969
and 1972 when classes were two to three times their
normal size. During this period the Sudanese were
heavily dependent on the Soviets for training and
equipment, and many of the young majors received
technical training in the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe.
Their inflated numbers give them fewer
chances for promotion. Many, moreover, are severely
frustrated because the military negds their technical
skills and refuses to release them to find more lucra-
tive positions in the civilian sector or abroad.
openly discuss the country's problems, and many 25X1
disagree with the regime's approach to inflation and
corruption. Most junior officers who sympathize with
the young majors see little immediate hope for ad-
vancement and find they must postpone marriage
because of financial constraints.
As of mid-November
E::~ounger officers at the Sta o eg are now
openly criticizing the government. Not only are they 25X1
critical of economic policy, but they strongly disap-
prove of Nimeiri's promise to send Sudanese troops to
support Iraq's war with Iran. The attache's sources,
however, report that the Staff College students have
not yet called for Nimeiri's removal.
Approximately 200 Sudanese officers have been
trained in the United States since 1977, and this
number will probably grow significantly in future
years. Although this exposure presumably creates
good will for the United States and improves Suda-
nese military capabilities, it may also encourage
impatience with Sudan's present economic and politi-
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there are serious
morale problems among noncommissioned officers 25X1
and the technical ranks. This group, however, is
generally considered apolitical by US military observ-
ers. Their grievances are essentially economic. Despite
salaries that compare favorably to other government
employees, most skilled technicians and noncommis-
sioned officers could make five times their salaries
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working abroad. Consequently, there is a low rate of
reenlistment, and many technicians harbor bitter re-
sentment because they are forced to serve beyond
their nine-year contract
Nimeiri's Leadership Style and the Military
Nimeiri clearly recognizes the importance of main-
taining the support of the military. He personally
selects officers and men for key units in the Khartoum
area. Sudanese military intelligence closely monitors
the civilian population and military personnel for
indications of serious unhappiness. Malcontents and
possible coup plotters are weeded out, and an effort is
made to deal with morale problems.
For the most part Nimeiri has not dealt violently with
his opponents. Rarely has he executed even coup
plotters in the military-with the exception of officers
who supported the Communist-led coup in 1971.
Senior military officers who challenge Nimeiri or his
policies are retired but usually are given a sizable
pension or an ambassadorial post far from Sudan. In
early 1982 Nimeiri retired some 20 senior officers
considered loyal to the Minister of Defense and the
Chief of Staff, who were dismissed for challenging
Nimeiri's leadership and judgment. Carried out in
typical Nimeiri style, the turnover of officers has so
far been remarkably free of negative political reper-
cussions. Nimeiri was able to maintain the support of
most other senior officers at least in part because the
retirements opened the way for promotions.
Following the events of early 1982, Nimeiri temporar-
ily assumed the duties of Minister of Defense and
Chief of Staff. He initially appointed three Deputy
Chiefs of Staff thereby creating a fierce competition
for Chief of Staff that would discourage a united
political threat. This arrangement, however, has
proved disruptive to the efficient management of the
armed forces.
receive special commissary privileges, free transporta-
tion to and from work, and a special housing allow-
ance is paid to those living off post in the Khartoum
area. Those in technical units with special skills
reportedly are given bonuses. Nimeiri also sends many
military personnel abroad for seconded assignments
or training where they can receive five times their
normal salary. After retirement, moreover, both offi-
cers and enlisted men receive placement assistance
and have access to low-interest loans. Free medical
treatment is also available to active-duty and retired
officers and their extended families.
Opposition Efforts To Suborn the Military
There are a number of civilian opposition groups
attempting to win supporters within the military,
including the Ansar Muslim sect, the Muslim Broth-
erhood, the National Unionist Party, the Communist
Party, and the Ba'th Party. The Ansars, who repre-
sent 20 percent of Sudan's 20 million people, comprise
a significant number in the military. A small group of
Ansar officers was implicated in a coup attempt in
1976, but there has been no indication that military
personnel with Ansar loyalties have conspired on a
broad basis.
support for the regime demonstrated by Ansar mili-
tary personnel during the Ansar rebellion in 1970
continues. Sadiq al-Mahdi, their principal leader,
could become a rallying point for Ansar discontent,
but we do not believe he has a large following in the
military. There are also exiled Ansars in Ethiopia,
The Muslim Brotherhood is a significant political
force in Sudan, but it currently supports the Nimeiri
regime, and its leader, Hasan al-Turabi, serves as
Attorney General.
Nimeiri has generally attempted to pamper the mili-
tary to ensure its continued loyalty. Last year a $5
million officers' club was erected in Khartoum. Even
though inflation quickly erodes salary increases,
Nimeiri has authorized substantial pay hikes over the
past two years. To help offset inflation, officers
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One of the most active opposition groups is the
National Unionist Party (NUP). Presently the NUP is
split between the Khatmiyyah sect, which favors ties
with Egypt, and a more leftist faction dedicated to
Nimeiri's downfall and the elimination of Egyptian
influence. In 1981 the now deceased leader of the
leftist faction reportedly sponsored an anti-Nimeiri
organization known as the National Organization of
Sudanese Officers and Soldiers, but Sudanese securi-
ty has no evidence that it was active in Sudan.
Although the Sudanese Communist Party had an
estimated 5,000 members in mid-1979, very few
probably were active-duty military personnel. Since
the abortive Communist coup in 1971, military securi-
ty has weeded out most Communist sympathizers, and
Over the past two years there has been some indica-
tion of renewed activity by a new Free Army Officers
Organization (FAOO) within the Sudanese Army.
The old FAOO provided the vehicle for President
Nimeiri to seize power in Sudan in May 1969. In
1980 FAOO leaflets were distributed to the press,
Army officers clubs, and certain opposition parties.
The leaflet claimed that the FAOO was still in
operation and would intervene in local economic and
political developments if necessary. Late in the sum-
mer of 1981, there was another distribution of FAOO
pamphlets, this time protesting corruption and incom-
petence among senior officials. No signs of FAOO
activities have appeared in 1982. Some Sudanese
military officials believe that the appearance of
FAOO leaflets in 1980-81 was the work of the NUP
and the Communists.
Prospects for Military Loyalty
Nimeiri presently appears to retain the support of
most of Sudan's military. Some US observers suggest
that this support is based less on enthusiasm for
Nimeiri than it is on the lack of a political alternative.
We believe that the military overthrow of the Nimeiri
regime remains a possibility, especially if the economy
plunges into an even more serious decline that gener-
ates massive civil unrest.
by the armed forces.
decide to enlist the support of civilian opposition
groups for a national coalition government dominated
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rioters. In such a situation, senior officers might 25X1
In 1964 the Sudanese military allowed the collapse of
the Abboud military government by taking no action
to control civilian riots. If extensive civilian riots
should again develop over economic grievances, the
military might behave similarly. If ordered to quell
unrest, senior officers might fear losing control of
junior officers and lower ranks sympathetic to the
pressed concern
Retired senior Sudanese military officers have ex-
the possibility of conspiracies against
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corruption. We believe that a coup attempt by the DIA
junior officers probably would not be successful. It is
more likely that senior officers, recognizing a threat
from the lower ranks, would stage a preemptive coup.
If senior officers failed to take action, middle-grade
officers who have direct command over large military
units might seize power rather than risk weakening
military unity
Implications for the United States
Any military government that replaced the present
regime would, in our view, be less likely to continue
the close working relationship with the United States
that has developed under Nimeiri. Even a government
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run by senior or older middle-grade officers, generally
well disposed toward Egypt and the United States,
would attempt at least initially to project the appear-
ance of independence from foreign influence in order
to strengthen its hand among those Sudanese critical
of the country's current foreign policy orientation. As
a result, Sudan's support for US positions on regional
issues-including the peace process with Israel-
might wane, and Nimeiri's offer of military facilities
to the United States might be withdrawn, if only
temporarily. Outward displays of cooperation with
Egypt, moreover, would probably cease temporarily,
including activities mandated by the integration char-
ter signed in 1982.
Nonetheless, we do not believe that a complete turn-
around in US-Sudanese relations would occur. A new
government probably would look to the United States
for continued economic and military aid. Additional-
ly, a new government could not easily replace the
security guarantees against Libyan and Ethiopian
threats that Egypt provides through the mutual de-
fense pact of 1976.
In the unlikely event that more junior officers seized
and held power, the future of Sudanese relations with
the United States and Egypt would probably be much
less favorable, but not enough is known about the
views of these officers to speculate with confidence.
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Appendix A
Military Officers in
Sudanese Cabinet Posts
Since Gaafar Nimeiri took power in May 1969,
military officers have dominated the more important
ministerial posts but have comprised a relatively small
segment of the total cabinet. Since 1969 about 16
percent of cabinet appointees have been from the
military.' Shortly after Nimeiri came to power, that
percentage rose to about 30 percent, but it now is less
than 10 percent because of the dismissals that fol-
lowed the confrontation between Nimeiri and the
former military command at the beginning of 1982.
In addition to the presidency, military officers have
normally held the post of vice president and the
ministers of defense, interior, and state security. Two-
thirds of these positions were filled by Army officers
with either an armor or infantry background, a
reflection of the strength of these branches. Converse-
ly, no prime minister, foreign minister, attorney gen-
eral, or minister of justice, except for Nimeiri himself,
has ever come from the military.
Nimeiri, a Colonel with a background in armor at the
time of the coup in 1969, has usually held two and as
many as four cabinet positions at one time. Since
1969 Nimeiri has held the post of Minister of Defense
four times. This tactic has helped to prevent one man
from establishing a significant power base within the
armed forces.
Southern military officers have had a negligible role
in the cabinet. Joseph Lagu, appointed second vice
president in June 1982, is the only one to hold a
cabinet position. The power of the second vice presi-
dent is illusory, however, since no responsibilities are
attached to this office and he is not in line to succeed
the president.
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Appendix B
Biographies
Gaafar Mohamed Nimeiri, aided by a small circle of
"Free Officers," seized power in a coup in May 1969
and named himself Prime Minister. He became Presi-
dent in September 1971 and, except for 13 months
during 1976-77, has continued to serve as Prime
Minister. Currently he holds the Defense portfolio
and is de facto Chief of Staff.
After taking over the government, Nimeiri successful-
ly overcame opposition from conservative Muslim
groups and then from Communists and their sympa-
thizers. In February 1972 he settled the 17-year-long
insurrection in the south, granted amnesty to the
rebels, gave the area partial autonomy, and integrated
southerners into the government. In February 1981 he
granted partial autonomy to other regions as wel1.7
Nimeiri has the reputation of being hard driving. He
approaches problems methodically, without much
imagination or depth. A career Army officer until the
1969 coup, Nimeiri attended the US Army Command
and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas, during 1965-66. Before coming to power he
was arrested several times for coup plotting. Once
antagonistic, Nimeiri has become increasingly friend-
ly toward the United States since the mid-1970s.
Maj. Gen. (retired) Umar Muhammad al-Tayyib has
served as Minister of State Security since 1978 and as
First Vice President since April 1982. Close to the
President, he is responsible for both internal and
external intelligence and has often acted as Nimeiri's 25X1
envoy on foreign missions. Tayyib clearly harbors
aspirations to become president.
As First Vice President, Tayyib is first in line to
succeed Nimeiri. He is unpopular with senior military
officers and leftist groups, however, and US Embassy
officials in Khartoum have questioned his compe-
tence. Nevertheless, Tayyib remains the most likely
successor to Nimeiri if the office is transferred
through constitutional means. Tayyib is favorably
disposed toward the United States, although he has 25X1
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Promoted to General and named Deputy Minister of
Defense in October, Abd al-Rahman Suwar Dahab
has also been Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics since
May 1982. Among those senior officers forcibly re-
tired in 1971 on charges of aiding a Communist-led
coup attempt, he has held several responsible positions
since his reinstatement in the armed forces in 1972.
Suwar Dahab is regarded as intelligent and hard
working by his fellow officers, although critics have
charged that he is unable to make decisions, even
routine ones. He apparently is not ambitious and has
not been politically active in recent years. He is
considered pro-British and friendly toward the United
States.
Lt. Gen. Tawfiq Abu Kadok has been Deputy Chief
of Staff for Operations since May 1982. He is senior
in prestige but ranks below the other two deputies. A
strong supporter of Nimeiri, Abu Kadok defended the
President in his confrontation with senior officers in
January 1982. He is closely associated with the
influential Minister of Presidential Affairs Baha al-
Din Idris. Abu Kadok is deeply suspicious of Ethiopia
and leads the faction within the military favoring a
more militant response to Ethiopian-based subversion
against Sudan. Strongly pro-Egyptian, he at one time
served in the Egyptian Army and has an Egyptian
wife. He is believed to be friendly toward the United
States.
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Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration since May
1982, Lieutenant General Yusif also served as a
member of the Central Committee of the Sudanese
Socialist Union until Nimeiri dissolved that body in
January 1982. Like his fellow deputy, Lt. Gen. Abu
Kadok, he supported Nimeiri during the confronta-
tion with senior officers in January. An outstanding
coordinator, Yusif is highly regarded by military
observers. Allegedly a Communist sympathizer dur-
ing the 1960s, Yusif changed his views after the
Communist-inspired coup attempt in 1971. He is now
believed to be staunchly anti-Communist and general-
ly favorable toward the United States.
Director of Military Intelligence since February 1982,
Maj. Gen. al-Sir Muhammad Ahmad is a career
intelligence officer. Al-Sir is close to Nimeiri, who
frequently consults him on internal security matters.
Since his appointment as Director, al-Sir's organiza-
tion has encroached on some of the responsibilities
held by Umar al-Tayyib's State Security Organiza-
tion. A critic of Lt. Gen. Abu Kadok, he believes
Lieutenant General Yusif should be the lone Chief of
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As commander of the Armored Corps in Khartoum,
Maj. Gen. Abd al-Azim Siddiq Muhammad is a key
figure in maintaining the regime of President Nimeiri
and protecting the capital of Sudan. He attained the
rank of major general early in his career and has led
the Armored Corps since April 1982.
A lifelong friend of President Nimeiri, Col. Abd al-
Fattah Aziz Hawari has been commander of the 500-
man Presidential Protective Troop, commonly known
as the Presidential Guard, since January 1982.
Hawari is responsible for the physical security of the
Brig. Gen. Mutasim al-Sarraj Ahmad since January
has been commander of the Airborne Brigade that is
instrumental in protecting the regime of President
Nimeiri He was promoted to brigadier in late 1980.
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Secret
Secret
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