BANGLADESH: A HANDBOOK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83S00854R000200070002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 64
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of -Secret-
Intelligence
Bangladesh: A Handbook
A Reference Aid
-Secret-
NSA 82-10547
November 1982
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Directorate of
Intelligence
-
mileS1; A
A Reference Aid
This handbook was prepared by
the Office of Near East?South Asia Analysis. The
section on Personalities was prepared b3
of the Office of Central Reference.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South Asia Division, NESA, on
and
This paper was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations and with the National Intelligence
Council.
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NESA 82-10547
November 1982
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Introduction
Information available
as of 1 November 1982
was used in this report.
Bangladesh: A Handbook
Bangladesh is one of the world's poorest and most tragic countries. Its
largely Muslim population of 93 million, crowded into an area the size of
Wisconsin, has created intense pressure on limited resources. On the basis
of current projections of an average annual population growth rate of 3.1
percent, another 9 million Bangladeshis will be added by 1985. The
country's residents have a literacy rate of only 23 percent, a yearly per cap-
ita income of $140, and a life expectancy of 48 years. Unpredictable
weather conditions can mean the difference between mere survival and
famine. Mercurial emotionalism, fervent but often temporary loyalty to
leaders, and a tendency toward political violence among Bangladeshis have
contributed to social and economic problems by hindering the establish-
ment of effective government, despite Bangladesh's ethnic homogeneity.
US interest in Bangladesh, besides humanitarian, is largely based on the
goal of preserving regional stability in South Asia. Bangladesh is too
economically and militarily weak to pose a threat to regional states, and it
must maintain a nonaligned, diplomatic stance to preserve economic aid
and to maintain smooth relations with its dominant neighbor, India.
Although mutual distrust exacerbates differences between the two coun-
tries, Bangladeshis recognize they have little choice but to cooperate with
the Indians. For leverage in the Bangladesh-Indian relationship as well as
to provide an additional donor source, Bangladesh has sought closer
relations with other Islamic countries, particularly Saudi Arabia.
Bangladesh has been an independent nation only since December 1971,
following a bloody nine-month civil war between East and West Pakistan.
During its 11 years as a nation, the country has had little political stability.
Three leaders have died by gunfire, and military coup attempts have been
frequent. The last leader to be assassinated was President Ziaur Rahman
(Zia), who had himself come to power as a result of a military coup. After
nearly six years in power, the charismatic Zia had changed Bangladesh's
image from one of hopeless poverty and disorder to that of a country
successfully attacking its problems. His assassination in May 1981 contrib-
uted to a new period of uncertainty for the country.
Given the lack of adequate civilian leadership, the military has evolved into
the dominant political institution. In March 1982, following increasing
military dissatisfaction over the aging, elected President Sattar's inability
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to handle economic problems and political corruption, Lt. Gen. H. M.
Ershad, Army Chief of Staff, orchestrated a bloodless coup and declared
martial law.
The political situation in Bangladesh remains unsettled and is not much
better than it was prior to the military takeover. Ershad, now Chief
Martial Law Administrator, is still attempting to consolidate his authority
and must govern with the consensus of some six senior military officers.
Military disunity and earlier allegations of questionable financial dealings,
which threaten Ershad's own credibility, could erode his fragile political
base and open the possibility for future military coups by disenchanted
opponents.
Continued economic deterioration is also likely to lead to political un rest.
Prospects for immediate economic improvement are poor. The economy
has been hard hit by unfavorable weather, inappropriate government
economic policies, and declining international prices for Bangladesh's
prime exports. Ershad has announced strong measures to purge the
bureaucracy of corruption and to increase domestic output. The longer
term outlook, however, hinges on how successfully the military regime
balances economic objectives against political realities. In the meantime,
Ershad is counting on Western aid and investment to bail out the country.
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Contents
Page
Introduction
Geography
111
Location
1
1
Topography
1
Climate
1
Natural Resources 3
Agriculture 3
Staple Crops 3
Livestock 3
Fish 3
Natural Gas and Minerals 3
Population 5
Human Geography 5
Society 5
Ethnic and Religious Groups 7
Language 7
Religion 7
Education 9
Health 9
Economy 11
Growth Trends
12
Income and Employment 12
Main Sectors of the Economy 13
Agriculture 13
Industry 15
Gas 15
Transportation and Communications 15
Foreign Assistance 16
Foreign Trade and Balance of Payments 16
Current Economic Policy 17
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Political Situation 19
Political Succession 19
Ershad's Programs and Staying Power 21
Structure of Government 22
Military Presence 22
Civilian Administrative Reforms 22
Opposition 25
Political Parties 25
Political Parties With Significant Constituencies 25
Bangladesh Nationalist Party 25
Awami League (Hasina) 25
Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal 26
Muslim League 26
Democratic League 26
Jamaat-e-Islami 26
Islamic Democratic League 26
Communist and Leftist Influence 27
Party Coalitions 27
Tribal Insurgency 27
Armed Forces 29
Strength and Capabilities 29
Army 30
Navy 30
Air Force 32
Paramilitary Forces 32
Bangladesh Rifles 32
Bangladesh Ansars 32
Armed Police Reserve 32
Coastal Police 32
Foreign Relations 33
India 33
Pakistan 33
China 34
USSR 35
Relations With the West 35
Islamic States 35
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US Interests 37
Economic Assistance 37
Military Assistance 37
Trade 37
Investments 37
Personalities
39
Hussain Mohammad Ershad 39
A. F. M. Ahsanuddin Choudhury 39
Mohammad Nooruddin Khan 40
Aminur Rahman Shamsud Doha 40
A. H. S. Atual Karim 41
Abul Maal Abdul Muhith 41
Humayun Rashid Choudhury 42
Jan (Mohabbat) Chowdhury 42
Abdul Mannaf
43
Atiqur Rahman
43
Chronology
45
Statistical Summary
47
Select Bibliography
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Geography
Location
About the size of Wisconsin, Bangladesh shares a
long land boundary with India on the west, north, and
east and a short land and water border with Burma in
the southeast. This irregularly shaped, low-lying, riv-
erine country has a total land area of 142,500 square
kilometers. It has a northwest-southeast extension of
764 kilometers and an east-west one of 467 kilome-
ters. Its southern seafront runs approximately 580
kilometers along the Bay of Bengal.
Topography
Except for the Chittagong Hills located in the south-
east and the marginally high ground in the northeast-
ern district of Sylhet, the distinguishing topographical
characteristic of Bangladesh is its uniformity. Most of
the country is a flat, alluvial plain that is an eastern
extension of the greater Indo-Gangetic Plain extend-
ing across the northern part of South Asia. In sum,
the country has been characterized as consisting of
old mud, new mud, and marsh.
The dominant topographic feature is a network of
rivers that flow generally north to south, with the
main river systems being the Ganges-Padma, the
Brahmaputra-Jamuna, the Meghna, and the river
junction stem and estuary on the Bay of Bengal.' This
profusion of rivers is both a valuable agricultural
resource and a nemesis. Seasonal flooding often sub-
jects Bangladeshis to widespread loss of life, crops,
and property and contributes to the severe food
shortages that the country almost perennially suffers.
Geography complicates Bangladesh's diplomatic
problems because all the large rivers, except for the
Meghna in the east, enter the country from India.
Consequently, water-sharing questions, such as the
continuing Farakka Barrage dispute, loom large in
Bangladesh-Indian relations.
' The rivers are designated by their different names in India and
Bangladesh, for example, Ganges in India and Padma in Bangla-
desh.
1
Climate
Located at about the same latitude as the Bahamas,
Bangladesh is warm and humid, with temperatures
varying between temperate and tropical. There are
basically three seasons: a hot "summer" of high
humidity from March to June; a somewhat cooler, but
still hot and humid monsoon from June through
September or early October; and a cooler, drier
"winter" from mid-October to early March.
The average temperature is 29? C, with some season-
al variation. January is the coolest month, with April
and May being the hottest. Summer temperatures
between 38? C and 41? C are occasionally reported,
although a maximum temperature range of 32?C to
36? C is more normal.
Humidity is high throughout the year. During June
and July, relative humidity across the country ranges
from 84 to 90 percent. Even during the cooler months
of November through February, the humidity range is
75 to 80 percent. The lower delta in Khulna and the
Chittagong coast are the most humid regions, al-
though the rest of the country is not far behind.
Annual rainfall averages 215 centimeters and varies
from 130 centimeters in the west to 500 centimeters
in the region of the Assam hills to the north. Rainfall
in the latter location is among the heaviest in the
world and subjects much of the area to flooding
during the rainy season. About three-fourths of the
country's annual rainfall comes from the summer, or
southwest, monsoon. Because land travel is difficult in
the rainy season, boats are a main source of
transportation.
Winds are a significant element of weather in Bangla-
desh. The most violent are rain-bearing monsoon
winds and cyclones off the Bay of Bengal; violent
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Figure 2
Agriculture and Land Use in Bangladesh
203
Rice
IAman (2 varieties) En Tea
Aus (2 varieties) (72 Jute (2 varieties)
Boro I Forest
Mean annual rainfall (cm)
152
203
254
0 190 Kilometers
0 100 Miles
CIA's Bazar
508
356
305
254
305
356
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thunderstorms called northwesters occurring from
March through May; and less frequently, tornadoes in
the flatter areas of the country.
Natural Resources
Agriculture. Agriculture is central to the nation's
economy and society. Nearly 90 percent of the popu-
lation is engaged in either growing, marketing,
transporting, or processing agricultural products. The
low level of food production is the most glaring
agricultural weakness and forces Bangladesh to im-
port substantial amounts of foodgrain. Most of the
farming population is occupied with subsistence farm-
ing. Until the early 1950s a region relatively well
supplied with food, Bangladesh now suffers from too
many people on too little land. To exacerbate matters,
Bangladesh agriculture faces the dual problem of too
much rainfall periodically, which causes flooding of
fields, and too little rainfall at other times during the
growing seasons. Because additional arable land is
practically nonexistent, increased production must be
achieved by farming the already cultivated land more
intensively and more efficiently. Additional irrigation,
drainage, and flood control facilities and an increase
in the use of fertilizer and improved seed strains are
essential to resolving Bangladesh's food production
problems.
Staple Crops. Bangladesh's principal crops are rice
and jute. The country has three separate rice crops for
the different seasons and two different methods of
planting rice. The aman rice crop is the main one and
is planted during the spring and harvested between
November and January. Aus rice is sown during the
early April and May rains and is harvested in July
and August. Boro rice, the dry season crop, is depend-
ent on irrigation. It is planted after the aman crop and
harvested in April and May. Jute, almost as critical as
rice to the society's economy, is the main cash crop
and is grown almost exclusively for export as fiber or
woven goods. Minor crops include tea, sugarcane,
oilseeds, fruits, vegetables, spices, wheat, potatoes,
tobacco, cotton, and fodder.
Livestock. Livestock play a minor role in agriculture
and are raised primarily as part of overall farming
activity. Cattle and buffalo are used mostly as draft
animals, although their milk and meat are consumed
as food. Goats, which can scavenge for food, are kept
3
Figure 3. Typical irrigation device used to empty canal in order to
harvest fish; jute dries on the bank.
to increase cash income and to provide limited
amounts of meat for farm family consumption. Sheep,
relatively few in number, are kept in the wetter areas
of the south.
Fish. Although Bangladesh, with its many waterways
and ponds, began fish culture in ancient times, com-
mercial fishing is not a respected occupation among
Bengali Muslims, even though most rural families
catch their own. Most commercial fishermen are low-
caste Hindus who eke out a bare subsistence. Despite
negative cultural attitudes, more than 80 percent of
the animal protein in the Bangladesh diet comes from
fish, and fish exports are gradually increasing as an
important source of foreign exchange earnings.
Natural Gas and Minerals. Bangladesh is poorly
endowed with mineral resources. Natural gas is its
prime energy asset, followed by some unexploited
deposits of coal. The Asian Development Bank cur-
rently estimates deposits of natural gas to be 9.6
trillion cubic feet (recoverable), and annual consump-
tion of natural gas is about 0.5 percent of this. There
are five gasfields, all in the east. Gas from these wells
is used for electricity generation, household and com-
mercial uses, and as feedstock for urea manufacture.
Coal deposits at Jamalganj near Bogra in the west are
estimated at 700 million metric tons by the Asian
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Figure 4
Population in Bangladesh
Persons per square kilometer
0 193
386
579
965
II
I
0 500
1000
1500
2500
Persons per square mile
0 190 Kilometers
0 100 Miles
Cox's Bazar
5054 1 0 1 1 ?82
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Figure 5. Pedicabs are the most popular mode of
city transportation.
Franz Furst (t) Figure 6. Villagers crowd onto public transport.
Development Bank but lie at a depth of 2,000 to 3,000
feet. Past geological surveys show that because of
technical and economic factors, exploitation is not
feasible at current prices.
Population. With an estimated population of 93 mil-
lion in 1982 and a density of about 650 persons per
square kilometer, Bangladesh is the world's eighth
most populous nation and the most densely populated
agricultural country in the world. At current projec-
tions of an average annual growth rate of 3.1 percent,
by 1985 Bangladesh will increase by 9 million per-
sons. As with other underdeveloped countries, the
population is characterized by a young age distribu-
tion-44 percent under 15 years of age.
Urbanization is a relatively new phenomenon in
Bangladesh. About 88 percent of the population lives
in rural areas. (Many of the rural residents?perhaps
as much as 50 percent?are landless.) Nevertheless,
given increased population pressure on rural lands, the
cities are growing fast. The largest city is the capital,
Dacca, with nearly 3.5 million inhabitants (see
table 1).
Bangladesh's demographic statistics reveal a popula-
tion in which mortality levels are high, with life
expectancy at birth of 48 years; nearly one-fifth of the
children die before the age of 5; nearly 16 percent of
the children 5 and under suffer from acute and
chronic malnutrition, and the growth of another 58
5
percent is stunted by chronic undernutrition; poverty
is pervasive; and only 23 percent of the population is
literate.
Bangladesh's family planning program, established in
earnest in 1976, ambitiously aims at achieving a
replacement level of fertility by 1990.2 But factors
such as traditional religious and cultural biases that
favor large families are not conducive to meeting this
goal. Table 2 indicates the statistical consequences
should attainment of this target be delayed five, 10, or
45 years. The Martial Law Administration has an-
nounced a new family planning strategy that entrusts
village leaders with motivating villagers to adopt birth
control measures. Field workers will be sent to each
house to discuss the merits of a small family, a
difficult task given the reluctance of a traditional
Muslim society that considers birth control against
the will of God.
Human Geography
Society. The name "Bangladesh" means the land, or
home, of Bengalis.' Although politically divided, Ben-
galis display an intense cultural homogeneity and tend
Replacement level of fertility is defined as the number of births
(about two per couple) at which a population will just reproduce
itself, given the level of mortality.
' In this handbook, the residents of Bangladesh will be called
Bangladeshis to distinguish them from those Bengalis who live in
India.
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Table 1
Population of Municipalities
Thousands Table 2
Population in the Year 2000
(Under Varying Assumptions)
1974
1981
Year in Which Replacement Level
Is Achieved
Dacca
1,679.6
3,458.6
1990
1995
2000
2035
Chittagong
944.6
1,388.5
Population in the year 2000
113
117
122
141
Khulna
437.3
623.2
(million)
Rajshahi
132.9
171.6
Density per sq. km
849
879
917
1,060
Sylhet
59.5
166.8
Persons per cultivable
1.9
2.0
2.1
2.4
Barisal
98.1
159.3
hectare b
Rangpur
72.8
156.0
Dependency ratio c (percent)
44
47
57
71
Jessore
76.1
149.4
Food requirement (million
19.8
20.5
21.4
24.7
Saidpur
90.1
128.1
metric tons) d
Comilla
86.4
126.1
Children of school age
19.0
21.5
25.1
34.6
(millions) e
Mymensingh
76.0
107.9
Working-age population
76.1
77.6
78.4
80.5
Sirajgonj
74.5
104.5
(millions) f
Pabna
62.2
101.1
a Based on an area of 133,040 square kilometers, which excludes
Source: Census data as reported in Bangladesh Census Commission.
river area.
to view themselves as superior to non-Bengalis. Their
legends tell of the exploitation of both land and people
by alien rulers and of steadfast and violent Bengali
resistance. Bengali culture represents a fusion of
influences: nature and animism expressed in folk
traditions; Hinduism and Buddhism, followed by
Mughal Islam from the medieval period until about
1800; the impact of Western modernism, especially as
conveyed by the British presence to 1947; and the
nationalist experience since that time.
Bengali society has yet to emerge from its traumatic
history sufficiently to develop an effective social elite
at the national level or stability in the predominantly
rural society. Before the exodus of the Hindu zamin-
dar (landlord) elite in the late 1940s following parti-
tion and the land reform of the early 1950s, the Hindu
zamindars provided a framework for a relatively
stable, although inequitable, social organization. Hin-
dus controlled the majority of all large rural landhold-
ings, urban real estate, and government jobs in East
Bengal and dominated finance, commerce, and the
professions. Following the Hindus' departure, upper
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b Total cultivable area is taken as 9.3 million hectares-net of
uncultivable area and forests.
c Ratio of persons in dependent ages, under 15 and over 64, to those
in the economically productive years (15 to 64).
d Total requirements based on a consumption target of 0.4 kilogram
of foodgrains per capita per day plus 10 percent for losses, feed, and
seeds.
e Children aged 5 to 14.
f Working-age population, 15 to 60 years.
Source: World Bank, March 1982.
level positions of control and policymaking fell to the
West Pakistanis. Thus, Bangladesh emerged from its
war for independence in 1971 without an economic
and governmental elite to fill the hastily vacated high-
level government and industrial positions.
Most of the country is ethnically uniform, in the sense
of being occupied by Bengali-speaking Muslims, but
cultural differences by region do exist. The people of
the central and southwest delta region dominate
among the Bangladeshis socially, culturally, and polit-
ically; the people of the trans-Meghna region of the
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east and southeast tend to be more religious, enter-
prising, and adventurous; and the inhabitants of the
northern region are more tolerant of social
differences.
The majority of Bangladeshis still live in rural villages
of a few hundred to a thousand people. There are
some 65,000 villages throughout the country. These
clusters of peasant homesteads form hamlets or paras,
which represent the first level of community structure
above that of the family. Residents of neighboring
hamlets interact with one another and commonly see
themselves as a socially and religiously distinct com-
munity, or samaj, which may not always correspond
geographically to the official village boundaries.
Within such a loose structure, the wealthier families
tend to exercise predominant social influence.
Few people travel much outside their village except to
market. New ideas have little influence and percolate
slowly; it is difficult for most rural Bangladeshis to
imagine how life can be improved. Bangladeshis,
particularly in the rural areas, believe that their lives
are governed by takdir, viewed as the predestined
limits and opportunities bestowed by Allah upon each
individual. More positively, however, each person has
been granted potentialities by Allah and is expected to
attempt to realize them. Bengalis look favorably on
the ability to mobilize other persons and to establish
social ties with those powerful enough to be instru-
mental in the achievement of one's ends.
Family and kinship form the core of social life, and
groups of kinsmen function to some extent as corpo-
rate entities. Following the doctrine of Islam, empha-
sis is placed on the value of being part of a household
or ban. The family unit is ideally composed of a man
and his wife, his sons and their wives and children,
and his unmarried daughters. Distant relatives may
board with a family while attending school or working
at a job. Divorced daughters and their children and
occasionally a married daughter and her husband
may take up residence in the father's ban i and share in
the work and food of the family.
Death of the father usually precipitates the separation
of adult sons into their own households. Such a split
generally causes little change in the physical layout of
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the ban. The brothers simply divide the fields and
other property their father held and used for their
common benefit and establish their own common
hearth or cula where each wife cooks for her own
small household. As the brothers' sons grow and
marry, the cycle begins again.
Ethnic and Religious Groups. Outside of the Bengali
Muslim population, there are approximately 13 mil-
lion Hindus, most of whom are also Bengali, and
several hundred thousand tribal peoples in Bangla-
desh. About three-fourths of the Hindus in Bangla-
desh are of the Namashudra caste, one of the lowest
groups. Most of the rest belong to other formerly
untouchable groups. Generally, these Hindus occupy
low social and economic positions. Some members of
higher castes belong to the middle or professional
class, but there is no Hindu upper class. The Hindus
are concentrated mainly in the areas bordering India,
such as Khulna, Jessore, Sylhet, and Dinajpur, al-
though some are located in the more central district of
Faridpur.
The 600,000 or so tribal peoples live mainly in the
Chittagong Hill Tracts, where they engage in agricul-
ture. The tribes are racially and culturally more akin
to the Burmese. They speak Tibeto-Burman rather
than an Indo-European language and are predomi-
nantly Buddhists.
Language. All but 2 percent of the population speak
the official Bangla language. Outside of the cities,
English is not widely spoken. Bangla is the eastern-
most of the broad grouping of Indo-European lan-
guages. It is a derivative of the eastern Prakrit
subgroup of languages stemming from Sanskrit. The
language and its script are identifiable from about
1000 A.D., although some scholars favor a date of
about two centuries earlier.
Religion. A secular, predominantly Muslim state,
Bangladesh derives an important part of its national
identity from its religious character. Islam plays a
significant role in the country's social structure and
has considerable influence on the daily lives of Ban-
gladeshis. Although loyalty to Islam is widespread,
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Figure 7. The Great Mosque is one of the more
than 700 mosques in Dacca.
Franz Furst
observance varies with social position and geographic
location. Adherence to Islamic tenets is more perva-
sive in the rural areas than in the few large cities
where exposure to modern influences is stronger. In
the villages religious leaders have a great deal of
authority over the moral conduct of Bangladeshis.
The ulama (religious leaders and scholars) do not
perform the official judicial functions they perform in
some other Muslim countries. In Bangladesh there are
no official sharia (Islamic law) courts; rather, the
British legal system is used. In matters of personal
law, there are local judges or lawyers (qadis) whose
advice is often sought and followed.
Secret
Nearly all of Bangladesh's Muslim population is of
the Hanafi sect of Sunni Islam; there are only a few
thousand Shiites. Bangladeshis practice Islam some-
what differently from their Arab and Persian coreli-
gionists, primarily because of the influence Hinduism
has had upon their culture. Islamic observances are
looser, and, particularly among the uneducated and
rural populations, belief and practice tend to incorpo-
rate elements that vary from, or even conflict with,
the teachings of orthodox Islam.
The spread of Islam in East Bengal was more the
result of conversion than conquest; dissatisfied with
Buddhism and opposed to Hinduism, which put the
majority of the population of East Bengal into the
lower caste, vast numbers of Bengalis were attracted
by the Islamic doctrine of the equality of all men
before God. But they retained many of their old
rituals and incorporated them into their new faith.
Despite several reform efforts in the 19th century to
bring Islamic practices in their country more into
conformity with orthodox Islam, Bangladeshis enjoy
their religious distinction. Claiming to be as pious as
other Muslims, they acknowledge that their observ-
ance is less formal but also less prone to fanaticism.
A second elemeilt strong in Bangladesh Islam is
Sufism, a mystical movement that evolved early in
Islamic history as a kind of popular Islam emphasiz-
ing love of God rather than the fear of God preached
by the ulama. Sufism prevails in Bangladesh to a
greater extent than in most other Muslim countries
because of the convergence of Sufi beliefs with the
mysticism influential in much of South Asian culture.
During their travels, Sufi teachers came to be vener-
ated as saints (pirs), and the tradition of seeking the
intercession of pirs is still common, particularly in the
Chittagong and Sylhet districts. In some areas the
shrines of saints almost outnumber the mosques.
At times the functions of the pirs and the ulama
overlap, but in general the two kinds of religious
leadership are distinguished by their qualifications.
The ulama undergo formal training in Islamic law,
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whereas the pir gains his powers through various
mystical experiences and may have no formal school-
ing. A Muslim may go to the pir for personal
inspiration, but he neither wants nor expects the pir to
lead communal prayers or deliver the weekly sermon.
Islam plays little current role in Bangladesh politics,
although it could be used by dissatisfied groups to
trigger political opposition. Religion has been an
important symbol in East Bengali politics in the past,
particularly in the prepartition period when it was
used to politicize the predominantly Muslim rural
peasantry of East Bengal against their Hindu land-
lords. During the period of Pakistani rule, however,
Bengali politicians became increasingly concerned
with what they saw to be West Pakistani threats to
their cultural and linguistic heritage, as well as
general neglect of Bengali interests, and the defense
of these interests superseded Islam as a political
rallying point. Today, both Islamic commitment and
Bengali ethnicity remain compelling elements in Ban-
gladesh's national identity.
No religious leaders have achieved widespread recog-
nition based entirely on religious credentials. A num-
ber of ulama have achieved prominence, however,
through their participation in party politics. They are
viewed as politicians first and religious leaders second.
The somewhat apolitical stance of the ulama has been
attributed to the British colonial policy of removing
religious instruction from the educational main-
stream, with the result that most students are taught
only secular subjects. The limited political and finan-
cial support given to Islamic political parties and the
political noninvolvement of Islamic social and reli-
gious organizations are contributing factors.
Education. The productivity of Bangladesh's labor
force is severely limited by the constraints and short-
comings of the educational system. About 77 percent
of Bangladesh's population is illiterate, and only
5 percent of its labor force has graduated from high
school or an institution of higher learning. Attempts
at large-scale functional literacy programs have been
largely unsuccessful because the curriculum does not
relate to the participants' needs. Those involved have
9
not been convinced of the benefits, and insufficient
attention has been paid to overall planning and
coordination.
The basic structure of the formal educational system
has remained almost unchanged since 1947, except
for limited expansion of technical education. Develop-
ment plans since independence have attempted to
meet educational shortcomings by increasing the
number of trained teachers for primary and secondary
schools, strengthening science education, emphasizing
vocational and technical education, making higher
education more selective, introducing adult literacy
programs, and giving special attention to female
education. The main institutions of higher learning
are the six universities?four comprehensive located
in Dacca, Chittagong, Rajshahi, and Savar and two
technical in Dacca and Mymensingh. As of 1977, the
universities had nearly 28,000 students.
The government's failures to fulfill its plans and its
lack of commitment to educational development have
been the primary reasons for the lack of educational
improvement. The Bangladesh Government will have
to improve the quality of instruction, correct the
serious imbalance between the curriculum and the
skill needs of the economy, and eliminate inadequate
management in order to tackle the basic flaws of the
existing educational system.
Health. As a result of poor nutrition and sanitation,
Bangladeshis suffer from a variety of diseases, and
mortality levels are high. Medical services are inade-
quate to take care of the country's health problems.
Bangladesh is one of the few countries in the world
where males have a lower mortality rate than females,
mainly the result of high female mortality in the
childbearing years. Projected life expectancies at
birth for males are 49.9 years and for females 47.3
years. Young children suffer disproportionately from
diseases, accounting for 40 percent of deaths annual-
ly. The major cause of child death is a series of severe
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diarrheas. Infectious diseases such as malaria and
tuberculosis afflict a significant proportion of the
population.
Although Bangladesh ranks above comparable low-
income countries such as Kampuchea, Ethiopia, and
Mali in life expectancy, it falls below regional neigh-
bors India and Pakistan in the number of available
physicians. According to 1977 World Bank data,
calorie intake levels for all three South Asian coun-
tries are similar.
To alleviate the shortage of doctors, the military
government has banned Bangladesh doctors from
seeking overseas employment prior to serving in rural
areas of Bangladesh for a minimum of five years.
Only a small number of the doctors who complete
their service in rural areas will be allowed to emigrate.
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Economy
Neither nature nor circumstance has favored the
fragile Bangladesh economy. Overwhelmingly agri-
cultural, Bangladesh depends heavily on a semitropi-
cal monsoon climate. A minor shift in rainfall pat-
terns can spell the difference between famine and
sufficiency. Central to Bangladesh's poverty is the
rapidly expanding population and a production struc-
ture that has been unable to keep pace. Unrelenting
population growth in turn has forced Bangladeshis to
farm all available land, although traditional agricul-
tural techniques and yields remain relatively un-
changed. In addition, the economy has undergone
several major political disruptions over the past few
decades.
Bangladesh's economic institutions are still embryon-
ic. Economic policy was formulated in London and
Calcutta during colonial rule and in West Pakistan
between 1947 and 1971. Priority was not given by
either center to the development of the area that is
now Bangladesh. Pakistan's efforts for promoting
economic growth in the area were made through a
series of five-year plans that emphasized industrial
development, irrigation, and multiple cropping to
increase cultivated acreage. The economy grew, but
the population grew even faster, and the growth in
agricultural output did not benefit most Bangladeshis.
Pakistan's emphasis on industrialization was also
unfavorable for East Pakistan because of the lack of
natural resources to support industries and the need to
find productive employment for the rapidly growing
labor force. The problems of declining rural incomes,
a heavy dependence on imports, and an unfavorable
balance of payments were partly hidden prior to
independence by the flow of goods between West and
East Pakistan because the trade was in a common
currency and largely exempt from outside competi-
tion. When this link was broken and foreign trade had
to be conducted in world markets, the import depend-
ence and balance-of-payments problems became im-
mediately apparent.
11
From its inception in 1971, the war-beleaguered
nation was faced with the resettlement of some 10
million war refugees, a transportation and communi-
cations network in need of extensive repair, and the
transformation of government from a provincial to a
national administration, with the added burden of
increased staffing requirements following the nation-
alization of most industries and banks and the depar-
ture of West Pakistani businessmen. Early on, poor
harvests and devastating floods, scarcity of goods,
inflation, declining real wages, rapid population
growth, and labor unrest heightened existing econom-
ic problems and encouraged political instability.
Little could be done to counteract the balance-of-
payments crisis in the early years except to attempt to
economize in imports and increase jute export prices,
already depressed by the competition of synthetics. To
make matters worse, neither export performance nor
the inflow of aid lived up to expectations. The first
five-year plan (1973-78) had to be scrapped and
replaced by a scaled-down program (1976-78) in
response to the enormous economic difficulties.
During 1976-81 Bangladesh emerged from a period of
dismal slump to one of limited progress, fueled by
heavier aid inflows and relative political stability
under President Ziaur Rahman, under whose leader-
ship the ambitious second five-year plan (1980-85)
was formulated. Zia's economic policy was simple
and, for the most part, pragmatic. Some 220 smaller
enterprises nationalized by the Awami League were
returned to private ownership, although Zia did not
denationalize the large and more profitable jute and
textile industries, which partly offset the benefits of
his policy aimed at encouraging foreign investment.
During 1976-81 real gross domestic product (GDP)
increased at an average annual rate of 5 percent. The
most important gains were in agriculture, with food-
grain production increasing substantially. Despite the
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influx of $5.2 billion in foreign aid, real per capita
income rose only slightly, primarily as a result of high
population growth.
Growth Trends
Despite muted economic prosperity, the growth prior
to Zia's assassination masked structural problems
such as unbalanced sector growth, stagnation in in-
dustrial productivity, low investment, and inadequate
infrastructure and tax base. Bangladesh currently
faces serious budgetary and balance-of-payments
problems. The financing of larger foodgrain stockpiles
and additional storage facilities in FY 1980/81 con-
tributed to Bangladesh's financial difficulties by plac-
ing an unexpected strain on the national budget at a
time when foreign aid disbursements were falling
below the Bangladesh Government's planning esti-
mates. The aid picture has been further clouded by
the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) withdrawal
of funding for a stabilization program, prompted by
Dacca's fiscal irresponsibility under President Sattar.
The national budget remains under stress, owing
mainly to large increases in the food budget and to
shortfalls in revenue from subsidized foodstuffs and
commodity aid receipts below budget levels (see
table 3). No real economic growth was achieved
during the fiscal year that ended 30 June 1982,
compared to the previous year's rise of 7.4 percent.
Income and Employment
Within a small and already overcrowded land area,
the faltering economy of Bangladesh is further bur-
dened by a huge, rapidly growing population, almost
half of which is under 15 years of age. With an
extremely low per capita income of $140, an increase
of only $70 since 1975, Bangladesh is one of the
world's poorest countries.
The population problem has given rise to unemploy-
ment and underemployment, which affect about a
third of the labor force. The size of the labor force in
1981 was estimated at 32.4 million, and net labor
growth throughout the 1980s will reach unprecedent-
ed levels. Figure 8 gives a breakdown of the country's
employment. Nearly 80 percent of the largely mal-
nourished, unskilled, and uneducated labor force is
Secret
Figure 8
angladesh: Employment by Sector
Employed (millions)
Other Services (10.00%)
Power and Gas
Construction
Bank and Insurance
Transport and Storage
Trade
Industry
Agriculture
(0.06%)
(0.20%)
(0.30%)
(2.00%)
(4.00%)
(4.70%)
(79.00%)
0.01
0.05
0.10
Source: US Embassy, Dacca, June 1982
587990 10-82
employed in agriculture, where underemployment
prevails. Wages and productivity in the small industri-
al sector are low.
Unemployment is hard to measure, according to
World Bank and US Embassy reports. Official Ban-
gladesh statistics cite an unemployment rate of 11
percent, compared to USAID estimates of nearly 30
percent, which include disguised unemployment and
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Table 3
Bangladesh: Balance of Payments
Million US $
FY 1977
FY 1978
FY 1979
FY 1980
FY 1981
FY 1982 a
FY 1983 a
Trade balance
?405
?852
?922
?1,685
?1,773
?1,770
?2,085
Exports (free on board)
460
497
611
687
751
650
595
Imports (cost, insurance, and
freight)
?865
?1,349
?1,533
?2,372
?2,524
?2,420
?2,680
Net services
?29
?32
?27
3
11
?70
?120
Workers' remittances
81
113
143
210
365
400
450
Current account balance
?353
?771
?806
?1,472
?1,397
?1,440
?1,755
Amortization
30
37
57
66
45
55
73
Foreign capital requirements
383
808
863
1,538
1,442
1,495
1,828
Financed by:
Grant and grant-like flows
265
393
553
686
542
620
660
Medium- and long-term loans (net)
238
398
420
470
560
550
610
Other capital flows (net)
?26
?2
?2
106
59
105
Changes in reserves
27
44
76
87
26
Errors and omissions
?35
?62
?27
41
26
?23
Surplus/Deficit (?)
86
?37
157
?148
?229
?220
?535
a Estimated.
Sources: World Bank, 1982 and IMF documents, 1982.
underemployment. The Asian Development Bank re-
ports that only 1.6 million new jobs were created
between 1977 and 1980, while new entrants to the
labor force totaled 3 to 4 million. The second five-year
plan optimistically projects the creation of 5.2 million
new jobs by 1985, of which 3.2 million are to be in
agriculture and 600,000 in small-scale and cottage
industries. Nonetheless, combined domestic finances
and foreign assistance are insufficient to deal with
impending labor force growth.
The export of Bangladesh manpower, particularly to
the Middle East, is an important source of foreign
exchange and a partial short-term solution to the
current unemployment problem. The Martial Law
Administration plans to encourage labor migration.
13
Main Sectors of the Economy
Agriculture. Agricultural output accounts for more
than 55 percent of Bangladesh's GDP. Jute is the
most important cash crop for Bangladesh farmers and
provides income for a large number of landless labor-
ers. Rice is the main foodcrop. Wheat and potatoes
are minor crops of increasing importance due to
governmental emphasis. Relatively small amounts of
sugarcane and tea are also grown.
Although agricultural production levels continue to be
highly dependent on weather, some gains are being
made in reducing the vulnerability of crops to weather
damage. Bangladesh has fertile soil and great poten-
tial for increased food production through the provi-
sion of more irrigation and drainage and flood control,
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Figure 9
Fuel, Industry, and Power in Bangladesh
Rangpur.
*.JarnSlganj
Bogra.
Mahal
Sirijganj
c&so
0 Gasfield cEia, Jute mill
a Petroleum refinery 11 Textile mill
;. Fertilizer plant * Leather
* Coal deposit n Hydroelectric
Al Thermal electric
.Mymensingh
ceO;' x621
Ghorbsil
Chhitak
Sy!het
0
Fenchuganje
0Habiganj
Bheramara
Kush%
Dacca
63,*
Tungi
c&)
arsinghtT
Si Frli
Titis cg0 LS,
huganj
? Siddhirganj Field
?Iladanganj
O?
Bakhrihad
cEpgessore Narlyanganj
acids-011GB,
190 Kilometers
100 Miles
Cons Bizir
505409 11-82
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Figure 10. Boat truffle is the primary means of transporting goods Figure 11. Pedicabs and oxcarts pulled by men are common
to market; these newly made clay water jugs are being taken to methods of transporting goods by road.
Dacca for sale.
which is a necessary condition for facilitating the
efficient use of fertilizer and high-yield varieties of
grain.
Industry. The industrial sector contributed approxi-
mately 8.4 percent of Bangladesh's GDP in FY
1 980/81 and consists primarily of the manufacture of
jute goods, with textiles playing an important second-
ary role. Domestic fertilizer production is of growing
importance to both the industrial and agricultural
sectors. Smaller industries include newsprint, leather
goods, pharmaceuticals, and chemicals. Although a
shift toward the private sector has developed over the
past five years, the public sector still predominates.
Gas. Bangladesh has substantial quantities of natural
gas located in the eastern part of the country. In the
absence of a cross-country gas pipeline, the western
part is almost totally dependent on the use of petro-
leum products for power generation and industrial
energy. Total reserves in one offshore and eight inland
fields are conservatively estimated at nearly 10 trillion
cubic feet. Two fertilizer plants using natural gas are
now operating, and another is under construction. No
domestic oil has been discovered, although foreign
companies have drilled offshore exploratory wells in
recent years.
15
Transportation and Communications
Topography, insufficient financial resources, and
shortages of maintenance personnel and equipment
have retarded the development of an adequate trans-
portation network. The country's flat terrain and
numerous river systems are the basis for 7,000 kilo-
meters of inland waterways, which account for most
of the movement of goods and people. The rivers,
however, have inhibited the development of road and
rail transportation. Adding to the difficulties of con-
structing new travel routes, road and rail embank-
ments may block natural drainage and introduce
additional flooding. Thus, in contrast to its more
numerous river routes, Bangladesh has only slightly
more than 4,000 kilometers of paved highway and
roughly the same amount of railroad. Most rail lines
in Bangladesh, built largely under British rule, run
north-south, following the natural course of the rivers.
Bangladesh Biman is the national airline, with the
principal airport being the new Zia International
Airport located 10 kilometers west of Dacca. Bangla-
desh has a fairly efficient domestic wire, microwave,
and broadcast service, although there is an average of
only 0.1 telephone per 100 persons.
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Foreign Assistance
Given its inadequate economic structure, low domes-
tic savings, and massive trade deficit, foreign aid is
essential to Bangladesh's economy. According to the
US Embassy, net aid disbursement to Bangladesh
during 1976-81 totaled $5.2 billion. Bangladesh has
been the recipient of food aid of about $200 million
per annum in normal years and close to $400 million
per annum during the poor crop years of FY 1975 and
FY 1980.
Bangladesh receives aid from several contributors.
According to the IMF, in 1980-81 about 85 percent of
external aid to Bangladesh was provided by interna-
tional organizations and countries belonging to the
Bangladesh Aid Group. Member countries include
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. Japan was the
largest bilateral donor followed by the United States,
West Germany, Canada, and the United Kingdom;
these five countries accounted for over 42 percent of
total aid disbursements. Other donors include Middle
Eastern countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and Ku-
wait, and various Communist countries (see table 4).
Foreign Trade and Balance of Payments
Bangladesh faces persistent balance-of-payments and
foreign exchange problems caused by a massive trade
deficit, due in part to the present recession in the
world jute market. Bangladesh has not yet developed
a sufficiently diversified export sector capable of
counterbalancing the fluctuations in jute export earn-
ings and the high price of petroleum imports, upon
which it must spend 70 percent of its export earnings
to meet domestic energy needs. Bangladesh recorded
a trade deficit for FY 1981/82 of $1.8 billion, roughly
the same as the previous year's deficit.
Bangladesh's major trading partners in exports are
the United States (14 percent) and the USSR
(8 percent); major import trade partners are the
United States (19 percent) and Japan (12 percent).
The official exchange rate is the equivalent of 20.4
taka per US dollar, according to the IMF.
Secret
Table 4
Aid Donors, FY 1980/81
Million US $
Source
Food
Project
Commodity
Total
International and private
organizations
Asian Development
Bank
164.3
164.3
European Economic
Community
22.0
9.6
3.3
34.9
Ford Foundation
1.0
1.0
International Develop-
ment Association
269.0
65.0
334.0
Islamic Development
Bank
10.0
10.0
OPEC
21.0
21.0
UN organizations
30.0
35.0
65.0
UNICEF
18.0
18.0
Individual countries
Australia
16.8
1.3
1.9
20.0
Canada
22.5
17.4
39.9
China
16.7
16.7
Denmark
16.8
2.4
19.2
Finland
1.2
2.0
3.2
France
2.0
64.2
3.8
70.0
Iraq
30.0
30.0
Japan
40.3
94.0
97.7
232.0
Kuwait
41.2
41.2
Netherlands
5.0
44.0
35.0
84.0
Norway
10.4
12.0
22.4
Saudi Arabia a
Sweden
13.6
12.4
26.0
Switzerland
2.7
7.5
10.2
United Kingdom
6.0
6.0
United States
72.8
72.6
36.4
181.8
USSR
70.2
70.2
West Germany
8.0
20.0
40.0
68.0
a Although Saudi Arabia contributed $505 million between 1974
and 1982, no data are available indicating whether donor aid was
provided in FY 1980/81.
Source: Bangladesh Ministry of Finance, 1981.
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Current Economic Policy
In an attempt to arrest the decline in Bangladesh's
economy, the Ershad government has called for ambi-
tious economic reforms. A key proposal in Ershad's
program is significantly greater private-sector partici-
pation and reduced public-sector activity, a departure
from the previous emphasis on a gradual increase in
private-sector involvement.
The most important, but perhaps most controversial,
aspect of Ershad's policy changes is the emphasis on
consumer austerity, which will lead to a temporary
drop in the already low standard of living. A sizable
rise in consumer prices, such as the doubling of public
transportation fares and substantial increases in the
cost of food and fuel, are economically sensible in the
long term but politically risky over the shorter term.
Ershad needs to win workers' trust to implement these
announced policy changes. Given the current popular
attitude of uncertainty and growing skepticism, such
support may be slow in coming.
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Political Situation
Although some 3,000 years of recorded history pre-
cede the existence of modern-day Bangladesh, the
country has been a separate nation only since Decem-
ber 1971, following a bloody nine-month civil war
between East and West Pakistan. Previously the area
was known as East Bengal under the British Indian
state of Bengal and as East Pakistan or the East Wing
after the partition of India in 1947. Bengali resistance
to alien political rule often has been stubborn and
violent. Even the chronicles of Mughal Empire histo-
rians refer to Bengal not only as an excellent source of
war elephants, but also as a region in which whole
armies were obliterated. Under British rule, Bengali
Muslim representation in the British Indian Army
and civil service was slight, as their loyalty was
questionable.
After Pakistan was established in 1947, Bengalis
continued to play a minor role in the new government.
Bengalis responded to domination by West Pakistan
with agitation for provincial and cultural autonomy
and played a major part in organizing the Awami
League in 1949 in opposition to the ruling Muslim
League. In January 1971 the Awami League won an
overwhelming political victory in East Pakistan but
almost no support in West Pakistan in the country's
first direct general elections. Although the League
had a majority in the National Assembly, then Paki-
stan People's Party leader Zulfikar Ali Bhutto ques-
tioned the League's ability to form a government. On
25 March 1971 following unsuccessful negotiations
between the League and West Pakistani leaders, the
Pakistani Army moved to suppress the League.
Sheikh Mujib was arrested, but Ziaur Rahman, then
a Pakistani military officer, declared Bangladesh
independence. During the ensuing civil war, the Ban-
gladesh Awami League existed as a mass party
unifying a variety of disparate elements under the
banner of Bengali nationalism.
The war increased tensions between India and Paki-
stan. Despite appeals by third parties for restraint,
open hostilities between the two states began in late
November 1971. By early December the Pakistani
19
Air Force attacked military targets in northern India.
India retaliated by launching a ground, air, and naval
invasion of East Pakistan, closing in on Dacca. On
16 December Pakistani forces surrendered in Dacca,
and the new but heavily war-damaged nation of
Bangladesh emerged.
Political Succession
During Bangladesh's 11 years of political independ-
ence three of the country's leaders have been assassi-
nated, and military coup attempts have been numer-
ous (see table 5). When Sheikh Mujibur Rahman
returned to Dacca from imprisonment in Pakistan in
early January 1972, a new government was formed
with Mujib as Prime Minister. Although the govern-
ment was nominally headed by the President, actual
executive authority was exercised by the Prime
Minister.
On 25 January 1975 an amendment to the constitu-
tion created a presidential system and allowed for the
establishment of a one-party state. All political parties
were abolished and a single new party created. The
judicial system and parliament were modified, and
Mujib assumed the presidency. Promised political
reforms were slow in coming, however, and Mujib's
policies came under increasing criticism. In a coup in
August 1975 Mujib was killed by junior army officers
bent on ending what had become a corrupt, ineffec-
tive, and violence-plagued government.
A second military coup followed in November 1975,
with a countercoup ensuing only four days later.
Following this chaotic power shuffle, Army Chief of
Staff General Ziaur Rahman (Zia) emerged as the
new leader of Bangladesh and instituted a martial law
administration. Zia pledged the Army's obedience to
the civilian government under Chief Justice A. S. M.
Sayem. President Sayem declared himself Chief Mar-
tial Law Administrator and appointed the heads of
the three services as deputy chiefs. He replaced the
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Table 5
Chronology of Leadership Accession (1971-82)
Dates of Leadership
Domestic Policy
Foreign Policy
Termination
President and Prime Minis-
ter Sheikh Mujibur Rahman
(Mujib)
March 1971?August
1975
Based on four principles of
nationalism, democracy, so-
cialism, and secularism; re-
habilitation and reconstruc-
tion of war-ravaged
economy and society; creat-
ed one-party state.
Pro-Indian and pro-
Soviet.
Assassinated in coup
by middle-level
officers.
President Khondokar Mush- August 1975-3 Novem-
taque Ahmed ber 1975
Banned political activity.
Moved away from
India.
Removed in bloodless
military coup as a re-
sult of "corruption."
Maj. Gen. Khalid Mushar-
raf
3 November-6 Novem-
ber 1975
Pro-Indian and pro-
Soviet.
Assassinated in
countercoup as a re-
sult of enlisted men's
mutiny.
Chief Martial Law Admin-
istrator (CMLA) and Presi-
dent Abu Sadat Mohammad
Sayem
6 November 1975-29
November 1976 as
CMLA, although he was
figurehead to Zia; re-
mained as President un-
til April 1977
Replaced cabinet with advi-
sory council; promised
elections by February 1977.
Set stage for Zia's
policies.
Resigned for health
reasons.
Chief Martial Law Admin-
istrator and President Maj.
Gen.Ziaur Rahman (Zia)
November 1976?May
1981; confirmed Presi-
dent in a May 1977 ref-
erendum and formally
elected President in June
1978
Restored democratic/civi-
lian government; held par-
liamentary elections Febru-
ary 1979; initiated energetic
economic and development
program that emphasized
self-sufficiency in food and
family planning; allowed re-
stricted reorganization of
political parties.
Moved further away Assassinated in coup
from India and attempt.
USSR and closer to
China and US; in-
creased ties to Islam-
ic countries; became
active in Nonaligned
Movement.
President Abdus Sattar
November 1981?March
1982
Failed to develop economic
and political reforms.
Followed same for-
eign policies as Presi-
dent Zia.
Removed in bloodless
coup.
Chief Martial Law Admin-
istrator Lt. Gen. Hussain
Mohammad Ershad
March 1982-
Anticorruption drive;
streamlining bureaucracy;
wants to make industry more
productive and reform legal
system; wants to use thanas
or rural areas as focus of
local government.
Conservative; pro-
Western; pro-Chi-
nese; pro-Islamic;
wants to establish
closer relations with
Pakistan.
Cabinet with an advisory council composed of politi-
cally uninvolved civilian officials and military officers.
Parliament was dissolved, and new elections were
promised by February 1977. Although President
Sayem retained the civil authority, he was only a
figurehead; real power was held by General Zia.
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Under Zia, the political and military structure be-
came more intertwined. In November 1976 General
Zia declared himself Chief Martial Law Administra-
tor. He further consolidated his authority in May
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1977, when he was confirmed President by a referen-
dum after Sayem retired in ill health, and in February
1979 when a new parliament, dominated by Zia's
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) was elected. Zia
obtained the support of the military elite by giving
coveted high-level positions to some of his former
military colleagues. He further politicized the mili-
tary by supporting promilitary civilian candidates to
the National Assembly. The result was that major
government policies required the tacit, if not direct,
approval of the military leadership.
During the ensuing two-year period, political polar-
ization in the military set in. A rift between the officer
corps and some discontented enlisted men, who even-
tually mutinied, forced Zia to begin diffusing power
in the armed forces. Zia's concurrent steps to secure
the loyalty of radical-leaning officers and enlisted
men by granting blanket pardons and giving them
positions of trust in the Army encouraged opportun-
ism among these elements.
On 30 May 1981, while on a visit to the port city of
Chittagong, Zia was killed during a coup attempt.
Those responsible were a longtime rival, Maj. Gen.
Muhammad Abul Manzoor, and a group of young
officers whom Zia had reputedly refused to discipline
despite persistent recommendations from senior mili-
tary advisers. The attempted coup failed, and the
major conspirators were arrested and executed.
An orderly transfer of power seemed unlikely in the
aftermath of Zia's assassination. Army intervention to
restore order after the arrest of the coup plotters
appeared imminent as Acting President Sattar was
seriously ill. Nonetheless, although Army Chief of
Staff Ershad deployed troops throughout the country
prior to the presidential election in November 1981,
the Army limited itself to maintaining order during
the polling. Sattar won a surprisingly large victory
running as a BNP compromise candidate in an unusu-
ally calm and fair election.
In early 1982 rising tension between President Sattar
and members of the BNP over Army demands for
more power led to a military takeover. The military
had become increasingly dissatisfied with the elderly
Sattar and his reluctance to deal with Bangladesh's
severe economic problems. By February the real
21
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authority in Bangladesh was the military, although
Ershad initially hesitated to move directly against the
government.
On 24 March Ershad orchestrated a bloodless coup,
declared martial law, and assumed the position of
Chief Martial Law Administrator. The President,
Vice President, Prime Minister, Cabinet ministers,
and speaker of the parliament were removed from
office. Parliament was dissolved, and the constitution
was suspended. Activity among Bangladesh's numer-
ous political parties was banned. Although a figure-
head civilian president, retired judge Abul Fazal
Mohammad Ahsanuddin Choudhury, was installed,
effective political power was in the hands of the
military.
Ershad's Programs and Staying Power
The current Bangladesh Government is in a state of
political transition as Ershad attempts to consolidate
his authority and establish political legitimacy for the
Martial Law Administration (MLA). Although
Ershad initially disclaimed any intention of becoming
a "politician in uniform" and promised a restoration
of civilian political activity within six months and
elections within two years, a return to civilian author-
ity is currently unlikely.
Decisions in the military government are made colle?
-
gially, and Ershad needs a consensus among senior
military officers to govern. Even if Ershad wanted to
restore broader political participation, his military
colleagues probably would be reluctant to go along.
Army officers, including Ershad, have proclaimed
that the Army must have a decisive political role in
the government.
In Ershad's attempts to solidify his power, he has
promoted an ambitious campaign to eradicate corrup-
tion in politics and business, streamline and decentral-
ize government operations, reform the country's legal
system, and establish more pragmatic economic poli-
cies. In keeping with these intentions, government
ministries have been consolidated and the number of
ministers cut in half; Dacca's diplomatic representa-
tion has been reduced; many former ministers have
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been arrested for taking bribes, breach of trust,
misappropriation of public funds, and abuse of official
power; and the judicial system has been suspended in
favor of martial law courts.
At first the martial law government seemed generally
accepted as a necessary evil in the hope that it could
tackle political and economic problems more effec-
tively than the previous government. More recently,
there has been some popular resentment and skepti-
cism of Army rule, and most people want to believe
that the situation is temporary. Overly hasty and ill-
handled implementation of the government's reforms,
which have affected every section of society, are
contributing to previously existing bureaucratic chaos.
Ershad's hold on power is fragile, and his survivability
is still questionable. His political longevity is depend-
ent on three Herculean tasks: his capability to imple-
ment his reforms rapidly, his ability to survive the
behind-the-scenes jockeying for power going on within
the military hierarchy, and the elimination of
Ershad's questionable financial dealings that are
eroding his credibility. Ershad himself has no popular
base, and much of his military support stems from
disgust with the ineffectiveness of the displaced Sattar
government.
Structure of Government
Military Presence. The political structure that has
evolved since the coup in March 1982 is still unsteady
and fractious. General Ershad's leadership has in-
volved extensive consultation with a key group of
advisory ministers, most of whom are military offi-
cers. Major decisions are based on the consensus of a
select group of "ruling generals." Reportedly, no one
general, including Ershad, can make major decisions
without the approval of the others. The two chiefs of
the Air Force and Navy have been named Deputy
Martial Law Administrators.
Middle-level officers are capable of influencing MLA
decisions. Ershad has been responsive to junior officer
concerns, and communication is fairly extensive
among senior and junior officers and possibly senior
noncommissioned officers. In addition, a consulting
mechanism provides the jawans (enlisted men) with a
channel for airing their views.
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Special martial law courts have been set up to deal
with corruption and criminal offenses, and the coun-
try's bar association has been dissolved. Although the
civilian courts have not been disbanded, the new
special courts may preempt the jurisdiction of the
civilian courts and try offenses punishable under
either martial law regulations or civilian law.
Civilian Administrative Reforms. Ershad has ap-
pointed active duty officers to civilian administrative
posts, judicial offices, and task forces. Part of his
intent may be to educate impatient officers in the
practical problems involved in resolving complex gov-
ernment issues; it also may be an attempt to satisfy
the Army's increasing desire for more power. Various
sources indicate that Army infiltration of civilian
positions has antagonized civilian government
employees.
Streamlining and decentralizing the civilian bureau-
cracy and improving public services are major topics
of MLA pronouncements. The number of government
ministries has been reduced from 41 to 20. The
number of assistant and deputy commissioners fo r
each district has been limited to three, and the elected
Dacca municipal corporation has been dissolved. A
surge of regulations concerning the conduct of civil
service employees has caused muted protests, demor-
alization, and fear among civilian officials. Vigilance
teams headed by military officers have been set up to
enforce work hours; dress codes have been established;
benefits, such as the use of government vehicles and
telephones, have been limited to high-ranking offi-
cials; and the retirement age for civil service employ-
ees has been set at 57.
Among Ershad's most ambitious reforms is an initia-
tive to restructure Bangladesh's local government
around the thana, or grass-roots level. By centering
government at this level, Ershad hopes to tackle
Bangladesh's enormous economic problems where
they originate (see box). Local authority will be vested
in a three-tier political structure consisting of the
district (zilla), the town (thana) parishad (council), and
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Local Government in Bangladesh
Division
Districts
Thanas
(rural townships,
literally police
stations)
?The four divisions (Chittagong,
Dacca, Khulna, and Rajshahi) pre-
date independence. Headed by com-
missioners, they have not functioned
as an important level of administra-
tion for some time, as their size
precludes their effectiveness.
?Currently, 21 districts are headed
by deputy commissioners.
?Each district is to consist of 6-7
million persons.
?The level of influence is to be
reduced by thana-level government.
?Thanas are to become the new
focus of government operations, un-
der which eight to 10 union pari-
shads are grouped.
?The revision will consist of 370
thanas of 250,000 persons each.
?Directly elected thana chairmen,
who will preside over a thana coun-
cil, will advise development and ad-
ministrative officials assigned to
thana-level positions.
Union Parishad ?Each of the 4,470 or so unions,
(village councils) which consist of about 15 villages
each, is governed by a locally elected
chairman who sits on the thana
council.
Gram Sarkar
(single village
government)
?The union parishads are responsi-
ble for overseeing local taxation and
allocating central government funds
for rural works projects.
?After 1977, the reputation of the
union parishads was tarnished be-
cause of the control of the parishads
by relatively wealthy local farmers
who often misused the councils in
their own interest.
?The most recent five-year man-
date for elected union parishad
chairmen expired in February 1982,
but the incumbents will remain in
office until new elections are held.
?This concept was created under
former President Zia and empha-
sizes village self-reliance.
?Each village is supposed to have
some five interest groups (that is,
farmers, women, youth, landless)
that elect two representatives to a
village government presided over by
an elected president or prodhan.
?These units have been dissolved
as the new government finds them
too small to be effective and fre-
quently in conflict with the larger
union parishads. The functions have
been transferred to the union
parishads.
the village (union) parishad. Under the new system,
the village, town, and district parishad chairmen will
be elected. The village parishads will become increas-
ingly important in the implementation of local
projects.
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Opposition
Factionalism, opposition to authority, and violence are
basic to Bangladesh politics. Most political alliances
are transitory, and regroupings are frequent.
Political Parties
Since the imposition of martial law in March, political
party activity has been banned. Initially Ershad had
talked about the possibility of resuming limited politi-
cal activity within six months. More recently, howev-
er, he opined that political parties, while very much a
part of the national landscape, merely seek power and
have little ideological basis. According to US Embas-
sy reporting, Ershad envisions a multiparty system in
which the number of parties is limited by being
required to poll a certain minimum number of votes in
elections.
The military seems to be moving toward a more
permanent and institutionalized role in politics that is
likely to downgrade the influence of political parties
even after civilian political activity is allowed to
resume. The ability of existing political parties to
become a strong mechanism of opposition to the
military government will be circumscribed by their
internal fragmentation, external differences among
parties that limit the formation of broadly based
platforms, and a tendency to follow personalities over
party doctrine. There is a 19th-century Bengali joke
that appropriately characterizes political parties in
Bangladesh: One Bengali one political party; two
Bengalis?two political parties; three Bengalis?still
two parties, but each has two factions.
Despite these handicaps, opposition political parties
are adept at disruption and have managed through
public rallies and demonstrations to derail policies
proposed by previous Bangladesh governments.
Should military dominance prove too restrictive or the
MLA leadership be inept at finding workable solu-
tions to Bangladesh's economic problems, the political
parties might offer a channel for popular dissent that
would threaten the military government.
25
Political Parties With Significant Constituencies.
Of the more than 50 political parties in Bangladesh,
only seven have a significant constituency.
Bangladesh Nationalist Party. Conservative and
formed from a variety of factions by President Zia,
the BNP was the ruling party prior to the latest coup.
Despite its close association with the Zia regime, the
BNP has suffered the most from the MLA's anticor-
ruption campaign. Because of the corruption charges
that have been brought against many BNP politicians
and businessmen, the party's leadership has been
weakened. According to US Embassy reporting, BNP
members hope to recoup their losses and resume
playing a major role in Bangladesh politics as a
middle-of-the-road party. Although political activities
are banned, BNP party officials reportedly continue
to meet privately to discuss the party's future. Should
the BNP manage to avoid factionalism, a possible
candidate for future BNP leadership is retired Maj.
Gen. Nurul Islam (Shishu), a prominent BNP mem-
ber and dissident in that party's former leadership.
According to the same Embassy source, Islam may
support Ershad if he chooses to follow Zia's precedent
and establish a reformed BNP as the country's ruling
party.
Awami League (Hasina). Although divided by a
schism between moderates and radicals, the League is
the best organized of Bangladesh's political parties.
Originally founded in 1949 by leaders who withdrew
from the Muslim League, the Awami League became
the first Bengali nationalist party in East Pakistan
(although it also had a small following in West
Pakistan). A major source of its appeal is its legacy as
the party of Bengali independence. Its left-of-center
ideology attracts a large number of youth. A relative-
ly substantial flow of funds from various and often
controversial sources, such as India, assures it some
financial strength, although its Indian affiliation is a
political liability.
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The return to Bangladesh from India in May 1981 of
Sheikh Hasina, daughter of the assassinated Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman, to become president of the Awami
League provided a needed boost for the party. Critics
of the League focus on its association with the crime,
corruption, and high inflation of Sheikh Mujib's one-
man rule and the League's connections with India.
The critics regard Sheikh Hasina as an Indian puppet.
Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal. The JSD, Bangladesh's
major radical leftist political party, is financially
strapped and internally divided over an ideological
dispute concerning whether to support a more moder-
ate stance in cooperation with the Awami League or
advocate immediate revolution. It may have a small
military following, and it has been the most active
party in trying to win favor with the jawans, or
enlisted men. JSD ideology tends to be more radical
in public than in private. Its members have been
labeled "political prostitutes" because of their tenden-
cy to compromise when expedient, although this is a
well-practiced Bengali trait. Although it is doubtful
that the JSD could launch its long-announced mass
movement, it remains a radical force in Bangladesh
and is sought after in forming political coalitions.
In 1980 serious differences between the students and
the leadership resulted in a split in which the majority
of JSD students at Dacca University formed a break-
away faction, the Bangladesher Samajtantrik Dal
(BSD). The BSD has been unable to attract any
national leaders and remains primarily a student
organization.
Muslim League. Conservative but not reactionary, the
Muslim League's strength stems from its historical
dominance in the politics of East Bengal during the
years of Pakistani rule from 1947 until its defeat by
the Awami League in 1970. Its membership dissipat-
ed after Bangladesh obtained its independence be-
cause of the constitutional provision prohibiting reli-
gious-based parties, but it was revived in 1976 when
restrictions were lifted. Although the League pro-
fesses to call for an Islamic state, its policies appear to
be more rhetorical than substantive, and it is not
fundamentalist. Its general attitude is that life was
much better before independence. It favors a govern-
ment position that will keep both the Awami League
and leftists from power.
Secret
Democratic League. This moderate, rightwing party is
led by former Bangladesh President Khondokar
Mushtaque Ahmed. It was formed by Mushtaque in
1976 following the reestablishment of political parties.
In 1977 Mushtaque was jailed by a martial law court
on corruption charges. The party has achieved some
significance since Mushtaque's release in March
1980. Basic weaknesses of the party are its inability to
organize effectively below the national level and the
fact that its following is based primarily on loyalty to
Mushtaque rather than party affiliation. Although
Mushtaque aspires to a center-right coalition, other
rightwing parties are suspicious of his former Awami
League association. The Awami League refuses to
cooperate with Mushtaque because they consider him
responsible for Sheikh Mujib's assassination.
Jamaat-e-Islami. The Jamaat stands at the extreme
right of the political spectrum. Formed in 1941 in
British India, the party sided with the Pakistanis
during the 1971 civil war. The Jamaat calls for a
democratic but strict Islamic state. Membership in
the Jamaat is small due to the rigid requirements
applicants must meet to demonstrate their commit-
ment to Islam.
The main controversy surrounding the Jamaat has
been its opposition to secession from Pakistan during
the civil war. Still, in early 1981 the Jamaat made a
strong attempt to rally public support. Subsequent
clashes between veterans of the civil war and Jarnaat
members, viewed as collaborators, caused the party to
resume a low profile. Following Zia's death a few
months later, opposition to Jamaat rallies died down,
probably reflecting the more conservative trend in
Bangladesh politics.
Islamic Democratic League. The IDL was formed in
1976 as a coalition of Islamic-oriented parties. It is
poorly organized below the national level and main-
tains an insignificant student front. The coalition won
six seats in the 1979 parliamentary elections. The
defection of the Jamaat-e-Islami from the League in
1979 and the independent position taken by the
Muslim League has diminished the IDL's influence.
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The IDL, which calls for an Islamic state in Bangla-
desh, reportedly admires Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini
and may receive support from the Iranian Embassy in
Dacca.
Communist and Leftist Influence. The Communist
parties of Bangladesh are largely factionalized and
centered in the cities. Some Communist activity has
spilled over into the countryside in the past in the
southwest districts and possibly in the Chittagong Hill
Tracts, although the more recent extent of such
influence is not known. The Communist Party of
Bangladesh (pro-Soviet) is of minor importance in
Bangladesh politics or internationally. Before the
martial law takeover, the student wing?Chatra
Union?was active on the campus of Dacca Universi-
ty as was its labor front, the Trade Union Center.
Membership in both groups is small. There are three
other small pro-Soviet parties: the Workers Party, the
National Awami Party (Muzaffar), and the Jatiya
Ekota Party. The three minor pro-Chinese parties
worth noting are the United People's Party (UPP), the
Sammyabadi Dal, and the Ganotantrik Party. The
UPP is the only pro-Chinese party with any organiza-
tion. Its small but active labor front, the Bangla
Sramik Dal, has clashed with the Bangladesh Nation-
alist Party's labor groups. More significant than the
above parties is the leftist influence in the Awami
League (Hasina) and the JSD, where radical elements
are strongest within the student fronts.
Party Coalitions. Party alliances, such as they are,
are short lived and based on expediency. Even when
several parties have aligned to oppose government
policies, their stance has not been unified. A major
problem in any coalition between Bangladesh political
parties is leadership, which each group is reluctant to
give up. For instance, among the rightwing parties,
both the Muslim League and Democratic League are
insistent upon leading any coalition. The Awami
League and the JSD have formed temporary alliances
on numerous occasions and are likely to do so again.
Lasting cooperation is hindered, however, by the
League's dominance, the historical antagonism be-
tween the two, and the League's more centrist orien-
tation. The only significant centrist party, the BNP, is
a heterogeneous and fragile coalition of leftists, right-
ists, and moderates; the party's leadership hopes to
27
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rebuild the BNP and would be unlikely to favor any
leftist or rightist alliance that could weaken its
position.
Tribal Insurgency
Tribal insurgents have managed to restrict movement
in the Chittagong Hill Tracts by attacking military
posts and terrorizing local civilians. The mostly Bud-
dhist tribes of the region believe the Muslim Bengalis
are a threat to their land and way of life. Under
British Indian and Pakistani rule, the tribal people
felt more secure because a law, the 1900 Act, barred
purchase and habitation of their land by nontribals.
Following Bangladesh's independence, the new gov-
ernment, in an effort to relieve population pressures
elsewhere in the country, ignored the act and allowed
Bengali homesteaders into the thinly populated area.
In 1972 the Chakmas, the most numerous of the 13
tribes living in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, formed a
militant organization called the Shanti Bahini to
resist the encroachments. Skirmishes between these
tribal rebels and Bangladesh paramilitary forces sta-
tioned in the area occur regularly, at times intensify-
ing to the point that the Army has had to support the
local security forces.
Unrest in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, while currently
not a major destabilizing factor, could be exploited by
outside sources wanting to cause problems for any
government in Dacca. Bangladesh's allegations of
Indian involvement in tribal disturbances and India's
denials have added to the strained relations between
the two neighbors.
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Armed Forces
Maintaining the loyalty of a strongly politicized mili-
tary is essential to the stability of any government in
Bangladesh. The military, particularly the Army, has
been the strongest institution throughout Bangla-
desh's short history. Although the military has the
power to make or break any government, it is not
cohesive and discipline is poor. The military's internal
factionalism will present a continuing source of poten
tial political instability in Bangladesh.
The most prominent split is between those who fought
against Pakistan in 1971 and the repatriates who were
interned in West Pakistan at that time and later
allowed to return to Bangladesh. The generally more
conservative repatriates have gradually gained con-
trol, their predominance increasing following the coup
attempt against President Zia, which was led by
freedom fighters who believed they were being edged
out of power.
Divisiveness also exists between senior and junior
officers?the latter tend to be more impatient and
expect more rapid solutions to Bangladesh's prob-
lems?as well as between officers and enlisted men.
Leftist influence of unknown extent exists in the
enlisted ranks. One of the factors reportedly restrain-
ing Ershad from a preelection coup was doubt that the
enlisted men would obey orders for such an action.
Strength and Capabilities
Bangladesh's total military strength of about 157,000
is made up of the regular services and the paramili-
tary forces (see table 6). Although Bangladesh has no
compulsory military service, recruitment is not a
problem given the economic benefits a military career
offers in a country where unemployment is high and
living standards are low.
Too small and ill equipped to defend itself against a
major external threat, the armed forces' objective is to
build a modern, mobile, and highly trained fighting
force capable of maintaining internal security and
raising the costs for any potential invader. With a
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Table 6
Bangladesh Military Strength
Ground Forces
Army personnel 70,000
Major formations
Maneuver brigades
Main battle tanks
5 division headquarters
11 infantry; I armor
T-54 30
T-59
48a
Artillery pieces (over 100 mm) 66
Air Force
Personnel 2,000
Fighter aircraft 34
MIG-21 8
F-6 (MIG-19) 18(12 additional on order
from China)
MIG-17
Trainers
8
38
Helicopters 23
Navy
Personnel 5,500
Major combatants 3 frigates
Patrol craft
Paramilitary Personnel
Bangladesh Rifles
Bangladesh Ansars
19(13 coastal and 6 river)
Armed Police Reserve
30,000
14,000
36,000
Not confirmed.
budget of about $150 million in FY 1982, the military
received less than 7 percent of that year's government
budget. The budget for FY 1983 has allocated about
$190 million for defense, an increase of over 25
percent.
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On their founding in early 1972, the armed forces
were equipped with weapons left in East Pakistan and
other equipment captured during the 1971 war. The
armed forces were heavily dependent upon India and
the USSR for technical training and equipment dur-
ing the regime of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Following
the demise of Sheikh Mujib in late 1975, relations
with India and the USSR quickly cooled. Since the
emergence of the present government, the Soviets and
Indians have provided almost no support. China has
responded to Bangladesh's request for assistance by
providing some major items such as aircraft. The
government is also seeking other sources, mainly
among Western countries.
In recent years China has supplanted Moscow as
Bangladesh's main source of military aid. A Bangla-
desh military delegation visited Beijing in April 1982
to negotiate an arms deal, part of which Bangladesh
expects to receive as grant and part through liberal
interest-free terms. According to a US Embassy
source in Beijing, the equipment to be supplied by
May 1983 includes one squadron of F6s (MIG-19s),
an unknown quantity of 1-59 tanks, and six transport
aircraft.
Army
The Bangladesh Army dominates the military struc-
ture by virtue of its size. It is organized into five
divisions and several independent brigades with both
tactical and territorial functions (see map). The mis-
sion of the Army is to conduct land warfare in the
national defense, to assist in the maintenance of
internal security, and to support civil emergency relief
operations. It could not wage successful defensive
operations against India, although in combination
with paramilitary forces, it could wage an extensive
guerrilla campaign. The Army is capable of maintain-
ing internal security in urban areas, however, its
abilities to do so throughout the country are limited.
Although it has a vast reservoir of potentially avail-
able manpower, the Army's major weaknesses are a
lack of modern equipment, a shortage of personnel
with technical expertise, an inadequate logistics sys-
tem, a low state of combat readiness, and inadequate
training.
Secret
The Bangladesh Army has only a rudimentary train-
ing program for its personnel. Following the British
regimental system, each combat or technical service
apparently has a school and training center that
imparts basic and some specialized training to re-
cruits. Additional specialized training is obtained on
the job. Officers are drawn both from graduates of a
six-week officer candidate school, known as Battle
School, and the Bangladesh military academies at
Comilla and Chittagong. Infantry training is conduct-
ed near Sylhet, where junior officers of all branches
learn small unit tactics, company command tech-
niques, regimental and brigade staff functions, and
weapons systems. The United Kingdom is assisting
Bangladesh with the establishment of a Joint Services
Staff College, to be located near Dacca. A seven-
member British military team arrived in mid-1977 to
direct the staff college until Bangladesh develops
sufficient proficiency for independent operation. The
college provides Bangladesh with its first in-country
senior staff training capability.
Navy
The Navy's main operating base is located at Chitta-
gong, Bangladesh's chief port. A smaller base is at
Khulna in the south where patrol craft are stationed.
Repairs and maintenance are conducted at Narayan-
ganj Navy Dockyard just southeast of Dacca. The
mission of the Bangladesh Navy is to protect coastal
waters, including a vast network of inland waterways.
The Navy also is charged with providing assistance to
civil authorities, internal security, salvage work in
ports and inland waterways, and disaster relief. At
present, the Navy does not have enough ships and
craft to perform its missions satisfactorily.
Although the Navy has ample repair facilities, it, like
the other services, is heavily dependent on foreign
sources for repair parts. The Navy Dockyard at
Narayanganj has built three small patrol boats for
river use. Construction of shipbuilding and repair
facilities in Chittagong, designed for merchant use,
and the arrival of a drydock from Yugoslavia in 1980
provide the Navy with a future capability for indige-
nous construction and maintenance of larger naval
craft.
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Figure 12
BHUTAN
c?i_ket1
NEPAL
,
1,
.,---
, .7
:-)?-.-'
Military Facilities
in angladesh
111 Division headquarters
Garrison
^ Airfield
? Port
Road
Railroad
Rangpur ,
O 20 40 60 Kilometers
I I
O 20 40 60 Miles
0
Beira
Mymensingh)
\4Ishurdi
Kushtia.
Dacca
tiDt*
Faridpur Nargyangarir
,;(Jessore,
OIP
Corn ill
tiN)
Chandpur ,
Khuln
Noakhali?
eBariial
Chalna Port
Chittagon
ka,,P
Retie,o,
505411 (544488) 11-82
? South Talpatty
(New Moore I.-India)
[in dispute]
Mouths of the
Bay of Bengal
31
Cox's Baz'ar?-,
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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The previous practice of recruiting experienced sea-
men and technicians from the merchant marine and
inland waterways organization is changing. More
recently, the emphasis has shifted to secondary school
graduates for officer cadet training and to less educat-
ed personnel between the ages of 18 and 20 for
enlisted basic training. The Bangladesh Naval Train-
ing Academy, which formally opened in 1976, pro-
vides training for both officers and enlisted personnel.
Following training, promising officer cadets may be
sent abroad for additional schooling, primarily in the
United Kingdom or India.
Air Force
Despite the addition of Chinese F-6 fighters, the Air
Force's performance is hindered by the inadequate
number of qualified pilots and maintenance techni-
cians. We believe a number of pilots and senior Air
Force personnel were among the 92 persons executed
following the coup attempt in October 1977. In-
country training of personnel is limited to basic
military courses and midcareer command and staff
training. Flight and technical training is now carried
out largely by China.
The Air Force is totally dependent on external sources
for equipment and spare parts, the USSR and China
being the primary suppliers. A continuing shortage of
critical parts and lubricants substantially reduces the
operational capability of the Air Force. Its MIG-21s
have been grounded frequently because of mainte-
nance and structural defects and equipment short-
ages. Although the addition of the F6 fighters has
improved the Air Force's air defense capability, the
Air Force cannot strongly resist potential aggressors.
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Paramilitary Forces
Bangladesh Rifles. Organized into approximately 29
battalion-size "wings," the mission of the Bangladesh
Rifles is to provide internal and border security. They
are active in counterinsurgency operations in the
Chittagong area, although Army assistance is re-
quired during the periodic flareups in the fighting
there. This force can cope with sporadic internal
unrest, however, it is not large enough or sufficiently
equipped to counteract widespread, organized
dissidence.
Bangladesh Ansars. A "second line of defense" force
and organized into approximately 40 battalions, the
mission of the Ansars is to assist regular forces in the
maintenance of public order, social welfare activities,
and national security. Its limited size renders it
capable of providing only marginal assistance.
Armed Police Reserve. This force supplements the
unarmed local police units. Stations of varying size up
to battalion strength are located in urban areas,
whereas rural posts average 15 to 20 men.
Coastal Police. Little is known about the strength and
organization of this force charged with patrolling
territorial waters and assisting in the protection of
Bangladesh's deep sea and coastal fishermen. Its
capabilities presumably are very limited.
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Foreign Relations
Given Bangladesh's military and economic weakness,
the primary objectives of its foreign policy are to
ensure a continued flow of external assistance and to
maintain stable relations with its dominant neighbor,
India. The initial foreign policy objectives established
in 1971 of securing recognition, obtaining member-
ship in major international organizations, and enlist-
ing international support for relief, rehabilitation, and
economic development have been generally realized.
Islamic solidarity is another mainstay of Bangladesh
foreign policy, providing a certain psychological coun-
terweight to Hindu India, which surrounds Bangla-
desh on three sides. Islam has played a major role in
cementing ties with wealthy Middle Eastern donors,
especially Saudi Arabia and other moderate Arab
states. The Bangladeshis, however, are conscious of
their need to temper their Islamic policies to avoid
provoking India.
India
Most Bangladeshis are innately suspicious of Indian
intentions and tend to view any problems in relations
with New Delhi as a sign that India is attempting to
undermine their government. Mutual distrust and
suspicion have long exacerbated real differences be-
tween the two countries. Bangladeshis, however, are
realistic enough to recognize that they have little
choice but to get along with their powerful neighbor.
India and Bangladesh signed a 25-year Treaty of
Friendship in March 1972. Bangladesh's appreciation
for India's aid in its liberation struggle was soon
replaced, however, by fears of Indian expansionism,
reinforced in 1975 by New Delhi's absorption of its
protectorate Sikkim and later by India's policy posi-
tions on Afghanistan and Kampuchea, which were at
variance with the other South Asian states. In August
1981 Bangladesh considered abrogating the 1972
Friendship Treaty and replacing it with a similar
treaty with China, but it retreated lest the action
provoke India.
33
Current relations between India and Bangladesh can
best be characterized as correct. Official Indian reac-
tion to the martial law takeover was cautious and
basically limited to views that developments in Ban-
gladesh are an internal affair and that harmonious
relations between the two countries would continue.
Editorial comment was more negative, dismissing
Ershad's statements on corruption as a pretext for
seizing power and expressing the hope that represent-
ative government would be restored. Acknowledging
that it would prefer to deal with an elected adminis-
tration, the Indian Government has little alternative
but to work with the military leadership. Although
New Delhi would favor the emergence of a more
accommodating government in Dacca, it recognizes
that blatant Indian interference in Bangladesh's inter-
nal affairs could be counterproductive for India.
India's tough position on bilateral disputes with Ban-
gladesh reflects Prime Minister Gandhi's longstand-
ing attitude that India is the predominant power in
the subcontinent and that its neighbors must accom-
modate themselves to Indian interests (see box). The
Martial Law Administration has talked of not sacri-
ficing national interests in dealing with outstanding
bilateral problems between the two countries. Such a
stance is only rhetorical, however, as Bangladesh
lacks the leverage to give its remarks substance.
Solutions will depend on the kind of relationship India
decides it wants with its smaller and weaker neighbor
and on the diplomatic skill Bangladesh can muster in
negotiating from a position of weakness. While Ban-
gladesh's delicate political condition reduces its abili-
ty to resist external pressures, any sign of subservience
to India on important issues would imperil the surviv-
al of any government in Dacca.
Pakistan
Bangladesh-Pakistani relations are guardedly cordial,
having improved steadily since both countries ex-
changed ambassadors in January 1977. After an
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Areas of dispute between Bangladesh and India over
which worsening relations could arise include:
South Talpatty Island. In September 1981 India
withdrew six gunboats that it had sent to counter
Bangladesh's claim to a tiny, silt-formed island near
the Bay of Bengal. The situation had triggered anti-
Indian riots in Dacca.
Farakka Barrage. This Indian-built dam diverted
Ganges water vital for irrigating Bengali rice crops
during the dry season. Bangladesh's attempts to
secure a greater portion of the dry-season river flow
have been consistently stymied by India. A five-year
waters haring agreement signed by the Desai and Zia
governments in November 1977 guaranteed Bangla-
desh a substantial minimum amount of water, even
during the dry season. A commission formed in 1978
to work out a long-term solution of augmenting the
flow of the Ganges river was unsuccessful. Negotia-
tions are continuing on the agreement?which expires
in November and which Prime Minister Gandhi,
believing the former Desai government too gener-
ous?refuses to extend. Among the issues is a contro-
versial Indian proposal for a link canal to divert
Brahmaputra waters to the Ganges.
Chittagong Hill Tracts (Ramgarh, Ram gamati, and
Bandarban Districts). Long-term tribal tensions in the
area have created a refugee problem; Bangladesh
refuses to accept what it claims are expelled residents
of India, and India claims there is a vast influx of
persecuted non-Muslim tribesmen. In September
1981 a cross-border attack, which each side accused
the other of launching, heightened tension. Although
repatriation of several thousand refugees to Bangla-
desh was under way late last year, the problem has
not been fully resolved.
Enclaves. Each country has small enclaves in the
other, with alleged prevention of free access the major
irritant. In October 1982, India, in an attempt to ease
bilateral disputes, leased a small area to provide
Bangladesh access to two enclaves in India.
Secret
initial period of hostility, the first significant step
toward reconciliation came in February 1974 during
the Lahore Islamic Summit Conference, where each
country recognized the other. This step was encour-
aged earlier in 1973 when an airlift under the auspices
of the United Nations brought Bengalis from Paki-
stan to Bangladesh and non-Bengali Biharis from
Bangladesh to Pakistan.
The primary remaining issue between the two coun-
tries concerns the fate of the additional 300,000 to
400,000 Bihari Muslims who, after the war, expressed
a preference for Pakistani citizenship though they
remained in Bangladesh. (The Biharis are Muslims
from India who migrated to then East Pakistan in
1947.) The last large-scale repatriation of 12,000
occurred in 1979; planning is under way for an
additional 5,000 to be returned to Pakistan.
The new military regime desires close relations with
Pakistan, primarily as a lever against India, and in the
hope that Pakistan will lobby on Bangladesh's behalf
with the United States, China, and Saudi Arabia.
Islamic bonds and a governing military leadership
also ally the two nations. Any attempt Ershad may
undertake toward a bolder pro-Pakistani position,
however, will have to be weighed against an ensuing
deterioration in Bangladesh's relations with India.
New Delhi would be reluctant to allow any Bangla-
desh leadership to curry too much favor with
Islamabad.
China
Bangladesh values its friendly relations with China as
a counterbalance to the overwhelming presence of
India, as a source of military equipment and training,
and as a modest donor of economic assistance. Both
governments share similar suspicions about Soviet
intentions in Asia. Although Bangladesh may hope for
Chinese support in bilateral problems with India, it
realizes that China's interest in normalizing relations
with India makes it unlikely that Beijing would again
give the Bangladeshis the strong support it provided in
1976 over the watersharing issue.
China maintains a substantial embassy in Dacca and
is Bangladesh's principal arms supplier. Between Jan-
uary 1977 and January 1980 China provided $27.7
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million in grants to the Bangladesh military and sold
the government an additional $10 million worth of
equipment. Since early 1980 the military trade has
been based on cash-and-carry sales and not grants.
This shift reflects China's decision to devote more
resources to its own development, as well as China's
emphasis on improving relations with India.
USSR
Although ErshacL favors a continuing tilt toward the
West, specifically the United States, he seems inter-
ested in improving relations with Moscow. Bangla-
desh's preceding government had also begun to make
overtures to the Soviets in order to balance its rela-
tions with the superpowers.
Although China has replaced the USSR as the main
arms supplier to Bangladesh, the USSR is providing
maintenance assistance on several previously supplied
MIG-21 aircraft. The Bangladesh Air Force is also
interested in purchasing Soviet AN-32 transport air-
craft, possibly for delivery in 1985. Recently, Bangla-
desh and the USSR signed their annual trade barter
protocol, the 11th in their trade partnership. The
barter provides for an exchange of commodities worth
$83.13 million in each direction. Educational ex-
changes provide for undergraduate and graduate-level
study grants for about 100 Bangladesh students each
year.
Relations With the West
Bangladesh's relations with the West are good be-
cause of the extensive economic and humanitarian
support provided, particularly by the United States.
When President Zia assumed power, he moved Ban-
gladesh away from its close relationship with India
and the USSR and nearer to China and the United
States. This trend has continued. The meeting be-
tween Ershad and President Reagan in June 1982
received considerable press coverage in Dacca. Be-
sides US assistance, economic aid comes from Cana-
da, Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Norway,
Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, West Germany,
Australia, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and Japan.
In addition, the European Economic Community has
provided food assistance, particularly wheat, to
Bangladesh.
35
Secret
The West provides some military assistance to Ban-
gladesh. Most recently, the Bangladeshis purchased
their third frigate from the United Kingdom. A seven-
member British military team has assisted with the
establishment of a military Joint Services Staff Col-
lege to be located near Dacca. To date, the United
States, through its security assistance program, has
trained 89 officers and enlisted men in managerial
and tactical skills. The United States is discussing
with Bangladesh the possible sale of some nonlethal,
dual-use US military equipment such as communica-
tions and engineering gear.
Islamic States
The search for financial aid has led Bangladesh to
seek closer relations with wealthy Islamic oil states,
particularly Saudi Arabia. Ershad's first overseas visit
after assuming leadership was to Saudi Arabia. Saudi
aid to Bangladesh is divided into loans from the
Islamic Development Bank and grant aid. Although
the Saudis do not view Bangladesh as a country with
much political influence, they consider it a contribu-
tor to Islamic solidarity.
Bangladesh is a significant source of manpower for
the Middle Eastern countries, for which it receives in
return sorely needed foreign exchange. Bangladesh
labor attaches, who assist in arranging jobs for Ban-
gladesh workers, are present in Iran, Iraq, Libya,
Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, and there are plans
to open additional offices in Bahrain and Oman.
Besides economic ties, Bangladesh values its member-
ship in the Muslim community and has been active in
demonstrating its affiliation in the Organization of
the Islamic Conference. Sentiment for the Palestin-
ians has spread since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon.
According to PLO claims, between April 1981 and
March 1982 some 1,200, and possibly as many as
2,500, Bangladesh recruits were sent to Lebanon
directly or indirectly by the PLO mission in Dacca.
Since the invasion, the number of recruits may have
increased, although no reliable numbers are available.
Bangladesh also has dispatched a 12-member military
medical team to Damascus to assist the Palestinians.
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US Interests
US political and economic interests in Bangladesh are
largely a function of Washington's broader goal of
preserving regional stability. Instability in Bangladesh
could lead to far more serious regional consequences
affecting India and Pakistan and intensifying Sino-
Soviet competition. Regional disputes between Ban-
gladesh and India might lead the Bangladeshis to seek
US involvement in such matters as the Ganges water-
sharing negotiations or demarcation of the marine
boundary between the two countries. The United
States has stood aside from these issues by stating
that the problems of the area have the best chance of
being solved if there is no outside involvement.
Economic Assistance
The US Government has granted $958 million in food
aid to Bangladesh since independence. The program
began on an emergency basis and has evolved into a
regular program. Beginning in 1978, the Title III food
assistance program made possible the establishment
of a foodgrain security system, including a procure-
ment program to support producer prices and acquire
domestic commodities for reserves, an open-market
sales mechanism to release commodities to dampen
excessive price upswings, and expanded storage
facilities.
The United States is engaged in one power generation
project, the Karnafuli Hydropower Station, which is
nearing completion. Since 1977 the United States has
supported rural electrification through the Area Cov-
erage Rural Electrification Program (ACRE). Phase I
will cover some 1.6 million households and is sched-
uled for completion in 1983. The US contribution to
this project is $69.3 million.
The United States is considering providing technical
assistance for a program intended to reduce Bangla-
desh's dependence on petroleum imports, possibly to
include seismic testing and gasfield development.
In addition to food and energy programs, the United
States provides assistance for research and develop-
ment, fertilizer production, irrigation, health, and
37
family planning. In total, the US Government has
contributed more than $1.8 billion in food and devel-
opment aid to Bangladesh.
Military Assistance
Although the Bangladesh Government has expressed
interest in obtaining communications and engineering
equipment from the United States, no foreign military
sales are currently proposed. The United States is
engaged in a security assistance program that pro-
vides training in military managerial and tactical
skills.
Trade
The United States is Bangladesh's largest trading
partner. It buys about $70 million of Bangladesh's
exports annually, mainly jute carpet backing and
sacks, and exports large amounts of wheat, cotton,
edible oil, and tallow to Bangladesh, largely under
AID and other donor financing.
Investments
According to US Embassy reporting, total US private
investment in Bangladesh is roughly estimated at $10
million. The principal US firms involved in this
limited investment are four pharmaceutical compa-
nies, four construction firms, and two US banks.
Although the Martial Law Administration is encour-
aging further foreign investment, it has proposed a
controversial policy reducing the manufacture and
sale of a number of pharmaceuticals in Bangladesh.
Multinational pharmaceutical firms in the country,
including US ones, claim they would lose considerable
revenue if the policy is implemented. Other problems
with which US investors must cope are a poorly
developed and overburdened power, transportation,
and communications network, limited domestic de-
mand, a labor force lacking in skills, and a cumber-
some bureaucracy.
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Hussain Mohammad
Ershad
A. F. M. Ahsanuddin
Choudhury
Personalities
Chief Martial Law Administrator; Minister of Defense (since March 1982). A
career military officer, Lt. Gen. Hussain Mohammad Ershad heads a country that
had been drifting since the assassination of President Ziaur Rahman in May 1981.
Ershad had served as Chief of Army Staff since December 1978 and received his
present rank in November 1979.
Well disposed toward the United States, Ershad will-continue Bangladesh's
moderate and cooperative relationship with the West. He is deeply suspicious of
Indian intentions but realizes he has to foster "correct" relations with New Delhi.
He attaches importance to relations with moderate Islamic states, particularly
Saudi Arabia.
In 1950 Ershad graduated from the University of Dacca. He was commissioned in
the Pakistan Army in 1953, and he was the commanding officer of the East Bengal
regiments from 1968 to 1971. He was arrested in East Pakistan in 1971 during
Bangladesh's independence struggle. His internment precluded his participation in
the war, although he later served as president of the Bangladesh Freedom Fighters
Association.
Ershad, 52, is a conservative with good common sense. He is often slow to engage
in conversation with foreigners and then generally is comfortable only in discussing
subjects about which he is knowledgeable, usually military issues. Quiet and
unassuming, Ershad often lapses into long silences during a conversation before he
warms to a subject. He speaks fluent English.
President (since March 1982). A retired Supreme Court justice, A. F. M.
Ahsanuddin Choudhury is little more than a figurehead. He left government
service in 1977 and before his appointment as President was extensively involved in
social service organizations.
After graduating first in his law school class at the University of Dacca,
Choudhury joined the then Bengal civil service in 1942. He subsequently served as
district judge in Sylhet, Rangpur, and Dacca. He was elevated to the High Court
in 1973.
Choudhury, about 67, is chairman of the management board and the board of
trustees of Dacca Shishu Hospital, the governing body of the Dacca Law College,
and the National Foundation of Mental Health. He is married and has one son and
two daughters.
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Mohammad Nooruddin
Khan
Aminur Rahman
Shamsud Doha
Chief of the General ste(since August 1980). A career military officer in his
midforties, Brigadier Mohammad Nooruddin Khan is an engineer who is among
the senior generals in Bangladesh. He is a shrewd individual who has the respect of
his superiors, peers, and subordinates and who may be the "brains" behind the
Army's role in the current martial law government. Nooruddin Khan has been
cooperative with US officials in Dacca.
A repatriated officer, Nooruddin Khan was named a zonal martial law administra-
tor in 1976 as well as commander of the 105th Brigade. In 1978 he became
commander of the 33rd Infantry Division; he held the latter post until becoming
chief of the general staff.
Minister of Foreign Affairs (since June 1982). A. R. S. Doha is a longtime
confidant of and perhaps the closest civilian adviser to Chief Martial Law
Administrator Ershad (the two were schoolmates). A former Army officer,
publisher, and politician, Doha served as an ambassador after Bangladesh gained
its independence. Immediately after the coup that brought Ershad to power in
March 1982, Ershad brought Doha into the Cabinet as Minister of Information
and Broadcasting. Doha held that post until he succeeded to the Foreign Ministry.
Doha comes from a political family (his father was a cabinet minister in Pakistan
during the 1960s). He received his early education at Christian schools in Calcutta
and Darjeeling. During the late 1940s and early 1950s, he studied at the
University of Dacca, where Ershad was also a student. Doha joined the Pakistani
Army in 1952; he was the top cadet in his officer training class. He later graduated
from the Royal Military College of Science in Wiltshire, England, and he has also
attended the basic artillery course at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. During his military
career, Doha was primarily involved in intelligence work. He retired from the
Army for health reasons in 1968 with the rank of major. He then established the
Interwing Weekly Review, which he edited and published until 1971. Concurrent-
ly, Doha served as an official of the Awami League, then the primary opposition
party in Pakistan; he was imprisoned several times for "inciting dissatisfaction
with the (Pakistani) Martial Law Administration."
In 1972 Doha was appointed to the Bangladesh Diplomatic Service. He subse-
quently served as Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Romania, Iran, and Turkey. He was
High Commissioner to the United Kingdom from 1977 until March 1982.
Doha, 53, was a member of the 1948 Olympic team (sport unknown), and he still
maintains an interest in sports. He has written three books, including one on the
Arab-Israeli conflict.
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A. H. S. Atual Karim Foreign Secretary (since May 1982). A career diplomat and the ranking civil
servant in the Foreign Ministry, Atual Karim is an unassuming, competent
individual who will probably discharge his duties in a low-key manner. In the
realm of foreign policy decisionmaking, he is likely to be overshadowed by Foreign
Minister Doha. Karim is essentially apolitical and is well disposed toward the
United States.
Karim joined the Pakistani Diplomatic Service in 1955 and served in missions in
Rangoon, Stockholm, and San Francisco. At the time of the war for Bangladesh's
independence, Karim?then the counselor at the Pakistani Embassy in Rome?
chose Bangladesh nationality. He was appointed director general for administra-
tion in the new country's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1972 and later served as
Deputy High Commissioner (1974-76) in New Delhi. Before his appointment as
additional foreign secretary in 1980, Karim was Ambassador to Indonesia for
three years.
Karim, 48, is a graduate of Dacca University. He attended Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy and the Georgetown University Institute of Language and
Linguistics during 1955-56 and studied French in Paris in 1957.
Abul Maal Abdul Muhith Minister of Finance and Planning (since March 1982). A thorough professional,
A. M. A. Muhith is one of his country's top economic advisers. He returned to the
government after a brief hiatus (he had retired in January 1982 after six years as
'secretary of the External Resources Division in the Ministry of Planning and a
brief period as an alternate director of the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development). Frank and hard working, Muhith is intelligent, experienced,
and action oriented. He is highly regarded by both his government and US
officials; the latter have commented that his appointment brings a solid technocrat
to a critical ministry.
Muhith has studied economics at Oxford University and holds an M.A. degree in
public administration from Harvard University. He served as economic counselor
in the Pakistani Embassy in Washington from 1969 until 1971. After Bangladesh
gained its independence, he held the same post in the Bangladesh Embassy. In
1972 he returned to Dacca to serve as a secretary in the Planning Commission. In
the early 1970s Muhith acted as a roving economic troubleshooter for Bangladesh,
handling negotiations on prewar debt issues and economic planning. From 1974
until 1977 he was an executive director of the Asian Development Bank in Manila.
Muhith, 47, speaks English.
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Humayun Rashid
Choudhury
Ambassador to the United States (since July 1982). A professional diplomat,
Humayun Rashid Choudhury was nominated as Ambassador to the United States
three months after the coup that brought the present Martial Law Administration
to power. He had served since May 1981 as Foreign Secretary, the number-two
post in the Foreign Ministry. In that position, he was a confident, pragmatic
decisionmaker. Since the appointment in June 1982 of A. R. S. Doha as Foreign
Minister, however, Choudhury has expressed some reservations about the new
regime. Although he probably does not enjoy the full confidence of his govern-
ment, he is generally expected to act as a thoroughgoing professional during his
tenure in Washington. Choudhury is basically well disposed toward the United
States.
Choudhury is uspicious of Soviet intentions and actions in Bangladesh, but, as
Foreign Secretary, he exercised a good deal of caution in taking actions against the
Soviets. He has carefully cultivated his relations with Arab representatives in
Dacca and has participated in as many Islamic Conference activities as possible.
He has nonetheless been critical of inter-Arab conflicts and of what he sees as a
squandering of resources and an obsession with sophisticated weapons. He has
argued that the Muslim world should concentrate on the liberation of Jerusalem.
Choudhury, 53, is deliberate in speech and manner and exhibits little emotion. He
nonetheless has an excellent sense of humor. He speaks French, Portuguese,
Italian, Urdu, and English.
Jan (Mohabbat) Minister of Interior (since August 1982). A career military officer with an
Chowdhury electronics background, Maj. Gen. Jan Chowdhury is one of a handful of generals
who are among Chief Martial Law Administrator Ershad's closest advisers. Until
August 1982 he was Director General of Forces Intelligence and was primarily
responsible for counterintelligence matters. In mid-August he assumed the position
of Minister of Interior, a move that will occupy him more heavily in the
government bureaucracy and at the same time remove him from his power base.
Chowdhury appears to be a shrewd and flexible powerbroker. He is heavily
involved in civilian politics. He visited the United States in 1976 and since that
time has regarded this country and Americans in a favorable light.
A 1955 graduate of the Pakistani military academy, Chowdhury was in Pakistan
during 1967-73. He had served as director of signals at Bangladesh Army
Headquarters immediately prior to becoming head of intelligence. He has
generally been regarded as a dedicated, hard-working professional. Chowdhury is
in his mid-to-late forties.
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Abdul Mannaf
Atiqur Rahman
Commander, 24th Infantry Division; Martial Law Administrator, Zone C (Chitta-
gong). Maj. Gen. Abdul Mannaf is one of the six generals who make up the
Martial Law Administration of Lieutenant General Ershad. US Embassy officials
have heard from several sources that he and Ershad are not on good terms, and,
25X1
He has expressed pro-American sympathies in the past. 25X1
A third-country military officer has described Mannaf as a well-qualified,
professional soldier. He served as Chief of the General Staff during October 1977?
December 1978. In that position he was involved in national development projects
and in disaster relief in Rangpur. He has commanded several Bangladesh divisions
and in March 1982 was also named Martial Law Administrator of Zone C.
Mannaf, about 50, is a graduate of the Pakistan Command and Staff College. In
1964 he visited Fort Knox, Kentucky, to attend short courses and briefings. He
subsequently twice participated in training exercises with US Army Forces in
West Germany.
Principal Staff Officer, Commander in Chief Secretariat (since June 1982). A
widely respected, apolitical officer, Maj. Gen. Atiqur Rahman is a close associate
of Chief Martial Law Administrator Ershad; Ershad may be grooming him to act
as his deputy.
Little is known of Rahman's early career. By 1975 he had risen to the rank of colo-
nel and was a Martial Law Administrator for the Chittagong Hill Tracts Zone and
commander of the 65th Brigade in the same region. He was promoted to brigadier
in 1976 and in August 1977 was named quartermaster general and received the
rank of major general. Rahman became chief of the Bangladesh Rifles in
December 1977. He is about 50 years old. Rahman may suffer from heart trouble.
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Chronology
B. C.
1 000 The Bang tribe settles areas that are now Bangladesh and West Bengal.
320-180 Mauryan Empire, first great empire over present-day India, Pakistan, and
Bangladesh, spreads; Buddhist influence also appears during this period.
A. D.
300-500 Classical Hindu Age exists throughout northern India.
750-1050 The Buddhist Pala Dynasty brings stability and prosperity to Bengal.
990-1100 The Hindu Sen family obtains power in Bengal and divides Bengal into four
regions.
1193 Indian states, now known as West Bengal and Bihar, fall to Muslims.
1206-1398
1318
1526-1707
1530
1757
Delhi Sultanate established; Muslim era begins; Bengal becomes important source
of war elephants.
East Bengal annexed as province of Delhi sultanate.
Bengal prospers during the Mughal period.
European traders enter Bengal.
In battle of Plassey, the British East India Company's army defeats Mughal forces
in Bengal.
1793 The Permanent Settlement of 1793 establishes new landlord system in Bengal,
which proves to be disastrous for Bengali farmers.
1905 Bengal is partitioned, and awareness grows of need for political party to serve
interests of Muslim community.
1906 The Muslim League is founded.
1947 India is partitioned, and Pakistan becomes independent. East Bengal becomes
Pakistani Province.
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March-December 1971
Awami League declares independence of Bangladesh; Pakistan Army in East
Pakistan surrenders to Indian armed forces; East Pakistan becomes independent
state of Bangladesh.
January 1972 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman returns from prison in West Pakistan and is sworn in as
Prime Minister.
November 1972 New constitution is approved by Constituent Assembly.
March 1973 Awami League wins first parliamentary elections.
January 1975 - Constitution is amended abolishing parliamentary system and establishing presi-
dential system with de facto one-man rule.
August 1975 Sheikh Mujib assassinated in Army coup; military assumes power.
November 1975
Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ziaur Rahman (Zia) takes power following new coup
and assassination.
April 1977 Zia is named President.
February 1979
May 1981
November 1981
Parliamentary elections are held with Zia's Bangladesh National Party (BNP)
winning majority.
President Zia is assassinated in failed coup attempt; Vice President Abdus Sattar
is sworn in as acting President.
Sattar is elected formally as President under BNP candidacy.
March 1982 Lt. Gen. Hussain Mohammad Ershad becomes Chief Martial Law Administrator
in bloodless military coup.
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Government
Land
People
Economy
Statistical Summary
Legal name: People's Republic of Bangladesh
Capital: Dacca
Type: Nominal republic under martial law.
142,500 square kilometers; about the size of Wisconsin.
Population: 93,040,000 (July 1982); eighth most populous in world.
Ethnic divisions: Predominantly Bengali; 300,000 to 400,000 "Biharis"; and
600,000 or so tribals of Burmese extraction.
Religion: 85 percent Muslim, 14 percent Hindu, 1 percent Buddhist, Christian, or
other.
Language: Bangla
GNP: $12.9 billion (1980/81); 1980/81 real GNP growth-7 percent.
Per capita income: $140
Agriculture: Jute and rice.
Major industries: Jute manufactures, food processing, and cotton textiles.
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Select Bibliography
Classified Bangladesh After Zia, INR/Department of State, 21 December 1981 (Secret).
Bangladesh: Politicization of Armed Forces, DIA, 28 April 1982 (Secret NF NC).
Unclassified Area Handbook for Bangladesh, Foreign Area Studies of American University,
1975.
Marcus Franda, Bangladesh: The First Decade, South Asian Publishers Pvt
Ltd/Universities Field Staff International, 1982.
Rounaq Jahan, Bangladesh Politics: Problems and Issues, University Press
Limited, 1980.
Talukder Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution and Its Aftermath,
Bangladesh Books International Limited, Dacca, 1980.
Just Faaland and J. R. Parkinson, Bangladesh: The Test Case for Development,
C. Hurst and Company, London, 1976.
Clarence Mahoney, K. M. Ashraful Azia, and Profulla C. Sarker, Beliefs and
Fertility in Bangladesh, Institute of Bangladesh Studies, 1980 (project funded by
USAID, Dacca).
Country Demographic Profiles: Bangladesh, US Department of Commerce,
Bureau of the Census, to be published (1982).
John P. Thorp, Power Among the Farmers of Daripalla, a Bangladesh Village
Study, University of Chicago, August 1978.
49
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5r3ttighat ?
AlTpur
Duar
Ranikhata
Kas,katra
Jelkar.
ooch Beha
Dataigaon
akari
Barpeta
Bangladesh
International boundary
x International boundary, in dispute
District boundary
National capital
11.11 District capital
Broad-gauge railroad (1.676 meters)
Narrow-gauge railroad (1 meter)
Road
Track
Airfield
Port
Populated places
Dacca- 1,679,572
Ga4hb
Thakurgaori
Ohubrt
lakhipu
Niiph-rnari
bati ur
anir Hal
pr KurTgram
Ran ur
ff31 Over 1,000,000
() 100,000 to 1,000,000 0 25,000 to 50,000
a 50,000 to 100,000 ? Under 25,000
Spot elevations in meters
Scale 1:1,750,000
25 50
Kilometers
Nautical Mlles
25 50
Statute Mlles
Lambert Conformal Conic Projection standard parallels 21'30'and 26'00'
? e D
bandha
Jaipur Hat
Jarnalganj
unamgan
Sherpur
alpu
Aria
Chhat
Naogaor
Bogra
utpara
Silcha
Gouripur
js hid h
Sherpu
enchuga
Ariirapira
alptr
Kulaura
Ra'shahl
Nator
Mau Bazar
Gafargao
shorgani
Nalhati
Ullapara
Habiganj
Sriman al
hhI r-jL ng
R pur Hat
Berhamp
Pakse
Ethe ramA
a
ad aha
Hardin
Bridge
Bolpur
lhemda
rishnag
NEd
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M a_g_u r a
dpur
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Kh.a3racPlari
Ar" bagh
o 'pars
Barra k ore
oakhal
J lakati
Dum Du
Calcutta
R n arr,a
Pr t Cang
P tuakhalr
Patuakha '
Chittagong
Chitt3
Bandar a
aynagar
flrtkJtl
Unclassified
88
South Talpatty Island-Engl.
**`-(New Moore Island-India)
dIsp,ej
MOUthtS of
.F00,
the Ganges
Cox's Bazar
3ay of Bengal
Boundary representaton
90 92 not necessanly author tatlye
Magyichau
505412 11-82 (543400)
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