SUDAN S SOUTH: DILEMMAS FOR NIMEIRI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83S00854R000200060002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP83SO0854R000200060002-7
Directorate of
Intelligence
Sudan's South:
Dilemmas for Nimeiri
An Intelligence Assessment
NESA 82-10545
October 1982
Copy 2 8 8
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP83SO0854R0002000060002-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP83SO0854R000200060002-7
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP83SO0854R000200060002-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP83SO0854R000200060002-7
Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Sudan's South:
Dilemmas for Nimeiri
This assessment was prepared b~
Office of Near East-South Asia Analysis. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be directed to
the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division,
This paper has been coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations and the National
Intelligence Council.
Secret
NESA 82-10545
October 1982
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP83SO0854R000200060002-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP83SO0854ROO0200060002-7
Sudan's South:
Dilemmas for Nimeiri
Key Judgments The deteriorating situation in Sudan's isolated and severely underdevel-
Information available oped Southern Region has potentially ominous implications for the stability
as of 16 August 1982 of President Nimeiri's moderate, pro-Western regime. A combination of
was used in this report.
social, economic, political, and security difficulties plagues the South, and
Nimeiri appears to have few options available to resolve the Region's
pressing problems. Continued unrest, which undermines Nimeiri's position
and further emboldens his Libyan and Ethiopian adversaries, is probable.
Nimeiri's hold on power depends on the loyalty of the military, moreover,
and its allegiance could be weakened by any increase in southern discon-
tent that would require prolonged, large-scale intervention by the armed
Conflicts have long existed between the Muslim-dominated central govern-
ment and the southerners, who are mostly black and either Christian or an-
imist. Southern resentment over northern exploitation and neglect is
widespread. Nimeiri gained considerable prestige by negotiating an end to
the southern rebellion that raged from 1955 to 1972, but in recent years he
has lost some of the respect he once enjoyed in the South.
Prospects for rapid economic improvement in the South are remote.
Development has stagnated, the standard of living may have declined in
the past decade, and the funds needed for basic investment are not
available. Recently discovered oil reserves may lead more to political
tension than to economic development, as southerners perceive that their
resources are being exploited by the government in the North.
Infighting among southern politicians, which is rooted in tribal and 25X1
factional animosities, aggravates the dismal economic situation, and there
is little doubt that political conflict will continue. The newly elected
government of the Southern Region is based on a shaky coalition whose op-
ponents will probably seek to undermine its stability whenever possible.
Adding to the Region's problems is an armed insurgency that Libya and 25X1
Ethiopia are actively supporting in an effort to subvert the Nimeiri regime.
Libyan-trained southern dissidents are being infiltrated into Sudan from
camps in Ethiopia, and they have launched sporadic attacks in the South.
Discontent among southerners could swell dissident ranks, a development
that probably would precipitate a Sudanese request for increased Egyptian
and perhaps US military assistance.
iii Secret
NESA 82-10545
October 1982
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP83SO0854ROO0200060002-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP83SO0854R000200060002-7
0 Insurgent camp
0 Oilfield
Madi Selected tribal group
-?- 1976 province boundary
Railroad
CENTRAL
AFRICAN
REPUBLIC
Bahr el
Ghazal
Port Red
Sudan
Et Kassala
Mira
Ad
Damazi
Eastern
Equatoria
Lake
Albert
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP83SO0854R000200060002-7
Southern
Kordofan
0Unity'~-/
Benti
~^:4!~? lAdok
jWaw L
~- Lakes ?
-?- - -) SOUTHERN
Western
Equatoria aIa?ae J
ambio ?__i Juba
wrt u~uair
Asmara
Teseney
Lake
Rudolf
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP83SO0854R000200060002-7
Secret
Sudan's South:
Dilemmas for Nimeiri
Geographical, cultural, and economic factors have
made the Southern Region of Sudan a distinct and
isolated area of the country. The predominantly
black, non-Muslim southerners have long felt neglect-
ed by the central government in Khartoum and have
viewed the country's Muslim leaders with mistrust.
Current conditions in the South, most notably politi-
cal instability and Libyan-Ethiopian-backed subver-
sion efforts, are combining with this bitter historical
legacy to produce serious challenges for Sudanese
President Gaafar Nimeiri. A further deterioration in
the situation will undermine Nimeiri's position and
provide his foreign enemies with a more vulnerable
target for subversion.
Mistrust and Resentment Toward the North
Southern resentment toward the North dates from at
least 1820, when a Turko-Egyptian regime conquered
Sudan. Punitive expeditions, which were mounted
against tribes that refused to accept the new adminis-
tration, disrupted traditional life and deeply embit-
tered southerners. A profitable slave trade was devel-
oped by European traders and their Arab cohorts in
Khartoum, and the violence and cruelty that it fos-
tered have not been forgotten in the South. After
Anglo-Egyptian armies took control of Sudan in 1898,
Christian missionaries kept the slavery issue alive by
telling southerners that northern Muslims were re-
sponsible.
British economic policy in Sudan also served to widen
the gap between the North and South. British officials
based in Khartoum argued vigorously against putting
northern resources directly into southern develop-
ment, and consequently little money was allocated for
the region.
Sudan became independent in 1956, with the South
included in a federal structure, but the region was
only barely integrated into the new state. The long-
festering discontent subsequently exploded into a se-
cessionist rebellion that many southerners supported;
others remained loyal to a united Sudan but favored
southern autonomy. By 1963 widespread resistance to
Africa Report
For several years the southern rebels, known as the
Anya Nya, tended to live in the bush in relatively
autonomous bands, unwilling to accept an overall
command structure. The situation changed between
1969 and 1971, however, when the Anya Nya united
under Joseph Lagu, a talented young officer who had
defected from the Sudanese armed forces in 1964.
Under Lagu's leadership, the guerrilla insurgency
became increasingly effective. Large amounts of mili-
tary equipment were supplied by Israel, which con-
tended that the rebellion was tying down the army of
then-radical President Nimeiri, who had assumed
power in a coup in May 1969. In January 1971, Lagu
formed the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement as
the political wing of the Anya Nya.
the central government had developed.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP83SO0854R000200060002-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP83S00854R000200060002-7
The six southern provinces-Upper Nile, Eastern
Equatoria, Western Equatoria, Bahr el Ghazal,
Lakes, and Jonglei-cover 250,000 square miles, or
about one-fourth of the area of Sudan. The approxi-
mately 7 million southerners represent a third of
Sudan's population. There are about 200 tribes and
subtribes in the South that make up the basic social
structure. Anthropologists have classified these tribes
into three main groups: the Nilotic, the Nilo-Hamitic,
and the Sudanic. One Nilotic tribe, the Dinka, has
over I million members and constitutes the largest
single tribe in the region. Intertribal animosity is a
fact of life there. Disputes over grazing and water
rights are common, and droughts that compel tribal
migrations create tension and conflict.
With the prospect of a costly military stalemate
facing his government, Nimeiri began secret negotia-
tions with the southerners, offering them regional
autonomy, separate administrative services, a legisla-
ture, and local elections. Nimeiri's opponents in the
North attacked the negotiations as a "sellout," but in
February 1972 he outflanked them by declaring an
early cease-fire, announcing the terms of a settlement
in a public rally, and publishing the agreement as law
even though it had not been ratified by the two sides.
The President's gamble paid off in March 1972, when
Lagu flew to Addis Ababa to ratify the agreement on
behalf of the South. He then accepted a position as
major general in the Sudanese armed forces and was
charged with overseeing the integration of former
rebels into the Army.
The Addis Ababa agreement granted the South "au-
tonomous" status within a unified Sudan. Legislative
power in the South was to be exercised by an elected
People's Regional Assembly, which in turn selected
the president of the regional government. The region-
al president serves as chairman of the South's High
Executive Council (HEC) and is answerable to the
regional assembly and the national president. Abel
Alier, a member of the Dinka tribe and Sudan's
Second Vice President at the time, was appointed
provisional head of the southern government immedi-
ately after the Addis Ababa agreement and was
subsequently elected as the first HEC president 18
months later.
Lack of Economic Development
Peace brought a greater degree of stability to the
South but so far has failed to generate improved
economic conditions. US AID officials believe that
development is stagnant, and the standard of living in
the South may actually be declining. Shortages and a
flourishing black market have developed. In January
1982 the head of the provisional southern regional
government spoke of "the stagnation in material
services and the miserable deterioration in the condi-
tion of our people" that had occurred in the decade
since the Addis Ababa accord.
Industrial development in the South is almost nonex-
istent. A basic problem is the lack of infrastructure,
particularly of transportation (see table). Although
several projects were planned for the South in the
early 1970s, almost all of them remain on paper.
Projects that exist suffer from shortages that severely
hamper their operations. The large industrial complex
of the Nzara Agricultural Production Corporation
near Yambio, for example, operated only 120 days
between April 1981 and April 1982 because of the
lack of fuel, spare parts, and raw materials. Employ-
ment opportunities are limited.
The agricultural sector produces little beyond subsist-
ence needs in most of the South.' Severe climatic
conditions, such as floods and droughts, create period-
ic food shortages, and the lack of adequate transporta-
tion prevents relief from reaching famine-stricken
citizens during poor harvest seasons and produce from
getting to market during good crop years. Veterinary
service is sporadic at best, and among cattle-raising
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP83S00854R000200060002-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP83SO0854R000200060002-7
Secret
Social and Economic Indicators:
Sudan and the Southern Region
19,860,000
7,000,000
(approx.)
73 percent
Muslim; 23
percent
animist;
4 percent
Christian
Elites are
Christian;
majority animist
Per capita GNP
$300 (US)
$10 (us)
Paved roads
1,800 km
5 to 10 km
Railroads
5,516 km
250 km
Principal airfields
16
3
Existing electric power plants
21
3
Planned electric power plants
39
6
Population per physician
10,880
116,667
Population per hospital bed
960
3,500
Primary school enrollment
(percent)
34
20
Secondary school enrollment
(percent)
14
tribes, diseases sometimes devastate herds. Traditions
impede improvements in agriculture and cattle-rais-
ing. For example, the prestige of tribesmen may
depend on the number of cows owned; to sell half of a
herd reduces one's status accordingly.
Southern resentment has been deepened by the con-
troversy over the central government's decision in
1981 to build a small refinery at the city of Kosti in
the North rather than at Bentiu in the South, which is
closer to newly discovered oilfields. Southerners were
not convinced by the economic and technical reasons
behind the decision and saw the choice of Kosti as a
deliberate northern effort to deprive the South of its
natural resources. When the southern regional gov-
ernment dispatched "Enlightenment Committees" to
explain the decision, several were shouted down, and
serious disturbances occurred in southern towns. Al-
though the central government and the Chevron Oil
Company agreed to increase investment in the South,
provide training in the oil industry to southerners, and
improve the distribution of oil products in the region,
most southerners remained skeptical. Ironically, the
US Embassy reported in late August 1982 that
Nimeiri had decided to drop the idea of a refinery
altogether and build instead an export pipeline from
Kosti to Port Sudan. The President sacrificed a great
deal of political capital in the South on a decision that
has since been annulled.
As Chevron continues its investment-the company
has spent over $300 million in Sudan since 1975-and
Sudan moves closer to becoming a modest oil exporter
later in the decade, southern resentment could esca-
late. Charges that the North is draining away oil that
rightfully belongs to the South are likely to intensify.
If significant reserves of oil are found in the South,
the idea of an independent southern Sudan might
reemerge because of its economic feasibility. Such a
situation could create an even greater challenge for
Nimeiri than he has faced in the past.
Inadequate Social Services
Basic social services, such as education and health
care, face enormous difficulties. Because qualified
teachers and textbooks are in short supply, students
who graduate do so with a "half baked" education, in
the words of the regional Minister of Education. He
believes that the government's stated goal of universal
literacy in the Region by 1990 should be scaled down
to 45 percent. Beds and essential medicines are
unavailable for hospitals because of a lack of funds,
and there are only 60 doctors for the South's popula-
tion of 7 million. The judicial system is in disarray
because northern judges who had been serving in the
South either transferred out of the Region or resigned
because of poor living conditions. Consequently, the
only courts of law are located in the regional capital of
Juba and the cities of Malakal and Wau, and prisons
are filled with those awaiting trial.
Political Instability
Political intrigue and infighting in the South have
been endemic since autonomy was granted in 1972.
Concern that government ineffectiveness was intensi-
fying North-South divisions prompted President Ni-
meiri to shuffle the southern leadership several times
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP83SO0854R000200060002-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP83SO0854R000200060002-7
over the past decade. Tribal and political rivalries,
including the persistent competition between the Re-
gion's two most prominent political figures, Abel
Alier and Joseph Lagu, have added to political tur-
moil in the Region.
The Addis Ababa agreement created a system with
overlapping powers for the central and regional gov-
ernments that has promoted discord. According to
open source studies, southerners have viewed some of
these arrangements as encroachments by the central
government on their autonomy. The regional govern-
ment has been particularly sensitive to charges that it
is controlled by Khartoum, an allegation frequently
leveled by southern politicians who are out of power.
While structural problems are serious, complex politi-
cal rivalries among southern groups and politicians
are at least equally damaging to political stability and
governmental effectiveness. Soon after the Addis
Ababa agreement, the split between southerners who
had remained loyal to the Khartoum government
during the southern rebellion and those who had
fought for secession took on a new shape. The former
group, associated with the Nilotic tribes, included
Alier as one of its leading spokesmen and was divided
into two major political factions-the Southern Front
and the Sudan African National Union (SANU).
The ex-rebels, of whom Lagu was the most prominent,
created the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement
and had demonstrated their willingness to fight
against northern domination. In addition to this split
in southern solidarity, tribal identity has become a
central factor in southern politics. Issues have increas-
ingly been viewed in "Dinka" versus "non-Dinka"
terms. Alier is a Dinka, Lagu a member of the Madi
tribe from Eastern Equatoria.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP83SO0854R000200060002-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP83SO0854R000200060002-7
Secret
The rivalry between Alier and Lagu grew during the
1970s as the two vied for the southern presidency and
control of the regional assembly. Throughout the
1970s the rival groups hurled accusations of incompe-
tence and corruption at each other, while North-
South tensions boiled over on a variety of issues,
especially those concerning "Arabization" or "Islam-
ization" of the South. US Embassy and other report-
ing indicated that southerners were especially upset
by Khartoum's advocacy of Arabic as the teaching
language in Sudan's schools, and over the possibility
that sharia or Islamic law might be implemented
throughout the country. Emotional issues such as
these produced periodic turmoil that forced Nimeiri
to intervene. He dissolved the southern assemblies,
called for new elections, and pushed alternately for
Alier or Lagu as HEC president.
Lagu's Redivision Plan: More Political Conflict
In early 1981 Lagu, who had lost the southern
presidency to Alier a year earlier, proposed changing
the southern governmental structure by replacing the
six provinces with three regions. Although he claimed
this alteration would improve governmental efficien-
cy, we believe Lagu's real objective in proposing the
redivision plan was to weaken Alier and his Dinka
supporters, who have traditionally dominated the
South. Nimeiri endorsed Lagu's proposal, probably
because he shared Lagu's concern that Dinka domi-
nance in the South was adding to the region's prob-
lems. In spite of Nimeiri's support, the plan provoked
a political uproar in the South. Relations between
Dinkas and non-Dinka tribes became increasingly
strained
Faced with widespread strife over an issue that he had
hoped would produce a calmer atmosphere, Nimeiri
abruptly issued a decree in October dissolving Alier's
southern regional government and the southern re-
gional assembly. He appointed Gasmallah Rassas, an
army general, to head a six-month interim govern-
ment that was to prepare for new elections and a
referendum to decide the redivision issue
Because of continued southern opposition to redivi-
sion, however, Nimeiri reversed his position in a
speech on 22 February and called for a compromise to
Major
Factions a
Sudan African
National Union
Joseph Lagu
Faction
Associated with the old Southern
Sudan Liberation Movement
(SSLM) and Equatorian tribes
1956 Sudan gains independence
1963 Southern rebellion intensifies
1971 Joseph Lagu forms the SSLM
1972 Addis Ababa agreement ends
southern rebellion
Abel Alier becomes southern re-
gional president
1978 Lagu elected southern president
1980 Alier regains presidency
January 1981 Lagu proposes redivision plan;
supported by Nimeiri
October 1981 Provisional military government
appointed
February 1982 Nimeiri reverses position on redi- 25X1
vision issue
June 1982 Joseph Tambura elected southern
president; Lagu replaces Alier as
national Second Vice President
a These factions are technically merged in the Sudanese Socialist
Union, the only legal political party in Sudan, but loyalty to them
has never disappeared.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP83SO0854R000200060002-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP83SO0854R000200060002-7
increase local authority within the framework of a
single, undivided southern region. A committee to
explore "greater autonomy"'was to be formed, and
elections for the new southern assembly were sched-
uled. Militant prodivisionists staged demonstrations in
Eastern and Western Equatoria Provinces to protest
the reversal, but Nimeiri stood firm.
Campaigning for the assembly elections proceeded
vigorously as various factions and politicians maneu-
vered under the cloud of the redivision issue. In early
June results were announced that paralleled pre-1972
political splits in the South. Three major groups
garnered seats: the Southern Front won 50; SANU,
25; and the Equatorians led by Lagu, 35. As the
election for southern president approached, several
candidates emerged from the three groups, but none
appeared to have a decisive edge
Tambura and Lagu: Equatorians Riding High
On 23 June, Lagu supporter Joseph Tambura, a
member of the Azande tribe, the largest in Western
Equatoria, was elected president of the southern High
Executive Council. According to US Embassy report-
ing, non-Dinka Nilotics had united with Equatorians
to elect Tambura. Dinka candidates associated with
the Southern Front faction, including Alier, were
The Threat of Subversion
Over the past several months the Sudanese Govern-
ment has become increasingly concerned about the
security situation in the South,
Dissident southerners, including
many who have received Libyan-supplied training and
weaponry in camps located in Ethiopia, have infiltrat-
ed Sudanese territory and mounted a series of attacks
against towns, army garrisons, and police stations.
Despite the hit-and-run nature of these attacks, the
Nimeiri government fears that Libyan and Ethiopian
efforts to exploit southern grievances will continue
and could create a serious security threat in the
South.
The Sudanese armed forces have responded fairly
effectively to dissident activity thus far, although they
are hampered by severe maintenance, logistic, and
supply difficulties. Nimeiri told the US Ambassador
in mid-August that with the aid of helicopters, includ-
ing two Soviet-built MI-8s that were supplied by the
Egyptian military in July, the armed forces had the
situation in hand.
Specific information about the composition and
strength of the dissident forces in the South is difficult
to obtain because of the Region's isolation.
dealt a stunning blow.
In another dramatic move, Nimeiri dismissed Alier
from his position as Sudanese Second Vice President
and named Lagu to succeed him.
the combination of Tambura's victory
and Lagu's appointment convinced many that Nimeiri
had decided to press ahead with the redivision issue.
"Unity" proponents appeared weak and in disarray.
the South. Most, or some 500, are thought to be
members of the so-called New Anya Nya (NAN).
About a third of NAN personnel are former members
of the Sudanese Army who mutinied in 1974 and
either fled to Ethiopia or went into hiding in southern
Sudan. Recent NAN recruits are believed to be
former Sudanese policemen and soldiers dismissed
-from duty at the beginning of this year.
The US Embassy believes that Nimeiri now realizes
that the greatest immediate threat to stability in the
South would be heavy central government pressure to
implement Lagu's plan. Tambura's government,
therefore, is likely to pursue decentralization policies
cautiously, such as by giving increased authority to
provincial and local committees, as is sanctioned by
Sudan's local government act of 1981
Potential targets for dissident attacks include agricul-
tural and development projects, Chevron's oil explora-
tion facilities, and river traffic between Juba and
Kosti. Several serious incidents have occurred during
this summer's rainy season, when it was difficult for
the armed forces to respond quickly to the widely
scattered attacks. A particularly successful dissident
9 X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1 ^
25X1
25X11
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
& ^
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP83SO0854R000200060002-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP83SO0854R000200060002-7
Secret
operation was the capture in late June of the town of
Adok, which is over 200 kilometers inside Sudanese
territory. The occupation lasted only two days, and
the 200 attackers withdrew under sporadic assaults by
Sudanese units
High-level Sudanese officials believe that Libyan
leader Qadhafi, who has long plotted to overthrow the
Sudanese regime, regards the South as a prime area
for subversion. Chairman Mengistu of Ethiopia, while
not sharing Qadhafi's intense personal antipathy for
Nimeiri, resents Sudan's harboring and active support
of Ethiopian rebels. We believe he perceives this as
part of a US effort to undermine his regime. He has
attempted to intimidate Khartoum by providing train-
ing areas and facilities for Libyan-supported Suda-
nese dissidents. Both northern and southern Sudanese
receive training by Libyans in these camps.
This subversive activity has yet to attract widespread
southerners who join the dissidents are motivated
more by boredom than by ideology and that the
population will not support the dissidents if it can be
demonstrated that Libya and Ethiopia are behind the
rebels' activity. The Sudanese Government has been
attempting to make that connection and on 8 August
announced that a "Libyan-led plot in collusion with
an African country" had been discovered in the
South
officials of the South's vulnerability to subversion.
Political rivalries among the southerners
are certainly exploitable by outside forces. Also, the
isolation and increased lawlessness in the South have
are a constant irritant to southerners.
produced a heavy illicit arms traffic, which has led to
violence and official corruption. Finally, the generally
dismal economic and social conditions of the Region
Serious problems plague Sudan's major military unit
in the South, the 1st Division. US Embassy reporting
indicates that Southerners, who constitute more than
half of the force, believe that they are discriminated
against because of the tendency to promote along
regional lines and especially by the use of Arabic at
the Armed Forces Command and Staff College. The
use of Arabic in entry examinations virtually excludes
the predominantly English-speaking southern officer
corps from the staff officer course, a requirement for
promotion to colonel.
northern military commanders, who
apparently have little confidence in the 1st Division,
are aggravating the situation by sending northern
units into the South to conduct antidissident opera-
tions. The southern officials fear that northern troops
will not take sufficient care to distinguish between
dissidents and innocent villagers. Southerners are also
nervous about rumors that Egyptian troops will be
asked to deploy to the South if the situation deterio-
rates. Old fears of Egyptian and Arab penetration
25X1
25X1
LOA]
25X1
25X1
would be reawakened if Nimeiri took such a step, and 25X1
resistance to the central government.
power base.
Outlook
Nimeiri's moderate regime in Sudan, a country of
political and strategic importance to the United
States, will continue to face a number of serious
problems, including the difficult and potentially dan-
gerous situation in the South. A renewal of the 17-
year-long civil war that ended in 1972 appears unlike-
ly in the near term. Any significant increase in
southern dissidence, however, could force Nimeiri to
deploy additional military forces to the area. Pro-
longed involvement in an antisubversive campaign
could damage military morale and eventually weaken
the loyalty of the armed forces, Nimeiri's principal
The volatile combination of social and economic
underdevelopment, political ferment, and a Libyan-
Ethiopian-backed insurgency almost certainly will
produce continuing instability in the South during the
next year. Without the resources to provide effective
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP83SO0854R000200060002-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP83SO0854R000200060002-7
solutions for the Region's many problems, and facing
widespread resentment from the southern population,
the central government has few options and must hope
that the situation will not become dangerous. Nimeiri
has proved adept at handling southern difficulties in
the past, but
his popularity and prestige have eroded
The South desperately needs political stability in
order to address pressing social and economic prob-
lems, but it is too early to judge whether the newly
elected southern regional government can provide
such a climate. Issues of redivision and decentraliza-
tion remain extremely volatile, and disputes could
easily erupt, once more plunging the south into politi-
cal disarray.
9 X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP83SO0854R000200060002-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP83SO0854R000200060002-7
Secret
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP83SO0854R000200060002-7