THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND ARAB POLITICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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STAT
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
MASTER FILE
1 T0 E -T
OR, MARS, ON
The Muslim Brotherhood
and Arab Politics
Secret
NESA 82-10533
October 1982
Copy (~ A
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
and Arab Politics
The Muslim Brotherhood
the Office of Near East-South Asia Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, NESA,
This paper was prepared byl
Operations.
This paper was coordinated with the National
Intelligence Council and the Directorate of
Secret
NESA 82-10533
October 1982
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Secret
Overview
Information available
as of 8 September 1982
was used in this report.
and Arab Politics 25X1
The Muslim Brotherhood
increased as the latest Islamic resurgence has gained strength.
The Muslim Brotherhood is the most important fundamentalist Islamic
organization in the Arab World. It is the largest opposition group in Egypt.
and has challenged the ruling regimes of Syria and Sudan. It also plays an
important role in the internal politics of Jordan and has members in a
number of other Arab states. The popularity of the Brotherhood, which
seeks a return to Islamic values and adherence to Islamic law, has
on some issues and the giving of mutual aid when necessary.
Despite occasional journalistic claims that a monolithic Muslim Brother-
hood exists under the leadership of a shadowy Supreme Guide, we believe
that Brotherhood organizations in the various Arab states are distinct
groups that formulate their own policies. There is evidence of cooperation
government.
In recent years Brotherhood leaders in Egypt and Sudan have adopted an
increasingly moderate stance toward the governments of those countries.
The Brotherhood in Egypt has reacted positively to conciliatory overtures
from President Mubarak, while the organization in Sudan has been
effectively co-opted by the Nimeiri regime. The organization operates in
Jordan and most other Arab states with the tacit permission of the
governments.
The Brotherhood, nevertheless, retains the potential to become a seriously
destabilizing force in the region. The individual organizations could adopt
confrontational postures if the host governments implement or persist in
policies that conflict with the Brotherhood's basic ideology. Leadership
changes that bring to power younger, more aggressive members of the
organization also could lead to a more militant stance toward these
assassination.
The major exception to the trend toward cooperation has been in Syria,
where the Brotherhood continues to seek the overthrow of the Alawite
regime of Hafiz al-Assad. Serious setbacks in recent conflicts with the
Syrian regime, however, will force the Brotherhood to abandon immediate
efforts to topple the government and instead focus on terrorism and
iii Secret
NESA 82-10533
October 1982
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Secret
and Arab Politics
The Muslim Brotherhood was founded by Shaykh
Hassan al-Banna in Egypt in 1928. Through an
aggressive propaganda effort the organization grew
until in the 1940s it rivaled other large political
groups in Egypt. The Brotherhood began to appear in
other Arab states following World War II. For the
most part the organization was spread by students
returning from Egypt or by Brotherhood members
who fled Egypt during periods of government repres-
sion. Only in Syria, Sudan, and Jordan, however, did
the Brotherhood gain political significance.
The basic goal of the Muslim Brotherhood is the
creation of a modern political community based on
Islamic precepts. Like the movement led by Ayatollah
Khomeini that deposed the Shah of Iran in February
1979, the Brotherhood calls for the elimination of
corrupting, Western influences in society. The Broth-
erhood's origins, however, are found in Sunni rather
than the more militant Shia version of Islam, and its
position on the imposition of Islamic morality is
generally less fanatical than Shia groups. Unlike the
more radical Shias, the Brotherhood seems willing to
attempt, when possible, to influence the policy of
secular regimes by nonviolent means. Brotherhood
leaders initially were encouraged by the rise to power
of Khomeini, but they became disillusioned by the
excesses of the new regime in Tehran
The Brotherhood Today
Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood is the largest and
most important opposition group in the country. The
US Embassy estimates that it has as many as 500,000
members, and several million other Egyptians proba-
bly sympathize with its ideology. Despite the arrest of
many Brotherhood members in 1981, the organization
has continued to eschew the violence that brought it
into open conflict with the Nasir regime in the 1950s.
Objectives of the Muslim Brotherhood
Many of the goals of the Muslim Brotherhood have
been spelled out by Al-Da'wah, the official periodical
of the Egyptian Brotherhood. a Its overall objective is
the implementation of an "Islamic order" based on a
set of moral and ethical principles that governments
in Muslim states must follow. These include:
? Substitution of Islamic shariah, or religious law,
for Western-inspired legal systems.
? An economy based on Koranic principles, including
the abolition of interest and the replacement of tax
codes by the traditional zakat, or alms tax, to help
the poor.
? The relegation of women to the home tofulfill their
divinely ordered function of bearing and raising
children.
Al-Da'wah also has specifically called on the Egyp-
tian Government to:
? Ban the sale of alcoholic beverages.
? Forbid birth control.
? Abandon Sadat's "open door" economic policy.
Relations between the Brotherhood and the govern-
ment were poor under Nasir but improved markedly
after Sadat assumed power in 1970. Sadat sought
support from Islamic elements to balance the power of
his leftist and Nasirist opponents. He removed some
of the restraints imposed on the Islamic hierarchy
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during the Nasir era, and he released many Brother-
hood members from prison. In return, Sadat received
the support of Brotherhood leaders in countering the
growing strength of antiregime elements in the uni-
versities. He also won Brotherhood backing for the
expulsion of the Soviets from Egypt in July 1972 and
the initiation of the war against Israel in October
1973
This period of cooperation, however, began to deterio-
rate in 1976-77. The Brotherhood attacked the gov-
ernment for permitting "indecent" and "vulgar" pro-
grams on radio and television and criticized the
educational system for failing to emphasize Islam.
According to open sources, the Brotherhood also
became disgruntled because of Sadat's continued
refusal to allow it to organize as a political party and
Sadat's trip to Israel in 1977, which the Brotherhood
regarded as abandonment of the common Arab cause.
Although the government initiated a crackdown on
fundamentalist groups, including the Brotherhood, in
September 1981, the organization apparently was not
involved in Sadat's assassination, and for the most
part it escaped the subsequent more vigorous crack-
down on extremist Islamic groups.
Brotherhood leaders had a positive first impression of
President Mubarak. They hoped that the new Egyp-
tian leader would combat corruption and lead Egypt
away from Sadat's conciliatory policies toward Israel
and seek better relations with the conservative Arab
The strong discipline exercised by Brotherhood
founder Hassan al-Banna has declined, but the Broth-
erhood still operates in Egypt as a secret organization.
Its membership below the senior levels and its struc-
ture remain largely unknown, but we believe it proba-
bly consists of numerous small cells as it did in the
1940s and 1950s. There apparently has been no
"Supreme Guide" since the death in 1974 of Hassan
al-Hudaybi, who succeeded al-Banna. Instead, the
Brotherhood's Office of Guidance, located in Cairo,
directs the organization's day-to-day affairs. Umar
Talmasani, the publisher of Al-Da'wah, the propagan-
da organ of the Brotherhood, acts as spokesman for
the group and apparently is the most important leader
in Egypt. Other prominent members of the organiza-
tion include Salih Ashmawi, the editor of Al-Da'wah,
and Shaykh Muhammad Ghazali, who was known to
be living in Saudi Arabia in early 1981.
Although there is little evidence to suggest that the
Brotherhood has formal ties to other fundamentalist
groups in Egypt, its
influence with the student Islamic Societies is strong.
These groups espouse many of the same Islamic
principles as the Brotherhood but appear to advocate
a more militant or activist line.
Brotherhood has
been recruiting in the Egyptian military for some
time. Since early 1981 the organization has begun to
focus its efforts on retired senior and middle-level
officers. The Brotherhood apparently reasons that the
former senior officers are unhappy over forced retire-
ment and that the middle-level officers are still young
enough to be susceptible to Islamic reformist rhetoric.
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the
Brotherhood has some 3,000 trained militiamen in an
apparatus called Al-Katiba (The Battalion) to defend
against renewed suppression by the government or for
protection in any confrontation with extremist groups.
Sudan. Despite its small membership, estimates of
which range from 60,000 to 300,000 in a country of
approximately 20 million, the Muslim Brotherhood is
a significant force on the Sudanese political scene.
Hasan al-Turabi, the Trustee General and senior
official of the Brotherhood, also serves as Sudan's
Attorney General. Yasin al-Imam, a newspaper edi-
tor, is Deputy Trustee General. The principal execu-
tive body, the Politburo, is chaired by Turabi and
meets regularly in Khartoum. An advisory council,
also chaired by Turabi and composed of representa-
tives from all regions of the country, elects the
Politburo and makes policy recommendations.
Although political parties are illegal in Sudan, the
government has permitted the Brotherhood to build
its strength among university students at the expense
of other political groups, particularly the Commu-
nists.
(Although he
previously was critical of Nimeiri's foreign and do-
mestic policies, Turabi apparently has decided that
Nimeiri is preferable to any likely alternative.
The main strength of the Brotherhood in Sudan is
found in the country's small educated class. It contin-
ues to recruit heavily among the students and faculty
of Khartoum University, where it has dominated the
influential student union since 1980. It is also well
represented among professional groups, and a signifi-
cant number of National Assembly delegates are
believed to be members. Although the Brotherhood is
less influential than the Sudanese Communist Party
among the labor unions, it is believed by the US
Embassy to be gaining strength in that element of
society.
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In 1980 Turabi withstood a challenge to his leader-
ship by a faction of the Brotherhood that criticized his
alleged liberal interpretation of Islamic precepts and 25X1
his acceptance of President Nimeiri's national recon- 25X1
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opponents, who also recommended closer ties to the 25X1
Brotherhood in Egypt, were expelled from the organi-
zation. As of mid-1982 Turabi appeared to be in firm
control of the Sudanese Brotherhood.
Jordan. The Brotherhood in Jordan operates legally
and may have as many as 50,000 members and
supporters. It is headed by a Supreme Guide, Shaykh
Muhammad Abd al-Rahman Khalifah, and a Council
of Guides. As in other Arab countries, the Brother-
hood has focused its efforts on recruiting students and
in recent years has also been successful in increasing
its strength in professional organizations
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King Hussein uses the Brotherhood to counter leftist
influence but recognizes that fundamentalist Islam
could pose a threat to his survival, according to the
US Embassy, and he has ordered close surveillance of
all Islamic groups, including the Brotherhood.
In early 1981 two distinct elements were evident in
the Brotherhood in Jordan,
Older members of the Brotherhood,
including the leadership, favored a nonactivist policy
and cooperation with the government. A group of
younger, more activist members opposed cooperation
with the regime but stopped short of calling for the
overthrow of the King. These two groups differed
most over policy toward Syria. The leadership group
agreed to a government request not to support Broth-
erhood members from Syria, either in Syria or in
Jordan. The younger members argued that it was the
duty of the Brotherhood in Jordan to continue aiding
the organization in Syria.
The Army constitutes the major obstacle to efforts by
Islamic fundamentalists to depose the King. Despite
the fact that all members of the armed forces are
specifically prohibited from membership in the Broth-
erhood, we believe that a few do belong, and a number
sympathize with the organization's goals. Those who
belong to the Brotherhood, however, keep a low
profile and make little or no effort to recruit their
acquaintances.
The Brotherhood also has a strong following in the
Israeli-occupied territories, particularly the West
Bank, its
major areas of strength are in the towns of Hebron,
Jenin, Tulkarm, Nablus, and Ramallah. The organi-
zation on the West Bank receives financial support
from Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Because the Brother-
hood has challenged the dominance of leftist and
Palestinian nationalist groups, the Israelis have adopt-
ed a tolerant view of its activities.
Syria. In 1980 the membership of the Muslim Broth-
erhood in Syria was estimated
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at 10,000 persons divided into several factions.
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In addition, a covert terrorist arm called the Followers
of Marwan Hadid may have had as many as 1,000
members. We believe that this group formed the core
of those who fought the Syrian military in Aleppo in
the spring of 1980 and in Hama in 1982.
The failure of Brotherhood factions in different areas
of Syria to coordinate their activities has handicapped
the organization's ability to operate effectively against
the Assad regime,
attempts.
Despite these differences and the serious losses suf-
fered by the Brotherhood in the conflicts with the
government, it remains dedicated to the ouster of the
Assad regime. The organization's ability to challenge
the government, however, has been severely weak-
ened. We believe that by provoking the regime to
move forcefully against its stronghold in Hama, the
Brotherhood had hoped to widen existing divisions
between the regime and the Syrian people. The heavy
casualties inflicted on the civilian population dis-
turbed many Syrians, but most apparently would
prefer a moderate, Sunni Muslim-controlled govern-
ment and are unwilling to support the Brotherhood's
attempt to seize power. The Brotherhood, neverthe-
less, retains the capacity to conduct terrorist opera-
tions in Syria, and government leaders, including
Assad, remain primary targets for assassination
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A Brotherhood group has long been present in North
Yemen but has only recently become involved in
politics. The US Embassy believes that although its
political influence is growing, it probably will not soon
have a significant impact on the regime's foreign or
domestic policies. Since 1980 a paramilitary organiza-
tion led by Muslim Brothers and armed by the Saudis
has periodically participated in fighting against South
Yemeni-backed insurgents. In August 1982 Muslim
Brothers used Saudi subventions to secure 25 of the
50 seats on the newly created Permanent Committee
of the Popular Congress. According to the US Embas-
sy, the Brotherhood also controls the student union at
Sanaa University. President Salih regards the Saudis
and their North Yemeni allies as dangerous political
adversaries. He knows that the Brotherhood in North
Yemen relies heavily on Saudi subsidies and would
swiftly curtail its political activities if it challenged
his authority.
Elsewhere in the Arab World
Small Muslim Brotherhood groups can be found in
several other Arab countries. These organizations,
however, generally are small and do not constitute a
threat to the stability of these states.
In Saudi Arabia, Islamic fundamentalism as a reviv-
alist movement has been preempted by the essentially
Islamic nature of the government. Moreover, since the
attack in 1979 on the Great Mosque of Mecca by
religious fanatics, the regime has attempted to bolster
its Islamic credentials by accelerating efforts to weed
out those aspects of Western culture deemed most
objectionable by the religious hierarchy. A Brother-
hood group exists in the kingdom, but it consists
mainly of Egyptians and Syrians. The government
permits Brotherhood members to reside in Saudi
Arabia as long as they refrain from engaging in
domestic political activity.
Some of the
estimated 4,200 Egyptians in Bahrain are also be-
lieved to be members of the organization. The Broth-
erhood in Bahrain does not, in our view, represent a
threat to the security of the state.
In Morocco, a Brotherhood group was organized in
1972 with government permission to counter leftist
influence, according to the US Embassy. Known as
the Islamic Youth Movement, it is reported to have
several thousand members and is strongest in Casa- 25X1
blanca, Marrakech, and Fez. The government has
thoroughly penetrated the group, which advocates
violence as the sole means of "purifying" Muslim
society.
In Algeria, a small number of university students may
be members of the Brotherhood, but they are de-
scribed by the US Embassy as apolitical and primari-
ly interested in bringing about a religious revival. It is
unclear if they have any ties to Muslim Brotherhood
groups elsewhere in the Middle East
Recent Trends
There appears to have been steady, although some-
times uneven, movement toward closer cooperation
between most Muslim Brotherhood groups and their
governments. Leaders of Egypt, Sudan, and Jordan
have at times used the Brotherhood to counter threats
from leftists and secular Arab nationalists. In efforts
to gain the cooperation of the Islamic establishment,
including the Brotherhood, these Arab leaders have
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Muhammad
Abd al-Rahman
Khalifah
Principal Brotherhood spokes-
man in Egypt and publisher of the
organization's periodical, Al-
Da'wah.
Editor of Al-Da'wah. Like Tal-
masani, a high-level official of
the Egyptian Brotherhood during
its early days.
A senior member of the Egyptian
Brotherhood who lives in Saudi
Arabia.
Trustee General of the Brother-
hood in Sudan since 1969 and de
facto leader since 1965. He has
served as the country's Attorney
General since 1979.
Supreme Guide of the Brother-
hood in Jordan. Advocates coop-
eration with the government.
Supreme Guide of the Brother-
hood in Syria. Believed to be in
exile in Europe.
Deputy Supreme Guide of the
Brotherhood in Syria. Described
as the ideologist of the Syrian
organization, he is also believed
to be living in Europe.
Forced out as Supreme Guide of
Brotherhood in Syria in early
1981 after conflict with govern-
ment in Aleppo. Lives in exile in
Aachen, West Germany, where he
is chairman of an Islamic center.
attempted to strengthen their Muslim credentials. In
Jordan and Sudan members of the Brotherhood have
been appointed to high positions in the government.
For the most part, the local Brotherhood organiza-
tions have been receptive to such approaches as long
as the governments did not go out of their way to
undermine the Brotherhood's basic ideology.
Although the Brotherhood in Egypt has openly chal-
lenged some government policies, in recent years it
has restricted itself largely to propaganda activities.
To avoid provoking the Brotherhood into more ex-
treme action, the government in turn generally has
dealt with the organization in a restrained manner. In
January 1979, after Al-Da'wah accused President
Sadat of collaborating with Israel and the CIA
against the Brotherhood, the government banned only
one issue of the journal. Consistent criticism of gov-
ernment policies, however, finally led Sadat to make
the Brotherhood a principal target of a crackdown on
all opposition groups in September 1981. Al-Da'wah
was banned, and a number of Brotherhood members,
including Talmasani, were arrested.
Under Mubarak, the government has once again
sought an accommodation with the Brotherhood. Mu-
barak released Talmasani and other leaders of the
organization and is giving them some latitude to
In Sudan, following Nimeiri's reconciliation with his
conservative opponents that began in 1977, the Broth-
erhood abandoned its efforts to topple the Sudanese
leader and adopted a policy of cautious cooperation
with the government. Brotherhood leader Hasan al-
Turabi was released from prison, given a position in
the Sudanese Socialist Union, and later named Attor-
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Another phenomenon worth noting is that the leaders
of the Brotherhood organizations in Egypt, Sudan,
and Jordan are mostly older men who appear to have
lost their enthusiasm for direct confrontation with the
government. In Egypt, for example, all of the leader-
ship is over 60, and some, including Umar Talmasani,
are in their seventies. Shaykh Muhammad Abd al-
Rahman Khalifah of Jordan is in his late sixties. One
of the youngest is Hasan al-Turabi of Sudan, who is
50. Most of these leaders have spent time in prison or
exile and have become increasingly susceptible to
We believe, however, that some cooperation between
Brotherhood organizations in the Arab countries oc-
curs, especially during times of crisis for one of the
In addition to periodic meetings in
Europe, Brotherhood representatives also meet in
Saudi Arabia during the Hajj, the pilgrimage to
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government efforts to co-opt them.
International Cooperation
Several reports in recent years have suggested that
Muslim Brotherhood groups in the various Arab
countries are directed from a single international
headquarters or by a central leadership body.
There is, however, no independent confirmation of
these or other claims about the existence of an
international leadership body. We believe that the
Brotherhood organizations in the various states in-
stead have developed since the 1950s into separate
and in some ways nationalistic groups. Hasan al-
Turabi, Trustee General of the Brotherhood in Sudan,
stated in 1980 that there is no international leader-
ship, although some Brotherhood leaders might claim
otherwise in order to give the impression that the
Brotherhood is more powerful than it actually is.
According to Turabi, when Brotherhood representa-
tives meet, they do so as individuals, not as repre-
sentatives of particular Brotherhood groups.
Mecca.
The network of Islamic centers in Europe, the United
States, and elsewhere may provide a mechanism for
sustained cooperation, particularly on religious and
propaganda matters. The foremost of these is the
center in Geneva, Switzerland, headed by Said Rama-
dan, a prominent Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood fig- 25X1
ure. 25X1
Funding
Because of the secretive nature of the Brotherhood's
activities, there is little hard information about the
manner in which various national Brotherhoods ob-
tain financial support. Although there was a formal
dues-paying mechanism in the early days of the
Egyptian organization, many observers believe that
most funds are now obtained through donations from
Brotherhood members or sympathizers, particularly
those in the oil-rich states of the Arabian Peninsula.
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Outlook
Future relations between the Brotherhood organiza-
tions and the Arab governments will depend to a
considerable extent on the course of the Islamic
resurgence and on future political events in the indi-
vidual states. The vitality of Islam over the centuries
has tended to fluctuate, usually in reaction to external
challenges, and it is not clear if the present revival is
still on the upswing. The attitude of the Brotherhood
organizations toward these governments also will de-
pend on their ability to find solutions to basic econom-
ic and social problems. Failure by the regimes to halt
the gradual decline in the living standards of their
citizens will increase the popular appeal of all opposi-
tion groups, including the Brotherhood.
In the near term, the Brotherhood probably will
continue to pursue its generally nonconfrontational
policy toward the governments in Egypt, Sudan, and
Jordan. The older, more conservative leadership of the
organizations in these three states is likely to continue
to avoid actions that could lead to harsh repression.
For their part, these governments would prefer, if at
all possible, to continue to avoid major disagreements
with the Brotherhood.
Over the longer run, however, conflict between the
Brotherhood and the governments of Egypt, Sudan,
and Jordan remains a definite possibility. Although
President Mubarak has taken some steps to address
Islamic sensitivities, there is no indication thus far
that he intends to abandon the "open door" economic
policy that fundamentalists charge is corrupting
Egyptian society. More important to the Brotherhood,
Mubarak has indicated that he will not reject the
Camp David Accords with Israel. In Sudan and
Jordan a confrontation appears somewhat less likely
but could develop if these governments fail to take
sufficient account of Brotherhood sensitivities and
goals
A key leadership change in the Brotherhood in any of
the three states also could lead to a more militant
posture toward the government. Although little is
known of the views of second-echelon leaders of the
organization, some elements within the Brotherhood
in each country have been critical of current leaders
for identifying too closely with their host govern-
ments. In any event, the Brotherhood is likely to
continue to be the spawning ground for more radical
groups formed by breakaway Brotherhood members
dissatisfied with the moderation of the current leader-
ship.
In Syria, the Brotherhood will continue to work
actively against the Assad regime. The setbacks suf-
fered by the Brotherhood in 1980 and 1982, however,
will limit its ability to challenge the regime seriously
over the next year unless it aligns itself with other
dissident groups.
Even though the Muslim Brotherhood does not appear
to constitute a serious immediate threat to any Arab
regime, the organization will continue to influence
policies in such states as Egypt, Jordan, and Sudan.
The leaders of these states realize that Brotherhood
ideals are appealing to important segments of their
societies, and that the organization could develop into
a more effective opposition force under certain cir-
cumstances. Therefore, they will continue to consider
the Brotherhood's conservative outlook when framing
foreign and domestic policies.
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Appendix
Origins and History
The Muslim Brotherhood was founded by Shaykh
Hassan al-Banna in Ismailia, Egypt, in 1928. Three
years later Banna moved his headquarters to Cairo,
where he spent the next decade building the move-
ment by recruiting among civil servants, students,
workers, and peasants. The new organization tended
to attract recent immigrants from rural areas who
were alienated by the widespread foreign influence
present in the metropolitan areas and their impersonal
nature. Banna and his followers believed that Islamic
morality was threatened by the growing tendency in
Egypt toward secularization and Westernization.
They demanded a return to Islamic shariah law and
adherence to an Islamic code of conduct
In the years immediately following World War II, the
Brotherhood became the second-largest political
movement in Egypt, exceeded in size by the secular,
nationalist Wafd Party. The Brotherhood's strength
stemmed largely from the wide economic, social, and
educational network it had established and its willing-
ness to use violence or threats to achieve its ends. F_
The Brotherhood began to lose strength, however,
after Banna was assassinated by government agents in
1949. Moreover, the organization had been officially
banned the previous year after a Brotherhood member
murdered Prime Minister Nuqrashi Pasha. Banna's
successor, Hassan al-Hudaybi, was opposed by some
members of the ruling body of the Brotherhood, and
the subsequent struggle for power further weakened
the organization.
Gamal Abd al-Nasir's Revolutionary Command
Council (RCC), which came to power after the 1952
coup, at first cooperated with the Brotherhood. In the
early 1940s Banna had been in contact with the group
of discontented young military officers led by Nasir
that later became known as the "Free Officers." Anti-
monarchist as well as anti-Wafd, the Brotherhood was
initially inclined to support the new regime. The
RCC, however, soon recognized that it could not
tolerate a powerful rival like the Brotherhood.
Nasir moved decisively to suppress the Brotherhood in
1954 after an assassination attempt against him by a
member of the organization. Seven members of the
Brotherhood were hanged and others sentenced to
various terms in prison. Hudaybi received a life
sentence. Despite this setback, the Brotherhood sur-
vived underground for a decade and began a tentative
comeback in 1964. In 1966, however, authorities
discovered another Brotherhood conspiracy against
Nasir. Three more members were hanged and a large
number imprisoned.
Under the presidency of Anwar Sadat in the early
1970s, many of the repressive tactics employed by
Nasir were eased and more political activity tolerated.
Athough it continued to be classified as an illegal
party, the Brotherhood began for the first time in
some years to function in a relatively open manner. In
1976 the government gave the Brotherhood permis-
sion to begin publishing a periodical entitled AI-
Da'wah (The Call). Through this vehicle the Brother-
hood propagated its ideas and began commenting on
government policy. It became bolder and in 1977
vigorously criticized Sadat's trip to Jerusalem and his
agreement the following year to the Camp David
Accords. Continued Brotherhood opposition to his
policies finally led Sadat in September 1981, one
month before his assassination, to arrest a number of
Brotherhood leaders, including Umar Talmasani, the
publisher of AI-Da'wah
In Syria, the Brotherhood was organized in 1945 by
representatives of Hassan al-Banna who recruited
members of an Islamic youth organization founded in
the 1930s. Although the Brotherhood coexisted for
several years with other political groups in Syria, the
seizure of power by the Syrian Baath Party in 1963
led to the suppression of the Brotherhood the follow-
ing year. In 1966 the wing of the Baath Party
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controlled by the Alawites, a minority religious group,
deposed the Sunni Muslim leadership of the party.
The Brotherhood does not recognize the Alawites as
true Muslims, and this added to the hostility between
the organization and the regime, which since 1970 has
been led by Hafiz al-Assad.
In the late 1970s the Brotherhood, led by the exiled
Supreme Guide Issam al-Attar, decided to move
directly against the government. In June 1979 the
Brotherhood killed 50 Alawite cadets at the artillery
school in Aleppo. The government responded by pass-
ing a law that made membership in the Brotherhood
punishable by death. In early 1980, alarmed by
apparent Brotherhood cooperation with professional
and merchants' groups in Aleppo, the government
moved forcefully to suppress the organization in that
city. Employing units from the Army and Special
Forces, the Assad regime reasserted its control over
Aleppo after several months of fighting.)
~he Brotherhood, under more aggres-
sive leadership headed by a new Supreme Guide,
Adrian Sad al-Din, began to prepare for a major
antigovernment action centered in the city of Hama.
In early 1982, however, the government learned of the
plan and moved to crush resistance in the city, long a
Brotherhood stronghold. The action provoked an up-
rising, but after several weeks of fierce fighting, the
government's military forces prevailed.
The Brotherhood in Sudan was founded in the mid-
1950s. Initially its membership was restricted to a
small elite group of Khartoum University students
and graduates. In 1964, according to a US specialist
in Sudanese studies, it organized formally and be-
came the nucleus of the Islamic Charter Front, a
larger mass organization that for the next five years
competed with other political parties for seats in the
National Assembly. Charter Front members advocat-
ed the adoption of an Islamic constitution and opposed
closer links to Egypt because of the Nasir regime's
crackdown on the Brotherhood.
After Gaafar Nimeiri seized power in 1969, he
banned political parties and jailed their leaders, in-
cluding Brotherhood leader Hasan al-Turabi. The
Brotherhood and other conservative groups-the An-
sar and Khatmiyyah Islamic sects-then formed an
anti-Nimeiri National Front. Even though Nimeiri
eased his stance after a Communist effort to depose
him in 1971, the Front continued efforts to oust him.
Coup attempts in 1975 and 1976 finally forced
Nimeiri to seek a reconciliation with his conservative
opponents. The most important of these, the Ansar
Muslim sect and the Muslim Brotherhood, agreed to
dissolve the Front in return for liberalization of the
political process. Turabi was released from jail and
appointed to a post in the Sudanese Socialist Union,
the nation's only legal political organization. Since
August 1979 he has served as Attorney General.
The Muslim Brotherhood has been active in Jordan
since the late 1940s and was represented in the now-
defunct Council of Deputies before the ban on politi-
cal groups in 1957. In the early 1960s the Brother-
hood's growing political power led the government to
jail a number of its leaders and ban its publications.
Subsequently, a tacit understanding was reached
whereby the government agreed to permit the Broth-
erhood to continue to function as long as it avoided
political activity. Although the importance of the
Brotherhood in Jordan appeared to decline in the late
1960s, it assumed a new significance in the 1970s
when many Jordanians were increasingly attracted to
Islamic fundamentalism.
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