MOROCCO: THE SUCCESSION ISSUE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83S00854R000100140002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 2, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
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Morocco:
The Succession Issue 25X1
An Intelligence Assessment
State Dept. review completed
Secret
NESA 82-10491
August 1982
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Morocco:
The Succession Issue
This assessment was prepared by
of the Office of Near East-South Asia Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
addressed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, NESA, on
Secret
NESA 82-10491
August 1982
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Morocco:
The Succession Issue 25X1
Key Judgments King Hassan II almost certainly will maintain firm control of Morocco' 25X1
political system over the next few years. A normal succession would be
followed if Hassan died suddenly from illness or assassination.
Hassan, a 52-year-old traditional monarch, has designated his 19-year-old
son, Crown Prince Sidi Mohamed, as his successor to ensure the continua-
tion of the dynasty. A 13-man Regency Council would act in an advisory
capacity until he turns 20 in August 1983. 25X1
We believe that Sidi Mohamed would follow his father's moderate, pro-
Western stance in the early years of his reign. At least initially, loyalists of
Hassan's palace clique are likely to dominate Sidi Mohamed's group of
advisers. Their subsequent jockeying for power, however, could weaken
Sidi Mohamed's control of the instruments of power. 25X1
A military coup seems a less likely scenario for succession, given the
apparent loyalty of the officer corps. A failure by a successor to project
strong leadership and at least the appearance of dealing with existing
economic and social problems, however, could encourage the military to
assume a political role or even to seize power. 25X1
We have only limited information about military attitudes, particularly
among junior and middle ranking officers. We are unable to measure.
accurately whether discontent exists among junior military officers or how
serious it has become among younger civilian members of the legal
opposition, but there does not appear to be a well-organized military or
civilian opposition capable of moving against the King at this time.F_
25X1
Deep-rooted economic and political problems as well as the continuing war
in the Western Sahara and the government's limited ability to satisfy
popular expectations will pose continuing challenges for Hassan and the
stability of Morocco in the next few years. It is impossible to predict how
skillfully Hassan or his successor will manage these problems-some
causes of which are beyond his control. 25X1
Information available as of 2 August 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.
Secret
NESA 82-10491
August 1982
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In the event of massive and sustained popular unrest-a possibility in the
years ahead if economic problems worsen-the armed forces probably
would intervene. We believe that the military would eventually restore
civilian rule, probably with a weaker constitutional monarchy. Such a
government probably would continue close ties with the United States but
would be less willing to be closely linked with US interests in the region.) 25X1
Although the possibility is unlikely, a leftist regime could emerge from a
military coup staged by junior officers. While such a regime would
probably increase ties with the Soviet Union, it would have a socialist
rather than Communist orientation. It almost certainly would cancel any
transit access agreements with the United States.
A fundamentalist revolutionary regime is the least likely government to
come to power after Hassan dies. Although the extremist religious groups
would challenge the legitimacy of Sidi Mohamed, they lack a strong
charismatic leader and are not sufficiently well organized to make a
successful bid for power.
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Morocco:
The Succession Issue
Fifty-two-year-old King Hassan II is very much a
traditional monarch who views himself as the protec-
tor of his nation and his dynasty, the Alaouites. The
concept of rule by divine right pervades Moroccan
society and is often used to buttress his legitimacy.
Hassan has had provisions written into the constitu-
tion to protect the monarchy and ensure a smooth
transfer of power in the event of his death or abdica-
tion. His designated successor is his eldest son, 19-
year-old Crown Prince Sidi Mohamed
Formal Succession Arrangements
The Moroccan constitution specifies that the crown
should pass to the King's oldest son unless the King
designates another son as his successor. Constitutional
revisions in 1980 lowered the age of majority from 18
to 16, making Sidi Mohamed immediately eligible to
ascend the throne. If the heir designate is under the
age of 16, the constitution authorizes a Regency
Council to exercise the power of the throne; if the heir
is between the ages of 16 and 20, the council acts as
an advisory body.
deliver personal messages from his father.
Sidi Mohamed
Sidi Mohamed has been rigorously groomed since
childhood to be the heir to the Moroccan throne,
according to US Embassy reporting. He frequently
appears in public with his father and sometimes
performs ceremonial functions by himself. During the
past two years, Sidi Mohamed has been eased slowly
into more important official functions; the Crown
Prince attended the Fez and OAU summits in 1981
and has been sent occasionally as special envoy to
class almost all day.
Sidi Mohamed has been educated at the palace
school, which provides a careful mix of royal children
and selected commoners from proper families. The
school appears to revolve primarily around the educa-
tion of the Crown Prince, as a new grade level is
added when Sidi Mohamed is promoted. According to
US EmbassyE::::l the pupils work hard and are in
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The Alaouite dynasty, the oldest reigning monarchy
in the Arab world, came to power in 1666. It is called
cherifien or noble and gains further legitimacy be-
cause it can trace its lineage from the Prophet
Muhammad. Until recent times, challenges to the
sultan came mostly from members of the ruling
family. To diminish this threat, the sultan would try
to position one of his sons close to levers of power and
place him in command of a large number of troops, in
part to build a loyal power base as well as to
demonstrate that his baraka (divine right) had de-
scended to the designated heir. Mohamed V, Has-
san'sfather and first King of independent Morocco,
introduced primogeniture, but in keeping with tradi-
tion he charged Hassan with organizing Morocco's
postindependence military forces in 1956.
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Little is known about the Crown Prince's personality
or his political attitudes,
Regency Council
the Regency Council members a year later formalized
the succession arrangements and was intended to
allay public concern regarding the transition. Hassan
probably believed a broadly representative council
including key interest groups would preserve popular
support for the monarchy if the council ever exercised
any power.
Loyal service to the Alaouite throne is the shared
hallmark of the council members. Most have been
close confidants of Hassan for at least 20 years, and
two are distant relatives. In our view, Gen. Ahmed
Dlimi, Hassan's senior military and intelligence advis-
er, is the only member likely to be a strong, independ-
ent political figure. We believe that Hassan may hope
that real power and control during a transition period
would remain with Dlimi and his closest political
adviser, Ahmed Reda Guedira, with the others acting
as a rubberstamp to show broad support for the new
The Regency Council is composed of three ex officio
members and 10 personal appointees of the King. A
1980 constitutional amendment stipulates that the
council's president is no longer the King's nearest and
oldest kinsman but the First Chairman of the Su-
preme Court.
The council would act as a consultative body until
Sidi Mohamed reaches the age of 20 in August 1983;
however, the council is prohibited from amending the
constitution. The 1980 revisions also changed the
composition of the council. The subsequent naming of
monarch.
Other Palace Interest Groups
Under the legal succession arrangements, Interior
Minister Driss Basri probably would be the only
cabinet member who might have strong influence with
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Regency Council
Ex Officio Members
? First Chairman of the Supreme Court, Brahim
Keddara
? President of the National Assembly, Dey Ould Sidi
Baba
? Chairman of the Religious Regional Council of
Rabat, Sheikh Mekki Ali Naciri
King's Appointees
? Minister of Royal Household, Protocol, and Deco-
rations, Gen. Moulay Abdelhalid Alaoui
? The three Royal Counselors-Ahmed Reda Gue-
dira, Mohamed Aouad, and Ahmed Bensouda
? His aide-de-camp and senior military adviser, Gen.
Ahmed Dlimi
? Secretary general of the League of Arab Ulema,
Abdullah Guennoun
? Publisher of the religious journal Ar-Risala and
Istiqlal Party member, Boubker Kadiri
? Minister of State for Tourism and political director
of Le Matin du Sahara and Maroc Soir, Moulay
Ahmed Alaoui
? Minister of State for Posts, Telegraphs, and Tele-
phones and secretary general of the Popular Move-
ment Party Mahjoubi Aherdan
Sidi Mohamed or challenge the opinions of the Re-
gency Council. Embassy reporting indicates that
Basri is a tough and efficient functionary who advo-
cates prompt, harsh suppression of demonstrations
and disturbances. Loyal to the King, Basri has been
left in charge of the country on several occasions when
both Hassan and Dlimi have been out of the country.
Basri shares domestic security and intelligence re-
sponsibilities with Dlimi.
(Al-
though there is a good chance for a behind-the-scenes
confrontation between Basri and Dlimi in a post-
Hassan Morocco, we judge that Basri lacks a stron125X1
power base of his own and probably would serve any
successor equally well. 25X1
Hassan's youngest son, 12-year-old Prince Moulay
Alaouite tradition, it is unlikely that Hassan would
change his mind and name Moulay Rachid to be his
successor. There is always a possibility that Moulay
Rachid as an adult could attempt to usurp the throne,
particularly if Sidi Mohamed proved to be incompe-
tent or Moulay Rachid became jealous of his brother's
power. 25X1
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its leadership 25X1
smallest of the major parties, represents the interests
of the urban lower classes, those most affected by
economic hardship. If a normal succession is carried
out, the USFP probably would attempt unsuccessfully
to press the monarchy for social change. The party
would have difficulty, however, in becoming an influ- 25X1
ential voice in a post-Hassan Morocco because,=
has been virtually emasculated and its activities re-
stricted. 25X1
The local Communist party has little popular support
and is tolerated only as a symbol of Moroccan
liberalization. It supports the government on most
controversial regional issues, being careful not to get
too far out of line. In our view, it would not be a
threat to Sidi Mohamed's regime.
The religious community is potentially a strong cata-
lyst for generating opposition to succession arrange-
ments. The King is the recognized head of the
country's Islamic establishment. Hassan is conscious
of his religious authority, which serves as a major
factor in legitimizing his rule in the minds of many
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Potential Political Challenges
None of Morocco's established political parties, labor
unions, student groups, or fringe opposition groups are
sufficiently well organized in our view to challenge
the present succession arrangements.' Most of these
groups have been manipulated, neutralized, or re-
ressed by Hassan.
the principal political parties, especially the
National Assembly of Independents, periodically are
directed by the King to assume the role of loyal
opposition on nonsensitive issues, such as criticizing
bureaucratic inefficiency, but to avoid criticism of
Moroccan policies and institutions. In our view, these
parties prefer to remain loyalists. Consequently, the
independence and integrity of these groups as effec-
tive forces of political opposition have been compro-
mised by their participation in the system. With the
partial exception of the left, we believe the political
parties would rubberstamp the policies of Sidi Mo-
hamed and the Regency Council or any successor
regime supported by the military.
The Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), the
country's only independent opposition party and the
conservative Moroccans.
Muslim fundamentalists recently have begun 25X1
criticizing Hassan's interpretation of the Koran and
have increased appeals to rally popular support
against the monarchy
Hassan has an established record of successfully using
his title of "Commander of the Faithful" to offset
religious criticism from religious groups. Whether his
son will be as adept at co-opting the religious commu-
nity is not known. If a coalition of Muslim fundamen-
talists and the orthodox religious community publicly
challenged Sidi Mohamed's authority as Commander
of the Faithful, we believe this could seriously under-
mine his legitimacy. The formation of such a coalition
would be hard to control since Islam pervades Moroc-
can society, and Islamic activism has a special appeal
in Morocco.
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Figure 5. Hassan's children
from left to right, Princess
Lalla Myriem, Crown Prince
Sidi Mohamed, Prince Moulay
Rachid, Princess Asmaa, and
The Military's Role
Hassan faced serious challenges to his regime in two
brief military-led coup attempts in the early 1970s.
The King reacted by restricting the movements and
authority of the military establishment and centraliz-
ing command and control in the palace. Through
postcoup purges and attrition, potential contenders for
power disappeared from the military. In their place
emerged a military establishment that is conservative
and seemingly loyal to the King. It is not a homoge-
neous group, however, and in our view it contains
diverse groups split along social, economic, genera-
tional, and regional lines. 25X1
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The military, especially the senior officer corps, has
an important stake in preserving the status quo. The
senior officer corps is a fairly homogeneous group: all
are about the same age-in their late forties and early
fifties-and enjoy a special camaraderie since many
were commissioned in 1957, the first group of officers
to graduate from military academies after Morocco's
independence from France in 1956. The senior offi-
cers, by royal design, lack power and autonomy in
command and control. US officials have reported that
these officers are loyal to a system that has comfort-
ably rewarded their service. Embassy officials have
speculated, however, that their loyalty could shift in
order to preserve their privileged status.
Junior officers, about whom little is known, appear
loyal to the monarchy despite their chronic complaints
about the competence of senior military leaders, a
politicized promotion system that rewards loyalty
rather than competence, and the protracted war in the
Western Sahara. In general, the younger officers are
better educated and have more advanced technical
skills. In our view some of the junior officers and
enlisted men are sympathetic to the economic and
political grievances voiced by their civilian counter-
Possible Succession Scenarios
Voluntary Abdication. King Hassan, in our view, is
not likely to step down in favor of the Crown Prince
unless he is extremely ill and can no longer perform
his duties as King. Hassan appears to be motivated by
a strong sense of duty and a desire to carry on; when
faced with pressure to abdicate, these factors might
make him hold on to the reins of power longer than
advisable. Hassan, at the moment, is in good health.
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Sudden Death or Illness. If Hassan were removed
suddenly by assassination or death by natural causes
in the next few years, the senior palace advisers, led
initially by Gen. Moulay Abdeihafid and the three
royal counselors, almost certainly would quickly en-
dorse Sidi Mohamed as King. This group might begin
jockeying for power, however, and relegate Sidi Mo-
hamed
to figurehead status.
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Dlimi, the only Regency Council member with direct
authority over the Moroccan military and security
apparatus, probably would attempt to consolidate his
authority over the armed forces and emerge from the
council as the de facto power behind the throne. US
observers have reported that Dlimi is loyal and does
not aspire to replace the monarchy as the legitimate
political institution of Morocco. He has suggested on
several occasions that he probably would retire if
Hassan were no longer King. He would not, however,
hesitate to neutralize potential rivals or crack down
harshly on civil disturbances or militant opposition
groups that might threaten the survival of the monar.
chy.
If Sidi Mohamed failed to consolidate his power in the
early years of his reign-a possibility-senior military
officers and royal advisers could become destabilizing,
contending forces that would undermine the political
process and might eventually lead to coup and coun-
tercoup activity. The survival of the monarchy as an
institution would depend on conditions prevailing at
the time, and there is insufficient evidence to predict
the outcome with confidence.
The military probably would remain loyal to the
monarchy and safeguard legal succession arrange-
ments. We believe the senior officer corps would view
itself as the guardian of the monarchy during the
early years of Sidi Mohamed's reign, making sure
that palace feuds and power plays did not disrupt the
daily running of the country. The senior officers
might also remind competing factions around Sidi
Mohamed that if political infighting began to threat-
en the country's political and economic framework,
they would not hesitate to use force to order or even
install a military government if political chaos devel-
oped.
A Palace Coup. The senior officer corps is the faction
best placed to stage a successful coup. Many of these
senior officers are away from the palace on a daily
basis, however, and would require the support of or
have to eliminate those officers who actually control
the palace security forces-the commanders of the
royal guard, paratrooper brigade, and gendarmerie.
We believe that a coup plot organized by junior
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officers is a more likely possibility, but these officers
would need, in our assessment, a large group of
coconspirators and would have great difficulty evad-
ing detection by Dlimi's reasonably efficient security
apparatus
Military loyalty could be undercut by major military
setbacks in the Western Sahara or by widespread civil
disturbances resulting from economic hardships.
Should Morocco's social fabric deteriorate signifi-
cantly, senior officers might request that the King
abdicate for the good of the country in an effort to
abdication.
The establishment of a temporary military junta to
rule in place of a new monarch could result, especially
if widespread public unrest erupted and a public
consensus called for the King's removal. An increase
in food or housing costs or an issue energizing Moroc-
co's large student population could trigger popular
unrest but is unlikely to lead to demands for abdica-
tion. On the other hand, tightly enforced austerity
measures, a series of corruption scandals directly
involving the King, or several major defeats in the
Western Sahara are the kinds of events that could
induce both civilian and military calls for Hassan's
preempt a revolutionary situation.
In the past Hassan needed only to appear to be
making progress toward resolving some of Morocco's
social and economic problems to survive. Press report-
ing suggests that Moroccans are becoming more
strident in blaming Hassan directly for the country's
ills; in our view, their frustrations will inevitably grow
unless tangible results begin to emerge from govern-
ment policies aimed at resolving unemployment, infla-
tion, or the Western Sahara conflict. Memories of the
harsh crackdowns in Casablanca in June 1981, how-
25X1 ever, still deter would-be agitators.
Should the armed forces seize power, they would most
likely restore civilian rule, probably in the form of a
constitutional monarchy with greater limitations on
the monarch's personal authority and a greater insti-
tutional role for the armed forces. A number of US
and local observers have noted over the years com-
plaints within the military and civilian establishment
that the palace has too much control over even minor
decisions, such as promotions of all military officers
and daily management of the bureaucracy. ~~
25X1
Morocco's political parties probably would oppose a
military coup, but they are incapable of taking power
on their own in the next several years. The civilian
forces, if sufficiently well organized, could nonethe-
less try to foster instability in the hope of forcing the
military to restore civilian rule. If faced with wide-
spread popular unrest, however, the military in ou25X1
view would most likely crack down on the political
factions rather than agree to relinquish power. F__1
Social Upheaval. According to US Embassy
the overwhelming majority of Moroccans support t25X1
monarchy on the surface. Most Moroccans still re-
spect the institution, and many seem to give credence
to Hassan's claim to a divine right to rule.
25X1
Although many Moroccans in the street blame the
King for the country's ills, the level of discontent,
according to US Embassy reporting, has not been
effectively organized to challenge the regime. Moroc-
co's economic difficulties, however, have already gen-
erated serious spontaneous outbreaks of civil disorder
followed by government repression. Local officials
reported that hundreds of Moroccans were killed or
injured and more than 1,000 demonstrators arrested
in economic-related riots in Casablanca in June 1981.
25X1
It is impossible to predict how severe the pressures
must become before widespread instability develops,
but it is clear, according to US Embassy officials, that
many Moroccans believe that their living standards
are declining. We believe that spontaneous civil dis-
turbances spawned by economic hardships probably
will increase over the next few years. If the disturb-
ances were recurring and widespread, they could
seriously undermine the loyalty of the junior officers
and enlisted men. 25X1
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Abolition of the monarchy would most likely come
about as a result of massive civil unrest. A prolonged
succession crisis during which the senior military
officers and a new monarch jockeyed for power could
encourage leftists or fundamentalists to make a bid
for power.
A leftist regime probably could emerge successfully
only through a military coup initiated by junior
officers. The policies of such a regime are difficult to
predict
that while such a regime probably would improve
Morocco's relations with the Soviet Union, it would
insist on close adherence to a nonaligned foreign
policy. Such a regime would probably cancel any
transit access agreements with the United States and
adopt a socialist orientation in its domestic economic
and social policies.
The fundamentalists, encouraged by events in Iran
and other Muslim countries, might contribute to
social disturbances, but in our view they lack the
charismatic leader and the capability to foment a
of Phosphates. We believe that neither Sidi Mohamed
nor a military regime would feel sufficiently qualified
to manage directly a general economic reform. It is
more likely that such an endeavor would be assigned
to a highly respected and competent technocrat. F-1 25X1
Western Sahara. Morocco's foreign relations toward
particular countries in our view would continue to be
governed, to a large extent, by how those relations
could advance Morocco's claim to the Western Saha-
ra. It is likely that a moderate successor regime would
take a more aggressive posture in the Western Saha- 25X1
ra-a position that some military officers, including
Dlimi, have already urged on the King. Resolution of
the Western Sahara conflict does not appear likely
unless all the parties to the dispute become more
willing to compromise. Should this conflict become a
contentious public issue, the successor regime would
probably seek increased US military support.
Algeria. Morocco's strained relations with Algeria, its
principal regional rival, are not likely to improve
dramatically even if the Western Sahara conflict is
resolved. Neither Rabat nor Algiers can afford politi-
cally to appear to yield to the other's demands
regarding the Polisario-a posture that only encour-
ages bad relations. Attempts by both Morocco and
Algeria to dominate regional politics will continue to
impede smooth relations.
Policies of a Moderate Post-Hassan Regime
A regime headed either by Sidi Mohamed or a
conservative military junta initially would be preoccu-
pied with consolidating its hold on power. It would
respond slowly to major foreign policy initiatives and
focus on ameliorating domestic pressures. We expect
that the security forces and, if necessary, the military
would follow the precedents set by Hassan and effec-
tively handle civilian disturbances. During this transi-
tion period, there would be relatively little change in
Morocco's moderate, pro-Western orientation.F_
A successor regime will probably encounter the same
social and economic problems that have beset Hassan.
Economic issues would probably be left to the already
semiautonomous and quasi-governmental institutions
like the Ministry of Finance and the Cherifien Office
Libya. Although Morocco and Libya restored rela-
tions last year, the Moroccans do not look favorably
on Oadhafi's regime, which also backs the Polisario.
Inter-Arab Relations. In regard to Morocco's position
in the Arab world, Morocco joined the Arab consen-
sus in breaking relations with Egypt and denouncing
US Middle East peace initiatives. Morocco, however,
most likely would continue its special intermediary
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role between the Arabs and Israel. Although US
Embassy reporting suggests that Morocco may be one
of the first moderate Arab states to welcome Egypt
back to the Arab fold, it will not do so without
assurances from Saudi Arabia and other like-minded
Arab states that it will not stand alone for long. Rabat
is financially dependent on Saudi Arabia to sustain its
war effort in the Western Sahara. A new regime
probably would not jeopardize this crucial assistance
by drifting closer to the more radical Arab camp.
The Soviet Presence. A moderate successor regime
would not significantly change its outlook toward the
Soviet Union. Rabat and Moscow have political dif-
ferences but maintain cordial relations in part because
of mutually beneficial commercial relations.
Rabat distrusts Soviet inten-
tions and machinations in the region and is convinced
that Moscow is supporting the Polisario. The most
important Moroccan-Soviet commercial ties appear to
be in the phosphate and oil industries, where the
Moroccans have been trying to develop their phos-
phate and oil shale reserves.
Western Europe. Morocco's relations with Western
Europe have focused primarily on France, Spain, and
the European Community. Despite cool relations be-
cause of Paris's rapprochement with Algiers, France
will remain Morocco's primary commercial and mili-
tary partner for the next several years. A moderate
regime probably would seek to balance Morocco's
relations between the United States and France,
taking care not to lose either as a supporter. A
successor regime would be less likely to endorse
Hassan's interest in establishing a strategic alliance
with Spain. Press reports indicate that problems
between Spain and Morocco have arisen on occasion
as a result of misunderstandings over the use of bases
by the United States in either country and the
ultimate disposition of the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta
and Melilla.
Implications for the United States
Since late 1981 Washington and Rabat have been
strengthening their military, political, and economic
ties, including a transit access agreement to support
military operations in Southwest Asia. The United
States has also pledged to increase its FMS and PL-
480 assistance at least through 1984. The King,
however, remains sensitive to allegations by Moroc-
co's political parties that Morocco might become an
American pawn. 25X1
Closer ties with the United States have been initially
well received in Morocco, but they may eventually
become the focus of strong opposition rhetoric. The
transit facilities agreement could strain US-Moroccan
relations over time and, if perceived as intended to
support Israel, could be grounds for Rabat to cool
relations with Washington. According to US Embassy
well-educated Moroccans as well as the 25X1
fundamentalists are sensitive to any infringement on
their country's sovereignty or too much Western
influence. 25X1
A moderate post-Hassan leadership probably would
continue to improve commercial as well as military
relations with the United States as long as it perceives
an American interest in tacitly supporting its efforts
in the Western Sahara and recognizing its regional
role. A new regime probably would be less willing to
be closely identified with US objectives in the region
and more sensitive to the Arab consensus. The West-
ern Sahara conflict remains a major obstacle for two
US goals in North Africa-regional stability and
improved relations with Algeria. Unrealistic Moroc-
can expectations of US assistance could damage
relations between Rabat and Washington.
25X1
It is likely that the interests and objectives of a
moderate successor regime will continue to coincide
with those of the United States on some international
issues. Moroccan support could be valuable in matters
concerning the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa
as well as in international organizations.
Outlook
Hassan, for the short term, is likely to maintain firm
control of Morocco's political system. He will contin-
ue to use his proven techniques of divide and rule,
manipulation, and co-optation of political parties to
control the activities of the opposition. The military
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and the domestic security apparatus will closely regu-
late dissident activity and will obey orders to suppress
sporadic civil disturbances.
Morocco is facing a number of serious social, econom-
ic, and political problems as well as enduring the
seemingly interminable Western Saharan conflict,
which together could pose a threat to internal stabil-
ity, King Hassan's survival, and the monarchy as an
institution. If, as seems likely, the present system fails
to satisfy rising popular aspirations, social pressures
probably will eventually generate demands for major
political change.'
Under any new regime, we anticipate that Moroccans
will seek political liberalization and decentralization
of authority not found in the existing patronage-
dependent system. According to US Embassy offi-
cials, Hassan's efforts to slowly "democratize" Mo-
rocco's political system have provided a modicum of
political freedom that has temporarily pacified much
of the population. Although an obedient cabinet has
accepted Hassan's circumscribed democracy, local
observers report that middle-level party members-
not co-opted by the King-have expressed a desire to
exert more autonomy to chart Morocco's future.
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