KAMPUCHEA: FAMINE, FIGHTING, AND REFUGEES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83R00184R002600420003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 21, 2007
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 1, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
NI 79-10007
September 1979
National Secret
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Kampuchea: Famine,
Fighting, and Refugees
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National Secret
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Kampuchea: Famine,
Fighting, and Refugees
Information available as of 31 August 1979 has been used
in the preparation of this report.
This assessment was prepared in the office of the
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia and the
Pacific and was based on reports submitted by
analysts of the Office of Geographic and Cartographic
Research and the Office of Political Analysis,
National Foreign Assessment Center, and of the
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department
of State. Contributions were also received from
analysts in the National Security Agency. The
assessment was requested by the United States
Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, Ambassador-at-
Large Dick Clark. It was coordinated with the Office
of Economic Research, National Foreign Assess-
ment Center, and the National Intelligence Officers
for USSR-Eastern Europe and China.
Secret
NI 79-10007
September 1979
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KEY JUDGMENTS
DISCUSSION
Status of Population
Population Size
Conditions in First Half of 1979
Population Distribution
Food Situation
Rice Production
Current Conditions
Prospects --- - -
- -- Soviet Aid - -- - -
Potential Refugee Trends
Political and Economic Trends
Heng Samrin/ Vietnamese Infrastructure
Heng Samrin/ Vietnamese Reactions to Relief Efforts
The Vietnamese Military Presence: Fighting and Insecurity
The Military Situation
Prospects for Peace
APPENDRX: Demographic Methodology
The Long Nol Regime, July 1970-April 1975
The Pol Pot Regime, April 1975-January 1979
Estimated Population Distribution
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Kampuchea: Famine,
Fighting, and Refugees
Key Judgments We estimate that the Kampuchean population has been reduced over the
past decade from more than 7 million to around 5.8 million. At the same
time, the amount of farmland in crop production has been severely
reduced.F--]
The estimated numbers of persons facing starvation is in the range of 2.25-
3.5 million. The brunt of this disaster will be borne by those living in or near
towns and cities.
Estimates of food assistance needed through December to prevent mass
starvation range between 150,000 and 200,000 metric tons of grain. A
substantial amount of medical supplies will also be required. The picture
over the longer term is no less gloomy, although the amount of external
assistance needed is as yet undeterminable. F-1
Many factors will influence the refugee flow, but, should famine become
widespread, tens of thousands each month may try to cross into
Thailand
Heng Samrin/ Vietnamese authorities will probably allow large amounts of
relief supplies to enter but will try to impose conditionsF---] 25X1
The Heng Samrin/Vietnamese administrative infrastructure in Kampuchea
is not adequate for the distribution of relief supplies and cooperation by the
Vietnamese military will be required.
Thailand will permit the passage of relief supplies both by air to Heng
Samrin authorities in Phnom Penh and overland to civilians under Pol Pot's
control at the border, but may change this policy if it should be criticized
~
publicly by Vietnan
In the event of a new surge of refugees, the Thais will probably maintain a
hardline policy and try to deny entry. They may also forcibly repatriate
refugees unless prompt guarantees of permanent resettlement are forthcom-
ing from the international community.'
The fighting will intensify in the dry season due to start in November, and
will adversely effect the security and food supplies of the civilian population.
There is little prospect for a negotiated peace at present.F-~
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Kampuchea: Famine,
Fighting, and Refugees (U)
Status of Population
1. A decade of civil war, oppression, and invasion in
Kampuchea between 1970 and 1979 has made it
difficult to assess population figures with accuracy.
The figures that follow represent our best estimates,
but should be treated with appropriate caution.
2. Population Size. Published estimates of the
Kampuchean population range between 4 million and
8 million. The latter estimate is a UN figure and
undoubtedly is too high, whereas the lower figure is
used by the Heng Samrin regime. The UN estimate
assumes a normal growth rate and does not consider
the effects of war, mass executions, and emigration.
Our estimate is 5.8 million, but the actual population
could be well below this. Clearly the difference
between our figure and that of the United Nations-
well over 2 million persons-illustrates the possible
extent of the disaster visited upon the Kampuchean
people. (See the appendix for methodology and de-
tailed figures.)
3. Conditions in First Half of 1979. The Heng Samrin
government is unable to provide the basic necessities of
life nor is it able to guarantee physical security for the
people under its control. The Vietnamese reportedly
distributed small amounts of rice in Kampuchea's
eastern provinces between January and March, but
this supply soon ran out and people were compelled to
forage in nearby forests for roots and tubers. In the
west, near Battambang, a rice-growing area, no rice
ration was provided and people reportedly lived on
scavenged rice.)
4. During and after the Vietnamese invasion, much
internal movement again took place; displaced peas-
ants were urged to return home and grow food, while
the Pol Pot forces removed large numbers to their
mountain retreats. As many as 1.5 million may have
been involved in internal migration between January
and July. Reentry to the cities is apparently forbidden,
but some citydwellers remain. Large numbers of
people-perhaps as many as 600,000-reportedly
cluster on city outskirts to gain increased security, and
many of these, undoubtedly anticipate reentry to their
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5. Population Distribution. We speculate that the most
realistic of several possible patterns of population
distribution is the following (see map and appendix for
detailed figures and alternative scenarios):
Estimated Population Distribution
Kampuchea, Summer 1979
Region
Distribution
(Percent)
Population
(Millions)
High
Series
Medium
Series
Low
Series
Total
100.0
6.1
5.8
5.3
Central rice-growing region
56.0
3.4
3.2
3.0
Northwestern rice-growing region
19.0
1.2
1.1
1.0
Eastern border region
8.0
0.5
0.5
0.4
Phnom Penh City and immediate environs
5.0
0.3
0.3
0.3
Southwestern mountain and seacoast region
2.0
0.1
0.1
0.1
Northeastern provinces
5.0
0.3
0.3
0.3
Major towns in rice regions (excluding Phnom Penh)
5.0
* Includes an estimate of 40,000 for Pol Pot troops and other
resistance forces.
NOTE: Because of rounding, figures may not add to totals.
6. UN and Red Cross officials reported in August 1979
that 2.25 million people in Kampuchea were facing
starvation, but we estimate the figure could be as high
as 3.5 million under present conditions. An envoy of
the UN Food and Agricultural Organization described
conditions in Phnom Penh and environs as "gro-
tesque," with clear evidence of malnutrition. If news
spreads that emergency food aid is available near
major cities, people from rural areas might try to evade
Vietnamese controls and converge on these supply
points. This would further disrupt agricultural produc-
tion. We believe that those in or near urban areas are
worse off than rural residents.F_~
7. Rice Production. Kampuchea has about 4 million
hectares of land cleared for farming. Some 3.2 million
hectares are normally cultivated; of that, about 2.7
million hectares are planted in single-cropped rice
harvested in two main crops. The August crop (30
percent of national production) comes mostly from the
southeast and the December crop (55 percent of
national production) comes mostly from the northwest.
The balance comes from scattered low-yielding crops
of upland rice and floating rice. Before 1970,
Kampuchea produced roughly 3 million metric tons of
paddy rice each year, yielding about 1.2 million metric
tons of milled rice, of which up to 200,000 metric tons
were exported. The excesses of the Pol Pot regime
significantly reduced rice production and consump-
tion, but at the same time the number of people
consuming food was greatly reduced.
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indicates that as of early August only
about 440,000 hectares-about 11 percent of the
potential farmland-was under cultivation. Most ap-
peared to be growing rice; few row crops like maize and
cassava were in evidence. The cultivated fields were
scattered around close to small populated centers.
Significantly, the pattern was the same in the north-
west and southeast. In both regions crops appeared to
be mature-that is, both seem to be growing August
12. Food imports, largely from the USSR, have eased
some of the pressure on food stocks. Vietnamese troops
are mostly supplied from Vietnam, although there
have also been reports of Vietnamese looting
Kampuchean food supplies. Small amounts of food
have been provided by Laos, and a small cross-border
trade exists between Thailand and Kampuchea. If
these imports continue, provided they are supple-
mented by significant amounts of aid from Western
sources, mass starvation can be averted over the next
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rice.
9. In April, Heng Samrin claimed that 1.8 million
hectares had been planted with rice and secondary
crops, but this claim was an obvious exaggeration. Not
only is the planted area much reduced; yields are likely
to be 25 percent below average because of pests,
inefficient farming and irrigation practices, and the
harvesting of the crop short of full maturity to fulfill
urgent food needs.F7
10. We estimate that the area now under production
can produce around 180,000 tons of milled rice under
optimum conditions. The pattern of cultivation sug-
gests that the Kampucheans have reverted to subsis-
tence-level farming, each settlement growing only
enough for itself. The 180,000 tons will thus probably
be consumed locallyF___1
11. Prospects. From mid-August to mid-December,
when the next harvest would be expected, 180,000 tons
of milled rice would supply 5.8 million persons with
only about 50 percent of their daily caloric require-
ments, and it is unlikely that the balance could be
found from alternative domestic food sources. Further-
more, as suggested above the rice probably will not be
distributed evenly; it will be consumed by those in the
small rural settlements who produce it. There might
also be fighting over areas to be harvested, and this
could lead to crop destruction and/or confiscation.
Those living in larger population concentrations face
starvation unless they receive aid from abroad. Since
the August harvest would normally produce about
360,000 tons of milled rice, the shortfall is thus
170,000 metric tons for 5.8 million people. If the
population is 6.1 million, the shortfall could be as much
as 200,000 metric tons; for 5.3 million people, 140,000
two to three months.
13. After that the picture remains gloomy. Normal
farming practices seem to have been abandoned in
favor of multiple cropping in small areas around the
villages. Land away from these population centers
appears to be fallow, and the December harvest, like
that of August, will probably be small. Considerable
outside aid will again be required if starvation is to be
avoided
14. Soviet Aid. Recent Soviet food aid to Kampuchea
reportedly amounts at least to 209,000 metric tons.
TASS reported in July that 159,000 metric tons of
"bread products" had been delivered to Kampuchea
during 1979. The Soviets are also reported by an
unverifiable source to have provided 50,000 metric
tons of rice to Kampuchea this year. Some of the food
grain supplied to Kampuchea probably comes from
India under the terms of a recently signed Indo-Soviet
agreement.
15. In addition, the Soviets and others have provided
Vietnam with some 1.5 million tons of food so far to
meet Vietnam's chronic annual shortage of some 2
million tons of grain. Some is known to be going to
Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea. Vietnamese trucks
and aircraft, as well as Soviet aircraft, are transporting
food to Vietnamese occupying forces. Some of this may
find its way to Kampuchean civilians, although appar-
ently not in significant amounts
more tons would be needed.
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16. Potential Refugee Trends. It is difficult to estimate
the refugee flow if famine becomes a reality. The
distribution and physical condition of Kampuchea's
population, as already noted, cannot be precisely
assessed. People living in northwestern and western
areas are best situated geographically to flee; distances
to the Thai border are the shortest and there are many
routes. As many as 1 million people may live in this
area and thus constitute a pool of potential refugees.
17. Several factors, apart from efforts by the Viet-
namese and Pol Pot forces to control population
movement, will affect the flow of refugees:
? Most inhabitants of the areas easiest to flee-that is,
near the Thai border-live in subsistence-farming
villages, with access to limited food sources. Unless
they are compelled to flee by the fighting or other
factors, they will probably stay where they are as long
as some food remains available.
? The danger of crossing the border, which is heavily
patrolled and mined on both sides, is probably the
major deterrent.
? Geographical distances and physical debilitation
may deter those suffering most from food deprivation
from making a long and arduous trek to the Thai
border]
18. In sum, December harvest prospects, and the
likelihood of heavy fighting during the dry season, will
determine the refugee exodus. The August harvest
normally provides food to last until the December crop,
which should be planted in June. Such planting,
however, is not evident. Unless a 90-day rice crop is
planted in September/October for a late-December/
early January harvest-and, because of many adverse
circumstances, this may not be possible-widespread
famine conditions will occur unless massive amounts of
external aid are provided. If aid is not forthcoming, we
foresee vast numbers of deaths from starvation and
disease; in addition a hunger-induced refugee outflow
could start, the monthly rate into Thailand possibly
reaching tens of thousand
19. Heng Samrin/Vietnamese Infrastructure. The abil-
ity of the Heng Samrin/ Vietnamese infrastructure to
distribute relief supplies is marginal. Certainly in
Phnom Penh eyewitnesses attest that the general
administration of the city is poor. There is little
evidence of civilian administrative authority in the
countryside. There are apparently few serviceable
vehicles, most able-bodied men are in military service,
and food and supplies cannot be protected effectively
from foraging troops of either protagonist. In the
absence of civilian authority, the Vietnamese military
is the only organization capable of providing logistic
services.)
20. Even if food aid arrives safely, the lack of normal
markets and currency and the probability of hoarding
would also impede food distribution. There are four
routes available for the processing of relief supplies: by
air into Phnom Penh, by boat up the Mekong River to
Phnom Penh, by ship into the port of Kompong Som,
and across the Thai border. In the countryside, the lack
of information about the distribution of people would
hamper relief efforts. Continuing military operations
make travel difficult, and fuel is not readily available.
Draft animals are reportedly scarce, and human
transportation, using bicycles, carts, etc., may be the
only mode available.
21. Heng Samrin/Vietnamese Reactions to Relief
Efforts. Plans to facilitate emergency relief deliveries
have made slow progress. Hanoi probably favors relief
operations because they would reduce demands on its
own limited resources and bolster Heng Samrin's
claim to legitimacy. The Heng Samrin/Vietnamese
authorities have moved slowly, however, apparently in
an attempt to maximize political advantages gained
from international concern over the plight of the
Kampuchean people
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22. Their options are limited. The Heng Samrin
ambassador to Hanoi said recently that his govern-
ment ranks aid offers, responding first to bilateral
approaches, then to international organizations, and
finally to private voluntary agencies. There is little
likelihood of much increased bilateral aid from the
Soviet bloc. Fewer than 20 governments recognize the
Heng Samrin regime, and most others would prefer to
provide assistance through international groups, since
they fear Heng Samrin would insist upon prior
diplomatic recognition.)
23. Phnom Penh delayed from April to August before
allowing international relief officials to visit Kam-
puchea, and subsequent negotiations have made little
headway. Red Cross and UN officials arrived in
Phnom Penh in mid-August, two subsequent ship-
ments of relief supplies have been made, but Phnom
Penh has yet to authorize a large-scale relief effort.
There are several possible explanations for procrasti-
nation by Heng Samrin/ Vietnamese officials:
? Bureaucratic inefficiency. Although Vietnam domi-
nates decisionmaking, negotiations have had to be
conducted with Heng Samrin officials who are not well
informed about relief procedures or the amounts of aid
required.
? Reluctance by the Heng Samrin/ Vietnamese au-
thorities to let outsiders see the limited extent of their
control, their inability to restore agricultural produc-
tion and basic social services, and the extensive role
played by the Vietnamese.
? Heng Samrin/ Vietnamese officials want to control
relief supplies themselves and are resisting distribution
schemes proffered by international organizations. .
They may feel that delaying until the food situation is
even more desperate will enable them to avoid strict
monitoring.
? They may be trying to play off the various relief
organizations against each other. They have appar-
ently attempted to obtain aid from French Communist
Party groups and others who would demand less strict
monitoring, even though these could not nrovide
24. Some sort of agreement for a large-scale relief
operation will, however, probably be reached in the
next few weeks. Red Cross and UN officials have
indicated that because of the lack of an efficient
infrastructure they may have to bring in their own
logistical support equipment, but Phnom Penh will
probably try to keep the foreign presence to a
minimum.
25. A serious problem could also arise from plans to
carry out simultaneous relief programs for both the
areas under Heng Samrin/ Vietnamese control and
those controlled by Pol Pot. Pol Pot officials have
reportedly agreed to a relief program for civilians
under their control, starting with food deliveries to
some 80,000 people near the Thai border south of
Aranyaprathet. Although international organizations
have informed Heng Samrin/ Vietnamese authorities
that they intend to provide relief to civilians in both
regimes, they are concerned lest the premature dis-
closure of their talks with Pol Pot leaders might cause
Heng Samrin to balk. Heng Samrin officials report-
edly have already insisted that they will not accept aid
from or anizations helping civilians under Pol Pot's
control
The Vietnamese Military Presence:
Fighting and Insecurity
26. The Military Situation. This has not changed
significantly since the Vietnamese drove Pol Pot's
forces from bases in western Kampuchea at the onset
of the rainy season last June. Vietnamese troops have
had difficulty' extending their control to the country-
side, which is still being contested. Most of the 150,000
to 200,000 Vietnamese troops still in Kampuchea are
involved in protecting major cities and towns, the ports
at Kompong Som, railheads, roads, bridges, and
military installations; and in keeping open the major
routes between Kompong Som, Battambang, Siem
assistance of the magnitude needed.
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27. Pol Pot and other resistance forces are believed to
total some 40,000 combat troops, operating in small
groups which seem able to move freely through much
of the countryside. They may be attempting to expand
their operations and establish new bases in central and
northern Kampuchea. Operating from sanctuary bases
in the Cardamom Mountains of the southwest and
along the Tonle Sap Lake, resistance forces are
attacking and inflicting casualties on the roadbound
Vietnamese forces, which are staying close to their
garrisons.F--]
28. When the dry season arrives in November,
Vietnamese forces will be able to use effectively their
superiority in armor, artillery, and aircraft. They will
undoubtedly launch another major dry season offen-
sive against Pol Pot forces in an attempt to eliminate
them, and this will result in further civilian casualties
and may disrupt food distribution, especially that
coming across the Thai border. We estimate that Pol
Pot and his guerrillas will survive and the fighting
continue in view of the logistical assistance provided by
the Chinese and the latter's strategy of maintaining
tensions along the.China-Laos and China-Vietnam
borders. The brunt of the fighting will likely be
concentrated in the west and southwest, but other
areas in the central and northern provinces may also be
affectedF___1
29. Prospects for Peace. There is little chance for a
negotiated settlement at present. All the protago-
nists-China, Vietnam, and Pol Pot-are opposed to
an international conference, especially one involving
Sihanouk in a leadership role. A negotiated settlement
will not be possible until the Vietnamese are convinced
they cannot win in Kampuchea and domestic sacrifices
are raised to an intolerable level. At present Hanoi is
convinced it has the upper hand in Kampuchea and
seems implacable. As long as the situation seems
favorable, and the Soviet Union continues to provide
military supplies and to defray some of Vietnam's
economic burden, Vietnam will probably pursue a
military solution.)
30. Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea and its installa-
tion of a puppet government threaten Thai security.
The subsequent refugee influx, when added to large
numbers from Laos already in Thailand, is both an
economic burden and a potential security threat.
Bangkok is also concerned over the possibility of
conflict with Vietnamese troops in the border area. A
number of small-scale incidents have already occurred.
31. The forthcoming Vietnamese dry season offensive
worries Bangkok because it heightens the possibility of
border clashes and could lead to a new refugee influx.
More than 80,000 Kampuchean refugees have entered
Thailand since January 1979: about 40,000 of these
were forcibly repatriated in June, 17,000 remain in
refugee camps, and the rest were Pol Pot's guerrillas
and their followers who have since returned voluntarily
to Kampuchea. Few refugees have entered in recent
months, because of increased Thai preventive efforts
and a reduction of Vietnamese military operations
because of the wet season.
32. Although the forced repatriation provoked much
international criticism, Prime Minister Kriangsak was
compelled to take these measures because of domestic
pressure and he can be expected to act similarly in the
future. Disappointment over the failure of the July
meetings in Geneva to solve the problem of land
refugees made Thai officials skeptical of the interna-
tional community's willingness to accept these and
thus reinforced Thai resolve to pursue an independent
refugee policy. (___]
33. The deteriorating situation in Kampuchea has
prompted Thailand to try to focus world attention on it
and on the need to force Vietnam to resolve it. Bangkok
was the motivating force behind the recent decision by
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to request
inclusion of the problem on the UN General Assem-
bly's September agenda. In the meantime Bangkok is
cooperating with international organizations and for-
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eign governments in sending food and medicine to
Kampuchea, and will probably continue to do so to
prevent a further refugee influx. It may, however,
reverse this policy if Vietnam makes a strong public
attack.F__1
34. Kriangsak has permitted use of Bangkok as a
stopover for planes carrying supplies from the Red
Cross and UN Children's Fund to Phnom Penh. He
has also promised to facilitate further relief efforts,
providing the supplies are distributed by international
organizations. Since June, Bangkok has allowed the
Catholic Relief Services (CRS) to send supplies to
Kampuchean civilians under Pol Pot's control with the
provision that the Thai military make the cross-border
deliveries and no publicity is given. Thailand has also
demanded that the CRS supply assistance to locally
displaced Thais
35. In the event of a further refugee influx domestic
political pressure would compel Kriangsak to assume a
tough policy. He would probably try to deny entry to
refugees and, failing this, repatriate forcibly those who
entered. Pledges from countries of permanent
resettlement to take additional refugees would prob-
ably not dissuade the Thais from tryin to deny entry,
but might prevent forced repatriation.
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DEMOGRAPHIC METHODOLOGY
1. The methodology used in computing demographic
statistics, leading to the totals given in tables 1 and 2, is
described in the text that follows.
Population Estimates for Kampuchea, 1970-79
1970
1971
1972
1973
Total Growth Total Growth Total Growth
Population Rate Population Rate Population Rate
7,201 0.95 7,201 0.95. 7,157 0.65
7,270 0.88 7,270 0.88 7,204 0.57
1974 7,334
1975 6,877
1976 6,544
1977 6,407
1978 6,284
1979 6,141
-6.43 7,334 -8.65
-2.12 6,191 -2.85
-1.94 6,017 -1.91
5,771
7,245
6,359
5,813
5,627
5,508
5,338
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Population Estimates for
Kampuchea by Period
Estimation
1 July
17 April
1 January
1 July
Series
1970
1975
1979
1979
Absolute Percent
(in thousands)
The Lon Nol Regime, July 1970-April 1975
2. The population as of July 1970 was estimated by the
United Nations as 7 million, and we estimate 7.4
million on 17 April 1975. The slow growth seems
reasonable because of the effects of civil war, the
disruption of family life, the breakdown of food
distribution networks, the failure of health delivery
systems, and the general inability of the government to
provide for its people
The Pol Pot Regime, April 1975-January 1979
3. Information on this period is fragmentary at best.
We assess the population as of April 1975 as 7.4
million, and as of January 1979 as 5.8 million
Absolute Percent Absolute Percent
(in thousands) (in thousands)
4. We presume that, on attaining power, the Pol Pot
regime repatriated all Vietnamese residents in
Kampuchea, together with those Kampucheans associ-
ated with them, back to Vietnam: estimates of
numbers involved in these repatriations range from
200,000 to 500,000.
5. Thereafter the population was divided into two
groups: urban and rural. The urban population was
probably around 4 million, a high figure caused by the
flow of people from the war zones to the comparative
security of the cities. After April 1975, the Pol Pot
regime stigmatized urban dwellers as decadent and
westernized, classified them as "new people," and
forcibly relocated them in the countryside. They had to
subsist largely on foraged food and surface water, and
were sent to work in designated farming areas. In
September 1975 a second migration to interior rice-
growing areas was ordered, to include remaining urban
residents and those living in rural areas bordering on
Vietnam.
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6. These "new people" suffered abominably in their
alien environment: heavy labor, inadequate diet, no
medical care, and constant physical and psychological
terror. Infectious diseases spread rapidly; malaria
became endemic, cholera appeared, and parasitic
diseases common. This combination of malnutrition
and disease, together with mass executions and a
refugee exodus, exacted a tragic toll on the population.
7. The rural population-the "old people"-fared
better, but nevertheless were also subject to food
shortages, lack of medical care, and forced labor. We
estimate that for this group population growth rates for
the 1975-79 period probably averaged around 0.5
percent
8. Alternative estimates for population distribution in
Kampuchea as of summer 1979 are shown in table 3
(scenario A has also been included in the text proper
following paragraph 5).
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Estimated Population Distribution
Kampuchea, Summer 1979
Distribution
(Percent)
Population
(Millions)
High
Series
Medium
Series
Low
Series
Northwestern rice-growing region
19.0
1.2
1.1
1.0
Eastern border region
8.0
0.5
0.5
0.4
Phnom Penh City and immediate environs
5.0
0.3
0.3
0.3
Southwestern mountain and seacoast region?
2.0
0.1
0.1
0.1
Major towns in rice regions (excluding Phnom Penh)
5.0
0.3
0.3
0.3
Total
100.0
6.1
5.8
5.3
Central rice-growing region
43.0
2.6
2.5
2.3
Northwestern rice-growing region
19.0
1.2
1.1
1.0
Eastern border region
15.0
0.9
0.9
0.8
Phnom Penh City and immediate environs
5.0
0.3
0.3
0.3
Southwestern mountains and seacoast regions*
3.0
0.2
0.2
0.2
Major towns in rice regions (excluding Phnom Penh)
5.0
0.3
0.3
0.3
Total
100.0
6.1
5.8
5.3
Central rice-growing region
57.0
3.5
3.3
3.0
Northwestern rice-growing region
15.0
0.9
0.9
0.8
Eastern border region
5.0
0.3
0.3
0.3
Phnom Penh City and immediate environs
3.0
0.2
0.2
0.2
Southwestern mountains and seacoast region*
2.0
0.1
0.1
0.1
Northeastern provinces
15.0
0.9
0.9
0.8
Major towns in rice region (excluding Phnom Penh)
3.0
0.2
0.2
0.2
? Includes an estimate of 40,000 for Pol Pot troops and other
resistance forces.
NOTE: Because of rounding, figures may not add to totals.
25X1
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Estimated Population Distribution in Kampuchea, Summer 1979
Central Contains 43 to 57 percent of population, or 2.3 to 3.5
rice-growing region million people. Rice and some other crops being
cultivated on a small portion of the fields. Vietnamese/
Heng Samrin forces garrisoned in major towns,
providing security to immediate environs, rest of region
insecure with peasants harassed by Pol Pot forces.*
Control by Vietnamese/Heng Samrin forces relatively
stronger nearer to Phnom Penh.
Northwestern Contains 15 to 19 percent of population, or 0.8 to 1.2
rice-growing region million people. Crops cultivated on a small portion of
the fields. Vietnamese/Heng Samrin forces garrisoned
in major towns, rest of region insecure and quite
accessible to Pol Pot forces.* Peasants severely
harassed.
Eastern Contains 5 to 15 percent of population, or 0.3 to 0.9
border region million people. Almost no land in cultivation, although
this was a major rice-growing region before 1975.
Vietnamese/Heng Samrin influence strong, and
peasants are reportedly returning to this region.
Northeastern Contains 5 to 15 percent of population, or 0.3 to 0.9
provinces region million people. Scattered fields in cultivation. Region is
forested, providing cover for marauding Pol Pot forces.
Vietnamese/Heng Samrin's influence weak.
Phnom Penh City Contains 3 to 5 percent of population, or 0.2 to 0.3
and immediate environs million people. Severe starvation and epidemic disease.
Vietnamese/Heng Samrin forces in control.
Southwestern Contains 2 to 3 percent of the population, or 0.1 to 0.2
mountain region million people, including most of Pol Pot forces. Region
is mostly forested, has scattered fields of cassava, dry
rice or other crops. Pol Pot forces control town of
Pailin and limited other areas; they can move relatively
freely and have strong influence throughout the region.
*Within the rice-growing regions, major towns and their immediate environs (excluding Phnom
Penh) contain 3 to 5 percent of the population, or 0.2 to 0.3 million people. Severe food
shortages for civilian population, who are thought to be camped around deserted town centers.
Vietnamese/Heng Samrin forces in control of most major towns.
o Major town
t Airfield
L Principal port
Main road
Railroad
0 100
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Secret
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