ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA: THE ECONOMIC, MILITARY, AND DEMOGRAPHIC SITUATIONS IN MID-1979

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83R00184R002600410001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 4, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Secret-
Foreign
Assessment
Center
gC7,/eay
g-20) /90,
25X1
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia:
The Economic, Military, and
Demographic Situations
in Mid-1979
Intelligence Assessments
Secret
NI 79-10006
August 1979
Copy 266
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National] Security
Ituformation
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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National
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia:
The Economic, Military, and
Demographic Situations
in Mid-1979
Intelligence Assessments
The papers published here were prepared by the
Offices of Economic Research, Strategic Research,
and Geographic and Cartographic Research in the
National Foreign Assessment Center of the Central
Intelligence Agency, and by the Defense Intel-
ligence Agency. Each paper has been reviewed at a
working level in other agencies of the Intelligence
Community. Information in each has been updated to
1 August 1979 where data has been available, but
the basic situations and projections are based on
materials from the first half of 1979.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be di-
rected to the office of the National Intelligence Of-
ficer for Africa,
Secret
Secret
NI 79-10006
August 1979
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secret
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia:
The Economic, Military, and
Demographic Sitiations
in Mid-1979
These three interagency papers examine the economic under-
pinnings and prospects for Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, the military forces
of the Muzorewa regime and the guerrilla groups and the demo-
graphic base underlying economic, military, and political
developments.
Secret
NI 79-10006
August 1979
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Contents
Page
The Economy of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia
1
Recession
1
Defense Burden
1
White Emigration
3
Sagging Confidence
3
Exports and Sanctions
3
Light But Growing War Damage 4
Impact on Living Standards 4
Impact on Balance of Payments 4
Impact on the War Effort 5
Regional Impact of Rhodesian Conflict 5
Outlook 6
Lifting of Sanctions 6
Military Forces in the Rhodesian Conflict 7
Security Forces of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia 7
Manpower, Equipment, and Capabilities 7
Tactics 8
Morale 8
Foreign Support 9
Effectiveness and Future Trends 9
ZANU Guerrilla Forces 9
Manpower and Training 10
Strategy and Operations 10
Problems 11
Foreign Support 11
ZAPU Guerrilla Forces 11
Overall Strength and Deployment 11
Organization 12
Training 13
Foreign Assistance 13
Operations 13
Problems 14
Prospects 15
Personnel and Equipment Summaries 16
111
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Key Ethnic and Demographic Factors in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia 19
Composition of the Population 19
The Tribal Factor 19
Population Density 19
Population Growth Rate 20
Age Structure 21
White Immigration and Emigration 21
The Urban Population 22
The Labor Force 22
Education 22
Tables
A-1 Rhodesia: Balance of Payments 5
B-1 Estimates of Military Personnel and Equipment Inventories in 16
Rhodesia and Neighboring States
B-2 Estimates of Military Personnel and Equipment Inventories in 17
ZAPU and ZANU, May 1979
C-1 Tribal Composition of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, July 1979 20
C-2 Immigration and Emigration of White Rhodesians, 1959-79
21
C-3 Populations of Principal Urban Areas of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, 23
Mid-1978
Figures
Al.
Rhodesia: Selected Economic Indicators (graph) 1
A2. Rhodesia: Net White Migration (graph)
2
A3. Rhodesia: Planned Construction Expenditures (graph)
Map
Southern Rhodesia appended
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The Economy of
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia
Recession
1. The Rhodesian economy, which had been a source of
strength to the government of Prime Minister Ian
Smith during most of the period since the unilateral
declaration of independence in 1965, has suffered a
13-percent drop in real output in the past four years.
The economic slump reflects (a) the increasing burden
of defense, (b) erosion of the middle class market by
white emigration, (c) waning business confidence, and
(d) weak international demand for Rhodesian prod-
ucts, which is due in part to economic sanctions. In
addition to these demand-related factors, the economy
is suffering from slowly mounting war damage and
prolonged drought. (See figure A-1 for selected
economic indicators.)
Rhodesia: Selected Economic Indicators
Percent of Change
Real Gross
National Product
10
Manufacturing
(Volume)
?2
?7
?4
731 74 17 1 76 1 77 78 73 1 74
75
Defense Burden
and supplies abroad, except for small arms and
ammunition. Direct military, police, and internal
security outlays in the fiscal year ending in July 1979
will reach an estimated $400 million, 28 percent of
total budget expenditures, as compared with only 17
percent earlier in the 1970s. If the defense-related
expenditures of other ministries are counted?esti-
mated at $50 million in the current fiscal year?the
since 1975 has directly undercut economic growth,
because Rhodesia buys most of its military equipment
2. The mounting diversion of resources into defense
cost of defense rises to nearly one-third of the budget.
U4J
Figure A-1
o l u Miningme )
(Volume)
? ?
12 '
11
8-1
1
1
f- -7
?4
?6
?8
76
77 I 78 73
74
75
76 177
78
579817 7-79
1
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Rhodesia: Met White Migration
1978 and 1979 (Monthly)
Thousand Persons
0
Jan
Figure A-2
Feb
Mar
Apr
May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
-2
3
1979
1967-78 (Annual)
10
Thousand Persons
5 -
-5
-10
-15
1967 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78
579818 7-79 2/
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3. To help finance,the domestic costs of the military
buildup, the government has initiated programs to tap
private savings and slow down the growth in
nonmilitary spending. Under the latest mandatory
bond purchase program, all white taxpayers and about
1,000 high-income blacks must buy government bonds
equal to 12.5 percent of their income tax; although this
is ostensibly a forced savings program, most Rhode-
sians do not expect the bonds to be redeemed. To help
free foreign exchange for military imports, Salisbury
has tightened quotas on imports of civilian goo
including raw materials and capital equipment.
White Emigration'
Rhodesia: Planned Construction
Expenditures
Million US Dollars
100
90
Figure A-3
80
4. Further dampening domestic demand has been an
upsurge in white emigration in the past three years that
is attributable to declining living standards, increasing
war casualties, and mounting uncertainties surround-
ing the transition to black majority rule. On a net basis,
an estimated 30,000 persons officially emigrated in
1975-78, a loss of about 12 percent of the white
population. (See figure A-2.) Another 20,000 to
30,000 Rhodesians may have left on extended vaca-
tions. This drain, concentrated in the middle class, has
reduced the demand for furniture, appliances, and
other consumer goods and has contributed to a steep
decline in housing construction. (See figure A-3.) Only
increased purchases of light manufactures by South
Africa arrested the drop in industrial output in 1978.
Sagging Confidence
5. Business confidence, of course, has suffered from the
uncertainties associated with stepped-up guerrilla ac-
tivity and black-led government. Planned industrial
plant construction dwindled to $9 million in 1978 from
a peak of $34 million in 1974. (See figure A-3.)
Purchases of machinery and equipment also plum-
meted. As in the case of housing, most new business
investment is apparently going into physical security
rather than into the buildup of economic assets?an
ominous sign for future economic growth
' See also Key Ethnic and Demographic Factors in Zimbabwe-
Rhodesia, p. 19, paragraphs 8-10
3
70
60
50
40
30
Residential Construction
Industrial Construction
20
10
0
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
579819 7-79
Exports and Sanctions
6. Weak international demand for Rhodesian com-
modities, in part because of economic sanctions, has
reinforced the deterioration in domestic demand.
Economic sanctions, although far from airtight, have
probably caused Rhodesia to suffer disproportionately
from the slump in world demand in the aftermath of
the 1973-74 oil price hikes. This is especially true for
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mining volume, which dropped 9 percent during
1974-78 as many firms in developed countries turned
to alternative suppliers of chromium, nickel, copper,
tin, and asbestos. (See figure A-1.) In the particular
case of chromium, the drop was reinforced by repeal of
the Byrd Amendment in March 1977, a move that cut
off the lucrative American market, and by a new
metallurgical process that reduces the cost competi-
tiveness of high-grade Rhodesian ores.
Light But Growing War Damage
7. Although on the rise, physical damage due to the
war has been relatively light so far and concentrated in
rural areas. In the zones with the highest guerrilla
activity?along the Mozambique border and northeast
of Salisbury?many small white-owned farms have
been abandoned because of the constant threat to
homesteads, cattle, crops, and vehicular traffic. In the
tribal trust lands set aside for blacks, thousands of dip
tanks used for control of tickborne disease have been
destroyed. The ensuing spread of livestock diseases?
nearly eradicated before the guerrilla war?caused an
estimated $80 million in cattle losses in 1978. Most
large inland plantations, however, have not suffered
much war damage yet, although present drought will
cause substantial foreign exchan e losses in tobacco
and corn production this year
8. The only major urban damage inflicted by guerrillas
so far has been the destruction in December 1978 of
roughly 300,000 barrels of oil-15 to 20 days' supply
at estimated current consumption rates?at the Salis-
bury fuel depot. The replacement of the lost $8 million
worth of storage facilities and oil will prove difficult
because of the country's foreign exchange bind and
disruptions in South African oil supplies due to the
cutoff of Iranian oil.
9. Other war-related problems affecting economic
activity, particularly in rural areas, include:
? Closure of schools, clinics, and hospitals.
? Suspension of rail and bus services after dark, as well
as intermittent daytime interruptions in these services.
? Population displacement, particularly of black farm
labor to urban areas, further straining scarce social
services.
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? Supply disruptions for rural retail outlets.
? Suspension of mineral prospecting.
? Dampened tourist trade. (c)
Impact on Living Standards
10. On average, the blacks are suffering more from the
recession than the whites. The number of black wage
earners?who constitute more than half the estimated
1.6 million persons in the black labor force?has
dropped by at least 49,000 since 1975. Heavy job losses
have occurred in plantation agriculture and in con-
struction, which traditionally provide employment for
40 percent and 6 percent, respectively, of the country's'
black wage earners. The 700,000 black subsistence
farmers have also been hard hit by war-related cattle
and crop losses and supply shortages. Many of these
farmers as well as those who once worked on white
plantations are flooding into the already overcrowded
black townships in Salisbury and Umtali.
11. The remaining whites are also tightening their
belts, largely because the prices of basic foodstuffs are
rising while salaries stagnate. The most severely
affected whites are those in the service sectors, such as
salesmen, shopkeepers, and construction contractors,
many of whom are joining the white exodus. The
decline in real incomes among white farmers is
lessened to some degree by high prices for key crops
until this year and Salisbury's willingness to provide
subsidies; the jobs of many white industrial workers
are also protected by subsidies.
Impact on Balance of Payments
12. The drop in demand for most imported goods,
caused by lower economic activity, has contributed to
the current account shift from a $210 million deficit in
1975 to a $22 million surplus in 1978. (See table A-1.)
In this period the import bill dropped an estimated 20
percent despite sharply higher military and oil pur-
chases. Meanwhile, export sales are estimated to have
increased only 6 percent because of weak international
demand for most Rhodesian products. The deficit on
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Table A-1
Rhodesia: Balance of Payments
Million US $
1973 1974
1975 1976
1977 1978
Merchandise trade balance
159
98
58
259
215
259
Export *
702
820
870
905
865
919
Imports *
543
722
812
646
650
660
Services balance
?173
?216
?222
?208
?222
?216
Transfer payments
? 12
? 33
? 46
? 38
? 25
? 21
Current account balance
? 26
?151
?210
13
? 32
22
Net capital transactions
92
111
178
43
? 36
24
Total current and capital
transactions
66
? 40
? 32
56
?68
46
* Estimated.
invisible transactions also remained fairly stable, with
the drop in tourist receipts matching any savings on
freight and insurance. Salisbury was able to cover its
current account deficits through loans and financial
assistance from South Africa. Rhodesia was also
reportedly able to secure a $15 million Eurocurrency
loan in July 1978
Impact on the War Effort
13. Although the war effort has taken a major toll on
the economy, the depressed economic situation has not
yet seriously impeded Salisbury's ability to wage war.
The economy can absorb the cost of the military effort
provided a mass white exodus is avoided and South
Africa continues its financial support. Direct budget-
ary grants from Pretoria reportedly have amounted to
roughly half of Salisbury's direct defense spending.
Increasing the effort on a sustained basis would require
substantial belt tightening, and this in turn could spark
a jump in white emigration. Both manpower and
financial constraints would restrict the government's
ability to react to an escalation of the war if the Soviets
and Cubans were to provide large-scale materiel and
troop support to guerrilla forces
5
Regional Impact of Rhodesian Conflict
14. Neighboring countries are suffering from the
Rhodesian conflict. Besides physical damage caused
by cross-border raids, over 130,000 Rhodesian refu-
gees are domiciled in Mozambique and Zambia,
further aggravating their shortages of food and social
services. Another 20,000 or so Rhodesian refugees
have taken asylum in Botswana. Furthermore, animal
diseases are spreading in these three Frontline States,2
partly because of war-induced breakdown of veteri-
nary services inside Rhodesia.
15. The war also threatens one of the three major
interstate rail connections still operating in southern
Africa. This southern rail link has taken on added
importance in view of the present drought in the
region, which has reduced the 1978/79 grain harvest
by at least 25 percent and requires large imports of
grain to be carried inland. Even before the drought,
Zambia?hardest hit by grain losses?had resumed
rail transshipments through Rhodesia after a five-year
'The so-called Frontline States include Angola, Botswana, Mozam-
bique, Tanzania, and Zambia.
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hiatus because of rail and port bottlenecks in the
Tarzara route. Zaire too would be hard hit by an
interruption in Rhodesian rail service. It has rerouted
half of its mineral exports through Rhodesia since the
1975 closure of the Benguela railroad. Moreover,
Zaire's mining district relies heavily on the southern
route for imports of food, consumer goods, fuel, and
machinery. Mozambique severed transport and other
economic ties with Salisbury in March 1976 and would
not be affected.
Outlook
16. Barring a mass white exodus, the rate of economic
contraction this year will probably be no greater than
last year's estimated 4 percent, because of strengthen-
ing international demand for Rhodesia's base metals
and an apparent bottoming out of manufacturing and
construction activity. This forecast assumes that the
new government does not seriously threaten white
economic interests and the security situation remains
relatively unchanged
17. If the new government erodes minority rights and
privileges without winning international support, it will
eventually witness a stepped-up white exodus that
would accelerate the economic decline. On the other
side of the coin, ending of international sanctions
would slow or possibly arrest the economy's slide.
Lifting of Sanctions
18. Although we are unable to quantify them, eco-
nomic benefits from an ending of the present interna-
tional sanctions would probably be substantial. Such
an improvement in Rhodesia's international standing
would boost white morale, and this, at a minimum,
would temporarily slow white emigration. The reten-
tion of white labor and purchasing power would bolster
economic activity. Although the lifting of sanctions
would be welcome news to local and foreign investors,
a pickup in investment must await an improvement in
the security situation, clarification of the economic
policies of the new black-led overnment, and easing of
exchange controls.
19. The easing of economic sanctions would also allow
Rhodesia to take full advantage of the current pickup
in world demand for base metals. Since January, prices
for ferrochrome?Rhodesia's leading mineral ex-
port?have increased by 29 percent and those for
copper by 40 percent. A jump in output of these metals
would not significantly increase employment, however.
Base metal production in Rhodesia is highly capital
intensive. Only about 3,000 workers, for example, are
employed in the mining of chrome.
20. The ending of sanctions would sharply reduce the
substantial sanction-busting fees being paid South
African,r?land other middlemen. If sanction
busters take 20 percent of the value of trade, the
economic sanctions are costing Rhodesia $300-350
million annually. This estimate may be conservative,
however, because tobacco farmers reportedly are
forced to sell their high-quality crop at half price,
losing over $100 million in foreign exchange last year
alone. On the import side, Rhodesia pays high pre-
miums, particularly for petroleum and military sup-
plies. Salisbury would also be able to reduce substan-
tially the amount?up to $200 million?it pays in
direct government subsidies for mining, industry, and
agriculture necessitated by the trade sanctions
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5. The Air Force has been a key element contributing
to Rhodesia's success against the guerrillas. Despite its
aging fleet of approximately 130 aircraft, the Air
Force provides the mobility and firepower that have
assured the effectiveness especially of cross-border
operations into Zambia and Mozambique. A predomi-
nantly white force of 1,500 personnel, many of whom
were recruited in Western Europe, the United States,
and South Africa, it is a match for any current
opponent. There is also an active reserve force of 500.
The Air Force's Canberra light bombers can reach
anywhere in Zambia and Mozambique as well as
portions of Tanzania and Angola. Continuing prob-
lems include difficulty in obtaining qualified pilots and
technicians and in procuring spare parts and replace-
ment aircraft. Few aircraft have been lost in
combat, but as ZANU and ZAPU (Zimbabwe Afri-
can People's Union) acquire more air defense equip-
ment and training, planes are likely to be downed or
damaged at an increasing rate. Rhodesia's own air
defense capability is marginal and of increasing
concern to its military leadership
6. Because of UN sanctions against Rhodesia, Salis-
bury has had a difficult time obtaining arms. Never-
theless, the Rhodesians have been able to acquire such
items as 18 Cessna 337 aircraft and 11 Bell 205
helicopters. Presumably, these aircraft were acquired
at a premium cost through international arms brokers
using various subterfuges to conceal the source of the
equipment. The price of most Rhodesian military
equipment is undoubtedly high and presents a constant
economic drain on Rhodesia and its benefactor, South
Africa
Tactics
7. To organize the counterguerrilla effort, the Rhode-
sians have divided the country into five joint operations
centers (JOCs). The activities of regular and activated
reserve units, as well as Air Force assets, are coordi-
nated by the respective JOCs. Company- and
platoon-size units, aided by air and special police
assets, conduct search and destroy missions throughout
the operational areas. In recent months some Rhode-
sian security forces have been operating in units of
larger size, designed to confront larger guerrilla units,
but only at the cost of abandoning control of some
areas to the guerrillas. Small unconventional warfare
teams track insurgents and locate staging bases and
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logistic facilities for strikes by highly mobile,
combined-arms contingency units called fireforces.
These units normally operate inside Rhodesia, but
occasionally make cross-border raids into Mozam-
bique, Zambia, and Botswana to strike at guerrilla
staging areas. In addition the Air Force conducts
search and destroy missions against guerrilla installa-
tions in Zambia, Mozambique, and Angola
Morale
9. Although there continues to be some disgruntlement
among reservists because of frequent tours of active
duty, the morale of whites in the Rhodesian armed
forces is high. Moreover, the success in keeping
incidents of violence to a minimum during the election
period and the anticipation of at least some interna-
tional recognition should keep military morale at a
high level for a number of months. Furthermore, an
incentive pay plan to keep whites in the security forces
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during the transition period will also have a beneficial
effect on morale. The morale of black military
personnel is harder to assess. In the coming months,
the black casualty rate in the armed forces will
probably increase as more blacks are involved in the
fighting; this could cause deterioration in morale.
10. If whites become discouraged to the point of
emigrating in increasingly large numbers, the military
would lose indispensable leadership and technical
skills, which would sharply reduce the government's
ability to meet the guerrillas' challenge. The security
forces would almost certainly disintegrate if white
officers and technicians were to leave on a wholesale
basis
and training as well as efficient use of available
manpower. Major weaknesses of the armed forces are
limited reserves, aging equipment, and uncertain
sources of supply for spare parts and new equipment.
Rhodesian superiority may diminish as more trained
manpower and better equipment become available to
the insurgents.
13. For Rhodesia's armed forces the greatest possibil-
ity in overcoming major weaknesses lies in improving
their sources of international supply?particularly if
sanctions are lifted. Much more difficult to overcome
is Rhodesia's shortage of skilled manpower. Even
though there are numerous black recruits who can be
taken into the military, a shortage of junior officers
and experienced noncommissioned officers will inhibit
the creation of additional military units
ZANU Guerrilla Forces
14. The military arm of Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe
African National Union has borne the brunt of the
fighting in Rhodesia since the insurgency expanded in
1972. Of the two rebel groups, ZANU has the more
guerrillas in Rhodesia and is responsible for most
guerrilla incidents. On the other hand, it has suffered
heavy casualties at the hands of the security forces
and, despite its propaganda claims, has not produced
any "liberated areas" inside Rhodesia. Nevertheless,
the gradual escalation of the guerrilla effort against
the Smith government helped force Salisbury to
arrange the internal settlement and the transfer of
power to the Muzorewa regime.
Effectiveness and Future Trends
12. The Rhodesian armed forces are more than a
match for the guerrilla forces at this time. This
superiority can be attributed to better tactics, weapons,
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are inadequately trained. Logistic support is inade-
quate, largely because of bad roads, a shortage of
transport, the remote location of many of the camps
(especially the new sites in, the north), and the overall
lack of resources and supplies. Thus, ZAPU is hard put
to deal with the influx of refugees and recruits, and
conditions in the camps remain primitive
52. ZAPU's relations with Zambia also show signs of
strain. Zambian air defense, for example, has been
almost totally ineffective against Rhodesian airborne
attacks on ZAPU facilities. ZAPU personnel in turn
have fired on Zambian aircraft and have terrorized
civilians whom they suspected of aiding the enemy.
Although these incidents are not likely to result in a
complete break in the relationship, they have ham-
pered and will continue to hamper ZAPU's programs
and operations and detract from its credibility
53. Finally, ZAPU is confronted by formidable oper-
ational problems. One is the difficulty of transporting
troops to the border area over bad roads, with too few
trucks, and under the threat of Rhodesian raids, mines,
and harassment. Infiltration itself is complicated by
geography?the Zambezi River and Escarpment,
Lake Kariba, and the brushland along much of the
border that inhibits undetected movement, especially
in the dry season. Because terrain along the Botswana
border is somewhat more favorable, some ZAPU units
have taken the long way around. Since the recent
destruction of the Kazangula ferry, however, move-
ment between Botswana and Zambia has proven more
difficult. Once inside Rhodesia, communications,
transportation, and resupply range from spotty to
nonexistent. As a result, ZAPU has had little success
in mounting and following through on planned, coordi-
nated operations.
54. The most important operational problem for
ZAPU, however, is the cross-border raids into Zambia
by the Rhodesians. Although costly in terms of
casualties, the Rhodesian raids have had the even more
serious effect of disrupting the ZAPU command
structure, diverting personnel and resources to defend-
ing the camps, and demoralizing the organization from
top to bottom. Frequently in the aftermath of raids,
most recently in mid-April, ZAPU is paralyzed for a
time.
15
Prospects
55. Clearly ZAPU faces serious difficulties in the
pursuit of its political and military objectives. Al-
though it has grown in size and has infiltrated more
troops into Rhodesia, most of its forces remain
uncommitted. It has inflicted damage on western
Rhodesia, in particular on government services, but
has suffered significant setbacks as well. Most impor-
tantly it has shown little sign of being able to come to
grips with, much less solve, its various internal
difficulties
56. Nevertheless, ZAPU's resources, especially in the
Rhodesian context, are considerable. It has managed
to expand both its numbers and its operations despite
casualties and desertions, and the USSR and Cuba
remain committed to supporting it. As long as these
trends continue and there is no negotiated settlement,
ZAPU's place in the Rhodesian military balance of
power is not likely to decline. On the other hand,
ZAPU without substantially increased Soviet-Cuban
support,is unlikely to achieve any decisive gains unless
the Muzorewa regime in Salisbury collapses.
57. Increased Soviet and Cuban aid could enhance
ZAPU's position considerably. If an effective air
defense network around ZAPU installations were
established to reduce the threat of Rhodesian air raids,
logistic and administrative arrangements could be
simplified, movement and deployment of troops would
be easier, and a greater proportion of personnel would
be made available for offensive operations. Soviet-
backed Cuban involvement in offensive operations
could shift the military balance decisively in ZAPU's
favor. Such an outcome, however, would depend on a
number of key variables: the size and type of the
intervention force (ground combat troops, fighter
aircraft, or other), adequate logistic support for the
force (no easy matter, because the bulk of it would
have to be airlifted), the South African response, and
whether or not and to what extent the Rhodesians
could preempt such an attack.
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Key Ethnic and Demographic Factors
in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia
1. Most of the data in this paper are based on figures
from Rhodesia's last census, in 1969, or on current
statistics from the Rhodesian Central Statistical Of-
fice.
Composition of the Population
2. We estimate that the population of Zimbabwe-
Rhodesia in July 1979 was 7,163,000.1 About 96
percent of the population was black (6,876,000); about
3.5 percent was white (230,000 to 250,0002); the rest
was Asian or Colored (persons of mixed race). Of the
black population, about 71 percent (4,882,000) were
Shona and 16 percent (1,100,000) were Ndebele. The
rest comprised a miscellany of tribes?including
Tonga, Sena, Hlengwe, Venda, and Sotho?that live in
peripheral areas and have played only minor roles in
the liberation moments or in black nationalist politics.
Table C-1 shows the composition of the black popula-
tion, including the major Shona tribes, and the
distribution of each group. The percentages of the total
black population were taken from the 1969 census.
(See the appended foldout map.)
The Tribal Factor
3. There is disagreement among observers on the
contemporary importance of tribal differences in
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia as well as on the impact those
differences will have on the stability of a black
majority government. Observers who stress the tribal
differences claim that postelection politics are certain
to continue along tribal lines and that majority rule
will almost automatically lead to serious tribal con-
flict?initially between the Ndebele and Shona, later
' This figure is based on the official estimate of the Salisbury
government as of 31 December 1978 and is adjusted for growth at an
annual rate of 3.5 percent. The estimate of the US Census Bureau is
7,560,000.
'Officially, the whites numbered about 250,000 at the end of 1978, a
decline of 27,000 from the maximum figure recorded in 1975 and
1976. The official figure, however, does not include some 20,000 to
30,000 whites on "extended vacation" outside the country who may
not return if military and economic conditions do not improvep7
(after the Shona have defeated the Ndebele) between
the Shona tribes themselves. Other authorities argue
that the tribal discord has been exaggerated, that
tribal differences have in fact been perpetuated by the
policies of the white government, that those differences
have been diminished by intermarriage, and that they
could be less pronounced under majority rule than
other observers have predicted. These authorities claim
that ethnic differences are less related to tribalism
than to geography, economics, and education.
4. The Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU)
and its military arm, the Zimbabwe People's Revolu-
tionary Army (ZIPRA), are predominantly Ndebele-
Kalanga organizations, although several of ZAPU
leader Joshua Nkomo's top political aides are from
other Shona tribes and there is a slender Shona
minority in the rank and file. Within ZIPRA, clashes
between Kalangas and Ndebeles have been reported at
the military camps, and tensions have been reported
between the Ndebele and Kalanga on the one hand and
the few other Shona remaining in the movement on the
other. Both the leadership and core membership of
ZANU and its military wing, the Zimbabwe African
National Liberation Army (ZANLA), are almost
exclusively Shona. Tribal factionalism among the
Shona tribes exists both in the leadership and in the
ranks. Most of the conflicts are between the Karanga,
who dominate ZANLA, and the Zezuru and Manyika.
19
Population Density
5. Population density is 19 per square kilometer
overall. Despite a rural black-to-white ratio of more
than 150 to 1, land owned by whites is about equal in
area to all the African tribal lands. The white-owned
lands (now categorized as "nonracial") are generally
lightly populated, whereas many of the tribal trust
lands are heavily overpopulated. Overall, density of the
tribal trust lands is 25 persons per square kilometer.
Even though racially based land divisions were abol-
ished in 1977, economic considerations?particularly
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Table C-1
Tribal Composition of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia
July 1979
Tribal Group
Percent of
Black Population
Approximate
Number
Location
Shona '
71
4,882,000
North and east
Karanga
16
1,100,000
Southeast, centered on Fort Victoria
Zezuru
13
894,000
Around Salisbury
Manyika
7
481,000
East, centered on Umtali
Ndau
4
275,000
Southeast
Korekore
3
206,000
North-central
Kalanga
2
138,000
West, along Botswana border
Other Shona'
26
1,788,000
Ndebele
16
1,100,000
South and west
Others (includes Sena, Tonga,
Venda, Sotho, Hlengwe)
13
894,000
Peripheral areas
Total black population
100
6,876,000
' The Shona were among the waves of Bantu tribes that migrated
from central to southern Africa several centuries ago. A series of
Shona empires controlled much of Rhodesia before the Ndebele and
white colonists arrived in the 19th century. The Ndebele first
entered Shona territory from South Africa in the 1820s. They were
better organized and militarily stronger than the more numerous but
scattered Shona tribes. By the mid-1800s the Ndebele had subju-
gated, and in some cases absorbed, many of the Shona people.
the lack of funds to buy the land?currently prevent
most blacks from moving from the tribal lands into the
nonracial lands. White ownership of the large commer-
cial farms in the nonracial sector presents the
Muzorewa government with the dilemma of having to
reallocate some of this land to the blacks in order to
alleviate population pressures in the tribal lands
without severely damaging the country's agricultural
production. The new government has outlined a
program that will, at least initially, limit nationaliza-
tion to nonracial land that is currently unused by the
white farmers.
Population Growth Rate
6. The population growth rate is more than 3.5 percent
annually for the blacks, one of the highest in the world.
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'The Kalanga have maintained closer ties with the Ndebele than
other Shona tribes. They are allied closely with the Ndebele in the
Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU).
This category designates blacks identified in the 1969 census only
as Shona, not with a particular tribe.
(At this rate, if all factors remain stable, the popula-
tion will double in only 20 years.) There are an
estimated 47 to 50 births per 1,000 people annually,
and 14 to 15 deaths. The United Nations, using a
medium variant which projects a growth rate that
declines to less than 3 percent by the end of the
century, projects the population to 10.3 million by
1990, 14 million by the year 2000. The annual rate of
natural increase of the white population is now
estimated to be only about 0.5 percent?an extremely
low rate and one which does little to offset population
losses from emigration.
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Age Structure
7. The black population is a youthful one with 48
percent of the blacks under 15, according to the census
in 1969. The comparable figure for the white popula-
tion at that time was 27 percent. Sixty-two percent of
the whites were between the ages of 15 and 60, as
compared with only 50 percent for the blacks. The
figures for the blacks have not changed significantly
during the 10 years since the census. The white
population, however, has gotten older as births have
been fewer and large numbers of young couples with
children have emigrated. The white population under
15 years of age is probably currently near 20 percent.
White Immigration and Emigration
8. Net white immigration has waxed and waned over
the past 20 years, reflecting political and economic
conditions. (See table C-2.) The net loss of nearly
14,000 whites last year was the greatest on record,
surpassing by 2,000 the number that left in 1963, the
year that the Rhodesian Federation was dissolved.4
The number of departures during the first five months
of 1979 (5,552) was nearly double the number for the
same period in 1978 (2,933), but the greatest emigra-
tion in 1978 occurred during the last six months of the
year. Even so, an overall increase over last year's total
seems likely. Zimbabwe-Rhodesia's Standard Bank
Economic Bulletin published in mid-March forecast a
net white mi ration loss in 1979 of between 15,000 and
20,000
9. The economic effect of the loss through white
emigration, which has contributed to a 13-percent
decline in gross national product since 1975, has been
magnified by the characteristics of the emigrants-
predominantly professional, white-collar, and tech-
nical workers, largely in the 25-to-45 age bracket.
Continued emigration will further retard economic
growth and increase the black unemployment rate.
The government has striven to discourage emigration
by limiting the foreign exchange and value of personal
' See also The Economy of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, paragraph 4.F-
? The Rhodesian Federation was formed in 1953 and included the
neighboring states of Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), Nyasaland
(now Malawi), and present-day Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.
21
Table C-2
Immigration and Emigration
of White Rhodesians, 1959-79
Immigrants
Emigrants
Net Migration
1959
9,000
5,000
+ 4,000
1960
8,000
7,000
+ 1,000
1961
8,000
10,000
- 2,000
1962
8,000
12,000
- 4,000
1963
7,000
18,000
-11,000
1964
7,000
15,710
- 8,710
1965
11,128
8,850
+ 2,278
1966
6,418
8,510
- 2,092
1967
9,618
7,570
+ 2,048
1968
11,864
5,650
+ 6,214
1969
10,929
5,890
+ 5,039
1970
12,227
5,890
+ 6,337
1971
14,743
5,340
+ 9,403
1972
13,966
5,150
+ 8,816
1973
9,433
7,750
+ 1,683
1974
9,649
9,050
+ 599
1975
12,425
10,500
+ 1,925
1976
7,782
14,854
- 7,072
1977
5,730
16,638
-10,908
1978
4,360
18,069
-13,709
1979
January
325
1,398
- 1,073
February
311
903
- 592
March
304
1,555
- 1,251
April
237
1,865
- 1,628
May
283
1,291
- 1,008
belongings that families can take with them, by
offering financial incentives to public and military
personnel to stay on, and by delaying emigrant
processing
10. A majority of the white emigrants have resettled in
South Africa, where terrain, climate, social customs,
and standards of living for whites are similar and
where ties are strong. Of the nearly 14,000 emigrants
in 1979, 8,650 went to South Africa. About 20 percent
of Zimbabwe-Rhodesian whites were born in South
Africa and many retain South African citizenship.
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Many others are relatively recent arrivals in
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, having fled other African coun-
tries when majority rule was adopted. Other likely
targets for emigration which have sizable immigration
quotas for Zimbabwe-Rhodesians and similar lan-
guages, customs, and living standards include the
United Kingdom, the United States, Australia,
Canada, and New Zealand. Australia announced in
January that it could process 10,000 Zimbabwe-
Rhodesian emigrant
The Urban Population
11. About 20 percent of the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian
population-16 percent of the blacks, more than 85
percent of the whites, and the vast majority of the other
two racial groups?lives in the 14 cities with popula-
tions of more than 10,000. Blacks outnumber whites in
all urban areas?in Salisbury by more than 4 to 1, in
Bulawayo by 5 to 1, in Umtali by nearly 6 to 1, and in
Gwelo by nearly 7 to 1. Ratios are higher in the smaller
towns. Table C-3, which provides official estimates as
of mid-1978, probably does not accurately reflect the
rapid (and largely unrecorded) increase in the popula-
tions of the urban townships in recent years as rural
blacks have fled the unsettled security situations and
stagnating economies in the tribal lands. University of
Rhodesia researchers estimate that several hundred
black refugees enter the townships around Salisbury
daily, and squatters there have placed a serious strain
on services. The office of the International Red Cross
in Salisbury unofficially estimates that hundreds of
thousands of rural blacks have fled to urban townships
in recent years
The Labor Force
12. The black labor force is currently about 1.6 million.
This figure includes all males between the ages of 15
and 65 but does not include women, who comprise a
large number of the close to 1 million black wage
earners. Whites have held most of the skilled jobs in
the modern sector, whereas most blacks have been
confined to semiskilled or unskilled jobs in agriculture,
manufacturing and construction, mining, retail busi-
nesses, and domestic and government services. The
black labor force is increasing at an annual rate of
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about 3.5 percent, a rate which adds some 56,000
males to the job roster each year.
Education
13. The literacy rate among whites, Asians, and
Coloreds is nearly 100 percent, whereas only 30
percent of the blacks are estimated to be functionally
literate.
14. The educational system has been segregated by
race and designed to prepare whites for higher level
managerial, administrative, professional, and aca-
demic positions while offering the blacks only basic
literacy and technical training necessary for semi-
skilled labor or low-level civil service or commercial
positions. Education has been compulsory for whites,
Asians, and Coloreds, but not for blacks. Total black
enrollments in 1978 were 777,000 in primary schools
and 45,000 in secondary schools?only about 35
percent of the children of school age (5 through 16).
Although most black children receive some primary
education, most do not finish; less than 20 percent
enter secondary school; and fewer than 1 percent finish
secondary school.
15. The University of Rhodesia is a multiracial
institution, but the inferior quality of education in the
black secondary schools and the limited number of
openings in highensecondary classes has put the blacks
at a disadvantage in the competition for admission and
limited their enrollment to about half of the total.
More blacks have attended universities outside
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia than the University of Rhodesia.
Although official figures are lacking, probably more
than 10,000 blacks currently hold university degrees,
including those who have received their higher educa-
tion by corres ondence from the University of South
Africa
16. Nevertheless, the country has fewer than 50 black
doctors and only a handful of lawyers and engineers.
Only 23 of the 250-person faculty at the University of
Rhodesia are black. Of the 42,000 black civil servants,
most hold low-level positions
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Table C-3
Populations of Principal Urban Areas
of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, Mid-1978
Urban Areas
(including townships)
Blacks
Whites
Asians
Coloreds
Total
Bindura
16,000
1,100
17,100
Bulawayo
290,000
56,800
2,800
8,800
358,400
Fort Victoria
19,000
2,600
200
300
22,100
Gatooma
30,000
2,400
200
300
32,900
Gwelo
59,000
8,600
400
1,000
69,000
Hartley
13,000
700
13,700
Marandellas
20,000
2,200
22,200
Que Que
48,000
4,000
300
300
52,600
Redcliff
16,000
1,800
...
17,800
Salisbury
480,000
117,500
4,800
8,000
610,300
Shabani
18,000
1,900
100
20,000
Sinoia
23,000
1,800
300
100
25,200
Umtali
52,000
9,100
600
700
62,400
Wankie
29,000
2,700
100
31,800
Total
1,113,000
213,200
9,600
19,700
1,355,500
Ellipses indicate fewer than 50 persons.
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Table C-3
Populations of Principal Urban Areas
of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, Mid-1978
Urban Areas
(including townships)
Blacks
Whites
Asians
Coloreds
Total
Bindura
16,000
1,100
17,100
Bulawayo
290,000
56,800
2,800
8,800
358,400
Fort Victoria
19,000
2,600
200
300
22,100
Gatooma
30,000
2,400
200
300
32,900
Gwelo
59,000
8,600
400
1,000
69,000
Hartley
13,000
700
13,700
Marandellas
20,000
2,200
22,200
Que Que
48,000
4,000
300
300
52,600
Redcliff
16,000
1,800
...
17,800
Salisbury
480,000
117,500
4,800
8,000
610,300
Shabani
18,000
1,900
100
20,000
Sinoia
23,000
1,800
300
100
25,200
Umtali
52,000
9,100
600
700
62,400
Wankie
29,000
2,700
100
31,800
Total
1,113,000
213,200
9,600
19,700
1,355,500
Ellipses indicate fewer than 50 persons.
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