WESTERN SAHARA: RAMIFICATIONS OF MAURITANIAN WITHDRAWAL AND MOROCCAN EXPANSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83R00184R002600080003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 2007
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 1, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of Secret
Central
Intelligence
Western Sahara:
Ramifications of
Mauritanian Withdrawal
and Moroccan Expansion
Secret
NI JIM 79-10018
August 1979
Copy 2 51
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WESTERN SAHARA:
RAMIFICATIONS OF
MAURITANIAN WITHDRAWAL
AND MOROCCAN EXPANSION
Information as of 30 August 1979
was used in preparing this memorandum
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Tindouf.
7 Spain (.
Atlantic Algiers
Ocean Rabat.l
I
Morco
Westa~
Sahafa
Mauritania
Nouakchott
Canary Islands
(Spain)
sear~!l~+Yet/rftantalpIii,
Tan-Tan
.Bouirat
Mauritania
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Recent Developments
In August 1979 Morocco unilaterally annexed the
southern portion of Western Sahara-the portion for-
merly claimed by Mauritania-and strengthened its
military presence in the area.' These actions by Mo-
rocco followed Mauritania's signature on 5 August of a
separate peace with the Algerian-backed Polisario
Front and the vote against Morocco at the Organiza-
tion of African Unity summit in mid-July. These
political developments left the dispute more than ever
a direct conflict between the two regional powers,
Algeria and Morocco. The events also seriously under-
cut Morocco's diplomatic position, thus increasing the
pressure on King Hassan to abandon his policy of
temporizing in favor of more risky political or military
strategies aimed at resolving the nearly four-year-old
conflict.
Many Moroccans now believe that the Saharan war
is responsible for their country's domestic diffi-
culties 2-inflation, heavy taxes, rising unemployment,
and inadequate social spending-and a growing num-
ber are said to favor a confrontation with Algeria as a
way to bring all parties to the negotiating table. Only
King Hassan would make such a decision, and he is
unlikely to be swayed by popular sentiment. Con-
sideration by Moroccans of this relatively desperate
strategy reflects their growing awareness that the tide
of war in the Sahara has turned against Morocco as the
Polisario's military successes and political strength
have mounted. The Moroccans-who have roughly
half of their more than 100,000-man military force
dedicated to the Saharan problem-early this year
withdrew the bulk of their forces to a defensive
perimeter in the northwest of Western Sahara (see
accompanying map), with the result that the Polisario
Front-a total force estimated at 10,000 to 12,000-
operates freely in large areas of the sparsely populated
territory. The guerrillas in 1979 began for the first
time to stage concentrated attacks on towns inside
Morocco, and the frequency and intensity of these
Note: This- memorandum was coordinated in substance at the
working level by representatives of the NFIB agencies. It was
prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for
the Near East and South Asia.
' Morocco formally claimed sovereignty over the northern portion
in April 1976.
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SECRET
attacks have increased since they first occurred in
January. This has strained the Moroccan Army's de-
fensive capabilities and intensified the deterioration of
its military position. (See accompanying table for a
comparison of Moroccan, Algerian, and Polisario mili-
tary forces.)
Near-Term Possibilities
Several potential developments (or lack of develop-
ments) unwelcome to the United States are possible
over the next six months:
- As part of Hassan's move to claim the former
Mauritanian-southern-sector, Morocco may
introduce a much larger military force into the
area (so far, Moroccan troops are believed to be
present only in Dakhla, the provincial capital,
and in one or two other population centers). A
large force would be able to secure the few towns
and establish bases but-without a fundamental
change in how they operate-the Moroccans
would not be able to ensure effective Moroccan
control over most of the area or defeat the
guerrillas. The Moroccan occupation of the
southern portion of Western Sahara has proved
popular initially among Moroccans because it
caters to Moroccan nationalism. However, if
Morocco is unable quickly to gain the initiative,
which seems unlikely, it will tax military re-
sources and undermine military morale. It will
also weaken Morocco's diplomatic and political
position, because it gives the impression of Mo-
roccan territorial hegemony and disregard for
the call for self-determination. Hassan may hope
to use his occupation of the territory as a bargain-
ing chip during any negotiations, but the Poli-
sario has repeatedly insisted it must control the
entire Western Sahara.
Hassan could provoke a military incident along
Morocco's border with Algeria or initiate guer-
rilla-style operations inside Algeria itself-
against Polisario and/or Algerian targets-as a
way of forcing negotiations. Morocco has report-
edly been training for several months a small
force of Saharans to stage attacks on Algerian
installations and personnel in reprisal for Poli-
sario raids. Hassan would presumably hope that
third-party mediation would follow such clashes
and provide him a face-saving way to negotiate
and make unpalatable concessions. This strategy
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Comparison of Military Forces
Personnel
Army
Navy
Air Force (pilots/jet qualified)
Medium tanks
Light tanks
Armored personnel carriers
Reconnaissance vehicles
Artillery and mortars (over 100-mm)
Antitank guided missile launchers
Air defense artillery pieces
Surface-to-air missiles
Jet fighers
Light bombers
Transports
Missile patrol boats
Attack helicopters
Foreign Military Advisers Y
French
Soviet
0
0
0
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown num-
ber of SA-7s
I Not reflected in these figures is the presence of a Cuban medical unit and possibly a few Cuban advisers
would risk full-scale war with Algeria. We have
at this time no evidence that Hassan has made
preparations for a military incident, that he seeks
wider hostilities with Algeria, or even that he is
preparing to implement his oft-repeated threats
of hot pursuit of the guerrillas into Algeria.
Hassan has in fact recently adopted a concilia-
tory posture toward Algeria, even promising not
to stage attacks on Polisario sanctuaries inside
Algeria.
Increased Moroccan pressures against Mauritania
are likely. The Moroccans have signaled that
they would like to see the Polisario resolve its
claims at the expense of Mauritania. Moroccan
efforts to encourage pro-Moroccan elements to
destabilize the regime in Nouakchott may be
under way, and it seems likely that the Algerians
and perhaps Libyans will take countermeasures
to support the present Mauritanian regime. Both
the Polisario and the Moroccans seem likely to
use Mauritanian territory in their ongoing strug-
gle, and Morocco especially may decide to in-
voke its long-declared "right of pursuit" by
making incursions into Mauritania.
95,000 90,000 10,000-12,000
4,200 4,000 0
7,000 (160/50) 10,000 (275/165) 0
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- The Polisario Front is likely to mount progres-
sively more frequent assaults on Moroccan forces
inside Morocco, as the guerrillas, bolstered by the
conviction that time and events are on their side
and having made peace with Mauritania, con-
centrate on the Moroccan target. Although de-
signed primarily to keep the military initiative,
the Polisario attacks will also further undermine
Moroccan military morale and probably force
Hassan in time to abandon his present concilia-
tion of Algeria.
- A negotiated settlement is very unlikely unless
Hassan makes major concessions and until Alge-
ria becomes more receptive than heretofore in
searching for areas of compromise. There is no
evidence that the Polisario or Algeria will soften
their fundamental demands, and it is uncertain
just how far Hassan will go in offering conces-
sions. He has thus far limited his public moves to
bilateral gestures toward Algeria. The King's
present unwillingness to make substantial conces-
sions is based primarily on his calculation that
such a move could fatally undermine his author-
ity at home; our assessment is that these risks are
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grave, but are now at least equally balanced by
the serious risks of failing to disengage from the
Sahara. Either way, his throne is in jeopardy.
- The outlook for effective mediation in the near
term by outside parties-such as the Organiza-
tion of African Unity, France, Spain, Saudi
Arabia, or Senegal-is not promising. The Euro-
pean parties continually work behind the scenes
to protect their own positions, and have ex-
pressed willingness in principle to become pub-
licly involved, but not unless Morocco or Algeria
or both moderate their demands. The Saudis and
the Senegalese have been more active recently in
exploring the possibilities for a negotiated settle-
ment, but thus far without result. The United
States has always eschewed such a role on the
grounds that the likelihood of failure would only
worsen its relations with the contenders and also
to avoid introducing a superpower element into
the equation. These concerns remain valid. In
any event, Algeria and Morocco have always
been in contact whenever either had anything to
say; so substance rather than communication
remains the issue.
- Hassan may continue to seek stopgap solutions
despite the seeming need to act boldly and
choose between the only two real alternatives
that might buy him a significant amount of
time-vigorous military operations or a success-
ful peace effort. Once the temporary domestic
political gains realized by the occupation of the
southern zone pass, Hassan's temporizing will
fuel domestic criticism and increase the possibil-
ity of a popular backlash as Polisario attacks on
Morocco continue. A backlash will be especially
likely with the normal increase in student and
labor unrest in the fall and with the diplomatic
setbacks expected at the nonaligned and UN
General Assembly meetings.
- A military coup is possible in Morocco. A number
of Moroccan military officers at junior and mid-
dle levels already are reported to be upset with
alleged incompetence in the military leadership
and to favor abandoning the war even if it means
ceding Morocco's claim to the Polisario. On the
other hand, those "hawks" at all levels of the
military who favor more vigorous action against
Algeria are also unhappy as a result of the
restraints Hassan has placed on the military-
restraints imposed and maintained as protection
against coup attempts such as occurred in the
early 1970s. These restraints imposed by the King
have been in the form of structural reorganiza-
tion of the armed forces that militates against
operational flexibility and individual initiative.
- Libya almost certainly will continue its recent
efforts to expand its limited role in the dispute.
Although Libya will not supplant Algeria as the
principal backer of the Polisario, its involvement
is likely to continue to increase the flow of arms
to the guerrillas, reinforce their reluctance to
negotiate, and further strain relations between
pro-Algerian and pro-Libyan elements of the
group's leadership.
Political Problems for the United States
Recent developments in the Western Sahara conflict
and most foreseeable subsequent scenarios virtually
ensure increased difficulty for the US Government in
preserving good relations with all parties to the dis-
pute. The most immediate difficulty for the United
States is likely to arise in protecting its relations with
Morocco as the King begins to seek scapegoats for his
declining fortunes in Western Sahara. The provision of
additional US arms to Rabat will become more impor-
tant to the Moroccans as they experience escalated
guerrilla attacks on their positions in Western Sahara
and in Morocco itself, and as they become more
anxious about possible conflict with Algeria. This issue
will transcend the purely Saharan context and become
for the Moroccans an even more important test of the
degree of support the United States will give an ally.
We see no evidence that either the provision or the
withholding of US arms will be the determining factor
in any decision by Hassan to make significant conces-
sions in negotiations or to seek a military solution to
the conflict.' Perceptions of US willingness to support
Hassan would strengthen his position internally, al-
though for how long is uncertain. Such support would
not sustain the King indefinitely if the war wore on.
The question of third-country perceptions of US sup-
port for a friend is also a factor. While most African
countries would be opposed to stepped-up military
support, the Saudis and the French, as well as the
Senegalese, recently have strongly urged Washington
to provide arms to Hassan.
Any successor regime in Morocco probably would
not be as pro-Western and responsive to US interests as
3 Moreover, we continue to believe that no amount of additional
military equipment without significant decentralization and
reorganization of the armed forces will reverse the decline in
Morocco's ability to control or defeat the Polisario militarily.
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Hassan's, and almost certainly would move toward a
nonaligned foreign policy. A new Moroccan govern-
ment might well step up the country's already expand-
ing economic contacts with the USSR, and perhaps
consider seriously a renewed military supply relation-
ship with the Soviets. Under foreseeable circum-
stances, the Soviets over the next six months are
unlikely to alter their own policy of avoiding direct
involvement in the dispute, not wishing to jeopardize
their economic stake in good relations with Morocco.
The United States, as it tries to remain neutral in the
dispute while preventing further strains in ties with
Morocco, will also find it difficult to avoid jeopardiz-
ing its relations with Algeria and ultimately with any
independent Saharan state that might emerge. Alge-
rian President Bendjedid is apparently no less deter-
mined to pursue the Saharan conflict than his prede-
cessor. Although he appears more flexible and
pragmatic in some other areas and seeks improved
relations with the United States, there is not likely to
be progress toward closer ties if Algeria perceives
increased US identification with Moroccan aims in
Western Sahara, especially through expanded arms
sales. Moreover, the sale of controversial items-OV-
10 armed reconnaissance aircraft and Cobra helicop-
ters-would introduce new strains in US-Algerian
relations.
Pressure will increase on the United States to deal
more directly with the Polisario Front as that group
wins increased Arab, African, and other international
backing. Failure of the United States to match growing
European willingness to deal with the Polisario risks
prejudicing future US relations with that group and
denying Washington the opportunity to influence its
orientation. Any US move toward recognizing or
dealing with the Polisario, of - course, will further
encumber US-Moroccan relations.
Relations between the United States and Mauritania
are unlikely to be adversely affected by Mauritania's
withdrawal from the Saharan conflict. Although in
theory the withdrawal would seem to promote the
principal US interest in Mauritania-the country's
stability and territorial integrity-over the longer
term, regional tensions arising out of the Saharan
dispute, continued Moroccan-Polisario fighting, and
expanded Polisario territorial claims will continue to
threaten Mauritania.
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