POLYGRAPH PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R002900150016-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 7, 2007
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: February 21, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/09/07: CIA-RDP83M00914R002900150016-2
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rLi-1-21L,
21 February 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR; Director of Security
SUBJECT Polygraph Program
1. The use of the polygraph by the Central Intelligence
Agency shall be governed by the provisions of this memorandum.
You are hereby directed to take, the necessary action to insure
implementation.
2. 'he Direct-or for of Security shall be responsible for the
.~ ,
supervision and training of polygraph examiners and for the
conduct of the polygraph program of the Central Intelligence
Agency. He shall insure that the highest standards of ized
of erating procedures and equipment capability are establis
and maintained.
3. The polygraph will be used in the Central Intelligence
Agency as an aid to investigation for determining the security
eligibility of persons for employment by or assignment to te
Agency; security clearance by the ,Agency; staff-like access to
sensitive Agency installations; utilization in operational
situations; or.continued access to classified information where
implications of a security nature or investigative information
require clarifying security interviews.
The polygraph will not be used in the Central Intelligence
Agency on official or administrative matters involving possible
malfeasance, for the sole purpose of determining violations of
the criminal laws of any country.
Approved For Release 2007/09/07: CIA-RDP83M00914R002900150016-2
 Approved For Release 2007/09/07: CIA-RDP83M00914R002900150016-2
5. X# a polygraph examination Involves a question pertaining
to the violation, of a criminal law, the individual shall be informcci
of his privilege a gaillst self-?inc:~il linatiOi1 and his right to consult
with legal COlmSel OA other professional assistance p'io7: Co the
examination. Notification of such rights will be formally recerclecT>
6, The Director of Security shall establish adequate safe-
guards designed to prevent unto rranted invasion of privacy.
,Each applicant for employment will be notified, at the rime he is
given application forms, of the. intent to use a polygraph exami-
nation in the course of his employment processing. Before -a
Person undergoes a polygraph examination, his consent should be
obtained in writing. He should be told, before testing , the general
content of all questions which will be asked. He Will also be .
bxi_efed On testing procedures.. All questions must have specific
relevance to the person being Tpolygraphed and to the purpose of
that particular test. Upon inquiry, he should,be told if the Poly
graph examination is being monitored or recorded.
7; The Director of Security shall maintain separate files
for illform.ation obtained during polygraph examinations. He shall
release such ir.foxi-nition Only to appropriate Agency off c_als Nviien
it Ila.`i a direct bearing oil a decision to be made by that ofllcial>
T le shall release polygraph acquired information) outside the Agency
only after he has made a determination, which is concurred in by
Director or Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, that. such
the
a release is necessary in the interest of national security,
Richard Helms
Director
Approved For Release 2007/09/07: CIA-RDP83M00914R002900150016-2
 Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
NOTE FOR THE A/DCI
30 September 1982
A basic issue, of course, is what "for lead
purposes only" (.pg. 2) means to the re-
cipient and how it is~handled. Bill noted
:somewhere that. the FBI and Secret Service
records are good:. Air Fnrrp/fcT wac +ho
bad actor in
case.
In intelligence dissemination, the NFIB
member is responsible for control and
proper use of distributed classified
reports. The same has to be true among
investigative agencies.
Since humans are involved, there will be
glitches -- I think AF/OSI's immediate
leap to a damage assessment was one such.
The OS release policy, handled on a case-
by-case basis, subject to 7th floor approval,
is basically sound. Periodic policing and
re-education is required.
Approved For Release 2007/09/07: CIA-RDP83M00914R002900150016-2
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 Approved For Release 2007/09/07: CIA-RDP83M00914R002900150016-2
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Approved For Release 2007/09/07: CIA-RDP83M00914R002900150016-2
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