DIPLOMAT`S ENEMIES PLAY ROLE IN BLOCKING HIS APPOINTMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R002800070036-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 36
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2007/04/13: CIA-RDP83M00914R00280007036-0 STAT
ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE_ I
THE WASHINGTON POST
21 May 1982 .
nerrles Play Rode;
BDort Oberdorfer
1n5Wn eM&smrrwdter
Fast September veteran diplomat
Morton I. Abramowitz was offered
the choice post of assistant secretary
of state for East Asian and Pacific
affairs, the top Asian policy job in
the government. He was' naturally
pleased--but. he had enemies who
were not. Partly because of their political
and' bureaucratic, opposition, his ap-
pointment did not develop, and he
was selected instead in early October
to be U.S. ambassador to Indonesia.-,'
President Reagan . himself. tele
phoned the offer;. Abramowitz ac-.
cepted.
But within a few weeks, disap-.
-pointing word was mysteriously re
ceived .from Jakarta that the Indo-
nesian government preferred that he
not, be named.
A statement issued yesterday in
the name of Secretary of State Al-
exander M. Haig Jr. announced with
regret that Indonesia will not accept
this "truly outstanding Foreign Ser-
vice officer," thus ringing down the
curtain on six months of agonizing
uncertainty for Abramowitz, and.
quite possibly presaging the end of a
22-year diplomatic career.
What happened to Morton Abra-
mowitz is an extraordinary 'episode,
even for unusual times, illuminating
a netherworld of intrigue that has
affected several 'Reagan diplomatic
nominations, as well as the torturous-
.pace at which a number of key per-
`sonnet decisions have been made.
Though he was backed by Haig
and at times personally approved by
Reagan, Abramowitz was opposed
not- by-outsiders but by enemies
within the administration itself.
Among . their most %. important
weapons in this effort was an anon-
ymous and confidential paper, much
I of it-inaccurate, which was prepared
by military officers, iwortedly with'
the. help : of Abramowitz's f rmer
C station chief at a p4.t abroad, in
antort to stop Abramowitz's rise
within the administration. :
After Reaganian'd his- senior as-
sistant&;decidedLto,nominate' Abra-
mowitz. aa_ambassador to Indonesia,
the,`.` 4 ternal ' aper mysteriously
found its way to e p rank of the :
Indonesian government- and 'ulti-
mately into the hands of columnist
derson. ' r ..
The. document apparently played
a role iri Jakarta's decision, conveyed
-in.preliminary .terms last November
and in final terms two weeks ago,
not. to accept Abramowitz' as U.S.
ambassador. '
Another shadowy aspect of the
case, prominent in reporters'. ques-
tions about it at the State Depart-
ment yesterday, is "the religion an-
gle.'- Abramowitz is Jewish, and In-
donesia is a predominately Islamic
country. Despite rumors that, this l
'affected Jakarta's decision, both
State Department spokesman Dean
Fischer and Abramowitz himself, in,
a terse statement yesterday, said the
Indonesians never 'conveyed an in-
dication that religion was a factor.
Abramowitz, 49, has amassed one
of the most outstanding records in
the active U.S. diplomatic service,
most of it involved with Asia. Among
other things, he served in Taiwan
and Hong Kong, as political adviser
to the chief of the U.S. forces in the
Pacific, as the Pentagon's senior spe-
cialist on Asian affairs and, in the
three years preceding his travail, as
U.S. ambassador to Thailand.
Both in the Pentagon and as am-
bassador to Thailand, Abramowitz
received awards for unusually effec-
tive service, including the prestigious
Joseph C. Wilson Award for achieve-
ment in diplomatic affairs, and last
year the President's Award for Dis-
tinguiahed Federal Servi:e. At the
same time, though, his blunt manner
and some of his bureaucratic moves
and positions earned him the enmity
of some officials. .
Abramowitz was 'considered espe-
cially vulnerable in connection with-,
Reagan administration posts because'!
of a long friendship with Richard C. I
Holbrooke, the Carter administra-
tion's assistant secretary of state. for
Asian affairs, who is anathema to,
many conservatives. The two men,
though friends, did not always agree,?
and Abramowitz had many admirers
'who disliked Holbrooke.
Abramowitz remained in Bangkok
for seven months after the onset of
the Reagan administration. When he
was replaced in that post last Auguste
the._ word was around ? that he 'was
likely to be nominated as ambassa-.
dor to the Philippines, in part be-,a
cause President Ferdinand Marcos is':.
said to have personally expressed his':
admiration for Abramowitz and' his-;
interest in his appointment.
In mid-September, back in Wash-
ington, Haig had decided to replace
his assistant secretary for Asian af-
fairs, John H. Holdridee. and . to?
offer him the embassy in the 'Phil-1
It was Haig's idea,'accordingi'.
to several knowledgeable sources,
that Abramowitz would move to the
top Asian affairs job, where his com-
bination of experience and bureau-'
cratic toughness was high on Haig's
qualifications' list
After Abramowitz was offered and'
accepted the job in conversations:
13: CIA-R DP83M00914R002800070036 OCONT--'-'-,'Tu
 with an. aide to Hat>< P&VeSfb&
lEoked to `conservative, circles -in
Washington nd to the press, setting
,off alarms :from longstanding ene-
mies-,-a&-:--well.' as some Republicans
who considered: him too close to the
ocrat,e-' '
An unsigned Oct.:1 paper headed
"Point 'Paper' on Morton Abra-
mowitz" was one result of this alarm.
Stamped'"confidential," it described
Abramowitz as a person whose "po-
litical philosophy is akin to McGov-
ern, Muskie . and . Mondale" and
whose wife had been a staff aide of
Muskie, McGovern and Carter.
In fact, Abramowitz is considered
by most who know, him to be
tough-minded :conservative in inter-
national affairs.-'His . wife;, -Sheppie, .
worked for about a year as an aide to
then-Sen. Edmund S. Muskie ? in-:
1970, but reportedly did. not work'
for the other two. The document-'. also - described
:'Abramowitz as "the architect' ;of
U.S. troop withdrawal from South
Korea, a course he publicly and pri-
vately opposed until President C.ar4::
ter. adopted it as a policy of his ad-
ministration. It also claimed, eiro-
neously, that Abramowitz "worked
very-hard" to provide diplomatic rec-
ognition and "a massive foreign aid
program" to Vietnam.
The, authorship of the memoran.-
dum has not been definitely estali-.
lished.. A senior administration
ficial familiar with it said: "As - best
we knew, it came out of D use; not
out o t e White House." and .that
this impression had subsequently
been confirmed by high-level State'.
Department inquiries.
It is widely reported in policy cir-
Iles that one of the most prominent
opponents of Abramowitz's elevation
Stilwell
rd G
h
Ri
ti
d G
,
.
en.
c
a
re
was re
once;--D-S.- 0 107 commander - in
South Korea, later a transition and
.National Security Council consultant
to the Reagan team and currently
deputy undersecretary of defense for
policy. Stilwell is currently in South
Korea; and sent word through' an
aide yesterday that he had "nothing
to da'with" the opposition to Abra-
mowitz
other verrson son :_ an yreported l 09.14t( SQQOiTMi
fftg nt to-Jakarta
uo er p e y repo
be involved is Daniel C. Arnold, who
was.CIA station chief in Bangkok for
aboiif'a year during Abramowitz's
tendre as ambassador. Arnold is con
sidered very close to Gen. Chamanan
Kriangsak, who was ousted as Thai
prime minister. in -February, 1980,
-while Abramowitz was U.S. ambas J
sador and reportedly felt lack of U.S.
support was part of the cause.
Arnold said yesterday that he and
Abramowitz had "no problem" when
the: worked together, but that they
quarreled in late 1980 over his re-
turn to Bangkok as a private consul.
tant after retiring from . the CIA.
Ar
ld
LaZU' November,
registered
no
with the Department of Justice as a
paid agent of the Thai government
with a $50,000 initial retainer.
A friend of both
en who asked
m
,, not to be named, said Arnold had',
told him last, fall - that "we are ett
up a memo" to stop - Abramowitz. ?.
and. that it being sent in a hurry
to the White House. rnol eme
e ping r sue a memo, but
said he did help to "check out" ques-
tions about Abramowitz on. request,
ed friends.
A third person, who acknowledged
that he opposed Abramowitz for the-
top Asian job, is Ray Cline of the
Center for Strategic and. Intemation-
al Studies at Georgetown University.
But he said he knew nothing of an
opposition memo. ..
In the face of opposition to Abra-
mowitz and a. threat by Holdridge to
resign rather than go to . Manila,
Haig dropped his plan . for this
switch. However, questions had been
raised at the White House, about~
Abramowitz in the process, partic-,
ularly for the post in the Philippines
where there'are.large U.S: military
bases and military interests..
A White' House personnel, official
is credited by insiders with suggest-
lhg. that Michael H. Armacost, who:
was preparing to go to Indonesia but,.
who had good relations with the U.S:,
military, be sent to Manila, and that
Abramowitz be sent to Indonesia.;
Apparently there was no consider-
ation of_ the. potential_ problem . of
sending a Jewish ambassador to an
Islamic country..
In. the. first week, o'f October, the
switch was decided. Reagan, despite;
the; .;`point. paper" - against Abra-j
mowitz an a -te House d -
and late that month formally asked
choice for the post in J8 rt "~t
statement said.
Abramowitz, by,. telephone, to , taker
the job.
Indonesians weie- at' first puzzled
and then. unhappy at the switch. In
'November the retiring U.S. ambas-
sador, Edward E. Masters, was told
by a high Indonesian official that the
country's leader, President Suharto,,
preferred that Abramowitz not be
sent. Later it was reported that-So
har o had been given a copy of an
anti-Abramowitz paper ep a iev tc,
` be White House document.
'Fop 0:. o ic s waited until
January : before _.: taking direct
steps-a letter and telephone call,
from Haig to' Indonesian . Foreign
Minister K. Mochtar. However, the
Indonesian responded that "the well
has been poisoned", and Abramaotz
could not be accepted.
Besides mention of the paper, In-
donesians have given no clear reason
for .their attitude. Reports that
reached the State Department and
`Capitol Hill, suggested''- that the In
donesians, -among other objections, ,
were concerned . by advice from.
someone in Thailand that Abra- .
mowitz "might try to run your arm-
try.` There is also an unconfirmed
report, heard by. a well-informed pri-
vate citizen,' that 'the Jewish angle'
came up in. conversation with the
Thais.
Hoping that the objections would '
clear up, and encouraged by some
hints to that effect; Haig waited
until. April to uronose . Abrarnn'itz
formally to Jakarta .as 'U.S_ ambas-'
sador. Though Haig sent the format
proposal with what is described Of
an 'unusually strong endo> t
the Indonesians replied early this'.
month that they would not 5c,%1A- '+
Haig's statement. yesterdav., e+e'
gretted this action and praised Abr6-
mowitz. "There 'has never lx+m
question in the president'* w1 (C4
my own -that he was an cxcelle+`
spokesman Fischer ridded: "tf hM
are faced with noahis-an"etuttuz-4
of the possibility of: snotfw '" assignment for Ambassa5tt r
mowitz." However, no ne*iOh "
sight for the diplomat. W
vaulted toward the top, i`ky
from the arrows of .-urn
nents. .
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