THE REAL SSOVIET THREAT IN EL SALVADOR AND BEYOND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R002800040018-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 22, 2007
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: March 11, 1982
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

approved For Release 2007/03123: CIA-RDP83M00914R00280
NOTE FOR: I
FROM: Michelle, OEXA
SUBJECT: 18 February 1982 DCI Interview
with Joe Fromm, U.S. News and
Worl d Resort
Jim,
Attached is the 18 February transcript
of the DCI's interview with Joe Fromm.
This copy has the Director's corrections;
the original was returned to Joe Fromm for
final publication.
Please call if you have any questions.
cc: C/PAD/OEXA w/att.
OEXA Registry w/att.
DD/OEXA file cy w/att.
 Approved For Release 2007/03123 :CIA-RDP83M00914R002800040018-3
Reprinted from
Interview With CIA Director VVilliarn J. Casey
The Real S
Yhreat in ~
And Beyon
In a rare and unusually candid d'ascussior9,
the nation's intelligence chief spells out
a Kremlin strategy for conquest by sub~fersion
and for building Russian military power
by using secrets stolen from the ll.S.
Q Mr. Casey, there's a great deal of concern that this country
might be dragged Into aVietnam-like quagmire in EI Salvador. In
your view, is that fear warranted?
A No. I don't think EI Salvador or what we're likely to do
there bears any comparison to Vietnam. In the first place,
El Salvador is on our doorstep. And we're not just talking
about El Salvador; we're talkirig about Central America-
Costa Rica, Honduras and Guatemala. The insurgency is
beamed at all those countries. Furthermore, this is part of a
worldwide problem.
Q Worldwide in what sense?
A Around the middle of the '70s, the Soviets assessed the
impact of Vietnam on American public opinion and decided
we probably would be restricted in our ability to respond to
lo~v-level insurgency operations. In the last seven years,
starting with the dispatch of sophisticated weapons to join
up with Cuban troops in Angola, they have developed a very
innovative and brilliant mix of tactics: Political, diplomatic,
destabilization, subversion, terrorists and support of insur-
gencies. And they have applied this around the world.
Over this past year alone, you've had insurgencies in
North Yemen, Chad, Morocco, Kampuchea, El Salvador,
Guatemala. You have incipient insurgencies in many Afri-
can countries. The Soviets work in some concert with Cuba,
Libya and North Korea. They work with Angola against
Namibia and Zaire; with Ethiopia against Somalia, and with
Libya and Ethiopia against i