CORRESPONDENCE FROM FRANK R. BARNETT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R002700160038-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 25, 2007
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: May 10, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/01/25: CIA-RDP83M00914R002700160038-9
STAT
Approved For Release 2007/01/25: CIA-RDP83M00914R002700160038-9
 . Approved For Release 2007/01/25: CIA-RDP83M00914R002AaW00 9 Z- A
NATIONAL STRATEGY
INFORMATION CENTER, INC.
OFFICERS
FRANK R. BARNETT'
President
DR. FRANK N. TRAGER
Director of Studies
(Director, National Security
Education Program,
New York University)
ROBERTG.BURKE
Secretary and General Counsel
PAUL E. FEFFER'
International Vice President
(President, Fetter & Simons, Inc.)
REAR ADMIRAL WILLIAM C. MOTT USN (Ret.)'
Vice President
DOROTHY E. NICOLOSI'
Treasurer, Assistant Secretary,
and Executive Administrator
DIRECTORS
KARL R. BENDETSEN
Director and Retired Chairman
Champion International Corporation
D. TENNANT BRYAN
Chairman of the Board
Media General, Inc.
RICHARD C. HAM
Attorneyat Law
MORRIS 1. LEIBMAN
Sidley & Austin
JOHN O. MARSH, JR.
Mays, Valentine, Davenport & Moore
111 EAST 58TH STREET
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022
AREA CODE 212 838-2912
April 26, 1982 DDI- 3&6_10Z
Honorable William J. Casey
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
In the past few months, our Center's been asked a
dozen times: "Should the U.S. begin to think about
an alternative or 'fall-back' strategy, if trends
in Europe get much worse?"
ADMIRAL THOMAS H. MOORER, USN (Ret.) NSIC favors doing everything possible to support
COLONEL JOHN C. NEFF,USAR(Ret.) pro-American elements in Europe who want to save
ROBERT H. PARSLEY NATO. In fact, we're expanding that part of our
Butler, Binion, Rice, Cook and Knapp
DR. EUGENEV.ROSTOW Program. On the other hand, it may also be time
Sterling Professor of Law for some quiet contingency planning both for
Yale University
LIEUTENANT GENERAL EDWARD L. ROWNY, USA (Ret.) modifications within the NATO structure and for
FRANK SHAKESPEARE
President
RKO General, Inc.
CHARLES E. STEVINSON
President
Denver West, Ltd.
JAMES L. WINOKUR
Chairman of the Board
Air Tool Parts and Service Company
MAJOR GENERAL RICHARD A. YUDKIN, USAF (Ret.)
Senior Vice President
Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corporation
ADVISORY COUNCI L
ISAAC L AUERBACH
VICE ADMIRAL M. G. BAYNE, USN (Rot.)
ALLYN R. BELL, JR.
PRESCOTT S. BUSH. JR.
JOSEPH COORS
MILES FLINT
HENRY H. FOWLER
JOHN W. HANES, JR.
ADMIRAL MEANS JOHNSTON, USN (Rat.)
R. DANIEL McMICHAEL
REAR ADMIRAL DAVID L. MARTINEAU, USN (Ret.)
CHUCK MAU
DILLARD MUNFORD
ADOLPH W. SCHMIDT
DR. FREDERICK SEITZ
JOHN A. SUTRO
DEE WORKMAN
EVELLE J. YOUNGER
ADMIRAL ELMO R. ZUMWALT. JR., USN (Rat.)
WASHINGTON OFFICE
1730 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
[phone]
REAR ADMIRAL WILLIAM C. MOT: USN (Rat.)'
(Executive Director
Council on Economics and National Security)
DR. ROY GODSON
Research Associate
(Associate Professor of Government
and Director, International Labor
Program, Georgetown University)
'Also Directors
collective security elsewhere. If you have a view
about this, or have seen a relevant article, we'd
like to have it.
Meanwhile, the enclosure is an up-dated version of
my draft proposal to create a new naval alliance to
defend the oil and mineral "lifelines" in the southern
oceans. Of course, this is not meant as a substitute
for NATO. Rather, it suggests the need to link
Russia's "three fronts" and bring Japan into full
partnership for mutual defense.
With best regards, I am
Enc. (1)
Fa~~u l ly,
rg~
Frank R. Barnett
cC d'
Approved For Release 2007/01/25: CIA-RDP83M00914R002700160038-9
 strata
N SOME POLITICAL circles
there is euphoria over the
apparent quality, elan and
competence of the national
security staff of United States
President Ronald Reagan's
Republican administration. But
this should not be allowed to
obscure the fact that a minimum
of five years will be required by
America before credible equality
can be achieved with the assets
and techniques of conflict now
held by the Soviet Union. It is,
of course, myopic to regard
`catching up with the Russians'
as necessarily matching numbers:
missile for missile, tank for tank,
ship for ship. Indeed, logic might
suggest that a nation such as the
United States should seek to play
`scientific leap-frog' by way of
quantum jumps in design and
technology, rather than risk its
high-technology edge at the
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
(SALT) table. Even so, one can
scarcely ignore the way in which
the power balance, changed in
favour of the Soviets by sheer
weight of numbers, has widened
for thd
West.
ftme
the diplomatic options
available to the
Kremlin. Between
1968 and 1980,
Russia's military
investment outpaced
that of the United States by at
least US$120 billion and perhaps
as much as $200 billion.
Paradoxically, the era of the
'vel safe for
{ 1 t
of American presidents to
frustrate the Soviets in regional
crises such as the blockade of
West Berlin in 1949, the threat
to Lebanon in 1958, and the
installation of Russian missiles
in Cuba four years later. But
today, after a decade of SALT
and detente, the dangers to the
United States and its allies have
significantly increased. First,
America exchanged military
superiority for parity, hoping by
such restraint to set an example
for Russia. Then - as the Soviets
reached for superiority in some
categories of weaponry -the
United States sought refuge in the
dubious semantics of `essential
equivalence'. Meanwhile, the
Soviet Union has created the clear
capability of moving from Stalin's
guiding principle, defence of the
homeland, to the doctrine of
Admiral of the Fleet Sergei
Gorshkov, commander of the
Russian Navy: the projection of
power overseas to all oceans and
continents. Nov, in an era of
detente, the West confronts a
relentless Soviet military build-
up that knows no peace time
parallel since the fabrication
of the Nazi war machine in
Germany. The Soviet Union is
putting 16 to 20 per cent of its
gross national product into
weaponry, military manpower,
and research and development
on new systems - a sum far in
excess of that needed if its sole
concern were prudent safeguards
r
cold war was re a y
America and her allies. During the for
the Reagan Russia.
Thus, defence
years that Josef Stalin and Nikita
Khrushchev held supreme office administration took office in
in Russia, that is the two decades January 1981 it was confronted
following the end of World War II, with the task of overcoming
the United States enjoyed clear inherited problems in the area
rs:
ffai
it
superiority in nuclear weapons,
sea power and strategic delivery
systems. When President Dwight
Eisenhower was in the White
House, three-quarters of the globe
was effectively closed to Russian
expansion. Moreover, strategic
superiority enabled a succession
y a
of national secur
o the vulnerability of America's
land-based nuclear deterrents
in the early 1980s, and the
consequent opening of a
Soviet military `window of
opportunity' that through
sustained and vigorous
 American effort can only be closed by about 1986 at the earliest
o a growing military advantage in conventional forces of the Warsaw
Pact over the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO), linked to an
ean allies to
a's Euro
i
f A
f
p
mer
c
many o
increasing reluctance o
up-grade theatre [regional] nuclear defence
o the lengthening shadow of the Soviet navy (with Cuban ;
and East German commandos) in the southern
hemisphere, which constitutes the source or supply
route of those oil and minerals that sustain the
economies of Japan and `NATO-Europe' and
foster American industrial health
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services, at a time when the KGB is
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United States defence, to such an
extent that the once-vaunted
much of its `surge capacity'- the
ability rapidly to turn to mass t(
1'
production of tanks, aircraft and if? I
r
the other heavy equipment of I
warfare / I
o sapping of friends' and allies' I
confidence in America's
capacity and will to meet the
full range of threats from the
Soviet Union and its expanding
Marxist commonwealth.
It is, of course, a matter of doubt
whether a democracy, short of
declaring war, can ever design and
implement a grand strategy. Critics
argue that, despite his anti-Soviet
rhetoric, President Reagan has not
yet done so. But it is undeniable that
his principal captains have already
~
`?
taken significant steps in a new V
a two-year increase in the defence
budget of 28 per cent after inflation, and
the Reagan administration's plan to spend ~~ . '.
$1 300 billion on armaments in the five years
1981 to 1986 represents a noteworthy effort
to close the gap opened during a one-sided
detente in which the Soviets alone engaged in an
arms race. \
`NATO short-war only' focus resulting from America's
Vietnam debacle: it no longer functions in anticipation
of a threat consisting solely of a high-intensity Soviet assault
on Europe and/or strategic nuclear war. While continuing to
prepare for such `worst case' scenarios, it recognises in its
contingency planning that protracted conflict in other theatres may
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? Western naval/air facilities
 Approved'For Release 2007/01/25: CIA-RDP83M00914R002700160038-9
demand more mobile forces with lighter equipment, and a need for
renewing stockpiles to support such a campaign in the Persian Gulf,
Africa, southern Asia or the Caribbean. There is growing
awareness, too, that America needs a 'three-ocean' navy,
especially since Persian Gulf oilfields are less than 1600
kilometres from the Soviet border. So far there is little
sentiment in favour of any replacement for the defunct
Central Treaty Organisation (Cento) in south west
Asia, hence a lack of large-scale bases in the region
may limit American intervention to small'trip-
wire' deployments of troops near the Gulf. Given
current limits on America's airlift capacity,
those more substantial forces that could be
flown in during a crisis might be overrun
in the absence of the conspicuous further
deterrent provided by regional naval
supremacy. In that connection, the
presence of French and other
European warships in the Indian
Ocean raises the odds against Soviet
adventurism; looking to the future,
one would not need the brilliance
of an Admiral Mahan to argue that
United States access to the big
South African naval base at
Simonstown and the addition of
even a few Japanese ships to
Indian Ocean routes could
change political and
psychological attitudes enough
to make the defence of the
Persian Gulf more feasible.
Western Europe, admittedly,
is less than eager to make any
formal commitment to this theatre,
and Japan continues to resist
American pressure to increase its
self-defence forces and broaden their
operating scope. But to those
concerned with Western defence in
the face of Moscow's commitment of its
power to intervene in unstable Third
World territories, it is evident that the
status quo is intolerable. There can be little
doubt that America under President Reagan
will fight for its own vital interests. But when
those of, say, Japan are even more endangered,
Americans cannot be expected to fight alone.
Russia's grand strategy is founded on the mutual
support of military sub-systems in four continents.
North Korean pilots, Cuban legions, Czechoslovakian
arms dealers, elite battalions from North Vietnam, East
German secret police, and terrorists financed by Libya are
among the interchangeable assets that can be manipulated by
Soviet conflict brokers. The forces of once landlocked Russia can
now extend from Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam to the Caribbean, and
 . pprove 7101125: CIA-RDP83M00914R002700160038-9
embrace the Indian Ocean in
between. In Stalin's day, it was a
communist boast that `the front is
everywhere'. But that claim was
limited to propaganda, espionage
and subversion; today, it is
Russian tanks that can be speedily
committed in such remote
salients as Nicaragua, Ethiopia,
Vietnam and Angola. Since
Moscow's strategy is now
inter-continental, at least two
propositions merit careful study
by those nations imperilled by
Russian expansion.
First: while it is imperative
to up-grade conventional and
theatre nuclear defences vis-a-vis
those of the Warsaw Pact, in the
end NATO cannot be defended
entirely from within the strict
limits of its own territory. Sixty
per cent of the world's oil supply
is virtually encircled by military
allies of the Soviet Union in the
shape of South Yemen, Ethiopia,
Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan.
Communists and other anti-
Western groups may well prove
aggressive participants in what
may turn out to be the next stage
of Iran's revolution - the crisis of
the Khomeini succession. The
southern third of Africa, the
`Saudi Arabia of minerals', is
either in the hands of govern-
ments sympathetic to Marxism
or under seige from Marxist
guerrillas. Surely, NATO cannot
be sustained if the links of a
shadow Soviet commonwealth
are fashioned in such a way that
in the long run they strangle
the trade flow of the United
States, Europe and Japan at
Third World choke points of
seaborne commerce.
Second: a war in Europe
launched by Russia would not
necessarily be restricted to
Europe. The United States is a
Pacific power as well as a NATO
member, and no prudent Soviet
planner, intent on invading
Europe, could ignore the peril of
back-door strikes into Russia from
American fleets and bases in the
Pacific and Japan. Moreover,
Soviet war plans would almost
certainly impel Moscow to
accompany any invasion of
Europe with a thrust aimed at
seizing the Persian Gulf and
interdicting the Cape of Good
Hope sea route, in order to shut
off NATO's oil lifeline. Hence, if
waged for even three weeks at a
conventional level, what might
have begun as a European war
would almost certainly spread
elsewhere; and Japan, South
Africa and Saudi Arabia, among
other states, might well find
themselves collateral targets of
a Soviet assault on NATO.
THE inter-dependence of
Russia's `three fronts' -
NATO to the west, Japan
and the People's Republic of
China to the east, Iran, Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia to the south
may apply as surely in military
matters as in trade, commerce and
energy. If so, Washington's
so-called `swing' strategy of
despatching its Pacific Fleet to
the Atlantic if the Soviet Union
attacks NATO, must give way
to the `tri-ocean' strategy of
a formidable Western naval
presence in all sectors. This
cannot, of course, be the sole
means of checking Soviet
ambition. Fleets move under
nuclear umbrellas, and to
preserve this shield the United
States must take immediate steps
to safeguard its land-based
nuclear deterrent, which will
become vulnerable within the
next two to four years. But
the West as a whole must also
understand that the new factor in
geo-politics is the global reach of
Russia's conventional weapons.
When Chairman Khrushchev
rattled his rockets, the West could
call his bluff. It was nuclear attack
or nothing for the Kremlin; in
those days, Moscow could not
project limited military power
into Africa, south Asia or Latin
America. But today, Chairman
Leonid Brezhnev can behave with
all the assurance of a Czar married
to a Queen Victoria. Not even
the Caribbean, gateway to the
oil treasures of Mexico and
Venezuela, is beyond the reach of
Admiral Gorshkov's naval power.
Moscow is not, as Secretary of
State Alexander Haig (unlike
some of his predecessors) is
keenly aware, so preoccupied
with command of the sea-lanes as
to neglect the nourishment of the
urban guerrilla and the peasant
revolutionary - the strategy of
terror and its application through
`wars of liberation'. Diplomats
may celebrate the alleged
evolution of the Cold War into
detente; but whoever rules Russia,
Lenin still lives in the Politburo.
To the Leninist mind, ideological
combat is not empty rhetoric
but rather a practical means of
winning political power in the
desert and jungle precincts of the
Third World. Leninism means
Soviet weapons for proxy
warriors, and training in the arts
of psychological warfare and dis-
information. It also means
persistence in conflict
management. As Lenin might
have put it: `One step backward in
Egypt; two steps forward in
Angola and Mocambique; three
steps forward with Soviet bases in
Libya, Ethiopia and Afghanistan;
and continue the struggle to
change the balance of forces in
Iran.' Brezhnev's advisers may
even have gone one better than
Lenin in devising a scheme to
`pyramid' foreign combat assets,
using Cuba's manpower to
throw a net over a
neighbouring country so that in
due course large numbers of
soldiers from, say, Nicaragua will
also be available as janissaries of
the Soviet Union.
Some Western elites-in
questions of RealpoIitik prone
to seeing mirror images of
 Approved For Release 2007/01/25: CIA-RDP83M00914R00270016003&
themselves - seem to assume
that Soviet leaders are essentially
Russian-speaking graduates of the
Harvard Business School. If that
were true, diplomats ought to be
able to manipulate Moscow with
credits, cost-benefit analyses and
gentlemen's agreements. But the
Leninist mind uses the cost-
accounting of the battlefield,
not the board-room.
I N estimating Soviet
objectives and capabilities,
it should be understood that
profound cultural differences
can make for diverse priorities.
If a nation's political heritage runs
from Magna Carta through Locke
and Jefferson, its values are not
quite the same as those of that
society whose legacy derives
from Genghis Khan through Ivan
the Terrible to Lenin. Not that
strategic planners can precisely
infer the intentions of the
Politburo simply by reading
Lenin. But Lenin is not dead
gospel; his works are at least as
relevant to the behaviour of the
commissars as is the doctrine of
the Harvard Business School to
the decision-making process of an
American chief executive. We
are entitled, therefore, to take
seriously a Leninist dictum that is
given concrete shape by Soviet
allocation of manpower and
resources to an indirect assault
on the West's economic infra-
structure: that the Achilles heel
of the capitalist economy lies in
what used to be called `the
colonies' and is now known as
the Third World. "Sever the raw
materials flow from the colonies,"
argued Lenin, "and you cut the
spinal cord of the Empire." In
Soviet professional journals and
in major speeches by Khrushchev
and Brezhnev, there have been
clear references to an up-dated
version of this thesis.
Six months before he was
confirmed in his post, Secretary of
State Haig warned a committee of
the United States Congress that
"the era of the resource war has
arrived". Much information has
been compiled to support that
view, not least by business groups
in London, Paris, Pittsburgh and
Washington. The evidence
contradicts those who posit that
the policy of the United States,
Europe and Japan must be
geared either to the'east-west'
confrontation or the `north-south'
inter-action. What West German
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt has
called `the struggle for the world
product' means that the east-west
conflict increasingly will take
place on a north-south axis and,
almost certainly, at the level of
low-intensity combat rather than
nuclear war. General William
C. Westmoreland, a former
Chief of Staff, United States
Army, has said: "The most likely
real-world threat facing America
today is not the nuclear forces of
the Soviet Union, and not the
Warsaw Pact forces facing NATO.
It is the threat posed by an ever-
increasing number of countries
subservient to the Soviet Union,
the control of bases along our
raw material supply routes and
the potential of terrorism,
propaganda and even military and
naval incursion by the Soviet
Union or their [sic] surrogates
against targets important to
our economy."
Western businessmen and
military strategists who assert the
reality of a dawning resource war
can find supporting evidence for
their view both in Soviet naval
deployments and in statements
from Russian leaders. In a book
entitled Strategy and Economics,
Soviet Major General A.N.
Lagovskiy has termed America's
dependence on certain strategic
materials from abroad the `weak
link' in American military
capability. Lagovskiy argued for
a Soviet effort to control such
strategic materials as a means of
exerting influence on the health
of the American economy.
The attempt to debilitate the
Western industrial economies
by depriving them of their raw
material imports is now firmly
implanted in Soviet doctrine.
Chairman Khrushchev supported
the resource war against the West
in a speech at Jakarta University
on February 22 1960: "Afro-Asian
countries play an essential part
in limiting aggression in an
economic respect. They are
important suppliers of raw
materials for the Western powers.
The supporters of aggression
understand that when the
majority of Afro-Asian countries
follow a peace-loving policy they
are unable to count on the use of
the rich resources of Afro-Asian
countries in their aggressive
plans." Robert Moss, former
editor of the `Foreign Report'
intelligence bulletin of The
Economist, recently commented
on a statement by Mr Brezhnev on
the importance of the resource
war to Soviet politico-military
objectives: "Leonid Brezhnev told
a secret meeting of Warsaw Pact
leaders in Prague in 1973 that
the Soviet objective was world
dominance by the year 1985,
and that the control of Europe's
sources of energy and raw
materials would reduce it to
the condition of a hostage to
Moscow" (my italics).
There can be little doubt that, in
practice, Soviet-style geo-politics,
backed by Russia's navy, poses
a threat to the raw materials
supplies of the non-communist
industrialised states of the
northern hemisphere. From
Moscow's viewpoint, an
undeclared resource war is low
cost, low casualty, low visibility
and (despite some successful
counter-moves by France in
Africa) usually below the
threshold of effective NATO
response. Moreover, the twilight
battles of this ambiguous conflict
do not put at risk the population,
 ? Approve or e ease 200770 1725 0 -
farms and factories of Russia;
indeed they do not interrupt
the eastward flow of grain,
technology and credits which
strengthens the Soviet Union
even as it weakens the West. Not
Clausewitz, nor Machiavelli,
nor even Sun-Tzu could have
devised a more oblique and
efficacious gambit.
ASSUMING hostile intent and
resource war capacity on
the part of Moscow, are
the Western powers really so
vulnerable? Is the threat not
a hollow one? Unfortunately,
evidence to the contrary is
overwhelming. William J. Casey,
the director of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), told
the United States Chamber of
Commerce in April 1980 that
"others far from our borders can
put their hands on our economic
throttles and on our economic
throats". It was that sort
of premise that prompted Mr
Reagan, in October 1980, before
the presidential election, to
appoint a'strategic minerals
task force'. This was a long step
towards American recognition
that the West (plus Japan) not
only depends on energy from
overseas, but in terms of minerals
is in danger of becoming a'have-
not' grouping. Indeed, within this
decade we may face the creation
of cartels along the lines of
the Organisation of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC), that
will manipulate the market in
non-fuel minerals.
To oversimplify, the northern
hemisphere depends for a critical
proportion of its industrial raw
materials on the southern half
of the globe: the United States
for roughly 50 per cent, the
Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development
and Europe for about 75 per cent,
and Japan for virtually 90 per
cent. (American dependence may
be overstated: the country has
synthetic materials and low-grade
ores it could use in an emergency,
albeit at painful cost. But western
Europe and Japan are singularly
vulnerable.) At present, the
defence industry's operations and
the economic viability of the
United States rest on the
importation of some two dozen
non-fuel minerals. The country is
more than 90 per cent dependent
on 13 of them (chrome, cobalt,
manganese, tantalum, platinum
group metals, and so on) and more
than 50 per cent dependent on
another 13. Without access to
reliable foreign supplies of raw
materials, the United States
cannot make tanks, bombers,
missiles, jet engines, machine
tools, computers, television
equipment, crankshafts, gears or
drilling bits -- just to begin the
list. Consumer interests would be
crippled just as surely as defence
production; indeed, the whole
way of life of advanced capitalism
would be jeopardised if Russia
could give effect to a 'denial
strategy'.
True, there are still untapped
resources in the American west
and Alaska and the deep floors of
the oceans. The United States has
some room for manoeuvre. It can
expand and up-grade minerals
stockpiles and increase its
domestic production by changing
environmental regulations and
removing ore-rich lands from the
list of official 'wilderness' tracts
at present closed to mining
companies. Europe and Japan,
however, do not have these
options; their economic
well-being is inextricably
intertwined with supplies from
the Third World.
Since Russia - unlike the
United States - is largely
self-sufficient in basic materials,
Moscow does not need the far-
flung battle fleets of a four-ocean
navy to protect its access to
overseas resources. Why, then, so
many Soviet surface warships and
submarines? Why a new naval
base at Cam Ranh Bay? Why a
Cuban 'foreign legion'? Perhaps
it is not to secure Russia's own,
but to deny others' access to
raw materials. Seen from this
perspective, the 1975
independence struggle in Angola
was not a minor tribal scuffle;
instead, it may have been an
opening campaign in the resource
war. The casualties of that kind of
conflict could include millions of
unemployed in the streets of
Europe - the human potential for
a second and possibly engulfing
wave of Euro-communism - and
the consequence for Japan could
be even more disastrous.
It is self-evident that the market
economies of the northern
hemisphere are closely linked
 -Approved For-Release-2007-101125: CIA-RBP83MOO944RO02700160O38-9--
to each other; conspicuous
industrial failure and mass
unemployment cannot be isolated
within one of them. Even if the
United States could obtain, for
example, all the cobalt it needed
from abandoned mines in Idaho,
the American government could
not ignore the interest of Japan
and Europe in promoting stability
in Zaire to maintain their supplies
of the mineral. A'security of
supply' concept, therefore, must
animate any policy that seeks to
sustain alliances, and America's
resource strategy must take
into account the needs of its
allies as well as the rights of
supplier nations.
Much doubt has been expressed
as to whether raw materials
cartels other than OPEC can
_Z, APPIUMM
sustain themselves against
wealthy industrial nations which
are able to turn to substitutes,
synthetics or alternative sources.
Oil is sometimes thought to be
the only indispensable item; and
certainly some studies show there
would be great difficulty in
holding together cartels for
copper, iron ore, bauxite, tin
and natural rubber. Sources of
chromium, platinum, nickel,
cobalt, gold and industrial
diamonds, however, are fewer,
with the Soviet Union and
southern Africa enjoying
positions of peculiar domin-
ance. If, for example, regimes
sympathetic to Moscow should
come to power in southern Africa,
the Soviet Union would control
90 per cent of the supply of
Bitter American experience in Vietnam
(above and left) contributed to reluctance
to plan for anything other than a short,
north west European conflict with Soviet
Union. Loss of Vietnam opened bases at
Da Nang and Can Ranh Bay as links in
modern Russian navy's considerable
`blue water' capability
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several minerals which underpin
millions of jobs in the northern
hemisphere and for which
no feasible substitutes exist at
present.
Moreover, orthodox analysis of
the economic utility of resource
cartels tends to assume that they
would be aimed at commercial
profit alone, not political
objectives. Such analysis omits
the Leninist incentive. Soviet-
inspired economic warfare would
not have to be profit-orientated in
order to achieve Moscow's goal of
creating financial chaos and mass
unemployment in the West and
Japan. The Soviet state could
tighten the belt of hapless Russian
consumers, take a temporary `loss'
by dumping (or withholding)
cartel produce, and look forward
to an eventual political `profit' in
the form of unrest in the streets of
Tokyo, Paris and New York. There
would also be an ideological
bonus for a Soviet-dominated
super-cartel. Russia's most
aggressive adversary, mainland
China, must also import most of
its chrome, nickel, cobalt and
platinum; thus, a Soviet resource
war mounted against the West
would also be a means whereby
Moscow could delay China's
modernisation and, with it, the
up-grading of Chinese military
forces on Russia's eastern frontier.
The `Saudi Arabia of minerals'
is what is called `High Africa':
Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe,
Namibia and South Africa. This
area, from the Transvaal to Shaba
Province in Zaire, produces most
of the non-communist world's
supply of chromium, cobalt, gold,
platinum, diamonds, vanadium,
uranium and germanium. The
alternative sources of comparable
size for most of these materials lie
chiefly inside the Soviet Union.
A workable Soviet-African cartel
for these items (unlike one for
bauxite and rubber, for example)
is not unthinkable, for it could be
held together by Cuban infantry
and East German security police
under Soviet auspices. It is
argued, of course, that a cartel to
control High Africa's minerals
cannot succeed because
individual African states would
have to trade with the West to
survive. This reasoning fails to
recognize the possibility that a
quasi-Marxist commonwealth in
Africa could be integrated into the
Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (Comecon) and .
exploited by the Warsaw Pact,
in the same way that the Soviet
Union has, in the past, exploited
eastern Europe. The arrangement
would not be efficient in Western
terms nor would it benefit the
African masses, but it might serve
long enough to disrupt world
trade and cripple the West.
The state-trading ministries of
Comecon, after all, have the
bureaucratic know-how to
organise commodity cartels and
economic warfare, while the
KGB and its associated secret
police forces would answer to
complaints from the African
consumer. That Vietnam has
become a de facto member
of Comecon suggests that
geographical distance from
Russia is no obstacle to
Soviet imperialism.
Given its proxy regimes in
Angola and Mocambique, the
Soviet Union is in an excellent
position to interdict the western
and eastern approaches to the
sea-lanes around the Cape of
Good Hope. South Africa's
strategic position alone, quite
apart from its mineral resources,
makes it of vital importance to the
United States and the West. Some
25 000 ships pass the Cape yearly,
about half of which call at South
African ports. These vessels carry
90 per cent of western Europe's
oil, 70 per cent of its strategic
minerals, 20 per cent of United
States oil imports, and 25 per cent
of western Europe's food. And the
extensive South African railway
network currently moves a
large proportion of the mineral
production not only of South
Africa, but also of Zaire, Zambia
and Zimbabwe.
A coalition of democracies,
much more than of dictatorships,
needs a transcendent vision that
can lift diverse nations above
the squabbles over trivial and
parochial interests. Without an
ennobling central mission, the
endless pursuit of pluralism
fragments the general good. At
risk of being thought quixotic or
utopian, therefore, let us offer a
geo-political dream. Moscow's
strategy is now inter-continental.
By contrast, non-communist
target states adhere to parochial
defence concepts. In Asia the
threat to Berlin is ignored; the
ovetl For"ReTeae 0CY770-1/25 .-GIA-FROM MO $"9' -
 Approved For Release 2007/01/25: CIA-RDP83M00914R002700160038-9
invasion of Afghanistan is under-
played in Europe; the conquest
of Angola was overlooked by
Washington. Yet the outward
pressure of the Soviet empire is a
common danger, which can best
be met by concerted response.
To fill the vacuum left by the
demise of the South East Asia
Treaty Organisation (Seato) and
Cento, we must summon to the
southern oceans a new chain of
naval alliances, fitted for an era of
energy crisis and mineral scarcity.
Instead of succumbing to creeping
defeatism, in awe of Moscow's
war machine, we must structure
a consortium armed with the
strengths of the high technologies
of America, Europe and Japan, the
oil reserves of Saudi Arabia, the
mineral resources and strategic
location of Australia and
South Africa, the martial skills
of Turkey, Pakistan and South
Korea, and the naval traditions of
Britain, France, the United States
and Japan.
It is now more than 30 years
since America helped transform
world affairs by initiating the
Marshall Plan and, with it, NATO.
Americans and Europeans alike
can take pride in the fact that few
peacetime efforts can compare
with the magnitude and success
of that enterprise. Together,
they rebuilt a shattered Europe,
they shielded it from Russian
aggression, and they helped lift
Germany from the rubble of
defeat to become a trusted and
prosperous ally. In the ensuing
years of peace, the West not only
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Invasion of Afghanistan (previous page)
has brought Moscow significantly closer
to West's oil lifeline in Persian Gulf,
and stimulated discussion of need for
European intervention force in region.
Fiasco of United States attempts to
rescue hostages in Iran (above)
emphasised lack of Western quick
reaction forces in south west Asia since
collapse of Central Treaty Organisation
renewed itself but also set about other African states would be
economic development in the welcome partners, although one
Third World. In a sense, it has touchstone for membership
been living off the diplomatic would have to be a perception
capital of the Marshall Plan and that Moscow rather than
NATO for three decades. NATO is Washington is the seat of the new
l
still a blue chip alliance that must imperialism. (This hypothetica
reflect
t t
be preserved and sustained as
the fulcrum for efforts towards
stability elsewhere, but it now has
vulnerable flanks. The world has
changed greatly in 30 years.
It is time for a new initiative of
creative statesmanship.
The plan can be summed up in
the term `Tri-Oceanic Alliance'.
(Dr Ray Cline, the executive
director of World Power Studies
at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, George-
town University, prefers `All
Oceans Alliance'.) It is an up-
dated mode of mutual security,
requiring new military alliances,
or less formal `arrangements',
on the part of key states on the
Atlantic, Pacific and Indian
oceans. Eventually, there might be
a consortium of regional `building
block' pacts, a chain of naval
agreements between sea-linked
nations which are threatened
directly by Soviet military power
or by communist subversion and
`wars of national liberation'
backed by Soviet proxies. Ideally,
the Alliance should include such
`core' states as the United States,
Canada and Brazil; Britain,
France, Italy and West Germany;
Saudi Arabia and Turkey; Japan,
Indonesia, the Republic of Korea,
Australia and New Zealand. One
can think of other candidates:
Argentina, Venezuela and
1 Blium
e
o
listing is not mean
adversely on states not named. In
some cases, for example Greece,
Norway and the Netherlands,
one fears that regardless of the
desirability of their membership,
domestic politics would inhibit
their governments from, say, a
military commitment to defend
the Persian Gulf. If the political
climate inside various states in
time made possible the evolution
of a wider geo-political role, the
Tri-Oceanic Alliance should be
ready to enlarge its membership.)
This initiative would repair the
gaps left by the demise of Seato
and Cento. It would likewise
remedy a weakness in NATO's
common defence that was
obvious to Gener:.i Charles de
Gaulle as early as 1958. At that
time the French president
proposed to Mr Eisenhower and
the British prime minister, Harold
Macmillan, that the United States,
Britain and France should
co-ordinate allied action during
crises on a scale far wider than the
geographical limits established by
the NATO treaty. De Gaulle's idea
was rejected, but its logic carries
even more force today, when
pro-Soviet Marxist regimes
in Angola and Mocambique
dominate African shores on both
sides of the oil route round the
Cape of Good Hope.
Mexico, for examp e,
g Z?R_OCEANIC Alliance
Spain and Portugal; Pakistan, the might also be the
Sudan and Morocco; Singapore Aframework within which
for her economic strength; the g could find
Philippines by virtue of historical Israel and Egypt
and naval realities. Indeed, sufficient ptt cou and psycho-
one would hope that Thailand logical security to consummate
and other Association of South their own peace pact. Recognising
East Asian Nations (Asean) states the difficulties, one should also
would eventually want to join the not exclude a formula by which
enterprise. Nigeria, Zaire and the Alliance could serve as shield
 - Approved For Release 2007/01/25: CIA-RDP83M00914R002700160038-9
and incentive to encourage
further progress on racial matters
in South Africa. Perhaps in the
longer term one might even hope
that India and mainland China
might consider associate
membership. Uncertainty as to
the final shape and nature of the
Tri-Oceanic Alliance should not,
however, stand in the way of an
immediate effort to enlist an
`executive group' of perhaps
ten states whose combined
manpower, technology and
geography would enable them
ambits
k Soviet
bl
and welcome African and Latin 0 help redress the unfavourable
American nations as fraternal military balance between
peers. The Alliance could be the NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Tri maritime NATO of the southern help The de-O Rceanic uss as Alliance would
oceans. It would enable non- communist countries to offset Moscow to worry about `three
the undeclared, Soviet-inspired fronts' that are interlinked
`resource war' in the southern o introduce the means-say, its
hemisphere, and to provide a own volunteer legions -
naval shield that would justify to meet Russia's use of
vast capital investment in the Cuban and other proxies in
Third World. In this way, those Third World resource wars
nations would help others as they o rally otherwise dispirited allies
saved themselves. Just as NATO that now feel isolated and adrift,
was the shield behind which at the mercy of Soviet power
Europe was rebuilt with the and drive.
O c Alliance
m
T
.
g
oc
to
The sheer mass of continental Marshall Plan, so the Tri-Oceanic
Russia overhangs the unprotected Alliance could be the shelter for
islands of Japan, the peninsula of the next 50 years of development
western Europe and the sparsely in the under-developed world.
populated oil states of the Persian Part of its mission would be to
Gulf. A dynamic, cohesive Soviet defend members against Soviet
empire faces outwards towards its economic warfare. But its
de
l
ldi
'three fronts'. But those `fronts'
are not united in their response to
the Soviet Union. NATO is under
no obligation to defend the
Persian Gulf. Japan and West
Germany are both allies of the
United States, but they bear no
responsibility for the security of
each other, although both are
threatened by Russia. Nor do
Japan and West Germany earmark
any military forces to defend
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia - on
Russia's southern flank - even
though their economies would
collapse within six weeks of a loss
of oil supplies from south west
Asia. Out of economic necessity,
as well as security, Japan and
West Germany, allies of America,
should also become allied to
each other. In this way, jointly,
stability in the Persian Gulf and
along the African Cape route
should be underpinned.
The Tri-Oceanic Alliance
must not, however, be a form
of Western paternalism. Its
members would frankly
acknowledge the Persian Gulf
states as a major power in the
world, accept Japan and other
Asian states as equal partners,
u
nc
objectives wou
fostering international trade, the
free market economy and capital
flow for development. Members
obviously would be free to trade
anywhere, as are those of NATO;
its purpose would be to
checkmate Soviet imperialism,
not to organise its own politico-
military monopolies.
Such an alliance is perhaps the
only structure big enough to:
o stop dangerous tremors from the
political earthquake in Iran
spreading to Saudi Arabia and
other oil-rich but precarious
governments in the Persian Gulf
o provide a 'framework of
assurance' solid enough to
enable Israel to make a lasting
peace with Egypt and eventu-
ally reach a compromise with
moderates in the Arab world
o bind Japan as securely to
Australia, the United States
and Asean as Europe binds
West Germany inside NATO
(for as Japan rearms, it must not
conclude - on the premise of a
weary America in retreat-
that its best course is to play off
Russia, China and America
against each other)
ri- cea
The
would confront Soviet power,
spreading from its heartland
towards targets at the rim, with a
global grouping of military allies,
not random regional groupings
with no mutual defence obliga
tion. In short, it could prove
the long-term dream to revive
collective courage to attack
short-term problems: safe-
guarding American missile
silos, perfecting cruise missiles
for NATO allies, deploying the
enhanced radiation weapon (the
`neutron bomb'), perhaps rescuing
from the shelf a derivative of the,
B-1 bomber, the development of
which was cancelled by the Carter
administration; all actions that
otherwise might seem hopeless
in the shadow of the Russian
war machine.
It must be recognised, also, that
the threat to Third World stability
and to NATO's economic flank
does not stem only from Soviet
warships and Cuban infantry.
It arises in part from massive
clandestine operations carried
out by the KGB. Propaganda,
psychological warfare, subversion
and support for guerrilla conflict
together constitute a major
offensive system for the Soviet
Union. The subversive `software'
helps prepare the ideological
climate for low-risk projection of
Soviet mercenaries into the belly
of a target nation. The United
 r_- _i_-zo,)nn7/nh I25 - C.IA-RDP83M00914R002700160038-9
United States Navy (amphibious units on
manoeuvres, above and right) would be
crucial to projected Tri-Oceanic Alliance
fleet. Japanese, Australian, Canadian
and New Zealand warships have joined
Americans on Pacific exercises,
extending principle of Western collective
security beyond boundaries of NATO
States needs to revitalise the CIA
and, with its allies, re-enter the
arena of trans-national politics.
Many forms of so-called `covert
operations' are non-violent, as
routine - and benign - as the
provision of funds to politicians,
labour leaders and editors who
oppose communist takeovers in
their own countries. It is a curious
form of morality indeed that
forbids the West to assist non-
Marxists of the Third World in
their political battles to maintain
genuine independence from
the myrmidons of the Russian
empire. Happily, the mood in
the United States Congress and
among national security and
intelligence chiefs in the Reagan
administration now favours
more resolute action against
Soviet underground warfare.
The concept of a Tri-Oceanic
Alliance must still be viewed as a
dream at the edge of the horizon.
But there is, fortunately, modest
but growing support for the idea
that collective security must be
extended beyond the current
boundaries of NATO. General de
Gaulle argued the case in 1958;
today, West German Foreign
Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher
speaks of Europe's energy flanks
and the importance of sea power
to protect them. The chaos in
Iran, the Soviet presence in
Afghanistan and the Iraq-Iran war
at least have stimulated talk of the
need for a European intervention
force in the Gulf. Early last year in
the Pacific, Japan for the first. time
ventured into multi-national war
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 Approved For Release- 2007/01125: CIA-RDP83M00914R002700160038-9
games, joining the United States,
Canada, Australia and New
Zealand in a naval exercise. The
Asean states are starting to
discuss military matters; and
other Asian powers are floating
the idea of a Pacific basin defence
arrangement. An American would
also be remiss in failing to note
with approval the presence of a
significant French fleet in the
Indian Ocean and the success of
the French Rapid Deployment
Force in contributing to the
stability of Zaire, Tunisia and
Saudi Arabia.
If no one imagines that non-
communist governments are yet
ready to support a vast new
alliance, why bother to draft
blueprints for a grand design so
difficult to implement? Because
man lives by political hope, as
well as invulnerable ballistic
missiles. Even to talk about the
Tri-Oceanic Alliance is to offset
defeatism. Instead of focusing on
Russian strength and the decline
of Western morale, why not
remind the faint-hearted that
the Tri-Oceanic Alliance would
compound awesome advantages
for our side? It would confer on
the non-communist world at least
a four-to-one advantage over the
Soviet bloc in gross national
product; up to 90 per cent of the
world's scientific, engineering
and management know-how,
to the extent that this can be
quantified; 60 per cent of the
globe's oil reserves; 85 per cent of
its food exports; and a three-to-
one superiority in naval power.
Many will say that a Tri-
Oceanic Alliance is either an
impossible dream or, given the
heavy- and rising- costs of
modern navies, the road to
economic ruin. One can only
reply that in 1949 it vas equally
quixotic to imagine that a
common market of extraordin-
arily prosperous nations could
rise from the ashes of World
War II in Europe. As to cost, it is
true that America at first bore the
brunt of launching NATO and the
Marshall Plan; but a Tri-Oceanic
Alliance in today's world has
many potential partners of
affluence and immense technical
skills. The Alliance maybe only
a dream, but it is one sufficiently
enticing to shift attention from
Soviet successes towards
the combined strengths of the
non-communist nations. It recalls
the wisdom of Sir Winston
Churchill's observation that to
bring forth a new alliance may
weigh more in the balance of
history than to win a battle by
oneself. It is inherently absurd
that the high technology societies
of the West and Japan should
yield military superiority to
Russia. Worse, it would be a
moral outrage if civilisations
based on freedom and the rule of
law should abdicate the future
to the architects of the Gulag
Archipelago. If a Tri-Oceanic
Alliance can mobilise enough
idealism and spirit to exercise
the constructive options that lie
between nuclear war and one-
sided detente, the weaknesses in
the Soviet system will compound
themselves. Marxism inside the
Soviet Union has long since lost
its elan. Only our own lack of
imagination and high purpose
would permit the Politburo to
gain further success*for the
shabby tyranny that it represents
- one now manifest to many in
the Third World as well as to the
industrialised nations of
the earth.