CLASSIFYING SCIENCE: A GOVERNMENT PROPOSAL . . .

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CIA-RDP83M00914R002700130005-8
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RIFPUB
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K
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3
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December 20, 2016
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February 22, 2007
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5
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Publication Date: 
February 8, 1982
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Approved For Release 2007/03/02 : CIA-RDP83M00914R002700130005-8 ry 1D q .v~j: 2~d AR J. v AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY Oil PAGy LQ__ .. 8 February 1982 ! ssIfy Science A Government Pro osal.. . Adm. Bobby R. Inman, USN, Deputy Director .. There is an overlap between technical information and national security, which inevitably produces tension. This tension results from the scientist's desire for uncon- strained research and publication, on the one hand, and the federal government's need to protect certain information from potential foreign adversaries who might use that information against this nation. Both are powerful forces, -thus it should not be a surprise that finding a workable and just balance between them is quite difficult. But finding this balance is essential, for we must simultaneously protect the nation and protect the-individual rights of scientists-both as academicians and citizens. This tension is accentuated when scientists are employed by the federal government directly, or work for the govern- ment indirectly in their own offices with federal research funds.* Some of this work is done on subjects that directly affect the nation's security--e.g., its defense, diplomacy and intelligence efforts. There .are eases where interplay has occurred between science and the national-security interests, One of the most obvious, of course, is the Manhattan Project of World War 2 in which the first nuclear. weapons were created and tested. Another is the development of "national technical means" to monitor foreign compliance with international arms control accords. Science and national security have a symbiotic relation- ship-each benefitting from the interests, concerns and -contributions of the other. In light of the long history of that relationship, the suggestion is hollow that science might (or should somehow) be kept apart from national security concerns, or that national security concerns should not have an impact on "scientific freedom." The need in today's world for protection of some informa- tion, for secrecy is clear-I believe-to any fair observer. Protection of the information necessary to safeguard our society, and to conduct our international affairs, must occur. Within the federal government, there is a system established by Executive Order to assess the' expected damage, should certain information come into the hands of foreign enemies, and-based on that assessment-to control access to that information so as to prevent any such exposure. This exposure potentially could occur through public release of the data, or from the successful clandestine activities of the agents of foreign intelligence services. And we should make no mistake, foreign intelligence services-among other entities of foreign governments-are collecting all types of information in the U. S. Specific data on technical subjects are high on the wanted list of every major foreign intelligence service and for good reason. The U. S. is a leader in many-if not most-technical areas,.and technical data can enhance a nation's interna- tional strength. In terms of harm to the national interest, it makes little difference whether the data are copied from technical journals in a library or given away by a member of our society to an agent of a foreign power. A different source of tension arises when scientists, completely separate from the federal government, conduct research in areas where the federal government has an obvious and preeminent role for society as a whole. One example is the design of advanced weapons, especially nuclear ones. Another is cryptography. While nuclear wean- ons and cryptography are heavily dependent on theoretical mathematics, there is no public business market for nuclear weapons. Such a market, however, does exist for crypto- graphic concepts and gear to protect certain types of business communications. - Research into cryptography is an area of special, long-' I concern to me. When I was director of the National Security Agency, I started a dialogue to find a common ground regarding cryptography between scientific freedom and national security. Considerable effort has gone into that dialogue, by both scientists and public servants, and I think the results so far have been reasonable and fair. Cryptologic research in the business and academic arenas, no matter how useful, remains redundant to the necessary efforts of the federal government to protect its own commu- nications. I still am concerned that indiscriminate publica- tion of the results of that research will come to the attention of foreign governments and entities and, thereby, could cause irreversible and unnecessary harm to U. S. national security.interests. There are, in addition, other fields where publication of certain technical information could affect the national security in a harmful way. Examples include computer hardware and software, other electronic gear and tech- niques, lasers, crop projections and manufacturing proce- dures. I think it should also be pointed out that scientists' blanket claims of scientific freedom are somewhat disingen- _ uous .in light of the arrangements that academicians rou- tinely make with private, corporate sources of funding. For example, academicians do not seem to have any serious .difficulty with restrictions on publications that arise from a, corporate concern- for trade' secret protection.' The strong. negative reaction from some scientists; over the issue of protecting certain technical information for national securi- ty reasons, seems to be based largely on the?fact that the federal government, rather than a corporation, is the source of the restriction. Yet this would presume that the corpo- rate` commercial interests somehow rise to a higher level than do national security concerns. I could not disagree ?more strongly. - Scientists and engineers have served our society spectacu- larly in peace and war. Key features of science-unfettered research, and the publication of the results for.validation by others and for use by all mankind-are essential to the a growth and development of science. Both our national security and our economic development rely heavily on these features: Restrictions on science and technology should only be considered for the most serious of reasons. But nowhere in the scientific ethos is there any require- that restrictions cannot or should not, when necessary, i ment be placed on science. Scientists do not immunize themselves from social responsibility simply because they are engaged in a scientific pursuit. Society has recognized over time that certain kinds of scientific inquiry can endanger society as a whole and has applied either directly, or through scien- tific/ethical constraints, restrictions on the kind and amount of research that can be done in those areas. Approved For Release 2007/03/02 : CIA-RDP83M00914R002700130005-8 Approved For Release 2007/03/02 : CIA-RDP83M00914R002700130005-8 One sometimes hears the view that publication should not be restrained because "the government has not made its case;' almost always referring to the absence of specific detail for public consumption. This reasoning is circular and unreasonable. It stems from a basic attitude that the government and its public servants cannot be trusted. Specific details about why information must be protected are more often than not even more sensitive than the basic technical information itself. Publishing examples, reasons and associated details would certainly damage the nation's interests. Public review and discussion of classified informa- tion which supports decisions is not feasible or workable. In contrast, it is a fact that in today's world congressional reviews of sensitive Executive Branch decisions are feasible and workable. The. existence and the processes of?such reviews are intentional. I do not think it is harmful to recognize that the federal government-particularly its intelligence agencies-have in fact made mistakes in the past on occasion, and suspicion of the actions of the federal government in this regard is understandable if not always' supportable. The dominant fact of this new decade is that there now exists in the Congress a forum where assertions by the government of secrecy needs can and have been challenged and examined in a properly secure environment. I recognize that there is concern in some circles that the suspension of publication of some information, for national security reasons, means that such information will never be published. The fact ? is,? however, that national security concerns to protect. information will not-and do not--last forever. The federal government's structure and procedures, though conservative and imperfect, do work. Sensitive infor- mation does get released in due course. . . The Executive Order I mentioned earlier, which.requires protection of information through classification, also --requires the eventual declassification of that same informa- tion. For example, voluminous classified data from World War 2 have been declassified and released-including intel- ligence materials that had extraordinary sensitivity when they . were acquired. Much of the stimulating effort for computer science in this country came from government- sponsored and controlled classified activity. There is in our society a legitimate'need.and desire which I accept that history, whether political or scientific, will be served eventually-even if national security requires that public -disclosure, and personal recognition, have; to be postponed. Rather than a confrontation between national security and science, I believe that a wiser course is possible and that our joint search for that course ought to beone of our goals. A potential balance between national security and science may lie' in an agreement to include- in the peer review process (prior to the start of research and prior to publica- tion) the question of potential harm to the nation. The details of such a systerd would . have to be resolved,. of course, but cooperation. will be..better.for all of us. than confrontation. Included in such a' system should be goals to simulta- neously preclude harm to. U. S. national. security and to . impose no unreasonable restrictions on scientific research, publication or the use of the results. And when 'restrictions are judged necessary, speedy procedures for appeals, review and appropriate compensation should be included. - One example of this type of process is that recommended in the Public Cryptography Study Group. It-is not easy to- create workable and just solutions that will simultaneously satisfy the wide-ranging *needs of national security' and science,.but I believe it is necessary before significant harm does occur which could well prompt the federal government to overreact. ' Il : . And a Scientist's Objection William D. Carey, Executive Officer . American Assn. for the Advancement of Science Adm. Bobby Inman, whose public service credentials are second, to 'none, has tossed a hot potato at the American scientific community and by doing so has opened a breach between scientists and the national security establishment that will be difficult to repair. . He has asked that research scientists submit voluntarily to open-ended censorship by the CIA or face the likelihood of being forced to do so by Congress. Even in wartime such a demand would be an extreme one, and in the absence of a national security emergency it is incongruous. It raises troubling questions involving both scientific freedom and the force of constitutional protections" against arbitrary government. -., Adm. Inman's job as deputy "director of the Central Intelligence Agency is to conduct intelligence and counter- intelligence activities within the bounds of statutory and constitutional lava. CIA's adversaries presumably are the Soviets, their mercenaries and assorted terrorist groups out to create trouble. . To be sure, it is within the agency's brief to worry about unfriendly penetration and shoplifting of scientific' and technological assets. On the other side of, the. street. the KGB is no less anxious to conceal Soviet progress. In both ? situations, the incentives run to overprotection and hyper- anxiety. - Unrestricted censorship is a draconian measure that can be justified legally and morally only in extremity. It is the first refuge of frightened or authoritarian regimes, of which. the Soviet and current Polish ruling powers furnish ready examples. It is an explicit interdiction of civil and human rights, and in a constitutional society its acceptability is challengeable 'in the absence of a clear and present dan- ger. -The contrast between the Soviet and American environ- ments for scientific research is sharp and unmistakable. Scientific. work in the USSR operates within a strict reward-and-punishment system administered by agencies of the state. American scientists, while shuddering at the constraints imposed on their Soviet counterparts, neverthe- less acknowledge That the quality of Soviet science in some instances is high. But it is evident that the controls and oversight that are applied in the Soviet Union discourage the creativity and spontaneity that produce great science, hence the notable. absence of Soviet scientists when Nobel honors are Landed out. Censorship, secrecy and the heavy presence of the police state all contribute to limiting Soviet science to something less than world class productivity. It comes as no surprise that Soviet science is imitative and predatory, nor that it must play continually at follower- ship. If the Soviets were less passionately interested in what we are doing it would be time to start worrying about the quality of our own research. If the objective were to reduce American scientific research to parity with the Soviet variety, censorship would be a fine prescription. But an anxiety neurosis accompanied by secrecy and censorship will not assure U.S. superiority in science or in technology. Approved For Release 2007/03/02 : CIA-RDP83M00914R002700130005-8 M best, secrecy retards the e a w ich knowledge spreads. It does not' E rRvP p= . & r 102 scientists are very good because security agencies do not tail them or blue-pencil their scientific papers and journals. They are good, too, because the First Amendment assures them of the right to publish and exchange ideas in the open literature and in symposia. American science is good because it can be challenged universally, tested and verified or shown to be mistaken. Finally, it is good because it thrives on competition that is at times ferocious, and it is the competition that produces winners. Adm. Inman plainly wants American science to show its heels to our adversaries. At the same time, according to press accounts, he proposes that U. S. scientists submit their work "prior to the start of research and prior to publica- to intelligence agencies that can censor research they tion" consider potentially relevant to national security. As stated, without limit or qualification, this could cover the whole spectrum of the scientific disciplines and all scientists in both academia and industry. Censorship on this scale has no precedent in peacetime, and it conjures the ultimate nightmare of thousands of scientists, outstanding and mediocre, queuing before a court of summary justice whose competence to understand and assess science is unimpressive. The likelihood is that the CIA's functionaries would search proposals ?for'key words and, finding them, would issue a secrecy order on that basis alone. The smothering effects on both academic and industrial science are only too evident, and it is difficult to see how our own national security interests would be well served. Imposing secrecy or censorship discipline on scientific research, if it must be done at all, .should be a last-resort decision and limited strictly to open-and-shut categories of research. Such an exception has been with us for 35 years in the case of weapons-related basic fission and fusion Tesearch. which is, treated under the Atomic Energy Act as "born classified." While it has not stopped other countries, friendly and unfriendly, from discovering how to make nuclear weapons, it has served our own security purposes reasonably well. "If there is a case for defining cryptology research as a new candidate for the "born classified" treatment, the case should be presented and argued before Congress on its merits. But it is not reasonable to attempt to throw a vast security net over the spectrum of basic and applied research in an undiscriminating effort to embargo the circulation of Something is very wrong in the CIA's comprehension of { how science progresses. It is seldom a point-to-point process, and rarely predictable. In a very true sense science is a I search and discovery process. Luck and inspiration, helped along by fortuitous accident and surprise, count for almost as much as the rigor of the scientific method. Besides, knowledge breeds promiscuously. It is the clue of one scientist, caroming off the thinking and clues of another, that fashions a new piece to fit into the puzzle of informa- tion. Without this open circulation' of thought, without this ?colliding of ideas and what-ifs, science would spin its wheels. A subordinate but not insignificant worry raised by the CIA's proposal is the possibility that once the agency is given the information it seeks, that. information may be handed off to unknown parties without the knowledge or consent of the scientists or their industrial employers, thus compromising both their professional and economic rights. After all, if the information is deemed to be of national security value, logic dictates that it belongs in the national Scientists will not deny that 'our .published scientific C1Pforce of the research enterprise, can be a prize vehicle for reinforcing Soviet science. But it does not follow that all our sensitive breakthroughs are advertised zealously. American scientists who work at the leading edges of theoretical or applied mathematics, physics or microbiology are certainly bright enough to know when their ideas touch upon national security interests, and they are better equipped than CIA functionaries to make those judgments. - No responsible scientist needs to lean on a security agent to know when to keep his mouth shut, and this is especially true of applied researchers in the high-technology industries which trouble Adm. Inman the most. . ' ' The question is how one perceives the degree of security risk that goes with publishing or reporting unclassified research. To judge by Adm. Inman's remarks, the CIA considers the risk to be high. The scientific community disagrees strongly, believing that the greater risk is the ultimate high cost to national security and scientific growth of suppressing the circulation of knowledge. - Scientists hold fast to belief in the superiority of "security' by achievement" over "security by concealment" in any contest with our adversaries. They will not easily accept the I shame of prostrating their minds and their work at the doors of the intelligence community. - Whatever maybe the case for front-door classification of certain areas of research, and for denying- enying our adversaries 'access to high technology that has reached the stage of final design, the rationales do not extend to censoring scientific research at its points of origin. To-impose such censorship is to Jay a crushing burden.on science and to import into our' practices the discredited methods of our adversary. 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