PROSPECTS FOR MOROCCO

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Director of Secret
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Prospects for Morocco
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
2
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PROSPECTS FOR MOROCCO
Information available as of 11 May 1982 was
used in the preparation of this Memorandum.
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SCOPE NOTE
This Memorandum attempts to assess those conditions and events
in Morocco that could affect the stability of the regime and the future
of US-Moroccan relations. Although the paper is limited to a one-year
outlook, it notes the existence of problems or possible developments
that, while posing little threat to the regime during that 12-month
period, could hold greater risks in the future.
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ............................................................................................................ iii
Social, Economic, and Political Pressures ................................................... 9
Social Pressures ..................................................................................... 9
Economic Problems .............................................................................. 9
Prospects for Recovery ......................................................................... 10
Potential Political Challenges .............................................................. 11
Political Outlook ................................................................................... 12
The Saharan War .......................................................................................... 13
The Polisario ......................................................................................... 13
Status of the War .................................................................................. 13
Political Implications ............................................................................ 15
External Relations ......................................................................................... 16
The United States ................................................................................. 16
The Soviet Union .................................................................................. 16
Regional ................................................................................................. 17
Western Europe .................................................................................... 17
Implications for US Policy ........................................................................... 19
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KEY JUDGMENTS
In the coming year, King Hassan II is likely to maintain firm
control of Morocco's political system. Hassan probably will continue to
use his proven techniques of divide-and-rule, manipulation, and co-
option of political parties to regulate the activities of the opposition. His
domestic security apparatus will keep a close eye on dissident activity
and we expect the armed forces will remain loyal. The military and se-
curity service will obey orders to suppress sporadic civil disturbances.
Neither Morocco's established political parties and labor unions, which
prefer to operate within the system, nor fringe opposition groups pose a
serious threat to the monarchy in the short run.
Over the next several years, however, Morocco will face a number
of extremely difficult socioeconomic and political problems as well as
the seemingly interminable conflict in Western Sahara that cumulative-
ly could pose a serious threat to domestic stability and King Hassan's
survival. Many of these problems-rapidly growing population, rising
expectations, inflation, and international debt-are common to most
developing states. Although Morocco's economy has considerable poten-
tial for growth, for the next several years it faces the prospect of-at
best-slow growth, austerity, and a declining standard of living.
Over the long term, the strains and pressures in Moroccan society
portend serious difficulty for the King, the monarchy as an institution,
and Morocco's political system, which is heavily based on patronage.
We question whether this system and Morocco's limited resources will
enable Rabat to cope with its serious problems. If, as seems probable,
the present system fails to satisfy rising popular aspirations, societal
pressures probably will generate demands for major political change.
It is impossible to predict how severe the pressures must be before
serious instability develops. The situation is not irretrievable, but Hassan
will have to demonstrate astute managerial skills to deal with existing
economic and social problems.
Note: This Interagency Intelligence Memorandum is issued by the Chairman, National Intelligence
Council. It was produced under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South
Asia.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation and coordination of the
Memorandum: the Central Intelligence Agency; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Security
Agency; the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Department of the Treasury;
and the intelligence components of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.
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In international affairs, Western Sahara will remain the primary
focus of Moroccan attention. The threats Morocco perceives from
Algeria, Libya, and the Soviet Union also will absorb Moroccan
attention. In pursuit of Moroccan interests, King Hassan will continue to
adopt foreign policies that often parallel or coincide with US interests.
Neither a military nor a political solution to the Western Sahara
quagmire is in the offing. The economic burden of the war will remain
bearable for Morocco so long as Saudi Arabia continues to provide
financial assistance to cover the bulk of the war's costs. The Moroccan
armed forces should be able to resist Polisario attacks but will not be
able to defeat the guerrilla forces so long as they have sanctuary in Alge-
ria and external sources of military assistance. For their part, the
Polisario will not be able to take control of the Sahara by military
means. Barring greater flexibility by all parties and in the absence of
minimal mutual confidence, the wide divergence of views leaves little
hope for a negotiated settlement. None of the parties would support a
referendum that did not appear to ensure an outcome favorable to its
interests.
Parallel interests have contributed to a recent effort by both the
United States and Morocco to intensify their close relations. The
accelerated pace of cooperation, however, risks serious regional and
bilateral misunderstandings. In the short run, and especially among
elements of the Moroccan military, the prospect of augmented US help
could lead to unrealistic expectations regarding the extent of US support
and strengthen the conviction that military victory in the Sahara is
attainable. Interest in a negotiated settlement consequently could be set
back. Regionally, Portugal and Spain might misperceive US intentions
and assume lessened US interest in established bases in Iberia.
In the longer run, unmet expectations could produce a reaction in
Morocco dangerous both to US interests and to those of the King. An im-
pression that the United States had made promises to Morocco it could
not keep, or that the King had proved inept in his dealings with the
United States, might harm close US-Moroccan relations and undermine
military and popular confidence in Hassan.
A close US-Moroccan relationship-especially one involving in-
creased military aid and the granting of air transit facilities-will
complicate efforts to improve US-Algerian relations. Algerian leaders
consider US military aid to Morocco evidence that the United States
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supports a Moroccan military solution to the Western Sahara dispute.
They also are concerned that US-provided equipment may ultimately
be used against Algeria. Although Algeria's leaders are more interested
than in the past in reaching an accommodation with Morocco, they will
not abandon the Polisario and will continue to view the developing US-
Moroccan relationship with suspicion.
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DISCUSSION
1. Traditional US interests in and relations with
Morocco are in large measure a product of that
country's geostrategic position. The kingdom's recently
expressed intention to provide support facilities for US
military contingency operations in Southwest Asia has
heightened US interest. Its relationships with other
regional actors have allowed it to play a useful moder-
ating role in Third World forums often dominated by
radicals. US relations with Morocco also are colored by
old and strong ties of friendship and sentiment.
from the West, and also affords US naval craft,
access to ports on
both the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. In the event
of conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, a
friendly Morocco could constitute a reserve area in
close proximity to Europe and accessible to the Atlan-
tic. In hostile hands, Morocco would pose a serious
threat to NATO's southwestern flank and particularly
to Spain, NATO's anticipated 16th member.
3. In the past, Rabat has permitted the stationing of
US forces and communications facilities in Morocco.
The last of these facilities was relinquished in 1978.
4. Morocco has well-established relations with
North African, Middle Eastern, and Sub-Saharan na-
tions that are important to the United States. In
pursuit of Moroccan interests, the King has long
followed policies in these areas that parallel US objec-
tives while opposing Soviet aims and those of regional
radical states hostile to the United States.
5. In addition to maintaining a friendly, stable
Morocco, the United States has an important interest
in good relations with the other Maghreb states and
harmony in the area. Both sets of interests would be
best served by an early settlement of the war in
Western Sahara and improved relations between Mor-
occo and Algeria. A too visible US relationship with
Morocco may jeopardize these objectives, isolate Mor-
occo in the region, and undermine US efforts to
improve relations with Algeria.
6. Domestic and intra-Arab considerations normally
dictate Moroccan policies that are close to the Arab
consensus, but Hassan has used what influence he has
to play a moderating role within the Arab world. He
has indicated his willingness to support a comprehen-
sive Arab-Israeli settlement and initially supported
and facilitated the Camp David process. Morocco is
likely to remain both supportive of and useful to US
efforts to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. The King's
moderate position and his ability to negotiate with
most parties are important assets for the United States.
7. In Sub-Saharan Africa, Hassan has generally
supported the status quo and peaceful change. He has
frequently provided strong diplomatic and, on occa-
sion, military support for Western objectives in Africa.
In 1977 and 1978 he provided troops to help defend
Zaire and in 1979 supported the new pro-Western
regime in Equatorial Guinea.
8. Finally, Morocco controls important economic
assets that in the future will become increasingly
important to the West. These consist of 70 to 75
percent of the world's proven phosphate reserves-less
than 10 percent of which is in the Sahara-and large
reserves of oil shale.
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Social, Economic, and Political Pressures
26. Moroccan society and the existing political
structure are being subjected to serious strains caused
by fundamental socioeconomic problems. Over the
past several years, economic difficulties have increased
social inequalities between the elite and working class.
As a result, the likelihood increases that civil disorders,
such as those in Casablanca last June over reduced
food subsidies, will recur. The government is able and
willing to suppress both spontaneous localized out-
breaks of civil unrest and organized dissident activity,
but it has done little to alleviate the underlying causes
of popular discontent. Although these pressures appear
manageable over the next year, the gap between
popular expectations and the limited resources avail-
able to meet them will widen with each passing year,
increasing the likelihood of popular unrest and a rising
level of dissident activity.
Social Pressures
27. Demographic change is a crucial factor retard-
ing Morocco's socioeconomic development. Morocco
has a burgeoning population of nearly 22 million,
more than half of which is under 20 years old. A
steady decline in the mortality rate over the last 30
years, with no change in the birth rate, has yielded a
population growth rate of nearly 3 percent a year and
has produced severe strains in such areas as health,
education, employment, food, public services, and
housing. If these mortality and birth rates persist,
Morocco's population in the year 2000 could reach 38
million.
28. Migration from rural to urban areas has in-
creased, particularly as a result of severe drought
conditions and the regime's failure to substantially
improve living conditions in the countryside. Already
overcrowded cities like Rabat and Casablanca have
been unable to provide the additional services necessi-
tated by the rural to urban migration and rising
expectations of the population, who look to the cities
for better opportunities.
29. Social and economic development as well as a
growing literacy rate (20 to 25 percent) is creating rising
expectations among elite and political groups that the
traditional patronage-based political system cannot sa-
tisfy. These groups are interested in career professions,
the opportunity to use their training, and decisionmak-
ing authority. Economic growth is insufficient to absorb
the growing surplus of educated and semieducated
youth who seek better jobs, and the political structure is
capable of assimilating only a limited number of new
individuals into the government.
30. The economy has not rebounded from the
slowdown brought about by the three-year (1978-80)
austerity plan and changing international and internal
economic conditions. Mounting economic and finan-
cial imbalances stemming from overly ambitious go-
vernment spending during the 1973-77 development
plan and the collapse of the phosphate market in 1976
forced Rabat to shift gears and adopt a less ambitious
three-year plan in 1978. While austerity measures
helped reduce the nation's trade and budget deficits,
they hit the modern sector of the economy especially
hard. Slow economic growth has produced spiraling
unemployment, which may now exceed 30 percent in
major urban areas. Wage increases have failed to keep
pace with inflation, which topped 17 percent last year.
31. Following on the heels of several dry years, the
drought that struck Morocco in 1981 is a major cause
of the nation's current economic plight. With the
livelihood of over one-half of the population depend-
ent on agriculture, the drought's impact has been
widespread. The rural exodus increased dramatically.
Financing the import of 3 million tons of grain-
almost double the 1980 level-severely taxed Rabat's
national budget and foreign payments position and
consumed the lion's share of available IMF funding
last year.
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32. Late rains and low soil moisture delayed the
planting of the 1982 grain crop, and erratic spring
rains virtually ensure the continued need for heavier-
than-normal grain imports. While the drought has
subsided, as much as 25 percent of the grain crop may
have been lost, placing an additional burden on the
economy; foreign exchange is scarce, farm grain re-
serves have been depleted, and livestock herds have
already been reduced.
33. Heavy defense expenditures and a large foreign
debt burden continue to contribute to the economic
malaise. Defense-related expenditures account for an
estimated 40 percent of the 1982 national operating
budget compared with 34 percent last year. While the
cost of the Saharan conflict is largely defrayed by
34. Escalating service costs on the nation's foreign
debt are likely to reach 30 percent of earnings from
exports of goods and services and worker remittances
in 1982, raising the prospect that some form of debt
rescheduling may be required in the next several
years. These conditions also restrict Rabat's ability to
accommodate additional foreign debt except at
concessional rates, which in turn limits prospects for
completing many aspects of the 1981-85 Five-Year
Development Plan.
35. Morocco's foreign payments position has dete-
riorated sharply in the wake of drought-induced grain
imports and the substantial depreciation of the dirham
against the dollar-over 26 percent in the last 15
months. The current account balance slipped to a $1.9
billion deficit last year, reversing the trend toward
improvement achieved under the austerity plan. Mor-
occo is dependent on crude oil imports for 80 percent
of its energy needs, and petroleum price increases
pushed up the nation's fuel bill by 27 percent last year.
36. The economic slowdown in developed countries
has had an adverse impact on the domestic phosphate
industry, the nation's largest foreign exchange earner.
While Morocco enjoys a significant competitive ad-
vantage over other producers, soft market conditions
forced Rabat to trim its phosphate rock price by 10
percent to $44 per ton last year. Continuing soft
market conditions and growing competitive pressures
from hard-hit US producers may force rock prices to
$40 per ton by the end of the year. As a result, foreign
exchange earnings from rock exports could decline by
20 percent. Despite these setbacks, plans are progress-
ing to expand domestic production capacity with a
goal of converting 30 percent of phosphate rock
annually into refined products by 1985.
37. US phosphate producers have objected to the
Eximbank's activity in Morocco and to the US Govern-
ment's support of World Bank loans to Morocco's
phosphate industry. The world phosphate market is
currently oversupplied. Demand dropped sharply in
the second half of 1981 and is expected to continue to
drop through 1982. The slack market has caused
significant layoffs in the US phosphate industry and is
beginning to cut into Morocco's export earnings.
Prospects for Recovery
38. The severe impact of the recent drought means
that a rebound of the economy depends on a return of
favorable weather. Even then it will take several years
to restore the agriculture sector to its predrought
position. During this period, heavy grain imports will
be required to allow farmers to rebuild depleted grain
stores and livestock herds. These conditions reduce the
chances of significant improvement in the balance-of-
payments position before 1985.
39. Food subsidies probably will continue at least at
present levels during 1982. Spending on social programs
will come at the expense of development projects if the
government wishes to continue to work toward reduc-
ing deficits and inflation. Improvement in the agricul-
ture sector, however, would slow the rural exodus.
Funds and weather permitting, government plans to
bring modern technology to bear on the agricultural
sector could produce results by mid-decade.
40. Financial constraints will remain acute for se-
veral years. This fact, along with requirements im-
posed under Morocco's one-year IMF standby loan,
precludes the acceptance of significant amounts of
new debt, except at concessionary rates. This agree-
ment will supply over $595 million in balance-of-
payments support during 1982. Concessional financing
from other sources this year probably will be adequate
to cover the remaining financial demand in 1982, but
the situation is less certain beyond this year.
41. Assistance from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf
states probably will remain near present levels,
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owing to the close relationship among these monar-
chies and despite lower oil revenues in these countries.
The new investment code that is before the Chamber
of Representatives will allow 100-percent foreign own-
ership of Moroccan-based enterprises and may stimu-
late greater foreign direct investment.
42. Although the economy has considerable poten-
tial for growth over the long term, the next several
years will require the King to exercise the skill of an
astute manager to deal with continuing financial and
social problems. The constraints on additional debt
and a need to control budget deficits and inflation
preclude significant expansionary investment and the
launching of many aspects of the country's ambitious
development plan. While the phosphate market is
likely to tighten as the world economy rebounds, it
will be several years before Morocco reaps the benefits
from its heavy capital investment in the domestic
phosphate industry. Over the next two years, real
economic growth will probably fall below the 3-
percent average achieved during the austerity plan
and, because of population growth, the standard of
living will decline. Growth should rebound after this
period if financial burdens ease and the impact of the
drought subsides. Together with phosphates, Morocco's
oil shale and fishery resources provide potential for
growth in the late 1980s.
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59. Over seven years have lapsed since the Polisario
Front 2 began its guerrilla campaign to wrest control of
Western Sahara from Moroccan forces. Both political-
ly and militarily the movement, with extensive foreign
assistance, has proved effective in pursuing its goal of
an independent Saharan state.
60. Originally most of the Saharan independence
movements were to a great extent externally inspired,
and the sudden prominence of the Polisario was
largely the result of Algerian support. In view of the
nomadic character of the population, it was and still is
difficult to determine who are and who are not native
to the Sahara. Insensitivity to the local populace in the
early days of Morocco's occupation, and Algerian
support of the protracted war, have undoubtedly
forged the Polisario into a more cohesive, nationalist
force.
61. The Saharan Democratic Arab Republic
(SDAR)-the Polisario government-in-exile-is now
3 Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el Hamra y Rio de
Oro.
recognized by 26 African countries and over 40 na-
tions worldwide. Much of the SDAR's diplomatic
support comes from leftist and radical regimes such as
Cuba and Iran. The Arab world itself is divided in its
loyalties, with Saudi Arabia and Iraq providing finan-
cial assistance to bolster the monarchy while Libya
and Algeria have extended political, financial, and
military support to the SDAR.
62. The movement's leadership is Arab nationalist
in orientation, but is divided into a pro-Algerian
group, a pro-Libyan faction, and a smaller element of
hardline Marxists-although the strength and influ-
ence of various groups are unknown. Political ideology
appears currently to play a subordinate role, with
nationalism and independence for Western Sahara the
movement's foremost considerations. The SDAR's
1976 constitution declared the realization of Arab
socialism and the implementation of social justice as its
political objectives.
63. The military wing of the Polisario Front-also
called the Peoples Liberation Army (ALPS)-initially
included most of the 2,500 Saharans, largely from the
Reguibat tribe, who served with Spanish troops during
the colonial period. These Saharans shifted their alle-
giance to the Polisario after Spain disbanded its territo-
rial force and Morocco refused to retain their services.
Recruitment has brought the Polisario strength to the
current estimated level of 8,000 to 10,000 combatants
and support personnel, some of whom are not natives
of Western Sahara. Algeria, which acts as the primary
conduit for arms, also provides training and sanctuary
for the guerrillas. Tripoli is also the source of unknown
quantities of equipment, trains some insurgents in
Libya, and may have supplied as much as 80 percent
of the movement's financial assistance. Despite Moroc-
can claims of foreign combat involvement, there has
been no confirmation of such participation since Mo-
roccan forces captured Algerian soldiers in early 1976.
64. The Polisario lacks the manpower resources,
skills, and quantities of materiel to engage in sustained
conventional operations. The guerrillas' combat suc-
cess has been, in part, attributed to its tactical mobil-
ity. The introduction of sophisticated conventional
weapons systems into combat units in quantity would
further complicate the guerrillas'maintenance and lo-
gistic problems and would require an expanded sup-
port structure inside Western Sahara. The use of more
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sophisticated air defense systems was at least tempo-
rarily effective in neutralizing Moroccan air superior-
ity and the guerrillas will probably continue to empha-
size air defense in their tactical planning.
65. Guerrilla activity has been cyclical and con-
fined mainly to low-level harassing attacks. But this
has been enough to divert almost half of Morocco's
armed forces. The Polisario also has mounted periodic
conventional-type operations, such as the October
1981 attack at Guelta Zemmur; a Polisario force,
supported by SA-6, SA-7, and perhaps SA-9 surface-to-
air missiles, air defense artillery, and some tracked
vehicles routed a Moroccan garrison and shot down
five Moroccan aircraft. As a result of the guerrillas'
expanded air defense capability, as well as a reassess-
ment of the efficacy of supplying, maintaining, and
protecting distant outposts, Rabat has withdrawn from
its isolated garrisons in the southern portion of the
disputed territory and the only units outside its defen-
sive barrier are at Dakhla.
66. Approximately 27,000 Moroccans man the 450-
km defensive barrier that encompasses Western Sa-
hara's major economic and population centers. Rabat
plans to expand these defenses to include the northern
third of the Sahara. Even if implemented, such a
strategy still would leave vast areas outside Morocco's
grasp unless Rabat can achieve battlefield control.
67. Current Moroccan strategy involves keeping
control of the northwest region and eventually con-
ducting periodic sweeps outside the defensive perim-
eter. Polisario forces have not yet breached the barrier
but remain committed to its penetration. In order to
be able to claim success, they do not need to seize a
major population center, but merely to discredit Mo-
roccan claims of the barrier's impenetrability. The
Polisario cannot seize and hold an important popula-
tion center behind the barrier nor defeat major Moroc-
can forces deployed there. They will continue to probe
for weak points and will seek to draw Moroccan troops
away from their defensive positions. The Polisario can
also be expected to launch a large-scale attack on a
major Moroccan position, such as the isolated garrison
at Dakhla, during the next 12 months, as well as
conduct low-level harassment attacks on a regular
basis.
68. Several factors have contributed to a lull in
major guerrilla activity since December 1981. The
Polisario leadership has shifted its focus to the political
arena to capitalize on the seating of an SDAR delega-
tion at the Organization of African Unit meeting in
February 1982.1 1
We believe the Polisario is
conserving its forces while it awaits an opportunity to
return to the offensive.
69. Nationalistic popular support in Morocco for
the King's Sahara policy has not waned, although some
have made an association between the country's ser-
ious economic conditions and the costs of financing a
protracted war. Most Moroccans, including opposition
parties, continue to support the annexation. This sup-
port limits the King's flexibility on the issue. His
announcement last June of Morocco's willingness to
hold a referendum in the Sahara drew criticism from
the USFP.
Political Implications
70. The Western Sahara imbroglio has caused deep
divisions in Africa. Nineteen delegations walked out of
the February meeting of the OAU in Addis Ababa
when an SDAR delegation was seated. Rabat has
threatened to withdraw from the OAU if the SDAR
were granted official recognition, but it is questionable
how long this strategy will prove effective. The SDAR
has the 26 votes necessary for admission into the
organization, but action on this issue has been fore-
stalled in hopes that a negotiated settlement would be
achieved. The SDAR's supporters will push hard for
formal OAU recognition at the organization's heads of
state summit in Tripoli in August 1982.
71. There is no indication that either a military or
political solution to the Western Sahara quagmire is in
the offing. Neither side is capable of winning the war
as it is currently being fought, but both Rabat and the
Polisario-with external support-are prepared to
continue fighting. Morocco should be able to contain
the guerrilla forces, but military victory will remain
elusive as long as the Polisario retains Algerian sanctu-
ary and external sources of military hardware. An
effective combination of improved tactics and in-
creasingly lethal weaponry could reduce the Polisario
threat. Conversely, the Polisario cannot defeat the
FAR and wrest control of Western Sahara by military
means. A political settlement also appears unlikely.
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Neither side has as yet demonstrated the flexibility
necessary for a compromise solution. Despite Moroc-
co's oral acceptance last June of a referendum on self-
determination for the territory, Rabat still refuses to
accept direct negotiations with the Polisario, and the
OAU seating of the SDAR has added a further compli-
cating factor.
72. While relations between Morocco and Algeria
will remain strained over Algerian support to the
guerrillas, the likelihood of a conventional conflict
between the two remains remote. Algerian military
superiority should deter any Moroccan military initia-
tive against guerrilla sanctuaries at Tindouf. Algeria,
for its part, has few incentives to fight Moroccan forces
so long as Rabat does not engage in aggressive hot
pursuit. Moreover, Morocco would seek to avoid a
conflict with Algeria because the bulk of its forces are
concentrated in the south.
73. Morocco, barring unexpected suspension of
Saudi financial support, will be able to bear the cost of
its military campaign at least through the next year. As
the conflict drags on, the potential for serious internal
dissension will increase, particularly if domestic eco-
nomic conditions deteriorate or the kingdom suffers a
series of serious setbacks on the battlefield. King
Hassan reached the pinnacle of his personal popularity
with the successful annexation of the Sahara in 1975,
and his exploitation of this issue over the years has left
him personally responsible for its success or its failure.
He must be able to appease a population committed to
the integration of the Sahara while keeping the eco-
nomic, political, and military hardships of a prolonged
counterinsurgency campaign within acceptable limits.
Failure to balance these conflicting forces could well
undermine his base of popular support. In the years
ahead, he will very likely confront increasing chal-
lenges, and the Sahara issue, which has served him so
well, could prove to be a serious liability.
74. From the Moroccan perspective, the United
States has been a major source of modern weaponry
and, perhaps of equal significance, of psychological
support for its war effort. The prospect of augmented
US aid has lifted morJc in the Moroccan armed
forces. US weapons now on hand or in the pipeline
will not enable the FAR to achieve a battlefield
solution but, for at least the short term, they have
enhanced Morocco's expectations of military success.
75. As a result of US military and political support,
Morocco may place more reliance on achieving a
military solution while assuming a hardline negotiat-
ing posture. Such an approach requires Morocco to
have an assured, longer range relationship involving
the United States as a continuing supplier of military
and diplomatic support. Although the King has com-
mitted himself publicly to ending the war through a
referendum, this probably is a tactical policy shift.
The outcome of a referendum, insofar as the Moroc-
cans are concerned, will be to "confirm" the Sahara's
Moroccan identity.
76. Hassan's aim in according the United States
transit facilities in Morocco is not to achieve a wea-
pons-for-facilities deal. His object probably is to capi-
talize on US global strategic concerns to secure a long-
term US presence and a commitment to support the
Hassan regime.
77. Morocco and the Soviet Union have political
differences but maintain their relations on a correct, if
not always steady, basis, in part because commercial
ties benefit both parties. Rabat distrusts Soviet motives
throughout the region and is convinced that Moscow is
providing support for the Polisario. In late 1980, a
brief crisis in bilateral relations occurred when Mor-
occo seized four Soviet fishing vessels off the West
Saharan coast that were suspected of providing intelli-
gence support to the Polisario.
78. More dangerous, from the Moroccan stand-
point, is the Soviet weaponry supplied by Algeria or
the Libyans to the Polisario. The Polisario's downing
of Moroccan aircraft in October 1981 with Soviet-
made SA-6 missiles provoked Hassan to deliver a sharp
protest. Use of the missiles constituted a destabilizing
challenge to the Moroccan military's position and,
consequently, to Hassan's regime, which the King
could not ignore.
79. The two areas of the Moroccan-Soviet commer-
cial relationship that appear most prominent are phos-
phates and oil. The Moroccans have encouraged Soviet
involvement in the development of their phosphate
resources, signing the $2 billion Meskala Accords in
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1978 that, despite politically motivated slowdowns,
have moved forward. Morocco has also purchased
Soviet crude oil; the Soviet share of Moroccan crude
purchases will be approximately 13 percent this year
and for the first time will take the form of normal
commercial exchange rather than a barter arrange-
ment. The Soviets are also involved in the develop-
ment of Morocco's vast oil shale reserves.
Regional
80. Morocco's foreign relations are heavily condi-
tioned by the Saharan conflict. To a considerable
extent, the touchstone of Moroccan policy toward
particular countries or regional organizations has be-
come Rabat's assessment of how those relationships
might be used to advance the legitimacy of Morocco's
claims to Western Sahara.
82. Morocco incurs little political cost in accepting
Saudi help. A principal Saudi objective, the curtail-
ment of Libya's capacity for regional mischief making,
conforms with Morocco's concerns. Hassan also finds it
easy to support another main Saudi goal, defense of
the dignity of Islam, by, for example, serving as
chairman of the Islamic Conference's Jerusalem Com-
mittee
83. The one area where Hassan's dependence on
Saudi Arabia has influenced his policy was in regard to
Arab-Israeli relations. As a moderate, Hassan original-
ly was associated closely with President Sadat and with
Egyptian peacemaking initiatives. But Saudi opposi-
tion to the outcome of Camp David encouraged
Hassan to join the Arab consensus, and he broke
diplomatic relations with Cairo. His earlier support for
Sadat had placed him well out in front of Moroccan
opinion, and his retreat therefore served only to place
him again comfortably with his own people.
84. Likely US support for Israel in the event of
renewed Arab-Israeli hostilities would cause strains
between Morocco and the United States. King Hassan
would criticize US support for Israel and possibly even
provide limited support to the Arab side. US-Moroc-
can relations probably would not be seriously damaged
in such an event.
85. Hassan has little reason to hold benevolent
views toward either Libya or Algeria. The Moroccans
may calculate that, of the two, Libya is the more likely
in the short term to work out a deal. Qadhafi, farther
removed from the conflict than neighboring Algeria,
has priorities of greater immediate concern than con-
tinuing his support for the Polisario. The SDAR's
quasi-admission to the OAU threatens to become the
rock upon which that organization will sunder and,
should that happen, Qadhafi's forthcoming presidency
as well as his showcase OAU summit in Tripoli, would
become historic might-have-beens. Rabat therefore
may consider the moment opportune to press a tempo-
rary advantage and seek to neutralize Libya as an
active Saharan participant.
86. Algeria's situation is more ambiguous. The
Bendjedid regime has shown clear signs of nervousness
over Libyan ambitions and, in its relations with Tuni-
sia, Niger, Mali, Mauritania, and Chad, has demon-
strated a will to check Tripoli's desire for regional
preeminence. Algeria under Bendjedid also seems
more interested than formerly in promoting regional
stability and better relations with Morocco, thereby
reducing the involvement of the superpowers. But
Bendjedid cannot afford politically to appear to yield
to Hassan by dropping support to the Polisario in
exchange for improved bilateral relations. Algiers
would not accept a referendum whose outcome ap-
peared to be determined beforehand by Moroccan
maneuvering.
Western Europe
87. Morocco's relations with Western Europe center
on France, Spain, and the European Community,
especially after Spain and Portugal join the EC.
France remains Morocco's principal trading partner
and Morocco depends heavily on France for arms,
military training, and intelligence. There has been,
nonetheless, a noticeable cooling in the relationship
since President Mitterrand's election. Rabat is aware
that Paris is likely to balance its Moroccan relationship
by improving relations with Algeria.
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88. Strengthened Moroccan-US ties constitute a
form of insurance against the possibility that Mitter-
rand's endeavors will work against Morocco's interests.
But Hassan's main objective is to add the United States
to France (and the Saudis) as a strong friend capable of
helping Morocco. Rabat will wish to avoid creating a
situation in which either ally perceives Morocco as
attempting to play the one off against the other.
89. Rabat's delicate relationship with Madrid may
well deteriorate in coming months as a result mainly
of misunderstandings arising from US-Moroccan dis-
cussion of transit facilities. Negotiations for renewal of
the 1976 treaty governing US use of bases in Spain
have been difficult and, with some key matters still
unresolved on the eve of the treaty's 21 May expira-
tion, both sides have felt under pressure. Prospective
US use of bases in Morocco could represent for the
Spanish a US attempt to increase the pressure. Madrid
might also suspect Morocco's intentions, given unre-
solved problems in Spanish-Moroccan relations, to
replace Spain as the principal partner of the United
States in the region.
90. Spain recognizes that it is only a matter of time
before Moroccan irredentism focuses anew on the
enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, probably after the
Sahara's fate has been determined. Hassan has suggest-
ed that Morocco might link disposition of the enclaves
question .to that of Gibraltar. Madrid, however, views
Ceuta and Melilla as integral parts of Spain, to be
defended vigorously against invasion.
91. Agriculture, fishing, and trade issues constitute
a separate field for potential conflict between the two
countries. Already rivals for the European market,
Morocco's position will be decisively-and adverse-
ly-affected once Portugal and Spain enter the Euro-
pean Community. The Moroccans have characterized
Spanish attitudes in current bilateral talks over fishing
rights as patronizing. Future talks, as EC entry ap-
proaches, will be difficult. The temptation to protect
economic interests via resort to political pressure could
prove irresistible.
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Implications for US Policy
98. The likelihood of Moroccan stability in the near
term coupled with future major change in the coun-
try's political system present opportunities to advance
US interests, as well as risks to those interests, in
Morocco and the region. The likelihood that Hassan's
moderate, generally pro-Western regime will remain
in power over the next 12 months should enhance
prospects for continued smooth US-Moroccan rela-
tions. This would include continued US naval access to
Moroccan ports and an increased likelihood that the
United States will have formal access to Moroccan air
facilities to support military operations in Southwest
Asia.
99. It is also likely that this moderate regime, for
reasons of its own, will continue to follow international
policies that will often coincide with or support US
interests and objectives. Moroccan assistance in the
future could prove to be particularly valuable in the
Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as in
international forums.
100. The war in Western Sahara will, however,
continue to pose an important obstacle for two US
goals-regional stability and improved relations with
Algeria. Although the war has engendered popular
support and national unity, it is also diverting Morocco
from more pressing problems. US assistance has had
important positive effects on US-Moroccan relations
and Moroccan military capabilities and morale. As a
result of expanded US military aid, however, Morocco
may place more reliance on achieving a military
solution and assume a more hardline negotiating pos-
ture that might well prolong the Saharan conflict.
Unrealistic expectations of US assistance and support
that are left unfulfilled could in the long run damage
US-Moroccan relations.
101. Algerian leaders, although more pragmatic
and interested in a resolution to the Sahara dispute
than in the past, will not abandon the Polisario's
interests. Increased US military aid is seen as an
attempt to ensure a Moroccan victory and as a threat
to Algeria.
102. The question of transit facilities could strain
US-Moroccan relations. While successful conclusion of
a facilities agreement will lead to economic and
military benefits for Morocco, such an accord could
prove damaging to the popularity and legitimacy of
Hassan's regime. Some Islamic fundamentalists al-
ready are criticizing Hassan for allowing too much
Western influence in Morocco and can be expected to
seize on the issue of increased US military ties. Like
the people of other former colonies, the increasingly
well-educated Moroccans are probably sensitive re-
garding any infringement of their country's sovereign-
ty. The presence of US military personnel and US use
of Moroccan facilities, particularly if perceived as
intended to support Israel, could be viewed as a
compromise of Moroccan sovereignty and a quasi-
colonial relationship. Hassan, aware of this possibility,
has made it clear up to now that he would prefer that
US military presence not be highly visible. Hassan,
however, is capable of manipulating popular opinion,
especially if the United States has maintained a low
profile and the King can show economic and military
benefits from a US military presence. Accordingly he
is likely to demand a very high price for use of the
facilities.
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BIOGRAPHIC ANNEX
KING HASSAN II
1. Hassan II dominates Morocco's secular and reli-
gious life. In his more than 20 years on the throne, he
has maintained his political preeminence largely
through his skill at balancing competing factions and
interest groups. He rewards his supporters with pa-
tronage; he conciliates his critics when possible but
does not hesitate to crack down when he deems it
necessary. Hassan enjoys dual legitimacy as Morocco's
spiritual and political leader. A member of the
Alaouite dynasty, which claims descent from the
Prophet Mohamed and has ruled Morocco since 1649,
Hassan also is Supreme Commander of the Royal
Armed Forces and spiritual head of Islam in Morocco.
2. When Hassan ascended the throne upon the
death of his much loved and revered father, King
Mohamed V, in February 1961, he was
11-suited to conduct affairs of state. In
the intervening years, however, he has increasingly
shed that image and established himself as a modern-
izing ruler who effectively uses the symbols and
ceremonies of his spiritual and political heritage. He
was systematically prepared to succeed to the throne
by his charismatic father, and his political behavior is
primarily directed toward perpetuating the Alaouite
monarchy.
3. Hassan believes that he rules by divine right and
feels a strong commitment to perpetuate the monar-
chy. Although he personally took charge of drafting
Morocco's first constitution in 1962, which theoretical-
ly permitted the creation of fledgling democratic
institutions, he demonstrates intolerance and disdain
for opposition to his policies.
4. An adept manipulator of power and people,
Hassan skillfully uses divide-and-rule tactics against
oppositionists.
5]
He jealously guards is
right to take the initiative in foreign affairs and
national defense. He has used foreign policy issues to
defuse domestic pressure. His major initiatives have
been the annexation of the Western Sahara after
Spain's withdrawal in February 1976 and the further
annexation of that portion of the territory held by
Mauritania after that country signed a peace accord
with Polisario guerrillas in August 1979. The Saharan
campaign was initially popular in Morocco, but the
continued casualties and the financial drain have
caused some Moroccans to blame the conflict for
Morocco's mounting economic difficulties.
6. Hassan, 52, has a law degree from the University
of Bordeaux. He is heavily influenced by French
culture. The King is well read and well informed. A
man of elegance and whimsy, he can be charming and
gracious. He is notorious for not keeping appoint-
ments, even with heads of state. The King speaks
fluent French and Arabic and some Spanish and
English. He is an accomplished orator, a gift he puts to
effective political use. As is traditional among the
Alaouite dynasty, Hassan is married to a Berber
tribeswoman. His wife is rarely seen in public, and she
does not carry the title Queen. Hassan has three
daughters and two sons. The older son, Sidi Mohamed,
has been designated as Crown Prince.
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