DCI WORLDVIEW BRIEFING: AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R002100170010-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2006
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: December 7, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2006/05/24: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100170010-4
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NESA/SO/ 7Dec820
DCI WORLDVIEW BRIEFING:
I. The Soviets can show little for three years of combat in
Afghanistan.
A. By the Afghan government's own estimates the insurgents
fully control more than half the districts in the
country.
-- In another quarter, the government controls
only the district capitals.
-- Insurgents are active even in the quarter of
the country the government says it controls.
(DISTRICT CONTROL GRAPHIC)
B. Social, economic and political programs designed to win
popular support for the communists have failed.
II. The Soviets have too few men to deal effectively with the
resistance.
A. There are about 100,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan;
we believe they need around half a million to make
significant progress against the insurgents. (SOVIET
OB MAP)
B. They do not have the men to establish garrisons in most
of the country.
C. They have been unable to close borders with Iran and
Pakistan.
D. Attacks on road convoys are a major problem for the
Soviets and account for the majority of their
casualties.
E. The Soviets receive little help from the 40,000-man
Afghan Army--plagued with desertions and containing
many insurgent sympathizers.
III. We doubt that the leadership changes in Moscow will make
much difference in Afghanistan.
-- The cost in killed and wounded--less than
20,000--and in money--about $10 billion in the
past three years are tolerable. (SOVIET MONEY
GRAPHIC)
 Approved For Release 2006/05/24: CIA-RDP83M00914R002100170010-4
-- The Soviets believe they would suffer a loss of
prestige, if they were to let a communist
government fall in a country bordering the
USSR.
-- They also don't want to forego the strategic
advantages--such as greater influence in South
Asia and the Gulf--that they would gain if
Afghanistan were pacified.
-- A small Soviet reinforcement is possible, but
the likely international reaction, the
difficulty of supplying a much larger force
over Afghanistan's primitive road system, the
greater economic costs, and reluctance to
reduce forces in Eastern Europe or on the
Chinese border make a massive augmentation
unlikely.
IV. Reports I indicate that some Soviets
think they can win in Afghanistan by wearing down the
insurgents.
A. In the past year, the Soviets have directed more of
their military efforts at civilian supporters of the
resistance--making mass arrests, bombing villages, and
destroying crops.
B. This seems to be aimed at breaking the morale of the
people and splitting them from the insurgents.
C. A few--5 or 10--of the hundreds of insurgent bands have
given up because of such pressure, but even in areas
where the Soviets have concentrated their anti-civilian
activities almost everyone continues to resist and
resistance morale remains high.
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