LETTER TO WILLIAM J. CASEY FROM BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL REGARDING WASHINGTON POST REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R002100160042-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 21, 2007
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: May 10, 1982
• Content Type: LETTER

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COMMERCE, CONSUMER, AND MONETARY AFFAIRS
SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING. ROOM D-377
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20313
May 10, 1982
Mr. William J. Casey
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Dear Director Casey:
Thank you for your letter of May 7, 1982, regarding a Washington Post report
of an incident involving Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs Subcommittee
staff and employees of the Central Intelligence Agency. The incident followed a
subcommittee meeting to consider public release of 17 CIA documents dealing with
OPEC investment strategies and the impact of OPEC surpluses and investments on
U.S. national interests. I share your concern that "the matter seems to be
getting out of hand" and I pledge my support for restoring a "spirit of cooper-
ation" between the subcommittee and the agency.
While I very much regret any possible misunderstandings, your letter does
not address what I view as the central issue underlying the incident about which
you wrote --namely, whether the Central Intelligence Agency or the House of
Representatives should have control over the conduct of and transcripts from
official meetings of House committees involving matters of interest to the CIA.
I regret to say that in recent weeks the CIA has acted repeatedly and I
think improperly to intervene in and influence the subcommittee's decisionmaking
process relative to release of the 17 documents. I am deeply concerned that the
totality of these actions demonstrates a lack of sensitivity to the constitu-
tional doctrine of "separation of powers" between the executive and legislative
branches of government and a lack of respect for the independence. of the legis-
lative process traditionally shown by executive branch agencies. My concerns
stem from a series of CIA actions, some of which are enumerated below:
(1) On April 27, 1982 -- two days prior to the subcommittee's first meeting to
consider H. Res. 433 (which would authorize release of the 17 documents) --
I invited the CIA to appear before the subcommittee to present its positions
.and to respond to any questions. The CIA specifically declined this invita-
tion and stated that its views were already known to the subcommittee.
Notwithstanding this refusal to appear, Congressman Clinger of the subcom-
mittee reported at the meeting on April 29 that the CIA was "in contact with
me yesterday and indicated they would be willing to appear in a closed execu
tive session." Mr. Clinger also stated that the CIA declined to appear
because "they felt there was really insufficient time for them to get in a
position to make a full case."
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Quite frankly, I believe it is inappropriate to decline a subcommittee
chairman's invitation to appear at a meeting and then advise minority
members of the subcommittee that it is willing to do so. If the CIA's
objection to appearing on April 29 was insufficient time to prepare its case
-- a reason not communicated to the chairman --then a request 'for a. post-
ponement should have been made directly to the subcommittee chairman.
(2) The subcommittee advised the CIA several weeks in advance that a meeting
would be held during late April to consider H. Res. 433. Thereafter, on a
number of occasions, CIA attempted to discourage the subcommittee from
having an official House reporter or any official transcript of the pro-
ceedings of the meeting. Apparently the CIA is not aware of the importance
of having an official transcript and of the House Rules that require a
record of all official meetings, particularly those dealing with the markup
of legislation.
(3) In my view, the level of security applied by the CIA to the May 6th meeting
was totally inappropriate to the level of information at issue and, more
importantly, infringed the right and responsibility of Congress to maintain
control of its own proceedings. The morning of the hearing, CIA security
personnel "swept" the meeting room and placed CIA personnel in the back of
the room with equipment designed to detect radio-type transmissions of the
proceedings. When the subcommittee staff arrived at the hearing room at 10
A.M. (the scheduled time of the subcommittee meeting) the door was locked
and guarded by CIA security personnel. In effect, the staff was locked out
of its own meeting and could not enter except by leave of CIA employees.
Your congressional relations staff should know that the Rules of the House
require all congressional committee meetings to be open until a recorded
vote of the members is taken to close the meeting. If the CIA believed that
it was necessary to place a guard at the subcommittee hearing room door, it
should have communicated this request to the subcommittee chairman who
could have arranged for the Capitol Police Force to perform this function.
Only House police officers, not CIA security personnel, have jurisdiction
over the grounds and buildings of the House of Representatives.
(4) The incident that gave rise to the Washington Post story took place immed-
iately after the subcommittee meeting was concluded and involved control
and disposition of the official stenographic tapes and records of the
meeting. When the subcommittee staff director and its chief counsel
returned to the subcommittee office, at least eight CIA employees were there
with the official House reporter. All of the official reporter's steno-
graphic tapes and notes were already in the physical possession of the CIA.
I fully accept the sincerity of the view expressed in your May 7 letter that
the CIA "merely sought to follow a long established and accepted procedure."
However, the subcommittee has been informed by the Office of the Clerk of
the House that the established procedure in the case of meetings involving
documents classified "top secret" and below (and the highest classification
for the 17 CIA documents is "secret") is for physical control and custody of
the stenographic tapes and notes and the resultant transcription to remain
in safekeeping with the House of Representatives and its committees.
Even assuming, for the sake of discussion, that all other committees and
subcommittees permitted the CIA to take such physical possession and
control, the CIA should not have assumed that the Government Operations
Committee or its Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs Subcommittee
.operated in this fashion. A simple request to the subcommittee chairman as
to the handling and disposition of meeting tapes and notes,
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(5)
would have avoided any dispute over this issue. I also believe it is
inappropriate for CIA security personnel to escort congressional employees
on Capitol grounds. If determined to be necessary, arrangements ccould have
been made with the Capitol police to perform this function.
I think you will agree that the subcommittee has a demonstrated record of
absolute good faith with respect to its dealings with the Central Intelli-
gence Agency on the overall matter of the release of the 17 documents.
These documents, which have been in the subcommittee's possession for more
than 2 years, have been kept, at all times, safe and secure. The subcom-
mittee has given the CIA advance notice of all subcommittee actions and
meetings involving the documents. The subcommittee even permitted the CIA
to review, for security classification purposes, a subcommittee staff memo-
randum analyzing the 17 documents, prior to its circulation to subcommittee
members.
(6) It is my view that CIA's deletions from most of the 17 documents are totally
out of proportion to any reasonable effort to protect national security
sources and methods. Moreover, unlike documents in the possession of the
Treasury and State Department, the CIA declined to provide the subcommittee
with summaries of the 17 documents which could-be released to the public.
(7) Finally, as to the "whisked away to Langley" phrase: there may have been a
misunderstanding. The official House reporter stated on a number of occa-
sions that he was going with the CIA employees to transcribe the notes.
Moreover, a CIA official told a subcommittee staff member that the notes
would be transcr-ibed in Langley and a copy made available to the subcom-
mittee. Given the fact that a CIA security officer already had physical
possession of the stenographic tapes and notes, together with the House
reporter's statement that he was going with the CIA employees, it was
logical to assume (even without the statement that the tapes would be
transcribed in Langley), that the reporter would be going to Langley to
transcribe his tape and notes.
In any event, the subcommittee staff had reason to believe and did indeed
believe that the House reporter would be going to CIA headquarters to
produce a transcript of the proceedings. We have been advised that private
firms, reporting subcommittee meetings involving the CIA, have transcribed
their tapes and minutes at CIA headquarters at Langley.
We have been advised by the House Clerk's Office that on numerous other
occasions involving other committees of the House, problems have developed over
CIA's efforts to take physical custody and control of stenographic tapes and
notes of meetings involving CIA issues or personnel. Because of my concerns over
the involvement of CIA employees in the conduct of House proceedings and because
of the apparent differences of opinion over standard House practices in dealing
with classified materials, I am bringing this matter to the attention of Speaker
O'Neill.
Benjamin S. Rosenthal
Chairman
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