LETTER TO THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY FROM GENE REGARDING REACTION TO THE LITERATURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110081-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 2007
• Sequence Number: 81
• Publication Date: November 13, 1981
• Content Type: LETTER

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
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SUSPENSE 20 November
Date
Please prepare brief
acknowledgment for DCI's
signature.
ecutive Secretary
16 November 1981
P;19/lY P4
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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Dear Bill,
"ovember 13, 1981
I am so pleased by your reaction to the
literature I keep churning out that I send
you the enclosed draft. My problem is that
I have lived for years under the dire rule
of "publish or perish". Now it's my duty.
Yours cordially,
OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR
Draft speech
The Honorable
William J. Casey,
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
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Draft B, Nov. 12, 1981
Please return comments
by November 18, 1981.
The Unnecessary War
The-Winston Churchill Lecture
of the English Speaking Union
by
Eugene V. Rostow
Director
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
London
November 30, 1981
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This ceremony gives me pleasure at many levels. I
believe in the English-Speaking Union and deeply value the
compliment of your invitation to speak tonight. It is an
extra satisfaction for me to be introduced by Sir Patrick
Dean. While I was in the State Department between 1966 and
1969, Sir Patrick was Her Majesty's Ambassador, and a most
distinguished Ambassador he was. We worked happily together
on a long list of difficult problems, and emerged from the
experience friends as well as. colleagues, demonstrating the
self-evident truths that Trinity Hall and King's are
close neighbors after all, and that the Special Relation
is not a policy but a fact.
What makes this evening singular for me, however, is
that I have been asked to give a lecture in honor of Winston
Churchill. The only occasion in my life which made my skin
tingle with comparable feeling was the challenge of writing
and delivering a Fourth of July oration in honor of Thomas
Jefferson from the steps of Monticello.
Both Churchill and Jefferson are heroes in the
Pantheon of the English speaking peoples. The heroism
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of these two giants is not simply that they had the
courage to stand and fight against odds in times of
trouble. There are many heroes of whom that could be
said. Their special quality is that they had the
gift of words as well as the gift of action. What
they did and what they said are woven together into an
epic whole. Like the other great epics of our tradi-
tion, the sagas of Churchill and Jefferson will remain
part of the living faith not only of the English
speaking peoples but of all the peoples in the world
who share the creed of Liberty, Equality, and
Fraternity.
That creed is really the heart of what I have to
say tonight. It is embodied in many famous slogans --
in the motto of the French Revolution I have just
recalled; in Jefferson's "unalienable rights of life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness"; in the Four
Freedoms of Churchill and'Franklin Roosevelt; and in the
natural human and civil rights men and women are claim-
ing with increasing vehemence these days behind the Iron
Curtain and in other parts of the world ruled by tyrants
or oligarchs. The themes which cluster around the idea
of liberty lie just below the surface of the political
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and military problems which preoccupy our foreign offices.
And they completely dominate the psychological-and educa-
tional tasks which constitute at least half the agenda of
our governments nowadays as they try to understand what is
involved in the decline of world public order; then try to
decide what should be done about it; and finally attempt to
persuade our own people and those who would be our adver-
saries to do what is necessary in the common interest.
Nominally, my subject tonight, in Churchill's compel-
ling phrase, is "The Unnecessary War" -- the war we must
prevent. Churchill proposed the phrase as the official name
for what is generally called "The Second World War." It com-
mands us to remember that if the United States, Great Bri-
tain, France, and the Soviet Union had acted wisely during
the Thirties, the war could never have taken place. After
Hitler came to power, Churchill urged such a course from
the back benches with all his magnificent resources of
reason, historical knowledge, experience, and eloquence.
He was denounced for his pains as a senile war monger who
saw Huns under every bed. His critics -- they were
numerous and influential -- dismissed him as a romantic
who still lived in the days before 1914, bemused by end-
less quantities of champagne or brandy or both.' To adapt
one of Churchill's best phrases, "Some champagne; some
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brandy." Nonetheless, he was kept in the wilderness until
the war had started and was nearly lost.
Both World Wars did terrible damage to the fabric of
our civilization. The twin evils of Fascism and Communism
were among their progeny. But a Third World War in a nu-
clear environment would be far, far worse. We must not
fail to prevent war this time, as Asquith and Grey failed
before 1914, and as Churchill and Roosevelt failed before
1939.
The situation today resembles that of the Thirties
in many ways. But it is different too, profoundly dif-
ferent -- even more dangerous; more volatile; and far
more difficult to control by the polite warnings and
veiled threats of old-fashioned European diplomacy. Like
legal precedents, historical precedents should never be
applied blindly. As Peter Clark remarked recently, "they
only hold good so long as things go on in the same old
way." World politics have not been going on in the same
old way for the last fifty years. The world we live in is
not the world Churchill and Roosevelt were struggling to
master in the middle Thirties. We cannot expect to succeed
where Churchill and Roosevelt failed by muddling through.
My thesis tonight is simple: peace has now become
truly indivisible, in the memorable words of a Soviet
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Foreign Minister forty five years ago. It is a thesis
entirely appropriate for us to consider on the first
day of a new round of Soviet American talks on the re-
duction of nuclear weapons. The pervasive menace of
nuclear arsenals and the apparently inexorable spread of
nuclear weapons create profound political instabilities
in themselves. One false step, one human error, one mis-
calculation can now set the computers whirring and destroy
a large part of the human race. But the weight and threat
of nuclear weapons are not the only engine of disequili-
brium in the world. Conventional warfare and subversion
have become epidemic and commonplace. When that factor
is added to the influence of the nuclear arsenals, world
politics are transformed into a witches' brew because the
wall between conventional and nuclear war can never be im-
permeable, no matter how high we make it. It is now
obvious that arms control agreements are not worth having
if their only consequence is to make the world safe for
conventional warfare, terrorism, and the movement of
armed bands across international frontiers.
Consider, for example, a current issue our Governments
are now grappling with. The Soviet Union has recently re-
vived its old proposal for a General Assembly declaration
banning the first use of nuclear weapons. The Soviet
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goal is transparent. They know as we do that the recovery
and renaissance of the NATO allies, Japan, and many other
countries since 1945 has depended on the credible threat
of the United States to use its nuclear weapons in defense
of its allies and other supreme interests against conven-
tional as well as nuclear attack. That is what nuclear
deterrence and the American nuclear umbrella are about --
the belief throughout the world -and particularly in the
higher circles of the Soviet Union -- that nuclear weapons
would be used, for example, if Soviet tanks started to
roll into Western Europe. Until the Soviet Union joins
us in agreements which could genuinely remove the menace
of nuclear war from world politics altogether -- a goal
to which the United States has been passionately committed
since we offered the Baruch Plan in 1946 -- there can be
no escape from reliance on nuclear deterrence when the
supreme interests of the United States are threatened by
aggression. Like many other facts of life, the nuclear
deterrence involves a moral dilemma. It is nonetheless
a fact of life.
The sound and reasonable response of the Western
allies to the Soviet proposal for a ban on the-first use of
nuclear weapons, therefore, should be an appeal for a rededi-
cation of the entire world community to the principles of the
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United Nations Charter against any form of aggression,
whether conducted by nuclear or conventional force or by
the movement of armed bands across international frontiers.
This appeal should be coupled with a corresponding rededi-
cation to a fresh start in the effort the United States
initiated in 1946 to bring nuclear energy under effective
international control. The Baruch Plan, you will recall,
would have placed what was then an American nuclear monop-
oly into the hands of a United Nations Agency. The means
.proposed in the Baruch Plan are certainly obsolete now.
But its animating idea remains important-.
No lesser steps could begin the indispensible process
of restoring world public order. The decline of world
public order and the specter of nuclear anarchy beyond
it are the greatest of all the threats to the peace. The
best available way to deal with that threat is through
international cooperation in enforcing the rules of peace
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. They con-
stitute the only available code of detente -- and the only
possible code of detente.
There is no use blinking the fact that there is a
risk of war in the Soviet Union's campaigns of expansion
all over the world. Those campaigns are carried on by meth-
ods which violate the rules of the Charter governing the
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international use of force. The Soviet Union does not
initiate all the trouble in the world. But it does take
advantage of trouble in order to expand its sphere of in-
fluence.. The Soviet campaigns of expansion have gone too
far. They now threaten the world balance of power on which
the ultimate safety of the Western nations depends, and
therefore they touch nerves of immense sensitivity.
The men and women on the Clapham omnibus know this
in their bones. That is why there is so much concern
about war in Western public opinion. The current wave
of anxiety about the possibility of war is natural and
reasonable. We all share it. The pervasiveness of
anxiety is not a sign of cowardice or pacifism, but a
normal symptom of the fact that public opinion has
reluctantly begun to acknowledge the true condition
of world politics. It has exactly the same significance
as the famous vote of the Oxford Union about fighting
for king and country in 1936.
The present turbulence of our public opinion does
not prove that there is something wrong with the younger
generation; that our moral fiber has been ruined by the
welfare state; or that the leaders of our churches and
peace movements are all Communists or fellow travelers
or their innocent dupes. Of course the Communists are
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trying to exploit and manipulate the feelings of people
about war and to convert those feelings into a poli-
tical movement that would serve the ends of the Soviet
Union. Communists always do that sort of thing, and
always will. But they have never controlled our politics
in the West, and they will not succeed now. We cannot
ignore their activities. But we should not get agitated
about them, either.
After all, the anxiety of public opinion about war
is not manifested only in demonstrations against the
presence of troops and weapons and in expressions
of the altogether sensible view that there is insanity
in the continued accumulation of weapons, and especially
of nuclear weapons. There are other expressions of that
anxiety and concern, equally significant, and much more
realistic. Throughout the West, people are coming to the
conclusion that their governments must stop the process of
Soviet expansion before it explodes into general war. They
know that peace cannot be achieved by unilateral disarma-
ment. And they recognize the wisdom of the old Russian
proverb, "If you make yourself into a sheep, you will find
a wolf nearby." Sadly and without jingoism, our people
support their governments in policies which seek to
arrest the slide towards war while there is still time
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to do so in peace and by the methods of peace.
- As a result, the North Atlantic allies and many
other nations are following the broad lines of policy
Churchill counselled in vain before the Second World War.
They are restoring the military balance which has eroded
in ten years of apathy, revulsion, and self-deception. And
they are resuming the quest for peace through negotiation
with the Soviet Union. They fully realize. how little has been
accomplished by arms control -nd disarmament treaties in
the past. Nonetheless, without illusion or euphoria, they
wish to be certain that no conceivable opportunity for
,peace is ignored. Therefore they welcome the effort of
the United States to persuade the leaders of the Soviet
Union that it is in the highest interest of the Soviet
state and of all other states -and indeed in the highest
interest of humanity itself -- to recognize the fact that
history has thrust an inescapable obligation on the Soviet
Union and the United States. That obligation can be trans-
lated into two imperative axioms: First, that the United
States and the Soviet Union should reach verifiable arms
reduction agreements which give each side an equal capacity
to deter the use of nuclear weapons for aggressive purposes;
and second, that world public order should be restored in
conformity with the rules upon which the United Nations
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agreed in San Francisco at the end of a terrible war
they had barely won. These two propositions are closely
related. Together they define the objectives of the
United States as we approach the TNF and START negotia-
tions. We hope the Soviet Union will come to agree with
us, and to accept these principles as major premises for
a process of Soviet-American cooperation which has now
become imperative.
Thus far, there have been no signs of progress in
that effort. Soviet behavior, diplomacy, and propaganda
remain what they have been for a long generation. We have
no choice but to persevere, however, seeking to reach
the peoples of the Soviet Union with every resource of
our intelligence and imagination while Soviet expansion
is restrained by the calm deployment of deterrent force.
We know that more than sixty years of Soviet rule have
not weakened the love of liberty and justice in Russia,
and that the. peoples of Eastern Europe remain an integral
part of the European culture and policy. So long as we
in the West are strong, confident, and determined, the
forces of hope in the East will not sink back into
despair.
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The analysis I have just summarized is adequate and
accurate, I believe, so far as it goes. But it does not
go very far. Rationally, it is easy to prescribe the
course the NATO allies and-the Soviet Union should follow
now, just as it is easy with the benefit of hindsight to
agree that Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union and
the United States could have prevented the Second World
War. The important question about the Thirties is not
what should have been done -- the answer to that question
is self-evident -- but why Churchill and Roosevelt, two
towering politicians at the height of their powers,
failed to persuade their fellow countrymen to follow
their lead. That, I believe is the principal question
on the agenda of Western foreign policy today, and it is
the issue to which I shall devote the remainder of this
lecture. What are the limits of reason in dealing with
the issues before us? Can we hope to persuade the
Soviet Union, or only to contain it, as George Kennan has
contended, until the benign influence of Russian high
culture brings about a mellowing of Soviet policy? And
how can our effort of persuasion and dialogue be organ-
ized and carried out by methods compatible with the
rules of our being?
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In this perspective, we see how much harder and more
complex our problems are than the problems with which
Churchill's generation had to deal. The state system
can be detonated today by remote and intractable con-
flicts, whose destructive impact could be multiplied by
the spread of nuclear weapons. Under these circumstances,
I repeat, there is no rational alternative to great power
cooperation in enforcing the agreed rules of peace --
equally, fairly and justly. But is there any chance that
reason can be made to prevail? How do we persuade the
Soviet Union that it too should obey the rules of the
Charter, give up the dream of empire, and join the
Western nations in seeing to it that the Charter rules
are generally respected throughout the world?
The questions I have just posed surely include matters
of diplomacy and strategy which would have been familiar to
Thucydides or Machiavelli. But their implications
transcend the abstractions of political theory, or the
cool detachment of the cynic. The balance of power
is not all that is at stake in the world crisis which
has come about through our blindness and negligence.
Churchill commented once that Marlborough and Wellington
had changed the course of history, permitting two cen-
turies of British primacy which were hardly compelled
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by the economic and demographic statistics. It is heresy,
I know, to ask such a question in a Churchill lecture,
but -- issues of national loyalty and national pride
apart -- would Western civilization have been very dif-
ferent if Marlborough had lost at Blenheim and Wellington
at Waterloo? That kind of speculation can hardly arise
about the outcome of the Cold and not-so-Cold War. No
one can contemplate the possibility of nuclear war with
any feelings but those of horror and disgust. And no one
could describe the architects of the Gulag Archipelago as
Saint Simon and Nancy Mitford describe the denizens of
Versailles in the day of the Sun King. With divided and
uneasy minds, the nations of the West have finally embarked
on a Churchillian effort to prevent war. We have taken
this step not only to protect our national independence
and avert nuclear devastation but to preserve the creed
and hope of liberty for ourselves and for all who cherish
it. Nuclear war could be averted, after all, by Western
surrender. But that course is unthinkable.
Many believe that the ideal of individual freedom has
had its run in the bleak chronicle of human history, and
will soon be forced to yield to one version or another of
collectivism. This every child of the Anglo-American
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culture must deny. The view that the ste.te exists to
protect individual freedom has always been at war with
the ideology of Leviathan; that war will never end. Man
yearns for freedom, but freedom is lonely. Man also
yearns for security and companionship. Sometimes he seems
willing to pay the price of slavery for them. It may be
that even in the West some people actually prefer such
societies, at least for a time.
There is no reason to lose faith in our humane
ideals. We speak with many voices, as free men and
women always do. But beneath the turbulence of these
lively sounds there is abiding unity and ample strength.
In their vast majorities, the people of the West remain
loyal to the code of values to which they have been bred
-- the values of a tradition which goes beyond the En-
lightenment of the Eighteenth Century to the roots of
our political liberty in the common law and the English
constitution, and to the roots of our moral freedom in
the heritage of the Old and New Testaments and the memory
of Greece.
Today that tradition faces the challenge of a new
Minotaur. And today, once more, those who love freedom
must rally to its defense. But the threat we face is
more than the threat of arms and the challenge of ideology.
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Sir Isaiah Berlin uses a simple phrase to sum
up the most fundamental difference between societies -
devoted to the freedom of the individual and societies
in which the state manipulates the individual in the
name of a greater good: the difference between "Freedom
from" and "Freedom to." We believe with Sir Isaiah in
"Freedom from" -- that is, we believe, in the autonomy
of man as a good in itself and the most important rightful
goal of organized society. It follows that we must also
believe with Jefferson that "the just powers of government
derive from the consent of the governed." If the consent
of the governed is the source of the authority of the
state in free societies, high principles of ethical
responsibility should govern the discourse among men and
women which is the source of public opinion and thus the
predicate for their consent. Democracy is impossible
unless we speak to each other with civility and scrupulous
respect for the truth as best we can perceive the truth.
As George Orwell saw so clearly, the most important
difference between free societies and modern tyranny is
a totally-different attitude towards the problem of truth.
This difference is why our efforts at propaganda, even
in wartime, are'so diffident, defensive, and ineffective.
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Everyday we read and hear propositions as bizarre as those
of Orwell's Newspeak. We find it almost impossible to off-
set their impact on our own minds, or to explain to others
why those propositions are wrong. We are simply not equipped
to contest the propaganda of Newspeak. In the end, we deal
with it as if it were the argument of a parliamentary oppo-
sition. That is all we know how to do.
Let me give you an example of central importance to
.my thesis tonight. We are being bombarded at the moment
by the breathtaking claim that the NATO allies and the
United States in particular are seeking to disturb a stable
equilibrium of world power, gain military superiority aver
the Soviet Union, and start a nuclear war to destroy the
Soviet regime. Sometimes an additional detail is added
for European consumption -- that the United States is
planning to fight the nuclear war entirely in Europe and to
its last ally. In the United States, Soviet spokesmen
say the opposite -- that if the Soviet Union is hit
by a nuclear missile, it will pay no attention to the
calling card attached to the weapon, but respond at once
with all its missiles against the continental United
States.
How can these contentions be answered? Can anyone
really believe that the American people miss Vietnam,
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and are looking for an excuse to start another such cam-
paign, this time with nuclear weapons, or even a Third
World War on a much larger and more exciting scale than
Vietnam? Can anyone suppose we are bored because our
universities are quiet and busy, preoccupied with educa-
tion rather than with anti-war protests? Can anyone
imagine that an American President could contemplate the
possible use of force for any reason except the most
austere sense of duty and obligation, knowing well that
President Truman's political career. was ruined by the
Korean War as President Johnson's was destroyed by
Vietnam, and indeed that every war in American history
was politically unpopular?
Or let us look at another aspect of the Soviet
thesis -- the actual state of the military balance, and
especially the balance in intermediate range nuclear
weapons in and near Europe. Year after year, the Soviet
Union tells us that there are roughly 1,000 weapons of
this kind on each side, and that the NATO decision to
deploy modern nuclear weapons in Europe is a destabilizing
quest for nuclear superiority in preparation for nuclear
war. There is irony in this claim. The magic figure re-
mains near 1,000 although the Soviet Union deploys a new
SS-20 every 5 days. And the Soviet Union has not yet
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offered a detailed statistical table to support its charges.
But Soviet spokesmen have said enough to make the statis-
tical fallacies of their argument apparent. For example,
they seem to count only SS-20 missiles deployed in European
Russia, although many of these missiles located beyond the
Urals can reach targets in Western Europe without difficulty.
And they count certain American planes in making their cal-
culations, but exclude Soviet planes of the same type. All
the studies I have seen confirm the judgment of the Interna-
tional Institute of Strategic Studies that Soviet superiority
in this particularly threatening category of nuclear weapons
is more than 3 to 1, so that even the full deployment of the
American weapons scheduled for Europe could not produce any-
thing like equality, to say nothing of "superiority." But
the charges continue to be made.
The problems the NATO allies face together at this
juncture have nothing to do with the fantasies of Soviet
propaganda. We do not have to choose between protecting
our interests and fighting a nuclear war or any other
kind of war, in Europe or elsewhere. That is a false
dichotomy. The sole object of United States and NATO
policy is to protect our common interests by restoring
stability without war. There is no reason to doubt our
capacity to protect the future of liberty in peace, by
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the methods of alliance diplomacy backed by deterrent
military power. TheNATO allies, Japan, Australia, New
Zealand, China, and other countries which oppose Soviet
hegemony have ample power and potential power to stop
the process of Soviet expansion. With Poland in the
process of undergoing profound social changes, this is
hardly the time to bend our knees to the power and ideol-
ogy of the Soviet.Union as the wave of the future.
We know that for the Soviet Union, separating West-
ern Europe from the United States is the first principle
of its strategic doctrine. If Western Europe could be
brought within the Soviet domain, the geopolitical theor-
ists of the Soviet Union believe, Japan, China, and many
other nations would draw the necessary conclusions, and
the United States would be left isolated and impotent.
The enormous Soviet effort in the field of intermediate
range missiles is intelligible only in the perspective
of Soviet strategic doctrine. In that perspective, it is
all too intelligible. The objective, as always, is de-
coupling the United States from Europe. The scenario would
follow these lines: the subliminal radiations of the Soviet
intermediate range nuclear arsenal would induce panic in
Europe while the growing Soviet strategic arsenal would
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paralyze any possibility of an American strategic response.
Presto and checkmate.
This was the nightmare which provoked deep European
and American concern five or six years ago. Henry
Kissinger's Brussels warning in 1977 dramatized the issue.
But the anxiety would have been the same if he had never
spoken. The danger of decoupling Europe from the United
States is implicit in the changing overall intercontinental
nuclear balance between the Soviet Union and the United States,
and therefore in the loss of the counterweight which had
kept superior Soviet conventional forces at bay since
1945. After a year or two of discussion, NATO decided
that the United States should deploy American intermediate
range land-based missiles in Europe and at the same time
negotiate with the Soviet Union about removing the threat
to Europe arising from the existence of the Soviet missiles.
The reasoning behind the NATO decision parallels the
argument which has persuaded the United States to keep large
American conventional forces in or near Europe, that is the
argument for.firmer coupling between Europe and the United
States. There has been periodic political agitation in
the United States for a reduction of our conventional
forces in Europe, and for exclusive reliance on intercon-
tinental nuclear weapons to protect Europe against Soviet
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pressures. But proposals of this kind have been firmly
and repeatedly rejected. The United States wishes not
only to make the nuclear guaranty clear and credible,
but to be in a position to respond appropriately to
threats across the entire spectrum of threat or attack.
To remove American forces from Europe would escalate
every conflict instantly to the nuclear level. With
American intermediate range nuclear weapons deployed on
European soil, there would be less doubt about the credi-
bility of the American intercontinental nuclear guaranty
to Europe both in Europe.and in the Soviet Union. As a
result, the risk of war by miscalculation would be re-
duced, and the nuclear threshold correspondingly raised.
The problem of the intermediate range nuclear
weapons must be examined in the SALT context, as the
North Atlantic Council has declared, because the line
between intermediate range and intercontinental nuclear
forces is not clear cut. Intercontinental weapons can
also be aimed at targets in Europe, Japan, or the
Middle East. And some weapons normally classified as
theatre weapons can be used under certain circumstances
on intercontinental missions. While much could be
accomplished by successful TNF talks, both in reducing
weapons and contributing to crisis stability, the ultimate
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security of the NATO allies will continue to rest on
the reliability of the United States strategic guaranty.
III
When I was a student at King's, the great Alfred
Marshall had gone, but the young dons- still faithfully
took their texts from his books and lectures. One of
their favorites, I recall, is appropriate to our problem
tonight. Marshall liked to say, "Trees do not grow to
the sky." He was , talking' about firms and trade unions,
and the checks and balances of economic life. But his
observation applies also to empires.
The Soviet Union is still in the imperial mood of
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries which the other
imperial powers have long since given up with relief and
conviction. Those nations have discovered what Bentham
pointed out long ago -- that the imperial powers had no
right to govern the peoples they had conquered; that they
gained nothing from their efforts; and, as Sir Norman
Angell concluded much later, that imperialism is extremely
expensive. An Italian minister summed up the problem of
costs in the late Forties, "Italy has lost the war," he
said, "but in compensation it has lost its Empire."
The former imperial powers have learned that it is more
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profitable and more satisfactory all around to make
money, not war.
If we take the Soviet drive to be the Hegelian thesis,
it has already stimulated a normal antithesis -- a coali-
tion of nations determined to retain their independence.
In the nature of things, the forces of the antithesis
are bound to prevail. Can the Soviet Union acknowledge
that fact, and accept the inevitable gracefully -- as
gracefully as Great Britain or The Netherlands welcomed
the end of empire after World War II? Will the last sur-
viving traditional empire join the other nations in seek-
ing the world order anticipated by the'Charter of the
United Nations -- a world order based on the equality of
states large and small, and on the rule that no state use
force to attack the territorial integrity and political
independence of any other state?
In our view, those are the ultimate questions before
us. The answers to those questions are in the mist. All
I can tell you tonight is that the United States and its
allies view the process of arms control negotiations as a
possible key to the riddle of the future. Arms control ne-
gotiations have no magic in themselves. Negotiating with
the Soviet Union is a rough sport, and a satisfactory out-
come is hardly guaranteed. But we cannot forego a possible
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opportunity for progress toward peace. The Soviet
policy of expansion, fuelled by the extraordinary growth
of the Soviet armed forces and particularly of its
nuclear forces, has produced a situation of growing
tension and instability. The efforts of the Soviet
Union to split the West and to prevent Western moderni-
zation of its defenses will surely fail. We have
appealed to the Soviet Union, and we appeal again, for
cooperation between us as the only.rational way out of
the dilemma both camps now confront. The fruits of
SALT I and SALT II have turned to ashes in our mouths.
What began ten years ago with the high hope of detente.
became the worst decade of the entire Cold War.
We approach the task determined not to confuse our
hopes for reality. We know that the Soviet Union, like
most other countries, has at least two cultures -- the
culture of Peter the Great and the culture of Ivan the
Terrible; the Russian culture of inspiring intellectual
quality and moral distinction, the culture of Tolstoy,
Turgenev, Checkhov and their modern successors, as well
as the culture of Oriental despotism now in the ascendant.
From long experience we know that Soviet spokesmen are right
when they say, as they often do, "we are neither pacifists
.nor philanthropists." But there are positive elements in
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the situation which ought to lead the Soviet leaders
to choose a policy of stability in their relationship
with the West: the apparently insoluble problems of the
Soviet economy and the situation in Poland, to mention
only two.
Beyond issues of that order, however, is the over-
riding problem of the nuclear weapon which is far more
serious. The inescapable logic of the nuclear weapon
applies to the Socialist and capitalist states alike.
It compels all states, in the interest of survival and
humanity, to consider far more radical and fundamental
remedies than any which have yet been tried if we are to
seize the opportunity implicit in the present crisis and
together lift the threat of nuclear war from the shoulders
of mankind. The United States believes that the time has
finally come to realize Alfred Nobel's tremendous dream --
that weapons can be so awful as to compel peace.
I can sum up all I have tried to say tonight by
telling you of an episode about which I heard recently.
The story is that in the early years of the nuclear
age, Hugh Gaitskell asked R. H. Tawney, the great social
philosopher and patron saint of the Labor Party, to write
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him a memorandum about what British policy towards nuclear
weapons should be. Tawney's paper said four things:
First, the secret was out of the laboratory, and could
never be returned. Any industrial country would have
the technology to make the weapons. Secondly, it fol-
lowed that the Western nations could not give up nuclear
weapons for obvious reasons of prudence. Third, nuclear
war was unthinkably destructive, and the West must find
ways to protect its freedom and security and at the same
time prevent nuclear war.
From these three propositions Tawney drew a conclu-
sion he regarded as inescapable, that the goal of policy
must be not simply the avoidance of nuclear war, but the
elimination of all international war.
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