THE U.S. RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET CHEMICAL WARFARE BUILDUP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110043-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 24, 2008
• Sequence Number: 43
• Publication Date: February 4, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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SUSPENSE,
.Remarks:
State Dept. review completed.
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4lnter national Office of the Director
Co.a
Agency CONFIDENTIAL 47
February 4, 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
William P. Clark
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
FROM: Gilbert A. Robinson
Acting Director
SUBJECT: The U.S. Response to the Soviet Chemical
Warfare Buildup
The revised factsheet and "Q and As" represent in our estimation
a solid advance over preliminary versions, and have the makings
of a useful public affairs treatment. Your staff has been
highly professional in dealing with us in this difficult matter.
However, final review of USG plans is needed to achieve the most
effective public presentation. Our position is still somewhat
defensive. We should seek to focus world attention on the continuing
desire of the United States to achieve a verifiable treaty on
chemical warfare, while being prepared for production of replacement
munitions if necessary. We offer the following recommendations:
A brief introductory statement such as prepared by USICA (copy
attached) should be drawn on by the State Department press spokes-
man to announce the broad U.S. policy response to the Soviet
chemical warfare buildup. State would refer additional questions
to DoD and ACDA.
Following the State announcement, DoD and ACDA briefings should
be held which reiterate the Department's policy. announcement and
add evidence for our view of the Soviet buildup and of our careful
and considered approach. The DoD spokesman would respond to press
queries about binary weapons along lines in the factsheet and Q
and A's, keeping the stress on:
-- The buildup of Soviet chemical forces.
-- The use by the USSR of chemical agents in Asia.
-- The U.S. search for peace.
CONFIDENTIAL
Classified by Gilbert A. Robinson
GDS 2/4/88
State Dept. review completed.
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CONFIDENTIAL
-- The deterrent intent and nature of any foreseeable U.S.
chemical munitions.
-- The binaries as replacements for older systems.
-- The plans to phase down outmoded munitions and arrive at a
smaller effective deterrent.
-- The U.S. view that we do not need to match the Soviets and
therefore perceive no "chemical arms race."
ACDA should explain some of the past difficulties in negotiations
and some possible new approaches. ACDA would include mention
that the U.S. is considering steps to resume negotiations.
Together the press statements and additional background briefings
should be perceived by the press as a USG effort to prod the
Soviets to negotiate a verifiable treaty. It would be'seen that
the U.S. is leaving time for negotiation while preparing to
produce replacements for existing outmoded munitions if necessary.
We also recommend that the principal officials involved in the
decision and its public presentation meet as soon as possible to
discuss these suggestions, review the factsheet and Q and A's,
and map out additional briefings and steps recommended in our
proposed scenario (copy attached).
With careful and total coordination aimed at the fundamental
impression we wish to create, it should be possible to deflect at
least some of the opposition. FBIS and other reports of media
coverage abroad as well as reports from our Embassies (recent
cables from Bonn and London are attached) show that the Soviets
are poised to mount a significant propaganda campaign against the
U.S. decision, and that they will have receptive audiences in
Europe. Independent of whatever mischief the USSR might attempt,
recent coverage in the American press attests to ready condemnation
here and abroad unless we construct a policy that takes the high
ground and directs attention to U.S. peace efforts in this
instance.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
cc: The Honorable
Caspar W. Weinberger
Secretary of Defense
The Honorable
William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
The Honorable
Walter J. Stoessel
Deputy Secretary-Designate
Department of State
The Honorable
David R. Gergen
Assistant to the President
for Communications
The Honorable
Richard R. Burt
Director of Politico-Military Affairs
Department of State
Mr. Horace Russell
Staff Member
National Security Council
The Honorable
Robert C. McFarlane
The White House
The Honorable
Frank C. Carlucci
Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Honorable
Fred. Ikl e
Under Secretary for Policy
Department of Defense
The Honorable
Henry. Catto
Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Public Affairs
CONFIDENTIAL
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LIMITED O'.: FTCIAL USE
Statement on the U.S. Despcnse to the Buildup by
.the Soviet Union of Chemical Weapons
Statement: Replacement of Old Chemical Muniticns
As a deterrent to discourage Soviet use of their massive chemical
warfare capacities and in the absence of a verifiable treaty banning
such weapons the United States has concluded that it is regrettably
necessary to undertake preparation in the taming year for production
two yczrs hence of replacement chemical munitions for those currently
in the U.S. deterrent stocks. These would, if produced, REPLJCE -
--Nor SL2PLE ELT -- older types that are less safe to store and handle.
These are not new and they are not biological. ?They are a retaliatory
deterren-nt. The United States has already renounced first use of such
munitions. No deployment is planned. Deployment c il.d only occur
after consultations with and approval of our Allies. Such
consultations have not occurred.
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LIt~Li. TED OrT'ICIAL USC
i ac}: ound: The Graoth of Soviet Chemical Warfare Capabilities
Ibr the past thirteen years the Soviet Union has steadily produced
massive amounts of chemical weapons, and developed large-scale
chemical warfare capacities, including equipment, special
decontaminaticn vehicles, and extensive experimentation. At present
the Soviets have stockpiled several hundred thousand tons of chemical
weapons- Some 50- to 100,000 Soviet soldiers have been trained in the
use of and defense against chemical weapons. The USSR has spent large
sums of money to equip and protect its forces against chemical war.
The Soviet CW capacity is not limited to one region, but could affect
any country.
U.S. Restraint
The Soviets have no reason for such build-up. The United States in
1969 renouu-iced the first use of chemical and biological weapaus and
toxins, and unconditionally renounced all methods of biological
warfare.
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LIU?1ITED OI'F1CJIJ, USE
president Nixon in that year ordered the destruction of all existing
sto&,s of biological agents and weapons. The United states closed
research and production facilities, reducing its research and
development to a strict study of has to defend against attack. by an
adversary.
Soviet Use of 2?iycotoxins
The world community is now aware that the Soviets have been
responsible for the use of new weapons, the mycotoxins -- ccmmonly
knc n as "Yella?a Rain" - against helpless peoples in Laos, Kampuchea
and Afghanistan. 5 he testimony of those who have suffered, the
chemical analyses, the pattern of use by the Soviets or proxy forces,
amount to undeniable proof of Soviet involvement in odious acts. (See
attached Department of State report.)
U.S. Efforts to Ban Chemical Weapons
Between 1977 and 1980 the United States conducted bilateral
negotiations with the Soviet Union tc and a canprehensive, verifiable
L MTTED OFFICIAL USE
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LTbiITF.D OFI,ICIAL U_`1:
agreement to ban and eliminate d-ieniical wealr-ns. The talks were
suspended in .1.9.80 because the Soviets could not agree to adequate
verification of both parties' compliance.
The United States stands ready to resume negotiations with the USSR
and try once again to achieve an agreement that is clear, equitable
and provides for adequate verification.
We hope the decision announced today will prove an incentive to the
Soviet Union to negotiate a verifiable ban on chemical weapons, an
achievement that will serve the best interests of all nations.
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SECRET ATTACHMENTS
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The attached documents were inadvertently
omitted from the memo from Gilbert A. Robinson
to Judge William P. Clark dated February 4, 1982,
subject: The U. S. Response to the Soviet
Chemical Warfare Buildup.
SECRET ATTACHMENTS
International Communication Agency United States of America
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Scenario LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Public Announcement of U.S. Response to the Soviet Buildup
of Chemical Weapons
Assuming that the FY 1983 budget request, including items for chemical
munitions, will be sent to the Congress in early February and thus bea
matter of public record, the following scenario for public affairs treatment
is proposed. The scenario calls for a coordinated series of U.S. public
affairs initiatives in Washington and overseas that seek to direct public
attention overseas to the actions of the Soviet Union.
1) Any additional evidence or reports on the Soviet use of mycotoxins
should be made available to the press prior-to-the submission of the
budget to the Congress. However, the USG should not attempt artificially
to generate attention to mycotoxins because it would be reported as a
---transparent effort to distract world attention from our impending decision
on chemical weapons. Reports or statements from Congressional leaders,
other private American sources, particularly scientists and leaders and
experts from other countries, would be useful.
2) Shortly before release of the budget, a number of senior U.S. officials
should have deep background briefings on an exclusive basis with a few
leading columnists or editors, explaining the forthcoming decision with
emphasis on our intent to use binaries as a deterrent and an incentive to
the Soviets to attain a verifiable agreement.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
- 2 -
3) The State Department Spokesman at the noon briefing on the day of
release of the budget should make a brief, forceful statement on U.S.
plans regarding chemical weapons (draft attached). He should of course be
prepared for questions with a briefing paper drawing on the cables already
prepared by State and DoD and talking points consolidated by USICA (drafts
attached).
4) At the same time White House, NSC, DoD and State Department senior
officials and briefers should brief the press corps including meetings at
the Foreign Press Center and followup exclusives for leading foreign
press. U.S. officials should have in hand the briefing papers that focus
on Soviet buildups and actions, U.S. interest.in negotiations and the
deterrence intent of our weapons.
5) The Department should instruct Ambassadors in key countries to seek
statements from foreign leaders that fix the onus for the buildup of
chemical weapons on the USSR and support a US call for renewed negotiations.
Similar statements from other public figures should also be sought.
6) A Presidential statement should be prepared either for delivery by the
President personally before the press'corps or as part of a press conference,
in which the President:
-- Regrets the need for US preparations;
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Places the responsibility for our decision on Soviet actions;
-- Calls strongly for resumed negotiations;
-- Emphasizes that we have consciously-built in time for negotiation
before being forced to proceed to production;
-- Asks the Soviets to account to the world for their stocks and
military preparation;
-- Seeks support from the international community for a treaty that is
verifiable; _
-- Stresses the deterrent and retaliatory nature of US weapons.
7) Coincident with the actions directly related to the U.S. decision, the
USICA Wireless File or USINFO and Voice of America-should carry stories on
previous U.S. 'actions and agreements attempting to ban and eliminate
biological and chemical weapons, and more general accounts of major U.S.
arms reduction and peace initiatives, as well as analyses of Soviet
chemical warfare strategy.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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8) It. will be valuable for the Voice of America and the File to cross-play
to the field texts or summaries of any supportive media reaction and
public stateiments from abroad and from the U.S.
9) At every opportunity senior U.S. officials should voice their commitment
to search for ways to make progress in arms reduction and guarantee world
peace and security.
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ESCE-:0 I,Sl.E?CJ 5;0.00 L-03 DOE-10 IRSE OD FM 09 AS? 717E PERCEPTIO+I THAT THERE ARE FEU CO!;IXGLS on
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C1ICUS!?'?EUi: f.El?:t:EFG GE EVICEIICE OF THE EXTENT CF SOVIET PRO TV11S. FOR
CIIICIJSSFF. EAY:iEll; 1C GE 1P,E LEST, THE MORE SAID ABOUT CETERRE'ICE AND THE
USNIIR Ski:.PE F: LESS ABOUT CEP. "vii:: !;T THE EETTIR. ER.GARDING
. DETERRENCE, CEPAETN:1iT SHOULD 607E PREVALENT
PERCEPTIC:I HERE THAT HITLER WAS DETERRED FRC"1 USING
CU AGENTS Ct:LY El HIS BELIEF THAT ALLIES
GENEVA ALSO FCn 101 BAD CAPACITY 10 RETALIATE. LOUIS
E.O. 12065: 6DS-1 01/27/12 (STREATOR, EDWARD J-)
TAGS: t1POL, L':, t1;?.TO
SUBJECT: MA!;.GIKG THE CU ISSUE IN EUROPE
1. S-ENTIRE TEXT
y? VIZ CONCUR IM EI!rLRSCY ROSlI'S INSIGHTFUL ANALYSIS OF
THE DANGERS POSED TO OUR FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY
DAIS EY IKE CHENICAL 67_4PO!IS ISSUE.
? , c-c:n~ n^Itt'crcT CRITICAL C;R!P
.-~--~-
3. 1HERE 11 AS BEEN A CF
TTEti C!1~~ 1550E t!-RE SIlICE THE A,;0AEIIA
HUEEER INTERVII U UITH UIER'S, UHICH RAISED THE
POSSIBILITY OF CU DEPLOYMENTS IN BRITAIN. VIE EXPECT
MEDIA IIITEREST TO MULTIPLY FOLLO'JIIIG JANUARY 25
10111011 OF EEC?S 1:EEKLY tIEUS DOCUMENTARY "PANORAMA,
V,11ICH FOCUSED C!1 CU ISSUES. PROGRAM REHEARSED HOEBER
COIIIROVERS'i, LAID HEAVY EtIPHASIS Oil PIE POSSIBILITY
CF CIVILIAU CASUALTIES III ANY CW EXCHANGE, CAST
DOUBT Oil U.S. ASSUMPIICIIS OF A SOVIET C'J BUILDUP,
SPOKE DARKLY CF TCU CU UEAPO:)S 10 FOLLOW BINARIES,
AND FEATURED 2-11ILUTE SEG'1EIIT (APPATEIITLY FROM OLD
111LITARY TEAINI"', FILM WITH U.S. VOICE.OVER) OF
Rf,CBIT DYII!G F1011 CU EXPOSURE. THERE WAS ALSO A
SIATEI:ENT 1HAT PA!;:RRSMA HAD 'INDEPENDENTLY CONFIRMED'
1NA1 HIGH-LEVEL CCD OFFICIALS DID, IN FACT, WANT 10
DEPLOY ILEW EIORRY 6EAPC!IS 711 EUROPE.
4. BECAUSE CF RECENT PUULICITY, THE 1100 HAS ALREADY
RECEIVED A IR.r.CE lOl'UER OF CUERIES 0.'1 CU AND IS
IXFECTIIIG A CELUSE fCLIOWIIIG LAST EVEIIING'S "PLNCRAMA'
PROGRAM. IN RESPO'JOIF'G, THE 1103 WILL DRAW FROM
L'ASHING1O1'S GUIDI,!;CE (STATE 1131,1 AND 13243).
" 5. OUR CO:ITOCTS AT THE ;CO COD THE NOD HAVE BEEN
EXPECSSII:,; I!.CF.E0',INS CC:;CERIJ TIIAT A CU CC:IIR:YERSY
IS III[ k.:C'IG t'.:UE AT THE ~''OIIG 1IMC. 11115 IS BOT
JU,1 11;1 51I.T1011;) Cr ICO CD:ES. A SE11105 1100
CfFICIPI, F[4 I crN'Lf, UIII1E SAY ICS I114) HE
PERSOUIGLLY C ,.Iufl:,o CU ULIIUfMH''l 1P fl'i!:PE "A COOD
l1 A', CR IIu:JD Ili,1.1'l1.."I?I-L'.':?,?.;Ir',~,r!t_I
V.1 1! u': l
PLAITS C11"I11 Lt',I,?'.l 1>1 l! ',1?I I? I
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10 SECSTATE WASHOC It":EDIATE 3463
SECDEF WASHOC IMMEDIATE
NATO COLLECTIVE Ir::ED1b1E
USCINCEUR VA!HIHGEN CE !.;IEDIATE
CINCUSA^EUR HEIOELCERG GE 1rrlEDIATE
CIRCUS:FE RAMSTEIT AC CE IT,':EDIATE
VSNMR SHAPE IMMEDIATE
5 E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BOI:!1 01671
E.O. 120&5: RCS-1 1125/52 (WOESSNER. W.H.) OR-1
ZAGS: KPOL, GE
SUBJECT:'- MANAGING THE CW ISSUE IN EUROPE
? 2. ALTHOUGH WE WELL U::OERSjAND THE DEFENSE
RATIONI;LE BEHIND THE DECISION TO PRODUCE BINARY
)UUITIONS, WE ARE FEARFUL THAT WE MAY WELL EE HEADING
INTO A RED-HOT POLITICAL COIITROVERSY, SIMILAR TO THE
OHL THAT SURRCUNCED ERW, SHOULD THAT DECISION BE
FOLLC'Y_D BY ONE TO FCR:.ATT CEFLCY THE M'J1IITION IN THE
FEDERAL P.EPUSLIC. WIT`: THE EXCEPTION NOTED IN PARA
4 BELOW, CHEMICAL WEAPCNS HAVE HOT YET BECOME A PUBLIC
OR MEDIA ISSUE HERE, EUT WE ARE CONVINCED THAT IT IS
ONLY A MATTER OF TIME EEFCRE THE "FEACE 110VEIIENT", WHICH
IS BADLY IN NEED OF NEW SLOGANS, AND OTHER GROUPS
It! EUROPE SEIZE
CONCERNED ABOUT THE MItITARY BUILD-UP
THE ISSUE. INDEED, STORIES SUCH AS THE RECENT PINCUS
ARTICLE LINKING CW AD GLC8 MIT ONLY SERVE TO DRAW
PUBLIC ATTENTION 10 THE PROBLEM BUT MAY WELL EE USED
BY ANTI-INF ADVOCATES TO PRESSURE BOTH THE CHANCELLOR
AND THE SPD/FDP COOLIT10:1 TO REASSESS THEIR PRESENTLY
FIRM SUPPORT FOR THE OVAL-TRACK DECISION. EVEN WITH
THE BEST OF MANAGEMENT, WE BELIEVE WE CANNOT AVOID
SERIOUS POLITICAL STRAINS.
3. IN A RECENT CONVERSATI0 WITH EUR/CE DIRECTOR
KORhBLL'M,' A SENIOR CHANCELLERY OFFICIAL VHO IS CLOSE
10 THE CHANCELLOR IH:ENICK) SAID THAT UNLESS THE HATTER
WERE CAREFULLY HANDLED, THE CW ISSUE COULD EE EVEN
WORSE THAN THE ERW CC.'ITROVER V. OFFICIALS OF THE
FOREIGN AND DEFENSE MINISTRIES HAVE EXPRESSED
SIMILAR CONCERNS. KCEY!.CK VENTURED THE PERSONAL
VIEW THAT WE WCuLD HAVE TO TAKE A MEW AND SERIOUS .
ARMS CONTROL IIIITIATIVE HEGARDIITG THE ELIMItIA!ICUI
OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS I.N. C;CER 10 CCNNTAIII THE ISSUE.
LIEYBASSY CC'MHEIII: A ltE HOEYNCK'S SUGGEST ION FOR A
TWO-TRACK APPROACH AEA Ill WAS PER:CtIAL, WE WOULD
NOT Cf AT ALL SURPRISED IF TONETHItG ALONG THESE
LINES E[CO:TES THE FRG POSITI0:1. EED COMMENT).
4. A IURTIIER SIGN CF 19E #0111ICAI CLIMATE III THE FRG
CONCEANING CV TURNED UP IN INC NEV; (Al[ LAST YEAR.
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ECHH 01671 CI OF 02 2511552 0211164 ICC2IG
IN T IGIIATEti'> Ili 101 SOL'IIIEXTI OF THE CGUUI1Ill INC p ?? ~' 4
FILED SUIT AGAINST THE FEDERAL POLICY OF STCiIUS
GUI MlCA.L MUGIllOUT IN TILE AREA, PARTICULARLY AT IISCHBACH.
T111S WEEP. AN EMBASSY SPD CONTACT REMINDED US OF THAT
INCIDENT, AND POINTED OUT THE SIGNIFICAYICE OP TRUOE
011IOIIS TOEING THAI ACTION. HE, 100, NOTED THAT THE
RESISTLGCE TO NEW Cl ADDIIIC!:AL CS! STORAGE IN THE
FIG WOULD EE ALMOST CLRRAIN 10 GROW.
5. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT IN
'.DISCUSSItG BINARY IIU:IITIO:: THE '/20,, u;j,!iLl
PE AVOIDED IN ORDER TO AVOID THE I!?F PAR41.LEL EEING
DP.AI!1I AND THAT A WORD SUCH
'RENEWAL' OR "EYCfii.,.GE" PE "'C;TIlATEO 1:1 ORDER TO
IIAKE CLEAR THAT C'W STOCKS ALREAD( Ex.ICT IN EURS?E.
'VE WOULD ALSO SUGGEST THAT RATHER T-=:1 =EFEF.3I'S;
PAST `RFGLECT" EF LI_ CW CC?P91LIli VE ,9'i iH?
IN US HL E}.EF::.I?EO 1: SIN DECIDING SG"E
YEARS AGO NOT TO PROCEED WITH BINARY PRODUCTION
IN THE ROPE THAI THE CW NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE USSR
IN GENEVA WOULD BE FRUITFUL AGO r;IE IT UNNECESS.RY.
11 V.ILL BE IM?ORT6'IT TO LAY TAN ELATE FOR -LACK r:
!:EGOTl iT IL_~ __c t"T_1ET:~'-_
PROGRESS IN 1H. LT
FONOFF OFFICIALS HAVE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT III
DISCUSSING THE GREATER SAFETY OF EICIARY WEAPONS
1c BE CAREFUL TO AVOID It'?LYI::G THTT T E :'EA'C'!S
110W sic, %ED IN lYE LuG t:Si lS T EY ALSO
SUGGESTED THAT THE FACT THAT CII;;R:ES C,!I1 ONCE
THEY AT:E 1!0LC::GEPNEEDED, EEC -gOtED '!T! -:Y
FBI! R EG'd~.&"?E;Trl RISKS
YE ALSO SUGGEST PLACIN EIt%Hd j0Nir.: ETc-??_tiT
_fOSSLLLELCC" TIt:G G_; F.^':SIE!c _.iuil T~'Y L'S:.
FINALLY, is EELtE`.E,iHAT FOCUSSING ATTENTI0:1 THE
FACT THAT THE LARGEST PORTION OF OUR EX'EU,DITU=ES
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