POLICY ISSUES INVOLVED IN UNITED STATES APPROACHES TO ARMS TRANSFER ARMS CONTROL NON-PROLIFERATION AND RELATED MATTERS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110020-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 14, 2008
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: March 3, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
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OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR
March 4, 1982
Dear Bill,
I am enclosing a copy of the Memorandum of Trans-
mittal and Staff Paper which constitute ACDA's re-
sponse to the President's directive of 22 December
1982, calling for a review of the policy issues which
constitute the matrix of our arms control programs in
the Middle East. The paper will not surprise you (or
). The point of view will recall the
deliberations of the famous Casey Committee which
flourished in the transition period between the 1980
election and January 15, 1981.
Let me know if there is any clarification I can
provide between now and the NSC meeting on the subject,
which I have recommended ASAP.
Yours cordially,
1. Memorandum of Transmittal
2. Staff Paper
The Honorable
William J. Casey,
Director,
Central Intelligence Agency.
Unclassified When Separated From Attachments
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OF=iCE OF
-`-!E D;PECTOR
March 3, 1982
Memorandum of Director of ACDA Transmitting
ACDA Staff Paper on Policy Issues Involved
in United States Approaches to Arms Transfer,
Arms Control, Non-Proliferation, and Related
Matters in the Middle East
On 22 December 1981, you decided to have the NSC
review the policy issues involved in our Middle East
arms control programs, and asked for a document which
could serve as the basis for future NSC deliberations
on the. subject. This Transmittal Memorandum and the
attached Staff Paper constitute ACDA's response to your
directive.
ACDA recommends that.you reaffirm the major objec-
tives of United States Middle Eastern policy since 1945
but direct a number of clarifications and changes in
the methods used to achieve those objectives.
The essential conclusion of our analysis is the
necessity for an integrated approach to all the policy
XGDS, Review for declassification on Feb. 28, 2002
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problems we face in the Middle East -- an approach
dominated by a fresh appraisal of our priorities,
so that we should be able in particular cases to recon-
cile conflicts among the objectives of policy, and
achieve a more coherent and therefore more effective
strategy. During the last eight months, we have often
allowed the pursuit of one proper goal of American policy
to frustrate the pursuit of other even more important
goals. The result has been unfortunate in arms control
as in other aspects of our policy for the Middle East.
The goals of United States policy in the Middle
East, as we understand them, are:
1. to prevent Soviet domination of the area, and indeed
significantly to diminish the Soviet presence in
the area;
2. to promote friendly and cooperative relations among
the peoples and states of the region, and between
them and the United States; in that connection, of
course, the most.important and explosive but by no.
means the only issue for our diplomacy is the task
of persuading the Arab states of the region (other
than Egypt) to comply with Security Council Resolu-
tions 242 and 338, and make peace with Israel; quite
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apart from all the other reasons which have led
the United States to support that policy since
1948, the Soviet Union has been able to exploit
Arab resistance to making peace with Israel as a
major weapon of its policy of expansion throughout
the Middle East; and
3. to help in seeing to it that the other purposes
and principles of the Charter of the United Na-
tions, and particularly its prohibition against
the international use of force save for purposes
of self defense, are fulfilled in the Middle East
as they they should be in other parts of the world.
1. Preventing Soviet Dominion in the Middle East.
Defeating the Soviet tactic of creeping hegemony in
the Middle East is now the most urgent task of American for-
eign and security policy in the region. Unless our effort
is successful, we face the likelihood of major geopolitical
change -- change it may be immensely difficult to reverse.
In this critical effort we have made no progress during the
last year. On net we have probably fallen further behind.
The Soviet campaign in the Middle East must be seen
in the larger setting of Soviet strategy. For many years,
Soviet strategic doctrine has been based on the maxim
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that he who controls the Eurasian land mass controls world
politics. Since 1945, the Soviet strategy has been to
achieve dominion over Western Europe, in the conviction
that if Western Europe falls, Japan, China, and many
smaller countries would draw the necessary conclusions,
leaving the United States isolated and impotent in a
hostile world. The Soviet drive for the Middle East
should be understood as a step in its campaign to outflank
Western Europe and separate it from the United States,
preferably without war.
Since the fall of the Shah, it has been clear
that -we shall have to establish a United States and
Allied military presence throughout the Middle East, from
Eastern Turkey and the Red Sea to Morocco. This is now a
recognized part of our policy. Success in this effort
would contribute immeasurably to stabilizing the region
and diminishing the probability both of war and of further
American retreat. It would also transform the political
environment, making it more likely that we could persuade
the Arab states to make peace with Israel.
This policy is being pursued, but not with the
urgency the situation demands. We have not yet convinced
either our friends or our adversaries that we are deter-
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mined to protect our national interests in the Middle East
and are capable of doing so. None of our political objec-
tives for the Middle East will be within our reach unless
we move forward quickly to establish a strong and visible
Western military presence throughout the area, backed by a
public opinion which understands and accepts the moral and
legal justification for our actions and is prepared for the
possible use of force if necessary.
Since the time of President Truman, every President
of the United States, with the full and repeated backing
.of the Congress, has declared that it is a vital national
interest of the United States to prevent Soviet domination
of the Middle East. The United States is committed by the
Middle East Resolution of 1957, the Eisenhower Doctrine
Resolution, as amended, to use armed forces as the President
deems it necessary to protect the territorial integrity and
political independence of all the states in the area against
the aggressive policies of the Soviet Union. Congress recog-
nized the Middle East Resolution to be a "specific statutory
authorization" for the Presidential use of force requiring no
further Congressional action under the War Powers Resolution.
The guaranty of the Eisenhower Doctrine Resolution has been
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invoked several times in behalf of countries in the
region, and American armed forces have been stationed
there at intervals in order to deter the threat of
armed attacks. The North Atlantic Council has also
declared that Soviet hegemony in the Middle East would
threaten the security of NATO.
2. Allied Solidarity in Stabilizing the Middle East.
In carrying out such a Middle Eastern policy, we should
work not only with friendly or potentially friendly regional
states but with some of our European allies, Japan, Austra-
lia and New Zealand, and perhaps certain other countries as
well. The entire Western world has the same stake in pre-
venting Soviet domination of the Middle East. We have had
successful policies of diplomatic concert in the Middle
East before -- notably in the early 1950s, before the Indo-
.China affair in 1954 and the Suez crisis of 1956, and
again in the period 1966-1969. We should try again. Even
if a discreet diplomatic effort to this end should fail,
we should be no worse off than we are now. Differences of
view between European and American attitudes towards Israel
have been considered an obstacle to Allied cooperation on
Middle Eastern problems. In my experience, these supposed
differences have been more an excuse than a reality.
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3. A Fresh Start for the Peace Process
ACDA recommends a major effort -- and if pos-
sible, a concerted, large scale diplomatic effort -- to
persuade the Arab states to carry out their obligations
under Resolutions 242 and 338 and make peace with Israel.
Arab refusal to make peace with Israel is the heart
of the Arab-Israeli component of our Middle Eastern problem.
Americans find it difficult to believe that in their vast
majorities the Arabs genuinely want to destroy Israel and
create a single state in the territory of "Palestine,"
i.e., the territory of the British Palestine Mandate.
But that is the case. No degree of Israeli or American
"flexibility" can alter this position, which is one of
principle and conviction. The Arabs will accept the verdict
of history and make peace with Israel, as Egypt did, only
when they perceive that they have no real alternative.
For parallel reasons, we must undertake a fresh
campaign to secure the fulfillment of Resolutions 242 and
338. There is no real alternative for the United States.
"Wait and see" would be an even more dangerous policy.
No step short of peace between Israel and all its neigh-
bors could deny the Soviet Union what has proved to be its
most powerful weapon of imperial expansion in the Middle
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East, its support for the Arab dream of destroying Israel.
The autonomy plan of the Camp David Agreements cannot ac-
complish that purpose. It is simply a transitional scheme
designed to bring about the appearance of change during
the period before Jordan is ready to make peace under
Resolution 242. Since Resolution 242 does not require,
contemplate, or indeed permit any change in Israel's legal
status in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip until Jordan
does make peace, it never was likely that a Camp David
autonomy plan could change the political atmosphere appreci-
ably; under Resolution 242 there can be no Israeli with-
drawals or basic political changes until Jordan makes
peace. And even under ideal conditions a Camp David auton-
omy plan could not produce peace between Israel and Jordan,
Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.
At the moment, Israel is still the strongest mili-
tary power in the area, and an indispensable ally of the
United States in any combined effort to diminish or elimi-
nate Soviet influence in the Middle East. That critically
important factor is likely to change if we allow the
present situation to persist, and Israel's military and
political position to erode. Moreover, there are positive
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elements in the situation, which should make it possible
for us to mobilize Western opinion, as we did in 1967.
Mitterand's presence in France should help. And beneath
the surface the Western governments still recognize both
their inescapable responsibility for the Palestine Mandate
and the existence of Israel, and the deep identification
of Christendom with the Zionist experiment. This is a
good time to try again.
Nothing could more vividly demonstrate the need for
an integrated Middle Eastern policy, including a firm
directive to push for the fulfillment of Resolutions 242
and 338, than our conduct of the day-to-day diplomacy
of the Arab-Israeli conflict. On this critical issue,
we have waffled ineffectively, taking inconsistent posi-
tions cut off from their roots in law and policy. On the
Israeli raid against the Iraqi nuclear reactor last
June, for example, your position, as stated in press con-
ferences and in your statement on non-proliferation of
July 19, 1981, put the issue in a sound perspective.
But the position we took in the Security Council bore
no relation to what you said. It repudiated the legal
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justification for our actions during the Cuban Missile
Crisis and led to a dangerous attack on the IAEA a few
months later.
4. Arms Exports. Our military assistance programs
throughout the area should be integrated with our effort
to carry out the first three components of the strategy
outlined here. This was the basis for the ACDA memoran-
dum sent to the Secretary of State on August 18, 1981,
supporting the AWACS sale to Saudia Arabia. (Attached)
On the basis of the assumptions about our Middle
Eastern policy stated above, that memorandum defended the
AWACS sale in the light of the criteria of the statute as
a contribution to regional peace and stability. At the
time I believed those assumptions were justified. While
the issue is now more doubtful, it is still my hope that
this is still the case.
While we try to achieve an effective Middle Eastern
program, ACDA recommends that we use military assistance
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consciously and firmly in the interest of encouraging-
Jordan, Saudis Arabia, and other countries to cooperate
with us in establishing stability in the area and making
peace with Israel. Only then will our actions meet the
test of being balanced and even-handed.
Both Saudi Arabia and Jordan are critical to the
peace process.
Jordan is the key to the settlement of the Palestine
problem. Jordan and Israel are the two Palestinian
states which have emerged from the sequence of war,
diplomacy, and Security Council decisions about Palestine
since 1946. By making a peace which would settle the
future of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Jordan and
Israel can greatly diminish the burden of the Palestine
problem in Arab politics and therefore in world politics.
Moreover, Jordan is now in a good position to make peace.
Egypt has taken the first step. Syria is in turmoil.
Iraq is at war with Iran. And Egypt and Saudi Arabia
should fully support a Jordanian bid for peace, if they
can be convinced we are going to win the Cold War. Unless
we can establish that conviction, however, we shall fail
in all our efforts.
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5. Non-Proliferation Policy. The President's
statement of July 19, 1981, linked the pursuit of non-
proliferation to the quest for general and regional
stability. It is apparent that nations which feel they
are threatened by extinction cannot be expected to
renounce the possibility of obtaining nuclear weapons,
however illusory the idea may be as a defensive measure.
Moreover, some states which harbor aggressive impulses
are potential proliferators. There are both kinds of
proliferation risks in the Middle East.
With regard to the Middle East, the United States
has supported the initiative for a Nuclear Weapon Free
Zone (NWFZ) sponsored originally by Iran and now being
pressed by Egypt. ACDA has taken the lead in urging an
active United States diplomatic effort in behalf of the
Middle East NWFZ project, both as a contribution to
regional stability and as a catalyst for persuading the
Arab states other than Egypt to make peace with Israel.
Exploratory talks on the subject have been held with
Great Britain', France, Germany, Australia, Canada, and a
number of other countries -- all of whom were positive
about the venture -- and with Egypt, Israel, and (at its
request) Iraq.
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The United States was active in supporting the
Egyptian effort to move the Middle East NWFZ proposal
forward at the last General Assembly. ACDA's view that
unless the Middle East NWFZ project is linked to the
peace process it is bound to be stillborn was the issue
which precipitated your decision to order the present
review of policy.
The linkage between arms sales and non-proliferation
efforts on the one hand and Arab cooperation in
security arrangements and the peace process on the other
cannot of course be mechanical or heavy-handed. But the
articulation of a clear policy objective often has a pro-
found and pervasive influence on behavior.
The application of the principle of linkage will require
a high degree of sensitivity to conditions in each of
the states concerned. What is needed now, in our judg-
ment, is that you instruct us to apply the principle of
linkage, so that arms control policy in the broadest
sense can contribute additional momentum to the progress
of our policy towards the goals identified here -- pre-
venting Soviet domination of the region; promoting peace
throughout the area, and especially between Israel and
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its neighbors; and building Allied solidarity in the
Middle East as a permanent and constructive feature of
our. diplomacy for the region.
(lam
Eugene V. Rostow
August 18, 1981 Memorandum
to the Secretary of State
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