THE US-SOVIET COMPETITION FOR INFLUENCE IN THE THIRD WORLD: HOW THE LDCS PLAY IT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R002000240001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 12, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 26, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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. SECRET
The Director of Central intelligence
26 April 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
SUBJECT: The US-Soviet Competition for
Influence in the Third World:
How the LDCs Play It
This may be of some interest and value in
connection with the security assistance aspect of
William!J. Casey
Attachment:
NIC M 82-10005
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National Secret
Intelligence
Council
The US-Soviet Competition for
Influence in the Third World:
How the LDCs Play It
National Intelligence Council
Memorandum
Secret
NIC M 82-10005
April 1982
Copy 2 4 9
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National Security Unauthorized Disclosure
Information Subject to Criminal Sanctions
A microfiche copy of this do
ment is available from OCR
DLB (351-7177); printed co
from CPAS/IMD (351-520
Regular receipt of DDI
reports in either microfiche
or printed form can also be
All material on this page
is Unclassified.
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 Approved For Release 2006/07/12 : CIA-RDP83M00914R002000240001-7
National
Intelligence
Council
The US-Soviet Competition for
Influence in the Third World:
How the Cs Play It
National Intelligence Council
Memorandum
Information available as of 22 April 1982
was used in the preparation of this report.
This Memorandum was prepared f
the National Intelligence Council Analytic Group. It
was discussed with officers of the National
Intelligence Council and the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments are welcome and may be
addressed to the author on 351-5075.
Secret
NIC M 82-10005
April 1982
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The US-Soviet Competition for
Influence in the Third World:
How the LDCs Play It
Preface This Memorandum discusses the principal considerations that leaders of
less developed countries (LDCs) weigh in shaping their relations with the
United States and the USSR. It examines the factors that, from the LDCs'
viewpoint, tend to make each superpower attractive or unattractive as a
partner and patron. The circumstances and concerns of LDCs vary widely,
and no factor applies to all of them to the same degree. But those addressed
here are the ones that, in general, affect US and Soviet strengths and
weaknesses in the competition for influence in the less developed world.
Key Judgments During the 30 years of US-Soviet competition for influence among LDCs,
the Soviets have enjoyed several advantages:
? The United States has been linked-however unfairly-to the colonial
policies of its West European allies, whereas most LDCs have had no ex-
perience with the USSR as a colonial power.
? The long-tenured Soviet leaders have displayed considerable continuity
in their policies toward LDCs, in contrast to US policies that have often
appeared to move by fits and starts.
? Moscow has been better able to identify itself with widely held positions
in two of the most prominent and volatile issues in the less developed
world: self-determination for Palestinian Arabs, and black majority rule
in southern Africa.
? The United States, unlike the USSR, is often blamed by LDCs for
actions taken by allies not subject to its control.
? The centralized, authoritarian political structure of the USSR is widely
seen as a more suitable model by the many LDC leaders who consider de-
mocracy an unaffordable luxury.
? The USSR delivers arms to LDCs faster, and appears to attach fewer
strings to them, than does the United States.
? Soviet leaders are much less constrained by parliamentary and public
opinion than US leaders are, and thus are freer to use armed force to sup-
port the USSR's clients.
? Friendship with the USSR often brings with it tangible assistance from
Cuba-which offers a form of military aid unmatched by the West-as
well as from the East European states and other Soviet allies.
? Moscow is more willing to use subversion or military intimidation to
pressure LDCs into cooperating with it.
iii Secret
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The United States has offsetting advantages, however, several of which are
likely to become much more important during the coming decade than
before:
? The colonial era has virtually ended, and the USSR's role in the less de-
veloped world has reached the point where it must defend its record there
as much as the Western powers do.
? The USSR has mismanaged its relations with several LDCs, suffering
embarrassing setbacks as a result. Its intervention in Afghanistan and its
subversive efforts elsewhere have angered and alienated many LDCs.
? Most LDCs recognize that the United States is in a better position than
the USSR to contribute to resolution of the disputes over the Palestinians
and southern Africa.
? The United States is a more successful model of economic development
than the USSR, a contrast that has become more widely recognized as
modern mass communications have exposed more people to the affluent
US lifestyle.
? There is widespread recognition that the United States is better able to
provide the types of economic assistance, investment, and technology-
agricultural as well as industrial-that are most likely to raise standards
of living and sustain economic growth in LDCs. The USSR's economic
problems, meanwhile, restrict its ability to make costly new commitments
in support of its clients.
? The United States and its Western associates control the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund, whose resources are of major
importance to LDC development.
? There is a widespread preference for the individual freedoms found in the
United States, and a general recognition-despite LDC rhetoric to the
contrary-of their relative absence in Soviet society.
Most LDCs will seek support wherever they can best meet their needs,
regardless of ideology. Most of them will not regard Soviet and Western
support as mutually exclusive, and will prefer to diversify their sources of
aid.
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Contents
The Foundations of LDC-Superpower Relations 1
The US and the USSR as Sources of Support 1
The US and the USSR as Exemplars 3
Types of Support 6
Outlook 12
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The US-Soviet Competition for
Influence in the Thiw ll World:
How the LDCs Play It
The Foundations of LDC-Superpoweir Relations
The US and the USSR as Sources of Support. The
chief reason LDC governments turn to a major power
is their need for support against foreign or domestic
enemies. The LDCs most likely to move or remain
close to Moscow are those confronting hostile neigh-
bors, particularly neighbors that are stronger than
themselves or that enjoy outside backing from anti-
Soviet sources (such as Syria against Israel, Vietnam
against China, India against both China and Paki-
stan, and several black African countries against
South Africa). In some cases (like Angola, Mozam-
bique, and El Salvador), an LDC's need for support
against an internal security threat largely determines
its relationship with the United States or the USSR.
A major secondary interest is in assistance for eco-
nomic development.
In general, LDCs accept outside support wherever
they can get it. Thus, if other major Western powers
are unable or unwilling to help, LDCs are more likely
to turn to Moscow. Several leaders-Zambia's Presi-
dent Kaunda is currently an outspoken example-
explain their approaches to the USSR as necessary
responses to what they regard as insufficient Western
backing. Of course, it is advantageous for them to say
this whatever their actual motives, but it is nonethe-
less true that Moscow has made many inroads as a
partner of second choice where other major powers
declined to act. Throughout their quarter century of
active involvement in the less developed world, the
Soviets have quickly and effectively offered services
that the United States withdrew or explicitly declined
to provide, from the financing of Egypt's Aswan Dam
in 1956 to the provision of fuel for India's nuclear
reactors in 1981.
To the extent that LDCs have a choice among
potential supporters, several factors influence their
selection. Among them are the specific quantities,
quality, and terms of assistance that each major
power offers, including military and economic aid.
(The characteristics of these and other types of US
and Soviet support are addressed in a later section.)
Another consideration is the perceived consistency
and reliability of major powers and their foreign
policies. In this regard, the USSR has the advan-
tage-in comparison with the United States and other
Western democracies-of leadership that has enjoyed
long tenure and relative immunity to domestic public
opinion and thus has exhibited considerable continuity
in its policy toward LDCs. Leonid Brezhnev has been
in power during five US presidencies, Andrey Gromy-
ko has been Foreign Minister during seven, and the
main lines of Moscow's strategy for penetrating the
less developed world have not altered substantially
since the mid-1950s, even though some of its tactics
have changed, notably the downgrading of economic
assistance. By comparison, US policy toward LDCs
has appeared to be a roller coaster of involvement and
noninvolvement as US administrations and their doc-
trines have come and gone, the American public went
through the trauma of the Vietnam war, and US
relations with individual LDCs have been subordinat-
ed to such broader objectives as detente, arms control,
nuclear nonproliferation, or human rights. The West
Europeans' relationship with the less developed world
has also changed greatly during this period, as they
have surrendered colonial empires, pared other costly
overseas commitments, and adjusted to the economic
clout of the oil exporters.
The effect these differences can have on perceptions
of superpower reliability is especially evident in India.
The government of Prime Minister Gandhi believes
that the United States is unreliable as a source of
support, and that US policy toward India and South
Asia has moved by fits and starts. In the view of
Indian leaders, Washington has failed to maintain a
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consistent recognition of India's importance and has
subordinated US-Indian relations to other foreign
policy concerns. By contrast, Moscow's courtship of
New Delhi has appeared patient, persistent, and
attentive to a wide range of Indian interests. It has
been supported not only by aid and trade but also by
propaganda that reminds Indians of the help the
USSR has provided at crucial points in Indian his-
tory, and by high-level visits that bolster India's self-
esteem as a regional and nonaligned leader.
Nevertheless, widespread cynicism about the Soviets'
motives in providing assistance tends to offset their
overall reputation for consistency. It is clear to most
LDC leaders that Soviet state interests, not sympathy
for the underprivileged, determine Soviet policies.
These leaders realize that Moscow's consistent pursuit
of those interests can mean inconsistent Soviet sup-
port for their countries if events in their regions cause
Soviet objectives to diverge from their own.
Attitudes toward foreign supporters also hinge on
their involvement in domestic or regional disputes.
Both the USSR and the United States have at times
been caught on the losing side of internal struggles.
For example, the US position in revolutionary Ethio-
pia suffers-and the Soviet position there benefits-
from memories of earlier US ties to the deposed
Emperor Haile Selassie. Similarly, Moscow's identifi-
cation with Ali Sabri and other Egyptian leftists who
were challenging Anwar Sadat during the early
months of his presidency contributed to Sadat's disaf-
fection toward the Soviets.
As for regional conflicts, the USSR's image is better
than that of the United States, largely because the
Soviets have been better able to identify themselves
with the majority position in two of the most visible,
persistent, and emotional such disputes:
? Israel versus Arabs. Most Arab leaders perceive the
United States to be too deeply committed to Israeli
objectives to be an effective and reliable supporter
of Arab interests. This perception underlies Syria's
retention of a close relationship with the USSR and
Jordan's recent turn to Moscow for arms.
? South Africa versus black Africans. The Western
powers-despite their efforts to ease the transition
to majority rule in Zimbabwe and Namibia-will
probably continue to be identified to some extent
with Pretoria's policies, if only because South Africa
is a conservative, capitalist state whose government
flaunts its anti-Communism at every opportunity.
The USSR, meanwhile, has been the major support-
er of black insurgencies in the region. This gives it a
headstart in establishing positions of influence in
countries where insurgents come to power (as in
Angola and Mozambique), as well as countries'
where insurgencies maintain bases of operations.
Spiraling tension in southern Africa tends to en-
hance the Soviets' role. Their activity in the region
feeds South Africa's sense of beleaguerment, which
leads to a more aggressive South African posture
toward the black-ruled states and this in turn to
more requests by those states for Soviet aid.
In another currently turbulent region-Central
America-the forces backed by the USSR and its
Cuban ally may not represent a majority view, but
they have lent credibility to the Soviets' vision of
revolutionary change in LDCs. The oligarchical, mili-
tary, and often antireformist character of the Somoza
regime in Nicaragua and of-several other recent
governments in the area has made them highly suit-
able villains in the Soviet script, and made it easier to
portray their revolutionary opponents as champions of
the people.
Western ties to the "wrong" side in each of these
regional conflicts are a mixed blessing for the USSR,
however. LDCs in both Africa and the Middle East
realize that because of those ties it is the West, not
Moscow, that offers the best hope of arranging peace-
ful settlements. Western powers can negotiate with
South Africa-as they are now doing with respect to
Namibia-while the Soviets cannot. In the Middle
East, even Syria realizes that the USSR, lacking
Washington's potential leverage on Israel, cannot
broker a political solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
In Central America, a potential mediator is Mexico,
which Moscow probably regards as scarcely better
than the United States in this role, and which is just
as capable of excluding Soviet influence.
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Moreover, in some cases it is the USSR that is
embarrassed by being associated with one particular
side of a regional conflict, though none of these have
had political effects quite as pervasive as those in the
Middle East and southern Africa. In the Horn of
Africa, for example, the expansion of the Soviets' ties
with Ethiopia has caused them difficulties, first in
their relations with Somalia and then with regard to
the Eritrean insurgency, which is backed by radical
Arab states-Iraq and Syria-that Moscow does not
want to antagonize.
In some respects the USSR, like the West, derives
some benefit from having a foot in the enemy's camp.
But LDCs look to Moscow less as a channel for
negotiation (the 1965 Tashkent agreement between
India and Pakistan is the Soviets' only clear success in
mediating a regional conflict) than as a restraining
influence on their adversaries. The Mengistu regime
in Ethiopia sought closer relations with the USSR in
1976-77 partly to induce the Soviets to keep Soma-
lia-then a Soviet ally-from pursuing its territorial
ambitions in the Ogaden. Similarly, India has consid-
ered its ties with Moscow useful in forestalling signifi-
cant Soviet assistance to Pakistan.
Most LDCs do not regard Soviet and Western support
as mutually exclusive. They prefer to diversify their
sources of assistance. Because most LDCs are former
Western colonies whose political, economic, and cul-
tural ties to the West antedate their relations with the
USSR, diversification has frequently meant moving
toward the Soviets. In other words, LDCs may wel-
come Soviet support not because it is intrinsically
better than what Western powers offer but simply
because it comes from a new, different, and compet-
ing source. By the same token, diversification is a
reason such Soviet clients as Angola or Iraq-and
perhaps now India-may seek support from the Unit-
ed States.
Giving the Soviets a role where Western influence has
hitherto prevailed can have these attractions, even for
an LDC that is not generally sympathetic to Soviet
policies:
Reducing dependence on traditional supporters, and
thus reducing their leverage.
Demonstrating nonalignment by balancing one's
relations with the superpowers. For this reason,
LDCs frequently try to couple any apparent move
toward the West with some overture to Moscow.
Kuwait's recently stepped-up contacts with the
USSR, for example, appear designed to offset in-
creased security cooperation with its pro-Western
colleagues in the Gulf Cooperation Council.
Jolting Western powers out of what LDCs see as
complacency on an issue important to them. The
desired Western response might be either additional
aid to match Moscow's, or the solution of some
longstanding diplomatic or military problem. Many
African leaders, for example, believe that the
USSR's military role in their region induced the
West to pressure the white Rhodesian regime into
accepting black rule, and that it is now spurring the
Western efforts to obtain independence for
Namibia.
Occasionally an LDC leader does conclude that a
sharp reduction in the Soviet role is necessary to
obtain help from the West. The expulsions of Soviet
advisers from Egypt in 1972 and Somalia in 1977
were undertaken partly in the hope of obtaining
increased US (and Saudi) assistance. Such dramatic
gestures are rare, however, largely because few LDC
leaders would rest their nations' security on the mere
hope of future support. Moreover, many of them
doubt that the United States-whose foreign commit-
ments, unlike those of the USSR, must meet the
requirements of Congressional approval and public
accountability-is responsive and flexible enough to
fill quickly the kind of voids left by the Soviets in
Egypt and Somalia.
The US and the USSR as Exemplars. The superpow-
ers offer not only support but also alternative models
for economic and political development, accompanied
on the Soviet side by a distinct ideology. Revolution-
ary socialism-of which Soviet Marxism-Leninism is
a subtype-has some attractive elements for LDCs,
most of which have little experience with stable,
competitive democracy or progressive, responsible
capitalism. State ownership of the means of produc-
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tion appears consistent with the desire of many LDC
regimes to restructure their economies, and with the
desire of all of them to gain firm and exclusive control
over their countries' affairs. Conversely, the popular-
ity of free enterprise has suffered from its association
with greed, a colonial past, a "neocolonial" present,
and internal and international disparities in wealth.
LDC leaders often find it convenient to blame their
economic problems, whatever the true causes, on
"monopoly capitalism." The authoritarian politics of
the Soviet model also have appeal for the many LDC
elites who consider democracy an unaffordable luxury
and a distraction from the main task of economic
development. The concept of a loyal opposition is alien
to most LDCs, and thus political freedom for one's
opponents is frequently regarded as dangerous and
divisive.
Nevertheless, there are a couple of reasons that
Soviet-style socialism and specific tenets of Soviet
ideology do not win broad acceptance in the less
developed world. One is the contrast between Soviet
and Western standards of living, a contrast that has
become more widely recognized as modern mass
communications have exposed more people to the
Western lifestyle and its abundance of consumer
goods. Western affluence, in other words, invites
emulation as well as envy. Another reason is a general
preference for indigenous ideologies over imported
ones, sometimes leading to resentment of doctrines
that, like Marxism-Leninism, claim to be universal
and scientific. Most of the ideologies propounded by
LDC regimes emphasize nationalist or ethnic themes
that have a specifically local appeal and are not
adorned with "scientific" theories of economic devel-
opment. Iraqi Ba'thism is perhaps the most fully
developed "socialist" ideology in the less developed
world; yet it places less emphasis on socialism per se
than on Arab unity and freedom from foreign domi-
nation. In instances where the local dogma is a variant
of Marxism (as in China), the Soviets-who must
protect their own version of Marxism to preserve their
domestic political legitimacy-have been inflexible in
adapting to the variant.
It is difficult to assess the exact extent to which
ideological affinity affects an LDC's relations with
the USSR and other major powers. Other things
being equal, LDCs naturally prefer to associate most
closely with states whose internal political and eco-
nomic systems most resemble their own. But other
things are seldom equal, and, even when an LDC
shifts its internal policy leftward at the same time it
makes overtures to Moscow, it is impossible to disen-
tangle ideological considerations from its expectations
concerning major power support. For example, some
regimes have strengthened their ties with the USSR
as they have nationalized major industries (such as
Egypt's Suez Canal in 1956, the Iraqi oil industry in
the early 1970s, and numerous enterprises in Ethiopia
since 1977), but this has been due less to socialist
solidarity than to a judgment by the regimes con-
cerned that their seizure of Western assets had made
the West a less willing source of support, and perhaps
a more serious threat as well.
Opinions about each superpower's political and eco-
nomic system tend to be distinct from attitudes '
toward them as actors in world politics. The Indian
Government, for example, considers the USSR its
best partner even though India has much in common
internally with the West: extensive civil liberties, a
large private economic sector, and one of the most
democratic political systems of any LDC. Conversely,
the governments of some undemocratic, socialist
states (such as Sudan) profoundly mistrust Moscow
and pursue genuinely nonaligned or even pro-Western
foreign policies, to the extent of cooperating with the
United States on security matters. In short, LDCs'
views of the United States and the USSR as great
powers are shaped less by shared values than by
specific US and Soviet foreign policy decisions
deemed to be friendly or unfriendly.
Even for avowedly Marxist LDCs, the practical bene-
fits of a patron-client relationship are more important
than ideology. Ethiopian leader Mengistu's turn to the
Soviets in 1976-77 is perhaps the best recent case of a
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major overture to Moscow that was, at least in part,
ideologically inspired. But the Mengistu regime's
radicalism was important in this regard not simply
because the Ethiopians wanted to fraternize with their
ideological comrades, but rather because it made
Moscow a more promising supplier than the West of
desperately needed assistance. The Soviets' position in
Ethiopia today rests not on shared dogma but on their
personal relationship with Mengistu and their logistic
relationship with the Ethiopian armed forces. In fact,
Mengistu has dragged his feet in establishing a
Marxist-Leninist political party, evidently to avoid the
risk that a new Soviet-influenced power base could
arise to challenge his own.
The US and the USSR as Perceived Threats. The
perception of either superpower as a threat is likely to
have profound effects on any LDC's willingness to
cooperate with it. This factor is generally less impor-
tant in Washington's relations with LDCs than in
Moscow's, but a few leftist leaders, such as Libya's
Colonel Qadhafi and Seychelles' President Albert
Rene, genuinely fear Western-sponsored coups or
assassinations. Their responses to their fears vary.
Qadhafi has perhaps moved closer to the Soviets as
his sense of insecurity has grown over the past couple
of years. But Rene's mistrust of the West has prob-
ably reinforced his inclination not to grant the USSR
military facilities or other significant concessions,
because he believes this could be the very event that
would trigger a US or French move to topple him.
The USSR's attempts to undermine incumbent gov-
ernments in LDCs significantly affect its efforts to
gain their cooperation, but again the effects are
ambivalent. On one hand, LDC leaders whom the
Soviets are trying to weaken or replace have obvious
reasons to hold unfavorable attitudes toward the
USSR. The warmth of relations between Moscow and
several LDC regimes has tended to vary inversely
with the level of Soviet support for the local Commu-
nist party, ethnic separatists, or other dissidents. In
some instances (again, as in Sudan), the Soviets'
involvement in subversion has severely damaged their
relations with the government. In others, resentment
over subtler forms of Soviet interference in internal
affairs has inhibited the development of close and
friendly ties (as in Algeria, where the Soviets unsuc-
cessfully promoted the candidacy of a leftist the last
time the presidency fell vacant).
The Soviets' December 1979 intervention in Afghani-
stan-their most blatant and ruthless interference in
any LDC-has tended, in two ways, to discourage
other LDC governments from close involvement with
the USSR. First, it has made such involvement seem
even more incompatible than before with their pro-
fessed objectives of peace and nonalignment. Second,
it is a lesson in the hazards of admitting the Soviets
into one's country in the first place. After all, the
deposed Afghan government of Hafizullah Amin gen-
erally supported Moscow's policies and relied heavily
on Soviet aid and military advisers. The Soviets' stake
in Afghanistan evidently led them to protect their
investment by overthrowing Amin when it became
clear he could not quell the anti-Communist insurgen-
cy there, and their military advisory presence clearly
facilitated the intervention.
On the other hand, the USSR's capabilities for
subversion, military intimidation, and support to op-
position movements can also serve to pressure an LDC
into cooperating with Moscow. A vulnerable regime
may conclude that its best strategy for coping with the
danger of a Soviet or Soviet-inspired move is in effect
to buy protection from the USSR by voicing support
for Soviet policies or otherwise appeasing Moscow.
Such cooperation gives the Soviets a stake in the
regime and undercuts leftist opposition at home.
Threats thus can supplement blandishments in the
USSR's approach to LDCs. Moscow is currently
following such a carrot-and-stick approach in North
Yemen, where the shaky government of Ali Abdallah
Salih maintains a military relationship with the
USSR (despite considerable strain to its relationship
with Saudi Arabia) partly because it lives under the
gun of the pro-Soviet National Democratic Front and
hopes to stave off a Soviet-instigated NDF challenge
to its rule.
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25X1
In short, the threat of Soviet-sponsored coups, subver-
sion, or intervention can lead LDCs either to distance
themselves from the USSR (and perhaps to enlist US
help) or to accommodate the Soviets through coopera-
tion. Each government's strategy depends on all of the
considerations mentioned earlier regarding the choice
of supporters and, most important, on the extent to
which the Soviets have already penetrated the coun-
try. At one extreme are LDCs where there is no
strong pro-Soviet opposition and where the govern-
ment has taken only limited, tentative steps toward
involvement with Moscow (Botswana, Jordan, several
Latin American states). They are likely to be highly
sensitive to the dangers of permitting the Soviets to
establish a position and to back away from Moscow if
those dangers appear to be growing. There are addi-
tional LDCs where, although the USSR's role is
somewhat larger, the local leadership has set clear
limits to Soviet influence. But at the other extreme
are a few states where the Soviets already have so
great a role (Benin, South Yemen) that Moscow would
be tempted to frustrate any political changes that
jeopardized its interests. This might mean assisting
the overthrow of a leader whose policies begin to
appear heretical or, like Amin's in Afghanistan, mere-
ly ineffective. More often, it means dissuading a
leader from drifting out of the Soviet orbit in the first
place. Such a leader is riding a bear; he finds it safer
to hold onto the beast than to try to get off.
Types of Support
LDCs look to the United States and the USSR for a
wide range of support. With many types of assistance,
they can see specific advantages that one superpower
offers over the other.
Arms. The USSR is the leading exporter of arms to
LDCs. Soviet military sales to non-Communist LDCs
in 1980 reached $14 billion-one-third of all military
purchases by LDCs in that year-as compared with
$10.7 billion in US sales. The USSR has an even
more impressive lead in major weapon systems alone,
which constitute about three-fourths of Soviet mili-
tary sales but only one-third of US sales (the rest
being instruction, maintenance, training, and other
forms of support).
Many LDCs consider weapons the most critical type
of foreign support, because their chief concern is `
security against external-or in some cases internal-
threats. The large political role of the military in most
LDCs also is a factor. Although a conservative officer-
corps may steer its country away from the USSR, the
overall effect of military involvement in politics is to
increase the priority given to the acquisition of arms,
and this sometimes means giving particular care to
relations with Moscow because of its importance as an
arms supplier. In Peru, for example, the government
of President Fernando Belaunde Terry is fundamen-
tally anti-Communist and pro-US, but the politically
powerful and Soviet-equipped military has influenced
some Peruvian foreign policy decisions to make them
less offensive to the USSR.
The principal advantages that Soviet arms sales have
over US sales are:
? Advanced equipment. Although the USSR has long
had many customers for simple military equipment
that is rugged and easy to maintain, since the early
1970s it has also exported some of its most sophisti-
cated products, including MIG-25 fighters, SA-9
surface-to-air missiles, MI-24 attack helicopters,
and T-72 tanks. In a few cases Moscow has sold
advanced weapons to LDCs even before they were
deployed by its Warsaw Pact allies. The United
States has generally-been more reluctant to offer'its
latest products to LDCs, and for a time explicitly,
renounced the introduction of advanced weapons to
areas where they had not previously been deployed.
Whatever the military utility of such sophisticated
equipment to LDCs, the Soviets are meeting a
strong demand for it, especially among states with
the ability to pay. Governments naturally like to
maintain a qualitative edge in regional arms races,
and military officers usually prefer state-of-the-art
equipment.
? Ready availability. The USSR generally can deliv-
er more military equipment and deliver it faster
than any other exporter. It has a large capacity for
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D
manufacturing arms, and substantial stocks of surplus
equipment. By contrast, US arms sales frequently
have long leadtimes, due either to the competing
demands on production lines of US armed forces or to
administrative and Congressional approval proced-
ures. To expedite their arms shipments, the Soviets
have, in addition to sealift, sufficient airlift capacity
to rush significant quantities of materiel to distant
regions. (The need for overflight clearances, the lack
of an aerial refueling capability, and the limited
range of most Soviet transports remain serious con-
straints, however.) The Soviets have mounted major
military airlifts-to Arab states in 1967 and 1973, to
the republican side in the Yemeni civil war in 1967-
68, to Angola in 1975-76, and to Ethiopia during the
Ogaden war in 1977-78. These operations dramatical-
ly demonstrated Moscow's ability and willingness to
support its friends during emergencies.
? No explicit conditions. The USSR seems to attach
fewer strings to its military assistance than does the
United States. It does not require its customers, by
law, to forswear "offensive" uses of its arms, nor has
it explicitly linked arms sales to the human rights
performance or other internal policies of the recipi-
ent. Some users of US-made equipment have ap-
proached Moscow about possible arms sales evident-
ly because they were annoyed at such conditions and
wished to demonstrate their independence from
Washington. Actually, the USSR imposes de facto
conditions of its own: it surely considers the internal
politics of LDCs when exporting arms, and, even
without a formal prohibition on "offensive" use, it
has been chary of militarily strengthening any LDC
in a way that would encourage it to start a war. The
latter policy contributed to friction with Egypt in
the early 1970s, when Sadat wanted aircraft that
could attack targets deep inside Israel. For most
LDCs, however, it is important that Moscow does
not impose explicit restrictions on their policies and
thus does not appear to infringe on their
sovereignty.
Favorable financial terms used to be an attraction of
Soviet military assistance for most LDCs and still are
for some. But since the mid-1970s, as the wealth of
the oil exporters burgeoned and arms sales became an
increasingly important source of foreign exchange,
Moscow has charged most of its customers prices
comparable to those for US equipment and has, like
the United States, required payment in hard currency.
Only a few of its most important friends, such as
India and Afghanistan, continue to pay in local
currency.
One of the most frequent complaints about Soviet
military assistance is the insufficiency of mainte-
nance, spare parts, and other logistic support. Soviet
arms deals make less provision for such follow-on
assistance than US military sales, which usually
guarantee spares and supporting services for several
years. At the same time, the Soviets provide little help
to LDCs in developing their own maintenance capa-
bilities, insisting on shipping major equipment to the
USSR for repair rather than training technicians to
do the work on the spot. LDCs resent this practice
because it is inefficient and prolongs their dependence
on the Soviets.
The other principal drawback of Soviet military
assistance is the frequent need for Soviet military
advisers to instruct indigenous forces in the use of the
equipment-especially the more sophisticated types of
arms-and the often poor performance of these advis-
ers in comparison with their US counterparts. LDC
military officers who have worked with the Soviets
have variously described them as arrogant, insensitive,
indifferent, racist, or more interested in their perqui-
sites than in their missions. Moreover, regardless of
the quality of the advisers' performance, many LDC
governments are wary of the political, diplomatic, and
security risks of permitting any Soviet military per-
sonnel on their territories.
Economic Assistance and Trade. In economic aid,
unlike the arms trade, the United States plays a
significantly more important role than the USSR.
Soviet economic assistance commitments to non-Com-
munist LDCs in 1980 total $1.8 billion. In contrast,
the United States in fiscal 1980 provided $4.3 billion
in bilateral development assistance and economic
support funds, plus another $2.6 billion to multilateral
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development banks. Soviet aid is more highly concen-
trated in a few recipients than is US aid, a pattern
that reflects Moscow's special interests in such key
LDCs as Cuba, India, and Ethiopia and also avoids
spreading limited Soviet resources too thinly.
Soviet aid planners, unlike their US counterparts,
need not answer to any informed public or Congres-
sional debate about the welfare of LDCs and the
economic utility of different types of aid. Soviet
economic assistance is designed to have maximum
political impact as a demonstration of Soviet friend-
ship, as well as to yield economic benefits to the
USSR. It is not primarily intended to meet basic
human needs, to promote the economic and political
stability of LDCs, or to raise the standard of living of
very many people over the long term. Moscow devotes
most of its assistance to a few large and prominent
projects in the public sector, particularly heavy indus-
try. It provides very little commodity or hard currency
assistance. Western governments and the multilateral
banks have also financed many large public sector
projects, but in recent years have deemphasized them
in favor of other types of aid.
Despite the USSR's comparative stinginess in offering
economic aid, Soviet assistance has several potentially
appealing aspects:
? Dams, steel mills, and other large projects are
highly visible and readily identifiable as products of
Soviet aid. Many citizens in the recipient country
are impressed by them, and hence by their govern-
ment's ability to obtain support through friendship
with the USSR.
? The emphasis on heavy industry accords with the
ambitions of many LDCs to develop rapidly and to
close the economic gap between themselves and the
industrialized states. The Soviets contrast their aid
with the "antidevelopmental" Western aid pro-
grams, which Moscow contends are designed to
perpetuate the LDCs' subservient status as suppliers
of primary products.
? The emphasis on expanding the public sector also
suits most LDC governments.
? Unlike the United States and the Western-domin'at-
ed International Monetary Fund, the USSR gener-
ally does not require broad economic reforms as a
condition of its aid. This helps it to advertise its
assistance as having "no strings"-an advantage in
the eyes of most LDCs because of their desire to'
avoid even the appearance of interference in their
internal affairs.
The extent to which an individual LDC leader finds
these features of Soviet aid attractive naturally de-
pends on his social and economic philosophy and the
course he has charted for his country. A leader who is
committed to reducing governmental interference in
the economy and assuring a sustained rise in his ;
country's standard of living (Jamaica's Prime Minis-
ter Seaga is a current example) would tend to be more
comfortable with Western aid programs. But leaders
under heavy domestic political pressure may, what-
ever their own philosophies, be pushed toward policies
that are well suited to the Soviet aid approach.
Prominent public-sector projects can provide a more
immediate boost to a government's popularity than
measures intended to foster private enterprise, and
such necessary but unpopular reforms as the elimina-
tion of costly food subsidies may be considered politi-
cally suicidal.
The financial terms of Soviet economic aid are gener-
ally less favorable than those offered by the United
States and other donors. Unlike the West, the Soviets
provide very little grant aid. Loans obviously are less
financially beneficial to LDCs than are grants, and
some large Soviet clients have found themselves mak-
ing repayments faster than they were drawing on their
line of credit. The USSR charges about the same
interest rate for development loans as Western powers
do, but usually stipulates a shorter repayment period.
Soviet loans, however, often permit repayment in the
product of the industrial project for which a loan is
made, or in the recipient's own currency through a
bilateral clearing account. For an LDC whose prod-
ucts are not readily salable in the West or which does
not want to subject its earnings to the vicissitudes of
volatile commodity markets, such an arrangement can
be valuable as a means to conserve scarce hard
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currency. It is much less valuable for a state whose
goods are more marketable, and it can lead to the
frustration of watching the USSR resell these goods
to a third party for hard currency that the LDC could
otherwise have received on the open market.
The least attractive aspect of Soviet development
loans is that they are rigidly tied to purchases in the
USSR. Moscow insists that its credits be used for
Soviet equipment even when comparable items are
available locally, or superior items are available in the
West. The absence of industrial competition within
the USSR makes this requirement even more con-
straining than it would be if imposed by a Western
lender. The World Bank, in fact, requires competitive
bidding for the projects it funds.
Trade is closely linked to aid in LDC-superpower
relations, particularly with the USSR, which has
tailored its aid program to encourage the expansion of
trade ties. The provisions in this program for repay-
ment in kind, local currency accounts, and use of
credits for Soviet goods are all partly intended to
stimulate Soviet-LDC commerce as an offshoot of
development loans. In some respects, the structure of
the Soviet economy is well suited to the expansion of
trade with LDCs:
? The USSR has more need than the United States
for imported food.
? Trade with the USSR requires negotiations only
with a government agency, unlike some purchases
from the United States (particularly items with
possible strategic significance), which oblige the
buyer to deal both with the US Government and
with private corporations.
? Central economic planning and control permit the
Soviets, if they so choose, to subordinate profit to
political objectives when making trade offers.
The USSR's potential as a trading partner, however,
is limited in that its economy is smaller and more
autarkic than those of the United States and the West
as a whole. Moreover, the Soviets' own immediate
economic needs weigh heavily on their decisions re-
garding trade and aid, thus negating some of the
trading advantage of a centrally controlled economy.
Moscow rarely makes financial or commercial sacri-
fices solely to placate an LDC. The Soviets have at
times been hard bargainers even with so valued a
partner as India. Only in the case of Cuba-un-
matched among LDCs in its value to Soviet foreign
policy-has Moscow provided aid and trade conces-
sions (such as purchase of Cuban sugar at above-
market prices and supply of oil at below-market
prices) that involve a prolonged and significant drain
on Soviet resources.
Training and Education. Training-civilian or mili-
tary, in country or out of country-is a significant
form of superpower support to LDCs. The largest part
of Soviet instruction carried out within LDCs is
military, with the Soviet military advisory effort being
substantially greater than the US one (about 16,000
Soviet advisers in LDCs, as compared with 600 for
the United States). LDC students are educated within
the United States on a far larger scale than in Soviet
institutions, however. There are about 1,600 military
and 2,900 technical trainees from LDCs studying in
the USSR, as well as some 8,000 LDC university
students, while there are about 200,000 LDC students
in the United States.
Training in the USSR is cheaper but generally of
lower quality than education in the United States.
The Soviets pay all the expenses of their LDC stu-
dents, but the curriculums often appear to emphasize
political indoctrination more than the impartation of
skills. Education in the USSR is only a second choice
for many students, who would attend Western institu-
tions if they could gain admission and afford the
expense. Some of them return home to find them-
selves ill equipped to compete for jobs, wealth, and
power with their more highly skilled countrymen
educated in the West. An additional advantage of
being educated in the United States is that the
student enhances his fluency in the English language,
which is used far more widely than Russian.
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25X1
The long-term political dividends to the superpowers
of these programs are at best uncertain. Playing. host
to bright foreign students is one way to cultivate the
friendship of individuals who might someday assume
positions of influence in their home countries. But the
foreigner's experience is often an unpleasant one in
which he encounters an alien environment, strange
food, and subtle discrimination. The bad memories
may permanently color his attitude toward the entire
host country, its government, and its policies.
The United States has had ungrateful graduates, but
the USSR probably has many more. The foreign
student in the USSR must cope not only with the
unfamiliarity of his surroundings but also with the
regimentation and other unattractive features of a
police state, not to mention a cold climate and often
cold people. Two of the more noteworthy alumni are
Taiwan's Chiang Ching-kuo, who was a student in the
USSR in the 1930s, and Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, who
received air force training there in the 1950s and
1960s. Their accession to the presidencies of their
countries would seem to demonstrate the wisdom of
establishing ties to potential leaders early in their
careers. Their student experiences, however, obviously
failed to impart a lasting pro-Soviet outlook.
Diplomacy. Diplomatic support from a superpower is
generally less critical than arms and other forms of
material assistance, but in some circumstances it can
be important. The support furnished by the United
States and the USSR to LDCs engaged in regional
conflicts has included general statements of approval,
specific warnings against enemies, and actions in
multilateral forums, particularly the casting of vetoes
in the UN Security Council. The Soviets, for example,
have used the veto several times to back India on
South Asian issues, including the Kashmir dispute
and the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war.
Diplomacy, like other kinds of talk, is cheap. It is
especially so for the USSR and other totalitarian
states, in which the regime's foreign policy statements
are not scrutinized in open domestic debate and
measured there against moral or legal standards.
Accordingly, the Soviet regime is better able to tailor
its statements to make the desired impression abroad.
Unlike the United States, the USSR seldom casts a
minority vote at the UN solely to be consistent with
fairness, international law, orderly procedure, or even
its own principles. In short, Moscow is less obliged'
than the United States to use diplomacy as a genuine
expression of values and objectives, and thus is freer
to use it to curry favor with LDCs.
Military Support. Except for the Soviet intervention
in Afghanistan, superpower military backing for
LDCs is currently confined to arms, training, and
other measures that fall short of the direct involve=
ment of combat forces. The possibility of such involve-
ment can be a critical form of support, however,
particularly for an LDC that faces a serious and
immediate threat to its security. Even before Afghani-
stan, the USSR had demonstrated its willingness to
fill combat deficiencies of its friends at war. Soviet
pilots or surface-to-air missile crews have fought in
North Yemen (1967), Egypt (1970), Syria (1973), and
Iraq (1974-75), and Soviet advisers have supported
combat operations in Angola, Ethiopia, Syria, Mo-
zambique, Vietnam, and elsewhere. The USSR is
currently better able than the United States to pro-
vide this type of relatively discreet but direct military
support. The costs and risks involved can be concealed
from most of the Soviet populace, While the US
Government's freedom to engage in similar operations
is severely curtailed by the legacy of the Vietnam war
and the climate of public opinion it has produced in
the United States. Recent public discussion concern-
ing the status and actions of US military personnel in
El Salvador, for example, demonstrated to all LDCs
just how constraining that climate remains, nine years
after the US military disengagement from Vietnam.
Another way in which superpower armed forces can
support an LDC in trouble is the force demonstra-
tion-generally a naval deployment designed to com-
municate a threat, and to be better positioned to
execute the threat should it go unheeded. The US
ability to stage such demonstrations was once un-
equaled, but during the past 25 years the USSR has
greatly improved its own capability to back up diplo-
matic declarations with shows of force. In the 1956
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Suez crisis, Moscow supported Egyptian President
Nasir with threats against France and the United
Kingdom but lacked the military resources to influ-
ence events in Egypt directly (and in fact the United
States was much more responsible for ending the
Anglo-French operation). Since then, the Soviets have
developed a global naval capability that enables them
to project military power throughout the less devel-
oped world. Using that capability, Moscow has fre-
quently deployed warships to reassure its clients or to
warn against Western intervention in regional con-
flicts. It augmented its naval presence near India
during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, in the eastern
Mediterranean during the 1967 and 1973 Middle
East wars, off Guinea when a clash between Guinea
and Portugal seemed possible in 1973, and in the
South China Sea when China attacked Vietnam in
1979. Today, the USSR is correctly perceived as the
only state able to offset the US capability to project
military power to distant areas, and to deter US
action by raising the risk of an armed confrontation
between the superpowers.
Use ofAllies. Support from a superpower often entails
support from its allies as well. The connection be-
tween the two is by no means automatic on the US
side; the West Europeans, after all, have their own
reasons to provide extensive economic and technical
assistance, export arms, and engage in other activities
in the less developed world, without any prodding
from the United States. On the Soviet side, the East
Europeans and Cubans would be very unlikely to
furnish major assistance to an LDC without at least
the tacit approval of Moscow. But, on both sides, help
from the allies may be an important side benefit of
friendship with the superpower.
The help provided by the USSR's allies can be
substantial. East European aid to LDCs includes arms
(especially from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Roma-
nia), assistance to internal security organizations (es-
pecially from East Germany), and a host of other
military, technical, and economic services. The East
European states currently have about 1,900 military
advisers and 60,000 civilians working in LDCs. But
by far the most active Soviet ally is Cuba, which has
39,000 military personnel and 23,000 civilians over-
seas. The Cuban military presence includes a portion
of the combat force that helped Ethiopia to drive
Somali forces out of the Ogaden in 1977, as well as
the more than 20,000 troops that prop up the regime
in Angola. Although states friendly to the United
States have also sent their military personnel abroad
(the dispatch of a Moroccan battalion to Zaire during
the Shaba crisis, the use of Pakistanis in the armed
forces of several moderate Arab states), the United
States has no equivalent to the Cubans in terms of the
size, scope, and impact of their operations.
The reason it has no equivalent is that the Castro
regime's purposes in dispatching so many of its people
overseas are largely those of a revolutionary state, and
are not found to nearly the same degree in any pro-
Western country. Havana wants to advance proletar-
ian internationalism, energize the Cuban populace,
divert attention from domestic problems, and create
sibling revolutions to protect its own. It also seeks to
maintain some influence with the Soviets and to
export some of its surplus population.
Cubans offer certain advantages to the host country
that personnel from major powers do not. As an LDC
and a member of the nonaligned movement, Cuba's
presence can more easily be portrayed as brotherly
aid, not great-power imperialism. Cubans are more
tolerant of tropical conditions and apparently less
concerned with perquisites than their Soviet counter-
parts are. Culturally, economically, and sometimes
linguistically, they are closer to the LDCs. Africans
often detect racism among Soviets but seldom among
Cubans, especially since the Castro regime takes
pains to use Afro-Cubans for service in Africa.
Whether the demand for Cubans' services will be as
great during the 1980s as it was in the 1970s is
uncertain, given that Castro's stock in nonaligned
circles declined as he shared some of the opprobrium
of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. But the
supply of Cubans, including troops, available for
overseas service will probably remain undiminished.
Castro can be expected to continue looking to overseas
adventures as a device to pursue his international
goals and to cope with domestic difficulties.
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Outlook
Key Contingencies. Considerable political instability
and regional tension, much of it deeply rooted in
ethnic, religious, or other animosities, will continue to
provide Moscow and Washington with opportunities
to gain-or lose-influence in the less developed
world. The attractiveness of US and Soviet partner-
ship and support during the next several years will
depend in part on several contingencies that are not
wholly in either superpower's control:
? The course of important regional conflicts, especial-
ly those over Palestine, southern Africa, and Cen-
tral America. Soviet opportunities will depend on
the intensity of these conflicts and on the success of
Western powers in resolving them. In general, the
USSR's role will be larger to the extent that these
conflicts assume a military cast, while US influence
will be greater the more that diplomatic channels
are used.
? The use of armed force by either superpower. The
Vietnam war profoundly affected LDC perceptions
of US power, intentions, and reliability. The Soviet
intervention in Afghanistan has also had substan-
tial, though somewhat different, effects on percep-
tions of the USSR. Any future US or Soviet
military expedition in the less developed world-as
well as the future course of the Afghanistan war-
would probably also make a deep impact on how
LDCs think about their relationships with the major
powers. Depending on the outcome, such events
could be read as an indication of strength and
wisdom, or of weakness and folly.
? Domestic upheavals in important LDCs. Revolu-
tionary political change can, of course, suddenly and
drastically alter a state's relations with the United
States and the USSR. Upheaval in an especially
large and important LDC, comparable to the fall of
the Shah of Iran, may also be read in other
countries as a lesson in the danger of relying too
much on one or the other superpower, or perhaps on
either of them.
? The course of East-West relations. Although Mos-
cow is not about to curtail its penetration of LDCs
for the sake of better relations with the West, any
thaw in East-West relations would probably make
the USSR appear less useful as a counterpoise to
the West and an alternate source of support. Mos-
cow's experience during the early 1970s, when some
of its efforts to preserve detente with the United
States strained its relations with LDCs, is instruc-
tive. The Soviets antagonized and embarrassed In-
dia, for example, by welcoming President Nixon' to
Moscow in 1972, at a time when New Delhi was
railing against expanded US bombing of North
Vietnam.
The Ability To Compete. During the next several
years, the Soviets' economic difficulties will continue
to limit their ability to support LDCs. The Soviet
economy shows no signs of overcoming several persist-
ent problems:
? Sluggish growth, a reflection of declining capital
productivity and slow expansion of the labor force.
? Limited ability to earn hard currency, caused by
the high production costs, uneven quality, and defi-
cient marketing of most Soviet manufactures.
? Inefficient agriculture, which requires the USSR to
spend much of its scarce foreign exchange on
imported grain.
Meanwhile, the East European allies are becoming
increasingly dependent on Soviet economic support-
a trend being accelerated by economic disruption in
Poland and the reluctance of Western lenders. These
requirements close to home will undoubtedly weigh
heavily on Soviet decisions regarding the help to be
offered to LDCs. Moscow will think twice before
assuming sponsorship of a country that could become
as economically burdensome as, say, Cuba-which
has been receiving more than $3 billion annually in
Soviet economic and trade subsidies. The Soviets have
accepted that particular burden because their rela-
tionship with Havana brings substantial noneconomic
benefits. They are likely to be at least as selective as
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they are now in pursuing additional clients, and will
incur significant financial costs only where, as with
Cuba, major political or military dividends seem
assured. LDCs will perceive that large-scale Soviet
assistance can come only to the handful of states
whose policies are, by design or circumstance, most
helpful to Moscow.
Economic difficulties will not, however, keep the
Soviets from continuing to offer development projects
that would provide them with economic benefits (such
as access to needed minerals). Nor will it constrain
Soviet arms sales (at least none made on any but the
most concessionary financial terms). Indeed, arms
exports have become increasingly valuable to Moscow
as an earner of hard currency. The Soviets will
continue to be formidable competitors in this field,
and will have even more economic incentive than
before to sell advanced-and expensive-weapons. A
large proportion of Soviet arms sales are likely to
remain concentrated, however, in the few states that
are wealthy enough to pay for such weapons them-
selves (like Libya) or that receive funding from a
wealthy third party (as does Syria, financed by Arab
oil-exporting states).
The Limits to Involvement. The enlargement of the
Soviet role in LDCs since the mid-1950s reflects a
long but finite retreat of Western influence from the
less developed world. As colonial rulers, the Western
powers were the natural enemies of independence
movements, which continued to dominate the politics
of many LDCs even after independence was gained.
The Soviets avoided the opprobrium of colonizers and
posed as champions of subject peoples. The United
States, as the West Europeans' most important ally,
was less able to do so, even though it too had a long
record of opposing colonialism. Since the Portuguese
territories in Africa became independent, however,
there have been no significant Western colonies to be
freed. Political change in the less developed world is
no longer predominantly a one-way flow of Western
losses and potential Soviet gains. The Soviets have
acquired enough interests in LDCs so that they can
be, and have been, occasional losers as well.
In attempting to expand their influence in LDCs, the
Soviets are running up against the same pretensions to
nonalignment that have also limited US and Western
influence. For some leftist governments, remaining
nonaligned has become more a question of restricting
their involvement with the USSR than with the West.
Avoiding the appearance of close alignment with
Moscow is particularly important for states that rely
on the support of more moderate LDCs. For example,
Ugandan President Milton Obote-despite good rela-
tions with Moscow during his earlier presidency-has
not given the Soviets and Cubans any significant
military role in Uganda today, partly because he
needs to stay on good terms with the moderate
neighboring states (Kenya, Sudan, and Zaire) that
have cooperated to improve security within Uganda.
The efforts of left-leaning LDCs to appear nonaligned
sometimes pay direct dividends to the United States,
inasmuch as they need to make some friendly gestures
to Washngton to "balance" their relations with the
two superpowers. It is partly for this reason that
socialist President Rene of Seychelles, despite his
fulminations against US military activity in the Indi-
an Ocean region, permits a US Air Force tracking
station to remain on his own territory. Given his
frequent support for the USSR on other issues, he can
point to this facility as "proof" of his evenhanded
approach toward Moscow and Washington.
In countries where the Soviets have become the
principal source of foreign support, they tend to
receive criticism and resentment for the same reasons
that the United States has incurred them elsewhere.
Among those reasons are xenophobia in LDCs and the
friction that results from contact between different
cultures. The friction generally intensifies as the
Soviet presence grows. The foreigners' privileges be-
come more visible, their impact on the local way of
life deepens, and awkward incidents involving Soviets
and natives multiply. In some instances-South
Yemen is a current example-local citizens dislike the
Soviets for using up scarce supplies of housing, food,
and consumer goods.
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Moreover, disagreements are virtually inevitable be-
tween governments that have a complex patron-client
relationship involving a wide range of military and
economic endeavors. A single misunderstanding can
initiate a cycle of recrimination and retaliation. An
LDC's displeasure with the amount of Soviet military
aid or the accompanying repayment schedules may
lead it to withhold payments, suspend access to its
ports or airfields, or initiate contacts with Western
suppliers. Any of these actions could in turn make the
Soviets less generous in extending further aid. Such
episodes have occurred in Moscow's past relations
with LDCs, and, even where a close relationship with
the USSR continued (as in Vietnam or Syria), a
legacy of mistrust has remained.
Serious disagreements are most likely to involve the
physical security of the LDC, and more specifically
the extent of Soviet military support during crisis or
war. LDCs understandably consider foreign support
most critical at such moments, but the USSR, just as
understandably, tries to avoid entanglement in mili-
tary campaigns that do not serve its own interests and
that could trigger a larger East-West conflict. Lead-
ers (and many others) in LDCs long remember how
foreign states responded in emergencies, and if the
Soviet response is lukewarm they are likely to con-
clude that the USSR has failed the test of friendship.
Egyptian President Sadat evidently reached this con-
clusion about the Soviets' behavior during the 1973
Middle East war, when Moscow pressed Egypt and
Syria to halt their offensive early, refused to share
satellite reconnaissance data, and provided what Sa-
dat considered an inadequate amount of military
assistance. Iraqi leaders are probably reaching similar
conclusions about tepid Soviet support during their
current war with Iran, although the full consequences
are not likely to be seen until the war is over and
Iraq's immediate dependence on Soviet supplies has
lessened. The newest test of Moscow's friendship has
been posed by Syria, which responded to Israel's
annexation of the Golan by attempting to invoke-in
the face of obvious Soviet reluctance-the consulta-
tion provisions of the Syrian-Soviet friendship treaty.
Whatever its genuine grievances, an LDC government
may use the USSR as a convenient scapegoat for its
problems, just as the United States has often been
used. It is easy to blame economic or security difficul-
ties on inadequate foreign support, and berating one's
chief supporter can pay domestic political dividends
by playing on popular resentment of foreign influence.
For example, Sadat's expulsion of Soviet military
advisers from Egypt in 1972-even before Moscow's
disappointing performance during the 1973 war was
immensely popular among Egyptians. The ineffic}-
ency in Egypt's air defense system that the expulsion
caused was probably offset by the boost it gave to
morale within the Egyptian armed forces. Sadat'
move was an assertion of national pride and, as h
later noted, was necessary for the subsequent miltary
"victory" over Israel to be credited to Arabs and not
to the Soviets.
The most successful Soviet assistance efforts carry the
seeds of their own demise by possibly making the,
LDC more self-reliant and less interested in the
future in the kinds of support Moscow can best
provide. Evidence of this has already surfaced in
Soviet-Indian relations. Whatever gratitude the
USSR may have earned during the 1971 Indo-Paki-
stani war, the elimination of Pakistan once and for all
as a serious conventional military threat to India
made Soviet military assistance less critical to New
Delhi than before. In addition, the Indian economy is
developing in ways that make Soviet economic aid and
trade less useful. India's demand for nonmilitary
Soviet manufactured goods has slackened as it has
expanded its own industrial capacity. New Delhi has
become increasingly impatient with the prepackaged
nature of Soviet development projects, which allow no
role for Indian planning or Indian-made parts. India
is now looking less for help in the basic industrial)
sectors that most Soviet aid projects involve and more
for high technology to be used in specialized plants.
The Soviets' inability to provide the latter is already a
handicap in their competition with the West, and will
become increasingly significant to the extent that
other LDC economies mature in the same direction as
India's.
Soviet involvement in the less developed world is also
self-limiting in another sense: Moscow's relations with
some LDCs tend to restrict its influence in certain
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others. One reason for this is the difficulty of be-
friending either party to a regional dispute without
incurring the wrath of the other. Somalia's break with
Moscow as the Soviets enlarged their support to
Ethiopia is a clear example. Another reason is that the
widespread use of Soviet-made arms has given pur-
chasers of this equipment alternative sources of fol-
low-on support. LDCs that want Soviet weapons but
do not want Soviet military personnel on their terri-
tories sometimes can-at least with unsophisticated
equipment-turn for advisers and instruction to other
LDCs that already have these items in their inven-
tories. In this regard, Jordan has been looking to Iraq,
Kuwait to Syria, and Botswana to India for help.
Although such arrangements may in some instances
expand the market for Soviet arms, they also make
arms sales less useful to Moscow as a means of
influence and a first step toward a closer relationship.
The Record of Successes and Failures. The greater
exposure and vulnerability of the Soviets is not the
only respect in which competition in the less devel-
oped world today differs from the situation 25 years
ago, when decolonization was just beginning. Another
difference is that the various approaches to political
and economic development that were chosen by newly
independent LDCs now have a track record. The
LDCs have acquired ample experience to demonstrate
which approaches work better than others. Overall,
the record argues in favor of the US model over the
Soviet one. The most prominent success stories have
been such countries as Singapore, Taiwan, South
Korea, Brazil, Mexico, and Ivory Coast, which have
achieved rapid economic growth through a strategy of
fostering free enterprise and retaining trade and
investment ties to the West, even though some of
them lack substantial natural resources. The record of
socialism in LDCs has been much less impressive. It
has, in fact, been downright dismal in some African
countries such as Tanzania. Even Cuba, despite the
strides it has made in health care and education since
the revolution, remains heavily dependent on the
USSR for its economic survival.
To the extent that LDC leaders learn from these
experiences, they become more likely to follow a path
closer to the United States than the USSR. On
occasion a leader may clearly and boldly switch paths
in order to overcome past mistakes, as President
Sadat did in redirecting Egypt, politically and eco-
nomically, toward the West. Most of the time, the
lessons learned will be implemented more subtly and
quietly. In many cases old socialist and anti-Western
themes will continue in rhetoric but will be gradually
abandoned in practice.
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