STRATEGY PAPER ON YAMAL ENERGY ALTERNATIVES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R002000090024-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 17, 2008
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: October 23, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

State Dept. review completed.
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October 23, 19al
CONFIDENTIAL
(With SECRET Attachment)
TO : ' OVP - Mrs. Nancy Bearg QyKe
?NSC - Mr. Allen Lenz
DOE - Mr. Henry Thomas
DOC - Ms. Jean Jones
?DOD - Mr. Jay Rixse
?JCS - LTC Edward Bucknell
USTR Mr. Richard heimlich
? Treasury - Mr. David Pickford
? CIA -
SUBJECT: Strategy Paper on Yamal Energy alternatives
Attached for interagency consideration and comment is a
working level draft strategy paper on Yamal energy alternatives
as tasked by the SIG on East-West Economic Relations in its meet-
ing October'9. The draft is being circulated in advance of SIG
level clearance owing to the presence of senior officers in
Cancun.
Addressees are asked to review the draft promptly. Sug-
gested revisions, in writing, should be sent to this office by
COB Monday, October 26. A SIG greeting to discuss the draft will
be scheduled tot the week iL\f October Z6 L.
L. Pau! nremer, III
Executive Secretary
Attachment:
Strategy paper with appendices
State Dept. review completed.
CONFIDENTIAL
(With SECRET Attachment)
GDS 10/23/87
L-Qi3q
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A US Strategy Towards the West European-Soviet Union Gas Pipeline
Background
The ideal European response to the President's concerns
about. the pipeline would be -_otal abandonment of the
Siberian pipeline project. iris would effectively reduce
European vulnerability to the disruption or threat of
disruption of Soviet gas supplies and eliminate the hard
currency earnings the r: rojec't L:4t3iC .rOSvll.de t~-? So v :.ets.
Given the strong political commitment by European
leaders to the project and the progress made in the negotiations
to date, the project is expected to proceed. Since President
Reagan aired U.S. concerns-to-European.-leaders at the J uiy
Ottawa Summit, ?-t-he only critical unresolved issue is price.
The Soviets and the Germans hope to conduce the discussions
before the November 23-24 Brezhnev visit to Bonn. Agreement
is expected to be announced at that time.
A fundamental issue is whether the U.S. can
effectively pursue with the allies the development of a
coordinated and mutu?ally beneficial strategy for international
energy security and East-West trade. Parts of this strategy.
are in place, but the pipeline raises broader strategic
problems which must be considered. The Europeans view the
Soviet.gas as an important means*, to diversify their energy
supply. Pursuing energy diversification has been an important
objective in the IEA and at Economic Summits. However,
European economies and political systems will remain vulnerable
to middle East oil disruptions and the pipeline would
create still another source of vulnerability. The Europeans
must be prepared to minimize the risk resulting from energy
disruptions from one or the other or both of these sources.
A second fundamental issue exemplified by this project
is the divergence of views on East-West trade between the
US and the Europeans. The Europeans believe that trade
results in benefits to both sides. The pipeline has wide
labor and business support in those participating'countries.
if the pipeline proceeds despite our strong concerns US
objectives should be sixfold:
(i) Minimize European vulnerability to Soviet gas
disruptions due to technical and/or political reasons;
(ii) Maximize the European options and incentives to
achieve a favorable price and set of conditions for the
gas;
(iii) Reduce the benefits which would accrue to the
Soviet Union;
(iv) Signal that the United States is willing to do
its share to strengthen the energy security of the
West;
EGRET
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(v) Take into account the need for Allied and
other European support for broader US objectives (e.g. TNF
and tighter multilateral export controls); and
(vi) Ensure that any US economic restrictions should
hurt Soviet interests more than US interests.
To address U.S. concerns--randinfluence the timing, terms
and conditions of the project it is imperative that the U.S.
begin discussions with the FRG and other European participants
by the first week in November, although at this late stage
it may not be possible for the U.S. to prevent the construction
of the pipeline. However, we should still continue to
voice our basic concerns to the Europeans and, as President
Reagan has promised, offer them options for meeting their
-energy needs.
Strong actions initiated by the UnitedStates--like
an embargo of equipment needed for the project--may delay
construction of the pipeline and could reinforce our arguments
and their doubts about the need for future increased quantities.
Valuable time could be gained--time which can benefit the
Europeans in their continuing negotiations with the Soviet
Union, as well as provide an important window of opportunity
in which to strengthen European defenses against a possible future
cut-off of gas supplies. The Europeans, however, may view
such a delay-as an extension of their vulnerability to
Middle East energy. In addition, such a step would exacerbate
our political difficulties with European allies and make
progress on other high Administration priorities more
difficult.
Major U.S. Points to be Raised
Achieving the above objectives would require joint
action by Western European countries and the United States.
In forthcoming discussions with the Europeans, the U.S.
should emphasize the following points:
The economic viability of the pipeline is becoming
;Bore unceAtain There are growing indications that gas
demand will be significantly lower than previously anticipated
and that other, less risky energy supplies might be available
from elsewhere. We must, however, recognize that while on
purely energy grounds the pipeline is becoming less economically
attractive, the Europeans see the pipeline as helping to
provide jobs and to support key depressed industries within
Europe.
The Europeans are trying and may be successful in
holding out until the Brezhnev visit to Bonn for a better
price and more favorable conditions. This is a point which
we should emphasize. Barring renewed conflict and disruption
in the Near East, a delay , even beyond the Brezhnev trip,
could work to the advantage of the Europeans. The Europeans
may oppose a protracted delay, however, since they view the
period ppreceding the Brezhr:-: visit to Bonn as the best time
to complete the deal.
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In the best of circumstances, Europe's gain can be-
maximized " at the expense oz the Soviet Union arc the objective
of reducing the benefits to the Soviets will be partially
realized. (Annex. l has a detai lilt d srcu.ssion of the economic
~
viability--of- the pipeline.
(2) In a worst case scenario, Europe would be susceptible
to increased political and economic leverage applied by_.tae
Soviet Uniono Although. European reli_nce on Soviet gas will
only account for 5 percent of total ener:;y consumption, some
regions -and sectors would be far more dependent. Irr t e
event of an interruption in Soviet gas supplies, there
would be no readily available-substitutes unless there was
ex-oess- capac.i-ty_in . other, parts of the.gas grid. Unless
'-there is sufficient stored gas__a;mod- ~frastr acture to deliver
it, gas is difficult.to replace on short notice: there is
no spot market and storage is expensive and technically
difficult.
In the event of a Middle East oil disruption, the
Soviet Union would have enhanced leverage which they might
exploit. If both the Middle East oil deliveries and Soviet
gas imports were disrupted simuLtaneousLy, Europe and
its Allies would face serious economic, political and
strategic difficulties.
- . (3) Other energy alternatives are available over
the medium and longer term that can better serve European --
economic, security and political interests than the Soviet
gas option. Imported coal, nuclear power, and intensified
indigenous North Sea oil and gas production could all
contribute to meeting future European energy aemand and
thereby replace the need for Soviet gas (see Annex 3).
There are new developments which suggest that the Nigerians
may be willing to provide significant quantities of natural
gas at competitive prices. (DOE will circulate, shortly, an
annex to this paper which goes into detail on this issue.)
(4) There are additional alternatives which the United
States could choose strengthen 'Wester r energ Se Ca
The -U .S . is in the process of strengthening its own energy
security: the President's move to decontrol oil has resulted
in a dramatic drop in oil imports which has benefited all
consuming nations; the size of the Strategic Petroleum -
Reserve has doubled in eight months; and nuclear power and
Alaskan natural gas prospects have been given strong Presidential
endorsement.
The U.S. could consider further actions which would
require interagency approval before these ideas could be
presented to the Europeans. Some of these would include
deregulation of natural gas, more active stock build
and the imposition of an oil import security tee. The U.S.
could also explore with the Europeans ways to accelerate the
already promising outlook for U.S. coal exports to Euro-pe_
In addition, the U.S. and _--hers could app ea? to- the rear
government in Norway to expand its natural gas production
and capacity and transport systems. Plans could be developed
:.r
1 J
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-4-
to assist Norway with recycling revenues into profitable
long term sources of income sc that its dpi est is eC'~'?C~my is
not adversely affected. The US could also discourage
imports of long haul LNG to U.S. mar,:ets f for example, by
applying a prohibitive impart fee-and/or a comparative fuel
price test) and thereby induce some producers to reconsider
their pricing decisions. European gas consumers would -
clearly, benefit: ~fxom Such._ ac io_n,.r Anre$ 4 gce Lnto.: tore ,-
detail on possible US action.)
(5) In the event that the pipeline proceeds, means must
----be founds and put- in plate _to -reduce -European `r'4lr.erabi 2 i tyti
---The -best-defens0--agairrs-t--a- politically motivated cut-off is
to have convincing emergency precautions in_ place that can
be red `i:'l act itvate& .- - Some - 4= = 't=n s ~ ce carat ions would-
Y-~
include' larger oil and gas stock s`, -shut'=in--gas reserves in
European fields which could be used in a gas emergency, and
more dual-fired capacity among large industrial users and
electrical power plants--so that oil and coal could be
substituted in the event of a disruption of the gas supply.
The're are several means to "internalize" the security costs
(e.g., a gas import security feel which could 'be used to
finance security initiatives such as those described
above. Such suggestions to the Europeans must be accompanied
with convincing arguments for the need and preliminary
assessments of the costs of these security measures. (Annex
2 has a fuller discussion of European vulnerability.I
(6) If it wished the US could try to delay construction
of the pipeline by seeking a joint US/UK embargo of key
compressor components and technology for the project.
Current plans for the pipeline call for west European
compressor component manufacturers to procure compressor
turbine rotors and drive shafts from General Electric. Only
Rolls Royce now produces a turbine which is not based on
U.S. technology and Rolls Royce is now prepared to deliver
these key components. If we can obtain and effectively
enforce a US-UK embargo of turbines to run the pipeline'
compressors, we may be able to delay the delivery of key
~__ _ =components for up to two years. By that time a French
licensee of G.e technology could retool to produce a
similiar product. On the other hand, it is doubtful that
the UK would go along with such an equipment embargo.
(British Defense Minister Notts reaction to Secretary
Weinberger was very negative.) The US could also consider
unilateral action. Such action would not be as effective as
a joint US-UK embargo, but it would signal the
of US concerns over the pipeline. G.S. companies would lose
sales; GE, for example, would lose some $175 million in
sales and release a new competitor on world markets. Any
other actions we might cake are not likely to have the same
impact in establishing the seriousness of our intentions.
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However, unilateral action is likely to meet with sharp
European criticism and may weaxen allied cooperation on
other high Administration priorities. The motivation
for such action will have to be clearly explained and
understood because there could be charges--that-the-US is
unilaterally imposing its viewpoint on the Western alliance.
It we choose to discuss the embargo option with the Europeans
it will be necessary to develop a convincing argument to
counter the likely European response that this is a move to
punish Europe for going through with the deal. We should
emphasize that such action is a worthwhile security measure
and in long term Western security interests. Because such
action could delay construction, it would give Europe more
time to reassess the economic viability of the pipeline in
light of recent and expected world energy markets. (See Annex V)
Recommendations
(i) That the objectives and means outlined in this
paper be cleared by,members of the SIG on East-West Economic
relations?and, shortly thereafter, by a Cabinet level
group (probably NSC).
(ii) That a high level State-led team visit. Bonn, Paris,
Rome and other selected capitals during the first week of
November to present these ideas to the Europeans.
(iii) That subsequent to, and depending on the results
of these meetings, a decision memorandum to the President
be drawn up on whether or not an US/UK embargo on key
compressor components and technology should be sought.
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ANNEX I - ECONOMICS OF THE SIBERIAN PIPELINE
The economics of the project are questionable:.
-- Since 1978 the economic factors affecting East-West
...gas trade have changed dramatically. Overall energy
growth rates are down and markets are soft. European
gas demand fell last year by 4 percent. It appears
that the rate of substitution of gas for oil has
slowed. Official estimates of future gas demand
have been -revised down"rd_ and the market is likely
to- be weak -for- a- cons idertble period of time.
--.These fundamental changes in world energy markets--..
raise serious 'questions `as to whether the volume of
gas contemplated for transmission through the
pipeline can in fact find a market in Western
Europe. While the Soviets may wish to set
the FOB price as close as possible to the BTU
equivalent of crude oil, in the current market and
for the foreseeable future such a high price would
almost certainly make it impossible for the gas to
be competitive with other forms of energy in Western
Europe.
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The pipeline project would make Europeans vulnerable to Soviet pressure
-- The volume- of Soviet gas as. a percentage of total
European energy consumption is not alone a sufficient
indicator of economic and political vulnerability:
Gas is a difficult fuel to replace on short
notice. Unlike oil, there is no spot market.
Gas trade requires large start-up infrastructure
investments in pipelines or LNG facilities.
Furthermore, it is much more expensive and-
technically challenging to hold large strategic
stocks of gas as compared to oil. Certain
regions will--be --heavily dependent on- Soviet gas
-and might,,apply. strong pressure on national
governments to avoid actions that could result
-in an interruption. In the event of an
interruption, Soviet gas could not be readily
replaced unless there was excess capacity
in other parts of the European energy grid.
- Residential and commercial consumers are particu-
larly dependent on gas. A cut-off- of Soviet gas
would be onerous for these politically sensitive
sectors. Thirty percent of gas for the pipeline
is earmarked for residential use. Residential
-and commerc'i'al consumers are the least able to
absorb an abrupt fuel supply interruption.
Homeowners have limited capacity to switch easily
to another fuel. Furthermore, gas prices would
probably rise precipitously in the wake of a
Soviet embargo and thus place a harsh financial
burden on homeowners and commercial businesses.
-- Technical or seasonal difficulties--perhaps
complicated .by the need to divert gas from export
to domestic use to make up for reduced deliveries of
Iranian gas--forced the Soviets to slow some gas
shipments to the West last winter and spring.
The probability of'further technical or seasonal
interruptions may increase as the Soviets try to
ship more gas from outlying and more risky Siberian
provinces to Western Europe.
-- In the past, the Soviet Union has used energy
exports as a political lever, interrupting supplies
to Yugoslavia, Israel, and China, among others.
Under some circumstances, the Soviets might elicit
otherwise unobtainable economic and political
concessions from their West European gas customers.
-- Thus, West European vulnerability to Soviet gas
leverage could be substantial. And it is not
unreasonable to assume that the Soviets from time to
time would see the dependence of Western Europe on
Soviet gas as an opportunity to try to obtain
political and/or economic benefits.
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ANNEX III - ENERGY ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE TO EUROPE
European economic security and political interests
could ke_.be.tter servea by choosing-non-Soviet alternatives.
-- A major alternative. may be oil itself. The oil
market for the 1980s has undergone a significant
change from that of the late 1970s when plans for
-gas imports were developed. Few predicted the
magnitude of demeud.reduction in response to rising
oil-prices. Much of this is due to structural
changes-in-'our-economies and societies; --not -simply '
reduced economic growth. In light of these circumstances
there is a possibility that energy prices may be
relatively stable during the 1980s.
---African gas-is closer to our European allies than it
is to us and can be an alternative to Soviet imports.
There are substantial gas resources in Algeria, Nigeria,
Cameroon and Qatar that could be available to our
European allies and friends; this gas could replace---
part of the anticipated Siberian pipeline deliveries.
--,Within Western Europe, Norway has the potential
to become an increasingly important gas supplier -
to Continental Europe in the 1990s, although prospects
for accelerated development in the 1980s are uncertain.
The US and others could assist Norway with recycling some
of its -increased revenues into long term profitable
sources, so as to minimize the adverse short term effects
in their economy. It may also be possible to convince
the Dutch to slow their phase-out of exports in
light of reduced demand. This is largely a
political question, and could be influenced by our
views.
-- Coal has more poterntia.]. than any other resource
,or providi.ng _ac =
this century and--- e,yond..- Rapid growth- in- tha use - oz.
coal is critical to the successful transition to a
more secure energy future. There are increasing
indications that a "coal renaissance" is now underway
and that the shift to increased coal use will gain
momentum.
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ANNEX Iv - 4....~,.~~..~~... -
WESTERN ENERGY SECURITY-
The United States has taken and will continue to
implement a number of steps which will- increase the
availability of oil as well as gas on the world
market. We have already decontrolled oil prices in
an. effort- to encourage domestic production and
reduce wasteful use. Moves are also being taken to
increase leasing of federal land including the-Outer--
Shelf in order to help stimulate heretofore
locked-in domestic energy wealth.
-- The-Administration is currently reviewing proposals
for-accelerated gas price deregulation. But,
even if the deregulation process cannot, be accelerated,
_ {rise controls- -on--mos-t- Zomestic gas_w_ill be removed - -
d
.
by the time that the Siberian pipeline is complete
Accelerated gas price deregulation will. help stimulate
domestic production and enable the US to decrease
its need for oil and gas imports.
-- As gas price deregulation proceeds,. gas use will
become more efficient and supplies more plentiful.
To the extent the US will still require imported
gas, market forces will favor imports from Canada
and Mexico and possibly other Western Hemisphere
sources rather than long-haul liquified natural gas
(LNG). Even under our current competitive fuels
test for the price of gas imports, long-haul
LNG will have difficulty finding a place in the US
market.
-- The Administration has announced its commitment to
the development of nuclear power in the US and
has stressed that the US will reestablish itself
as a reliable partner in the international nuclear
energy arena. Many of our allies and friends in
Europe will welcome the reentry of the US into a
oosition of leadership in the international nuclear
community. Several European countries are concerned
about problems related to the back-end of the
nuclear fuel cycler specifically reprocessing and
waste management. Out ;;*ore positive position on
reprocessing and expanded nuclear cooperation,
particularly in the back-end of the fuel cycle,
could help to mitigate some of the problems associated
with the accelerated development of west European
nuclear power.
1
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ANNEX-V'- Embargoof Compressors and Related Technology
- A means to possibly delay construction: of the pipeline
would be a US embargo.of.compressors and related technology.
The supply of turbines may be -'a-critical- chokepoint for the
West_Siberian pipeline--project. The Soviets have- ordered
some- $2" bill-i on-wo.rth~-of tnrbine eoirpres brs for the project
from Western European companies who are partial licensees
of G.E. gas turbine technology. Current plans call for
General Electric (U.S.) to supply the'European companies
with $175 million in critical turbine technology. GE and
Rolls Royce control directly, or indirectly by means of
licenses, all Western technology for the production of
urbine~_Shat. could be -used on the- pipeline. A- French
eomgny; ~;lstth~tlariti=q3e, is the only full G.E. licensee
of-gas ?t-u-r--b-ine- t h.p,o-log-y,- bu-t- does not -now produce the type
of roto that G..E..'s _ artialw.li,censees in. Europe have
ordered--from. the. Amerj.can;-cQmp.any Under -5ke -terms of f the
Export Administration Act-If tfie president could 'place either
national security or foreign policy export controls on this
equipment and technology.
The US faces four options-with regard to-an embargo:
(i) No embargo. This would mean a continuation of present
policy, as the US does not currently control the export of
turbines or compressors nor their components and technology.
This option aiould'allow'the construction of the pipeline to
go forward as expected and US industry, in particular GE,
would benefit. The perception that this would implicitly
signal US approval is somewhat muted by the fact that no US
company is a direct supplier. Other high Administration
priorities in European dealings could continue to be judged
on their own merit (as opposed to being possibly affected if
an embargo option is chosen).
(ii) US unilateral embargo. This would signal the
Europeans of the seriousness of US intentions. It would
also deny the Soviet Union the best product; the GE turbine
is known to them -- it is already in use and it fits their
needs. If denied the GE product, the. Soviet Union would
1-i k- e l y pcrr e??1s et F1e - ^ re"+'p?sr -?.~3 f- Rte? a???y ce.. t+ r , v ~__~ __ _
I-are~QS~tech_ no ogy~, artfiougTi _i~ rias"iaFe~n"T
tested in the Soviet Union. We recently learned that the
British EGCD (their EXIM equivalent) is prepared to finance--
Rolls Royce -- thus the British Government appears ready to
support such a sale. There is an added Soviet bonus to
buying the Rolls Royce unit, since it "is an aeroderivative
engine several generations more advanced than the G.E.
product.
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(iii) UK/US embargo. This option could have the effect of
delaying delivery of compressor components for up to two
years--the= time needed for the French firm to produce a
similar product. There is question how a delay in the
..components will affect: the overall schedule of the- pipe-line-
completion.-* -Compressors can be added -rathe-r late during
construction and, therefore, gas flow might not be delayed
significantly. UK Defense Minister Nott told Secretary
Weinberger'in August that the idea of UK participation in an
equipment enbArgo'is a "ndn--starter" and would be "politically
disastrous" for the Atlantic Alliance because of German
sensitivities over the project.
- (iv)- UK/US/French embargo. This option would have the
most effect in delaying the pipeline. The Soviets would
have to substitute two to three times as many of their
compressors for the higher quality Western alternatives, if
the Soviets could indeed increase production to that level.
As noted above, there would be possibly serious problems in
obtaining the British and French support for such action.
While G.E.'s full licensee in France is technically bound by
contract to honor US export control regulations, the US has
no means to enforce. this regulation outside of its borders.
Enforcement would require French Government assistance and
the French are unlikely to stop a project in which they have
an important energy stake. Neither the French nor the
British-have domestic legal mechanisms to control.trade that
has not been designated as strategic (i.e., trade which has
direct military application) by COCOM. COCOM, which operates
on a consensus basis, does not currently control equipment
and technology in the energy area, and a US proposal in
COCOM to institute. an embargo would face German (and perhaps
other) opposition.
Since neither the British nor French have legislation
with which to control non-strategic exports, a possible US
alternative strategy with these countries is to ask them not
to extend official credits for substitute sales to the
USSR. All existing equipment orders for the pipeline, with
the exception of GE sales of rotors to its European manufactur-
ing associates, are slated to receive- official credits. If
Rolls Royce and Alst om-Atlantique were forced to offer
market financing for their substitute products, their
attractiveness as suppliers would be diminished. However,
as rotors constitute only about 10% of the total value of
turbine and compressor sales for the pipeline, the Soviets
might pay the price to ensure that the pipeline moves
forward.
*This issue is being carefully considered at this
time and more information should be available shortly.
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If we choose to pursue one of the embargo options, a
co w mcinq_ strategy will have -to be developed to cou-rater the
their.-decision to procee4 w.ith- the pipeline. The US shotrld
-stress that this is- no-t the case: it -is bu, sincere view
-o-bjec-tive.-- Be-cause such action might delay construction of
the pipel-ine,-the Europeans may reassess the economic
viability of the pipeline, which in the view of the US has
not--been gJien sufficient attention in light of recent and
-expected world. etre-r-gy--markets. _-- T _-.?
Leo-embargo -is likely. to-,affect other areas
of European-US relations. It may also drivea wedge.betweep
the allies which; would benefi t the Soviet -Union. = -Thepros and
cons of this action will have- to-b--given careful--.consideration
alongside other high ldmin st-ratlon-.priorities.
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 The Europeans are likely to reply that:
Projected levels of European dependence on -Soviet-"
gas are low. Dependence on Soviet energy will be
5 percent or less of total energy consumption in all
countries except Austria. The Europeans conclude,
therefore, ttlat the Soviets would not gain any real
leverage as a result of this pipeline.
Their use of Soviet gas is a necessary part of
their strategy to reduce their oil consumption and
to diversify their sources of energy. Soviet gas
imports, by reducing their dependence on fuels from
the Middle East, would, on balance, improve their
overall energy security.
The Soviet Union, unlike Middle Eastern suppliers,
has never in the past shut off energy shipments to
West European countries for political reasons.
The only ?immediate alternatives to increased Soviet
gas imports would be increased dependence on oil and
gas. from the least reliable Middle Eastern suppliers.
They have scaled.-down the project and are contemplating
a safety net based on:
- The flexibility of indigenous European gas
-,product i_on;. ..
- Their ability to substitute other fuels (oil or
coal) for gas used in electric power plants and
industry;
- Significantly expanded stored gas reserves; and
- The integration_ af.. E_utopean...nat_iona.l_ gas grid
creation of employment and contracts for the European
companies, particularly in-the currently depressed
steel industry.
The US approach does not meet one of the major
reasons for proceeding with the project--the
SECRET
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ANNEX- VI - LIKELY EUROPEAN REACTION TO US CONCERNS AND
PRESENTATION
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 Approved For Release 2008/06/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R002000090024-9
Drafted: E:WFMartin:jvm:10/22/81
Clearances:
EUR:JScanlan
EUR/SOV:HHamilton
_EUR/RPE:DMi11er
EUR/CE : JDB i:idenag le
S/P:DLoft
T:MMarks
EB/IEP:ALarson
'RE
Approved For Release 2008/06/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R002000090024-9