LETTER TO THE HONORABLE JOHN A. MCCONE FROM WILLIAM J. CASEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R002000040021-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 1, 2006
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: March 5, 1982
• Content Type: LETTER

83M009 14R0 0 0040021-~
Please send his copy to:
The Honorable John A. McCone
I can't tell you how delighted I am
have agreed to accept the Donovan Award. I am
planning to get out to San Francisco for the event.
I thought you would be interested in some background
on the occasion which might help orient you for the
remarks that you want to make there. I am enclosing
a copy of the talk I made when I was an awardee in
1974 and also my remarks on the occasion of presenting
the Donovan Award to Margaret Thatcher last year.
While I'm loading you up with reading matter
I might as well include my current interview in
U.S. News and World Report, and also some remarks
I made last week in Palm Beach in which I used your
,name in vain in the warning about the dangers of
the conventional wisdom.
Best regards.
The Honorable John A. McCone
Enclosures
VCC
L- a.oy
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"And again, thank you for being here, and I look
forward to working with you and thank you in
advance for your support."
-The CIA Auditorium, 3 February 1981
THE CLANDESTINE WAR IN EUROPE
(1942-1945)
How can I adequately express my appreciation for the William J. Donovan
Award. This medal has very special meaning for me. There is the great affection and
admiration which General Donovan holds in my memory. There is the example and
inspiration he provided during the 15 years I was privileged to regard him as leader
and friend.
So many of my most cherished friendships were formed in the OSS and for all
these years I have been proud of what we were able to do together.
This sentiment extends in a special way to those who have come across the Atlan-
tic for this occasion tonight and to so many others who worked with us throughout
Europe. At the time, we may have known them only as numbers or code names, like
Caesar for Jean-Pierre Roselli, but strong friendships and bonds have formed and
flourished across the Atlantic over these 30 years.
We have visited back and forth and attended each other's reunions. We've even
overcome the barriers of language, notably when the French invited us back for the
20th anniversary of their liberation. They took us all over France and everywhere
we'd go, there would be an occasion and a speech. I had to respond in my fractured
French and I would begin: "Nous sommes tres heureux d'etre ici." This was intended
to mean, " WVe are very happy to be here." After a few such performances, Barbara
Shaheen, who had studied French in school, came to me and said: "Bill, you are
saying, 'Nous sommes tons heroes,' " which means, "We are all heroes." I hope you
won *t think that's what I'm saying tonight, as I tell you for the first time the full story
of OSS.
For us, in the United States, it all began with a New York lawyer who saw his
country facing a deadly menace and knew that it was unprepared and uninformed.
It's hard for us to realize today that there was a time in 1940 and 1941 when William
1. Donovan was a one man CIA for President Roosevelt.
I remember General Donovan bouncing.into London, with little or no notice,
brimful of new ideas, ready to approve any operation that had half a chance. He'd
come tearing in from New Guinea, or wherever the last invasion had been, and go
charging off to Anzio, or wherever the next landing was to be.
Remarks of William J. Casey on receipt of the William J. Donovan Award at Dinner of Veterans of
OSS. 5 December 1974.
 -9 NeWS
;WORLD RePORT
Interview With CIA Director William J. Casey
cal SovEel
i~ E9 Salvaor-
evon
In a rare and unusually candid discussion,
the nation's intelligence chief spells out
a Kremlin strategy for conquest by subversion
and for building Russian military power
by using secrets stolen from the U.S.
Q Mr. Casey, there's a great deal of concern that this country
might be dragged into a Vietnam-like quagmire in El Salvador. In
your view, is that fear warranted? .
A No. I don't think El Salvador or what we're likely to do
there bears any comparison to Vietnam. In the first place,
El Salvador is on our doorstep. And we're not just talking
about- El Salvador; we're talking about Central America-
Costa Rica, Honduras and Guatemala. The insurgency is
beamed at all those countries.- Furthermore, this is part of a
worldwide problem
Q Worldwide in what sense?
A Around the middle of the "70s, the Soviets assessed the
impact of Vietnam on American public opinion and decided
we probably would be restricted in our ability to respond to
low-level insurgency operations. In the last seven years,
starting with the dispatch of sophisticated weapons to join
up with Cuban troops in Angola, they have developed a very
innovative and brilliant mix of tactics: Political, diplomatic,
destabilization, subversion, terrorists and support of insur-
gencies. And they have applied this around the world.
Over this past year alone, you've had insurgencies in
North Yemen, Chad, Morocco, Kampuchea, El Salvador,
Guatemala. You have incipient insurgencies in many Afri-
can countries. The Soviets work in some concert with Cuba,
Libya and North Korea. They work with Angola against
Namibia and Zaire; with Ethiopia against Somalia, and with
Libya and Ethiopia against the Sudan.
Q Now are the Soviets Involved?
A What happens in these insurgencies is that the Soviets
go in and exploit the underlying social and economic dis-
contents, which are plentiful. That gives them a base. They
feed it with trained men and with arms. That drives away
investment. The insurgents sabotage economic targets, and
so economic discontent grows. And as the discontent grows,
more people go over to the insurgents' side.
It's almost a no-lose proposition for the Soviets. They can
stay in the background. They sell their arms and get up to
20 percent of their hard currency from Libya and other
countries that can pay for the arms. It's something we have
very great difficulty coping with.
Q What is Cuba's role in all this? -
A Here's a country of 10 million, with 50,000 people
around the world-military and civilian. Besides the Cuban
troops in Angola and Ethiopia, there are 12,000 technical
trainees in East Germany and Czechoslovakia and 5,000 to
6,000 students in the Soviet Union. They have 50 people
here, 60 people there-in Africa, in the Middle East and in
Latin America.
They can do this because of the demographics that led
them to get rid of 120,000 people in the Martel sealift.
There has been a 50 percent jump in the 15-to-19 age
group in the Cuban population. That's quite a latent force
that Castro has no work for at home and can use for mis-
chief abroad. He said in a speech just a few months ago that
he would like to send 10,000 young Cubans to Siberia to
chop down trees for construction projects in Cuba.
Q Do you have evidence that materiel is being supplied by
Cuba to the guerrillas in El Salvador on a significant scale?
A Oh, yes. Without it the guerrillas wouldn't be able to
sustain an insurgency.
Q And Nicaragua? What part does it play?
A This whole El Salvador insurgency is run out of Managua
by professionals experienced in directing guerrilla wars.
You've got to appreciate that Managua has become an inter-
national center. There are Cubans, Soviets, Bulgarians, East
Germans, North Koreans, North Vietnamese, representa-
tives of the PLO. North Koreans are giving some weapons
they manufacture. The PLO provides weapons they've
picked up around their part of the world. There are American
weapons that the Vietnamese brought in in substantial quan-
tities-mostly small arms that were left behind in Vietnam.
0. Now large are these foreign groups operating in Managua?
A In the case of the Cubans, 6,000 are in the country, of
whom 4,000 are in civil work and maybe 1,800 or 2,000 are
in military and security work. The East Germans and Soviets
each have somewhere between 50 and 100. The Bulgarians,
the North Koreans and the Vietnamese are fewer. They all
have their little function: The East Germans work on the se-
curity system; Cubans work on the general strategy, and the
Soviets work, for the most part, on the large weapons that
have come in. The North Koreans and Vietnamese are good
at caching arms and digging tunnels and things like that.
Q Why is the administration apparently so concerned about
the arrival in Cuba of crates presumably containing a squadron
of MiG-23s-a plane that already is operating there?
A Well, Cuba has the biggest air force in the hemisphere
next to ours. The new planes are just part of a buildup. But
I don't know that we are that concerned. Jimmy Carter
made it an issue when MiG-23s arrived in Havana, and he
didn't do anything. about it. I think this President has been
rather careful not to make it an issue-although I wouldn't
say we're unconcerned.
Q Does what is happening now in Cuba violate the 1962
Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement ending the missile crisis?
. A Oh, sure it does because the '62 agreement said the
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REMARKS OF WILLIAM J. CASEY
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
TO
THE SOCIETY OF THE FOUR ARTS
PALM BEACH, FLORIDA
23 February 1982