DISCUSSIONS WITH GRN - NICARAGUA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R001900230198-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 4, 2008
• Sequence Number: 198
• Publication Date: March 29, 1982
• Content Type: CABLE

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CONFIDENTIAL
ARA/CEN:AMGIESE
-3/29/82 X-24975
ARA:TOENDERS
ARA/CEN:LCJOHNSTONE
S/S-0_
IMMEDIATE MANAGUA
NODIS
E. 0. 12065:
TAGS
GDS 3/29/88 {ENDERS,
PINS, PINT, NU
DISCUSSIONS WITH GRN
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
THOMAS 0.}
2. YOU SHOULD INFORM D'ESCOTO THAT ASSISTANT SECRETARY
ENDERS IS PREPARED TO VISIT NICARAGUA IN MID APRIL
TO HOLD TALKS WITH THE GRN ON THE FULL RANGE OF ISSUES
OF CONCERN TO-BOTH GOVERNMENTS. YOU SHOULD INDICATE
THAT ENDERS WILL EXPECT TO TALK SUBSTANTIVELY WITH
RANKING MEMBERS OF THE DIRECTORATE INCLUDING JUNTA
COORDINATOR ORTEGA. -
3. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE
THE GRN'S RESPONSE TO INCLUDE SCHEDULE OF APPOINTMENTS
WITH MEMBERS OF THE DIRECTORATE. {FYI: WE WOULD
NOT'PLAN TO PROCEED WITH VISIT IF APPOINTMENTS WITH
DIRECTORATE AND ORTEGA CANNOT BE SCHEDULED.} YY
State Dept. review completed.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Option I, Pg.
OPTION I
APPROACH TO CUBA IN APRIL
PRIOR TO TALKING TO SANDINISTAS
Nicaragua
o We have reached a critical point on Nicaragua
the present course of events cannot continue.
o One way to achieve this is through-mutual under-
.standings.
Before we meet with the Sandinistas we want the
Cuban Government to understand what we seek to
achieve.
(Mane Nicaragua a.points)
Central America
o To accompany the adjustments concerning Nicaragua
and to foster a propitious climate for security
and-peaceful change in Central America, we loolc
to Cuba to cease its material support (training,
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.
Option I,. Pg.., 2
weapons, financial support) for revolutionary
groups in entire region.
Angola
With respect to Angola, we envisage a settlement that-.
includes the following elements:
o We are proceeding on the assumption that Luanda
makes its own decisions.
o We accept Cuba's claim of nonalignment with respect
to Angola and thw"s expect Cuba, i accordance
with the February 4 communique, to withdraw from.
Angola when Luanda so decides.
o ' We are talking. to the Soviets and they acknowledge
fiche` rel"at i onship between South African withdrawal
from Namibia and Cuban withdrawal from Angola.
o We welcome the fact that the February communique
recognizes a link between a settlement in Namibia
and Cuban withdrawal from Angola.
0 A Cuban withdrawal following a South, African
withdrawal is not adequate.
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Optio n? I,- P g-_ 3
0 There must be a credible plan for parallel, coor-
dinated.movement by both sides..
Such an approach is-the only way to achieve Namibian
independence, resolve Angola's long-range political,
and economic problems and stem the violence that
could develop in the region.
Mar i el
o Finally, Cuba must take back Mariel.Cubans found
excludable under US law, including those released
from prison, those with physicaf and mental ail-
ments requiring institutionalization and other
undesirables.
0 Will help us to f' restall other initiatives in
Central America by allowing.us to say that we
are engaged in a dialogue with Cuba as well as
Nicaragua.
o Will'strengthen our claim that we have a record
of having tried to.talk to Cuba about pressing
problems.
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Option_ I ,, Pg.... 4
If there is any Cuban predisposition to achieve
some negotiated security for Nicaragua, Castro
may urge the Sandinistas.to accept at least some
of our terms.'
Castro will exploit continued private bilateral
contacts to weaken the resolve and increase-the
sense of insecurity of those Central American
governments looking to us for support against
leftist violence.
o If Castro does not want us to reach a settlement
with Nicaragua he could try to stiffen Sandinista
opposition to our proposals.
o -?Castro -is likely to conclude we are only talking
to him to forestall other (e.g. Mexican, French,
etc.) initiatives in the area and is likely to
try to torpedo our efforts in the entire region.
o Might give Castro the idea there is some bilateral
bargaining chip we are willing to give up for
Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola...
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Option.. II", Pg-. 1
OPTION II
Keep Castro Informed
of What We Hope to Achieve
in Nicaragua and Angola
This would consist of two separate approaches
(a) On Angola we would ask a member of the Contact
Croup to communicate to Cuba the same points
as in Option I.
On Nicaragua we would ask the Chief of our Interests
Section in Havana to brief Castro on what Tom
Enders would say to the Sandinistas. This would
be done the same day that Enders told the Sandi-
nistas. We would say publicly that we.are keeping
Cuba informed through our Interests Section.
o Will help us to forestall other initiatives in
Central America allowing us to say that we are
discussing this with Cuba as well as Nicaragua.
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Option it,- P'g. 2'
If there. is any Cuban predisposition to achieve
some?negotiated security for Nicaragua, Castro
may urge the Sandinistas to accept at least some
of our terms.'
o Keep Castro informed on Nicaragua but in such
a way as to minimize the sense of insecurity
of those Central American governments looking
to us for support against leftist violence.--
o Keeps Castro informed on Angola but in a way
that emphasizes that we are not prepared to offer
Cuba any bargaining chips.
o More likely than Option I to persuade Castro
-chat we are keeping him informed mainly to stave
off other initiatives.
o More likely than Option I to make Castro feel
that the US views him as ancillary to rather
than instrumental in reaching agreements on Angola
and Nicaragua. ,
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 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP83M00914RO01900230198-3 25X1
(Cr aig)
NICARAGUA POLICY:
THE NEXT 60 DAYS - NEGOTIATIONS---SCENARIO'
A. This week we send a message to the Nicaraguans
through normal diplomatic channels proposing a visit
to Managua by Enders in mid-April. Visit conditioned
on appointments with Directorate/Ortega: -
- B. If Nicaraguans insist on Mexican presende
at talks we refuse.
C. Immediately after message is delivered, key
allies (France, Mexico, Canada, Great Britain, FRG,
Italy, Spain, Venezuela, Colombia, CADC Three, Panama)
informed of Enders visit and briefed on kind of proposals
We expect to discuss with Nicaraguans.. Purpose would
be to reassure some.(like CADC three) and preempt
other-s (France and Panama). We thank Mexicans for
their efforts and encourage them to lean on Nicaraguans
.to be forthcoming in talks.
But, as a demonstration. of our goodwill,
we make some kind of symbolic gesture prior to Enders'
visit (i.e., postponement of Colombia exercise, island
landing portion).
25X1 -1
STAT
STAT
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(Craig., Pg.. 2)
E. Public relations line during this period
is low-key but we let. fact of forthcoming Enders visit,.
be known publicly after consultations completed with
allies. Emphasis in public discussion is on our concern
over Cuban presence in Nicaragua.. We'continue effort
to show repressive nature of?Nicaraguan regime. This
is facilitated by increasingly repressive measures
likely to be taken by Nicaragua as internal pressures
grow.
P. Prior to visit "high-level source" would
background press on US willingness to reduce trainer
presence in F1 Salvador .f Cubans reduce to same levels
in Nicaragua.
G. The Enders visit is kept to one or two days.
Comprehensive peace plan is presented to the Nicaraguans
(see -x and L 'below) and Enders
2.s not
begun,
have to
by Cuba
says we
makes clear that time
on their side, that their problems have only
and that when the chips are down they will
face, us alone because they will not be supported
the USSR in a major confrontation. Enders
will not allow the continuation of a state
in Central America aligned militarily or ideologically
with the Soviet Union and Cuba. Enders agrees to
return to Managua after Nicaraguans have studied proposals
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(Craig--, Pg. I)-
but reiterates that there will be no progress until-
the first steps. are taken..by the Nicaraguans to end,
support-for-the insurgency in El Salvador, Costa Rica
and Honduras. Enders gives a deadline of ten days
for a Nicaraguan response.
H. If the Nicaraguans do not respond in ten
days we proceed with portion of Colombia exercise
which had been previously postponed.
1. Following Enders visit we brief same countries
as previously on details of US proposals and urge
support.
J. If Nicaraguans do not respond by early May
we table peace proposal at the CADC meeting in:Colombia.
.(Secretary would participate.) CADC could then put
proposal-to OAS .
K. The Comprehensive Peace Plan. The comprehen-
sive peace plan will be based in large measure on
the package of proposals put to the Nicaraguans in
August-September. The difference will-be:
o The question of Nicaraguan support for the
insurgency in El Salvador (and in Honduras
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(Craig, Pg. 4)
and Costa Rica).. is made more explicit to
require Nicaragua to cut off training and
command and. control.facilities'as well as.
arms flow.
o: The Honduran proposal for international
(OAS) observers at. borders, ports, airfields,
sensitive zones, etc. is incorporated into
the plan as a verification item.
o The portion dealing with Cuban advisors
is amplified.
L . Vine seven elements of the. peace plan. are:
1. The cessation of Nicaragua's support for
insurgencies in neighboring countries.
2. A statement for dealing with Nicaraguan.
exile activities in the-United States.
3. A .US-Nicaraguan statement on friendly rela-
tions.
4. A proposal.on arms and military force limita-
tions.
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(Craig, Pg.., 5)..
5. A proposal on international verification.-
6. A?proposal on economic cooperation.
7. A proposal on human and cultural exchanges
and confidence building.
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