NICARAGUA - EL SALVADOR BRIEFING DRAFT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R001800010036-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 28, 2008
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: March 15, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WasMn,-;cr. D.C. 20520
March 15, 1982
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM
TO: ARA - Mr. Bosworth
FROM: ARA/PPC - Luigi R. Einaudi
SUBJECT: Nicaragua El Salvador Briefing Draft
Attached as promised is the latest version,
Attachment:
As Stated
cc: INR - Mr.
P Mr.
C - Mr.
S/P - Mr.
PA/PRESS- Mr.
ARA - Mr.
ARA - Mr.
ARA - Mr.
ARA/CEN - Mr.
ARA/P - Mr.
Stoddar/d
Palmer
Ledeen
Glassman
Romberg
Briggs
Bushnell
Gillespie
Johnstone
Biggs
CONFIDENTIAL
GDS 3/15/88
State Dept. review completed
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15 March 5:00 p.m.
CUBAN AND NICARAGUAN SUPPORT FOR THE SALVADORAN INSURGENCY
I. INTRODUCTION
This briefing deals with the question of Cuban
and Nicaraguan support for the guerrillas in El Sal-
vador. As you are all aware, we have been conducting
highly-classified briefings in recent weeks for leading
members of Congress and for distinguished officials
from previous administnetions. You are also aware
that the persons who have seen the sensitive intelli-
gence have overwhelmingly agreed that it is convincing,
and that the Government's contention of a close working
relationship between the Salvadoran guerrillas on
the one hand, and the governments of Cuba and Nicaragua
on the other, is firmly based on information in our
possession.
We will not be sharing those_secrets with you
today. This is not the same briefing given to Congress,
and it is hardly necessary to dwell on the reasons
for withholding certain secrets from the world at
large. Were we to release them, we would not only
lose access to critical information, but we might
well risk the lives of some brave people who feel
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it is important that the Government of the United
States know what is going on. A Government that does
not keep secrets does not receive them.
We have nonetheless pulled together for some
information that describes the general pattern of
outside support for El Salvador's violent left. Some
of this information comes from classified sources.
Most of it can be obtained by careful analysis of
public sources. The.cumulative weight of this informa-
tion leaves no reasonable doubt that the guerrilla
movement in El Salvador receives vital assistance
of many kinds, including arms and political-military
training and counsel, from an international infrastruc-
ture outside El Salvador. The two most immediate
links in this international chain are Nicaragua and
Cuba, which is heavily subsidized by tho Soviet Union.
In what follows, you should keep the following
First, that the most recent information -- the
information we cannot provide to the general
public and therefore not contained in this briefing
-- is consistent with-patterns of guerrilla activ-=
ity and foreign support evident for two years
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and more. As you will see, a clandestine support
system establ-fished at the time of the Nicaraguan
civil war continued to operate afterwards with
a new final destination El Salvador. Cuba played.
a major role-in developing this network,. and
remains its key link;
Second, that the existence of this network --
initially identified by the Carter'Administration
-- has been repeatedly and vigorously denied
by Nicaraguan and ,Cuban spokesmen . Yet a consid-
er.able quantity of solid information shows that
those denials are false, and that the network
is vital to the Salvadoran insurgency.
Third, that many elements of the pattern have
been repeatedly confirmed by independent researchers
and journalists who have gone into the field
to investigate the actual situation on the ground.
Confirmation has come from as far away as Lebanon
and Vietnam.
Fourth, that in assessing the situation in El
Salvador today, one should pay attention to the
nature of the guerrilla movement. To this end,
we have appended to this report a schematic history
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of the development and organization of El Salvador's
violent left.
Finally, that we are witnessing in El Salvador
a drive for power controlled by groups as or
more extreme than any that took power in Nicaragua
in 1979, or, twenty years before that, in Cuba.
Our decision to support the government of El
Salvador rests upon both the aggressive actions
of Cuba and Nicaragua and the unhappy state in
which their citizQns.now find themselves. If
a Cuban-style totalitarian pattern is repeated
in Salvador, no evolution toward democracy would
be possible.
II. THE PATTERN
Outside backing for the insurgency in El Salvador
has taken many forms over time. The pattern is intri-
cate, but has three major components.
External Arms Supplies. Within weeks after the
fall of Somoza in July 1979, the Sandinistas began
to cooperate with Cuba in support of the Salvadoran
extreme left by establishing training camps and the
beginning of arms supply networks. This clandestine
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assistance initially involved local black'markets
and relatively limited resources. In 1980, after
a unified command structure under Communist control
was established for the Salvadorans with Cuban help,
the Sandinista leadership decided to directly manage
an arms trafficking system of unprecedented proportions
and which originated outside the hemisphere.
Arms for the Salvadoran insurgents reach Nicaragua
by direct flights from Havana to Nicaragua. Two Nicaraguan
ships, the Aracely and .the Nicarao, also frequently
transport arms to Nicaragua from Cuba in their cargo,
as do Cuban and other vessels. These arms are stock-
piled in Nicaragua until guerrilla headquarters near
Managua arranges for their shipment into El Salvador.
The timing of deliveries is coordinated with the planned
level of fighting.
The arms reach the guerrillas from Nicaragua
by several means. The guerrilla support networks
vary the routes for security reasons. Aerial supply
was an important means of arming the Salvadoran guer-
rillas for the failed January 1981 final ,offensive,
but air deliveries do not now provide the bulk of
the guerrillas' weapons. 'The guerrillas' main overland
routes from Nicaragua to El Salvador are through Honduras.
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Honduran officials succeeded in closing several routes
in November 1981. With the compromise of so many
air and overland routes, since late 1981 deliveries
by sea have increased. From the southeast coast of
El Salvador, these supplies then move inland along
various routes to the north and northwest.
Le.t me provide some concrete illustrations-of
the arms flow.
The Papalonal Airfield provides a clear case
of the direct airlift of weapons from Nicaragua to
guerrillas in El Salvador. Papalonal is a remote
area 23 nautical miles northwest of Managua. The
airfield is accessible only by dirt-roads (Photl).
In late July 1980, the airfield was an agricultural
dirt airstrip approximately 800 meters long. By mid-
December, the length had been increased by 50 percent
to approximately 1,200 meters; a turnaround had been
added to each end; a dispersal parking area with three
hardstands -- a feature typical of a military airfield
-- had been constructed at. the west end of the runway;
three parking aprons had been cleared; apd three hangar/stor-
age buildings, each about 15 meters wide, had been
constructed on one of the aprons (Photo). After mid-
December, at least three more hangars and two support
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buildings. were added, and future additions were initi-
ated. Hangars were to stockpile arms for the Salvadoran
guerrillas. Extensive photography showed that these
hangars resembled those at major Cuban airbases.
Other sources confirmed Cuban involvement in the con-
struction. C-47 flights from the airbase, confirmed
by photographic evidence, corresponded with sightings.
in El Salvador. We identified five pilots in Nicaragua
who regularly flew the.route into El Salvador. Deliver-
ies from Papalonal dropped dramatically as a result
of the January 1981 capture of. pilot Julio Romero
by Salvadoran officials. Pilot recruitment then became
difficult, despite Sandinista offers of substantial
bonuses to fly the route.
Weapons delivery by overland routes from Nicaragua
is mainly through Honduras. In early January 1981,
Honduran police intercepted a shipment of arms concealed
in a large truck enroute from Nicaragua. The police
caught six individuals unloading weapons.from the
truck. The six identified themselves as Salvadorans
and as members of the International Support Commission
of the Salvadoran Popular Liberation Forces (FPL)..
They had in their possession a large number of altered
and forged Honduran, Costa Rican, and Salvadoran pass-
ports and other identity documents. This one truck
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contained over 100 M-16 automatic rifles, fifty 81-mm
mortar rounds, approximately 100,000 rounds of 5.56-mm
ammunition, machine gun belts, field packs, and first
aid kits. .We traced over 50 of these M-16 rifles
tonumerous U.S. units assigned to Vietnam in 1968-
69, and which remained in Vietnam after U.S. troops
departed.
Honduran authorities have continued to intercept
arms smuggled from Nicaragua. This particular truck
was apparently heading for Guatemala when it was cap-
tured in April 1981 crossing into Honduras from Nicaragua
(photo A). Ammunition and propaganda materials were
hidden in the side walls of the trailer. This picture
shows a storehouse prepared by these same arms traf-
fickers in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, with a false floor
and special basement for storing weapons (photo B).
It should be noted that when a clandestine shipment
of arms is intercepted or a safehouse is found contain-
ing arms and terrorist supplies it is often impossible
to know with certainty whether the ultimate are Guatemalan,
Honduran or Salvadoran terrorists, since the arms
supply networks established by Cuba and Nicaragua
are funnelling lethal military supplies to terrorists
and guerrillas in all three countries, using the same
clandestine smuggling techniques and routes.
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Training, Cuban and Nicaraguan political and'
military training create the basic framework for the
use of the arms by the guerrillas within El Salvador.
Nicaragua and Cuba coordinate training efforts, with
Cuba providing key specialized training.
Salvadoran guerrillas train at several military
sites in Nicaragua under guidance from Cuban.and other
foreign advisors-. The Sandinistas have trained Salvadoran
guerrillas in military tactics, weapons., communications,
and explosives at temporary training schools scattered
around the country and on
Sandinista military bases.
.This training has increased the tactical skills of
the guerrillas in El Salvador. For more specialized
training, guerrillas transit Nicaragua for Cuba.
The Managua-Havana air shuttle link is in daily opera-
ticn and the increase in traffic has required a ticket-
ing system where none had been required before. Guer-
rillas are provided false identity documents to allow
them to transit third countries. The Cubans are train-
ing guerrillas in sabotage and demolition efforts
and reinfiltrating them through Nicaragua back into
El Salvador. Guerrilla operations -- such as the
attacks on Ilopango airport and the El Oro bridge
were performed by trained saboteurs and underwater
demolition experts,
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The link between training and the regional infra-
structure behind guerrilla activity is evident in
this next series of photographs, taken following a
raid by the Honduran police on a FMLH safehouse.
In an October 1981 interview in the pro-government
Nicaraguan newspaper El Nuevo Diario, "Octavio", a
founder of the Morazanist Front for the Liberation
of Honduras (FHLP) explained that his self-described
political-military organization was formed in view
of the "increasing regionalization of the Central
American conflict." this raid took place on 27 November'
1981, in the Loarque section of Tegucigalpa, Honduras.
By way of background the Honduran police were attempting
to search this house when a firefight broke out, resul-
ting in the deaths of one policeman and two guerrillas.
The police ultimately captured four of the nine known
members of this group. This particular cell of the
FMLH consisted of one Honduran, one Uruguayan, and
seven Nicaraguans. The Nicaraguan Government provided
funds for training and travel ex2enses, as well as
explosives.
Captured documents and declarations, from detained
guerrillas indicated that:
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The group was formed in Nicaragua at the instiga-
tion of high-.level Sandinista leaders;
The group's chief of operations resided in Managua;
and ?
Members of the group received military training
in Nicaragua and Cuba.
The documents included classroom notebooks from a
one-year training course held in Cuba in 1980. Other
documents revealed that gubrrillas at one of the three.
safehouses were responsible for transporting arms
and munitions into Honduras from Esteli, Nicaragua.
Command and Control. The military forces of
the FMLN guerrilla movement are controlled by the
Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU) with three
members from each of the guerrilla groups active in
El Salvador.
The DRU was formed in Havana in 1980 after meetings
that began under Castro's sponsorship in late 1979.
Creating a unified military command that included
the Moscow-line Salvadoran Communist Party before
supplying modern armaments was a key to Cuba's-political-
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military strategy. This pattern, applied previously
in Nicaragua and since then elsewhere in Central America,
draws on ideologically-commited Cuban-trained military
cadres to ensure Marxist-Leninist control of the insur-
gent process and any government emerging subsequently
from it.
The DRU command headquarters is in Nic.aragua,
and is part of an extremely sophisticated command
and control relationship. This system is more elaborate
than that used by the Sandinistas when they were fight-
,
ing Somoza. Planning and operations are guided from
this headquarters in Nicaragua. The guidance flows
to guerrilla units widely spread throughout El Salvador.
This headquarters coordinates logistical support for
the insurgents to include food, medicines, clothing,
money and most importantly weapons and ammunition.
Although some free-lancing inevitably exists, the
Managua headquarters decides on locations to be attacked
as well as coordinating supply deliveries.
We have information that Cuban and Nicaraguan
advisors are present at DRU guerrilla headquarters
in Nicaragua, where they are intimately involved in
planning' Salvadoran operations.
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Recent Developments. The 5000 full-time front
line and 5,000-10,000 part-time guerrillas consume
roughly 10 to 20 tons of lethal supplies each month
when engaged in hit-and-run attacks. This.far exceeds
what they capture from government forces. Three months
ago -- in mid-December 1981 -- Fidel Castro decided,
in consultation with guerrilla leaders, that external-
supplies of arms to FMLN units should be stepped up
to make possible an offensive to prevent a peaceful
vote in the March 28 Constituent Assembly elections.
Extreme leftist groups throughout Central America
were mobilized to support the effort. Nicaraguan
Junta coordinator Daniel Ortega recently predicted
privately that there would be an increase in spectacular
actions by Guatemalan and Salvadoran guerrillas.
Shipments of arms into El Salvador have increased
markedly within the past three months. During the
past year, we have been able to follow closely deliver-
ies of arms to the Salvadoran insurgents. The recent
Cuban-Nicaraguan arms flow into El Salvador has empha-
sized both sea and overland routes through Honduras.
Early this month, for example, a guerrilla unit in
El Salvador received several thousand sticks of TNT
and detonators. Five sticks of TNT are sufficient
to blow up an electrical pylon. Last month, a Salvadoran
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guerrilla group picked up a large shipment of arms
on the Usulatan coast. This shipment came by sea
from storage sites in Nicaragua.
These and other recent external supply efforts
have furnished heavy weapons, including M-60 machine
guns, 57m,-n recoilless rifles, and M-72 antitank weapons,
thus significantly increasing guerr-illa firepower.
Individual units also regularly receive tens of thou-
sands of dollars for routine purchases of non-lethal
supplies on commercial markets.
III. CONFIRMATIONS FROM THE PUBLIC RECORD
On March 8, 1982, Stephen Rosenfeld wrote in
the Washington Post that the evidence of the Nicaraguan-
Salvadoran connection "is lying all over Central America."
The following examples are all drawn from the public
record.
1. The Sandinistas on their own role in Salvador:
The official position of the Nicaraguan regime
is that they have provided only "political and
moral" support to the Salvadoran guerrillas.
Yet'in recent months'leading Sandinistas have
confirmed that material support does in fact
exist.
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Sandinista Directorate member Bayardo Arce told
an American Embassy official on 16 September
of last year, "when will you Americans ever under-
stand that nothing and no one will prevent us
from helping'our fellow guerrillas in Central
America?"
One month later, Arce was quoted in the official
publication Barricada to the effect that American
demands that Nicaraguan aid to the Salvadoran
guerrillas cease ":will never be accepted by Nica-
ragua."
When American journalists have pressed Nicaraguan
officials, the Nicaraguans have admitted that
there is material support. Stephen Rosenfeld
of the Washington Post wrote that Foreign Minister
D'Escoto admitted "on the record" that Nicaragua
is in fact giving help to the guerrillas. "All
he denied," wrote Rosenfeld L_"was that there
is a substantial flow and that it is authorized."
2. Yasir Arafat on the PLO role in Nicaragua and
El Salvador: PLO chief Arafat confirmed to a
group of Palestinian 'journalists on January 11,
1982, that "there are Palestinian pilots 'in Nicaragua,
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there are Palestinian revolutionaries with the
revolutionaries in El Salvador...."
3. Sandinista and Vietnamese leaders on the Vietnamese
role: Last March,. Sandinista Directorate member
Humberto Ortega travelled to Hanoi. In a speech
given there, Ortega said, "we sincerely thank
the Vietnamese people and highly value their
support for the heroic Salvadoran people...The
fierce and bloody struggle in El Salvador requires -
the support of all progressive nations and forces
throughout the world".
Vietnamese support for the Salvadoran guerrillas
was confirmed by author William Shawcross when
he travelled to Vietnam last year (New York Review-
of Books, 24 September 1981):
Had Vietnam been distributing any of the vast
pile of weapons left by the Americans? Colonel
Bui-Tin acknowledged, in effect, that It had.
In El Salvador? "It's not fair to say the
US can help the junta but we cannot help our
friends.. We do our best to support revolution-
ary movements in the world...."
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4. On Cuban Activities in Nicaragua and El Salvador:
Fidel Castro publicly denies providing assistance
to the Salvadoran guerrillas, and avoids commenting
on Cuban military advisers in Nicaragua.
Yet just a few days ago, Sandinista leader Jaime
Wheelock confirmed to the Washington Post that .
Cuban military advisers were present in his country,
although he claimed that there were only about
a dozen of them. ,
In a.speech in Havana (18 November 1981) Castro
said, "we had also foiled other lies of theirs
(the Americans): The lie that we sent advisers
to El Salvador,. the lie that the arms we received
here for the defense of the country...we were
redistributing in Central America."
Yet in April, 1981, when German Social Democratic
leader Hans-Jurgen Wischnewski per confron-
ted Castro with State Department contentions
that Cuba had shipped weapons to Salvadoran guer-
rillas, Castro admitted it was true.
Castro again confirmed the reports of transshipment
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of arms-to the Salvadoran guerrillas in discussions
with several Interparliamentary Union delegations
in Havana last September.
A Special Legislative Commission established
in June 1980 by the Costa Rican legislature con-
firmed that the Cubans had establisheda clandes-
tine arms-supply link between Costa Rica and
Nicaragua during the Nicaraguan civil war, and
that the link continued to function between Costa
Rica and El Salvador once the Sandinistas had
come to power in Nicaragua. After the Nicaraguan
civil war was over, according to the Costa Rican
Commission's report, "arms trafficking (began),
originating in Costa Rica or through Costa Rican
territory, toward El Salvador, indirectly or
using Honduras as a bridge."
American journalist Shirley Christian had earlier
investigated these charges, and confirmed them
(Miami Herald, July 18, 1980):
"Large-scale arms traffic through Panama and
Costa Rica to leftist guerrillas in El Salvador
has surfaced in the wake of a series of accusa-
tions and resignation in the Costa Rican gov-
ernment. This traffic..-appears to follow
..the same route and methods, and involve many
of the same suppliers and go-betweens, as
the supply line to the Sandinistas during
the Nicaraguan war that ended a year ago."
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Top Cuban leaders have confirmed that Salvadoran
guerrillas are trained in Cuba. Vice-President
Caslos Rafael Rodriguez, for example, confirmed
it in at least two interviews (Der Spiegel, 28 Sep-
tember, 1981 and El Diario de Caracas, 29 October,
1981), and journalists exploring the question
have been able to confirm it. For example, a
last month that "at least 30 Salvadoran guerrillas"
were currently training near Havana. The report
was based on an interview with a Salvadoran guer-
rilla billeted in a Havana hotel, which according
to a hotel employee had been booked by the Cuban
Foreign Ministry for "Latin American" guests.
reporter * for the Toronto. Globe "and:-Mail-r-,
- epo aed
5. On the Nicaraguan Link to El Salvador:
In the New York Times (15 January, 1981) Ambassador
Robert White said "it is my personal conclusion
that there has been a change.-in the amount and
sophistication of weapons coming to the guerril-.
las".. In the Washington Post the following day,
Ambassador White was. quoted as saying that "com-
pelling and convincing evidence existed of Nicaragua's
material support for?guerrillas...."
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In an interview with editors of the,Washington
Post published January 30, 1981, former Secretary
of State Edmund Muskie said that Cuban arms and
supplies being used in El Salvador's bloody civil
war were flowing through Nicaragua "certainly
with the knowledge and to some extent the help
of Nicaraguan authorities."
Alex Drehsler, a-reporter for the San Diego Union
(1 March, 1981) interviewed a guerrilla leader
in El Salvador who said that "the Salvadoran
guerrillas have a permanent commission in Nicaragua
overseeing the smuggling of weapons from that
country to here." He also said there have been
Cuban advisers in the province-of Morazan, and
that Vietnamese advisers have made several trips
to guerrilla camps in El Salvador.
A Salvadoran guerrilla, who defected in September
1981, Santo Salome Morales, reported that he
and twelve others left El Salvador and entered
Nicaragua via a point near the Gulf of Fonseca
in May, 1980. From Managua, they proceeded to
Cuba where they received extensive military train-
ing; together with over 900 Salvadorans. Morales,
said he was-trained in underwater demolition.
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Two Salvadorans and one Costa Rican arrested
in Costa Rica on January 29 in connection with
an attempted kidnapping of a Salvadoran -businessman
told Costa Rican police that they were recruited
by a Salvadoran guerrilla organization and had
been given military training in Nicaragua where
they were provided false identity documents.
IV. -CONCLUSIONS OF DISTINGUISHED AMERICANS.WHO HAVE
BEEN GIVEN ACCESS TO SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE ON THIS
SUBJECT
We have presented detailed classified information'
to appropriate congressional committees and to many
American statesmen, who have served both Republican
and Democratic Administrations. Let me quote from
some of their statements.
Former Secretary of State William Rogers said
that anyone who heard the information would have to
be convinced that the Government's position is sound.
Ambassador Sol Linowitz said, "I found what we were
shown to be credible and quite persuasive. It was
sobering and reason for concern." Former Democratic
party chairman Robert Strauss told the press that
the government had "put on,a rather impressive bit
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Lloyd Cutler, former advisor to President Carter,
issued a statement March 10 that he was satisfied.
that available intelligence justifies the conclusion
that the Nicaraguan Government is assisting the Salva-
doran guerrillas "to organize and command forces"
and "is providing them with the bulk of their military
weapons and the means of their delivery." Mr. Cutler
said that he was satisfied that "a substantial portion
of these weapons are supplied to Nicaragua via Cuba,
and that the Cuban Government is directly participating._
in Nicaragua's military assistance to the Salvadoran
guerrillas." He also noted that detailed public dis-
closures would pose an unreasonable risk of compromising
the sources.
Ambassador Anne Armstrong, Chairwoman of the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFI B)
characterized the group of distinguished citizens
receiving the intelligence briefing as "a?bi-partisan
group of patriotic Americans" and said she believed
all present found the evidence convincing. She said
the information was too sensitive to be made'-public,
adding "I wish it were not so because it's a story
that desperately needs to be told to the*American
people."
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After similar intelligence briefings, House Intel-
ligence Committee Chairman Edward Boland.(D-Mass.)
said there was evidence of Sandinista involvement
in training, arms, and financing of the Salvadoran
guerrillas, while Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman
Barry Goldwater (R-Arizona) said "the officials charged
with developing and implementing U.S. policy in this
area are doing so on the basis of solid information"..
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