THE MILITARY SITUATION IN EL SALVADOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R001800010029-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 26, 2007
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: March 29, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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Ccntmi Intelli~Cr~^ ,cncy,
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable William P. Clark
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs;)
The White House
SUBJECT : The Military Situation in E1 Salvador
Attached is the assessment you requested on the
Military situation in El Salvador.
Copy #1
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4
Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
29 March 1982
MEMORANDUM
THE MILITARY SITUATION IN EL SALVADOR
Summary
A military stalemate has existed in SI Salvador for much of the past
year, although each side has attempted to seize the tactical initiative at
various times. In general the armed forces appear to have made the most
progress in improving their capabilities, and as a result, their offensive
operations have gradually increased in scale and effectiveness. The
insurgents nevertheless remain a potent force and they have improved their
combat readiness appreciably in recent months through acquisition of more and
heavier weapons and the return of foreign-trained manpower.
The insurgents had planned to make a substantial show of force prior to
28 March in hopes of postponing the elections and forcing negotiations. The
armed forces were able to neutralize most insurgent attacks, however, and
retain the military initiative.
This placed the insurgents in a position where they had to make a
concerted effort during the final days before the election to disrupt the
balloting and reduce voter turnout. Even this failed, however, resulting in a
major strategic setback to the guerrilla cause.
The armed farces were able to provide sufficient, security in most cases
to permit an unexpectedly high voter turnout. The insurgents were able to
This memorandum was requested by the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs. It was prepared by of the Central
America Working Group, Middle America/Caribbean Division, Office of African
and Latin American Analysis and coordinated with the Clandestine Service, the
Department of State, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. Information
available as of 29 March 1982 was used in its preparation. Questions and
comments are welcome and should be directed to Chief, Middle America/Caribbean
Division, ALA, 25X1
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reduce balloting significantly only in Usulutan and a few other areas of
eastern and northern El Salvador.
Despite the success of the elections, the insurgent problem will not
disappear by any means. The insurgents retain considerable disruptive
potential, and the military balance is not likely to swing quickly in the
government's favor. But leftist hopes for negotiating with the new government
from a position of strength are greatly reduced, and new strains are likely to
appear in the already fragile insurgent alliance.
More than a year after the failure of the insurgents' "final
offensive" in January 1981, the military conflict in El Salvador
remains a stalemate. The military initiative has changed hands
several times over the past year, but never long or decisively
enough to represent a trend. Repeated armed forces' offensives
against major insurgent concentrations generally have failed to
encircle or inflict heavy losses on the guerrillas. On the other
hand, while the insurgents have been able to keep up their hit-
and-run raids and economic sabotage, they have not been able to
gain enough momentum to turn the military balance in their
favor .
Despite the continued stalemate, both sides have improved
their capabilities over the past year. On balance, the armed
forces appear to have made the most progress, although
significant weaknesses remain on each side. Nevertheless, the
failure of the insurgents to disrupt the 28 March elections will
provide a major psychological boost to the military's
counterinsurgency efforts.
Military Improvements
One of the greatest weaknesses of the armed forces has been
a lack of sufficient strength to conduct offensive operations
while still defending major population centers and economic
targets from insurgent attack. Since the January 1981 offensive,
the military has made a significant effort to expand, aided by
increased US material assistance. As a result, the armed forces
have nearly doubled in the past year, and now number about 18,000
(see Table 1).
To improve command and control of this larger force, two
additional brigade headquarters have been formed, bringing the
current total to six (see Map 1). The activation of a quick-
reaction battalion has provided a central reserve force. While
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regular units have often been tied down in a static defensive
posture, this elite battalion has been free to operate where
needed.
The army currently has two additional quick-reaction
battalions in training, one in the US at Ft. Bragg and another
in-country. The General Staff hopes to activate two other such
units by early 1983, bringing the total to five. Regular
infantry battalions throughout the country also are being
strengthened and reequipped with US M-16 rifles, M-60
machineguns, 81 mm mortars and 90 mm recoilless rifles.
The security forces have also been expanded since January
1981, and currently number about 10,500 men. This has improved
urban security and allowed the National Guard to strengthen
detachments in smaller towns, particularly in isolated areas. In
most of these, the National Guard is the primary defensive force,
generally supplemented only by civilian irregulars.
Another significant manpower weakness also shows signs of
improvement. This is the critical shortage of junior officers--
platoon leaders number only some 55 percent of the authorized
total. About 500 officer candidates are currently undergoing
training at Ft. Benning, however, and they should be available to
El Salvador by June 1982. Nevertheless, the officers will
require combat seasoning before they become fully effective.
A major air force improvement over the last year has been
the acquisition of 14 UH-lH helicopters. These have greatly
improved army mobility, allowing small units to be airlifted and
wounded personnel to be evacuated quickly. Although a number of
these aircraft were destroyed in the late January 1982 raid on
Ilopango Air Base, they were rapidly replaced by the US. The
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current inventory is being expanded to 20 UH-lHs, and 125X6
mechanics will be available to assist in maintenance
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Despite these improvements, significant weaknesses remain:
-- Basic infantry training is poor. There is no national
training center, and each major unit is responsible for
training its own recruits. Given the distractions of
regular combat operations, this has often proved
difficult.
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-- Logistical support capabilities are inadequate. The
recent acquisition of some 180 military trucks has eased
a critical shortage, but the entire supply system is
poorly managed and controlled. Operations are often
curtailed, for example, because of inadequate rations of
food and ammunition.
-- Command and control is still weak. Major sweeps are
conducted by different companies drawn from throughout
the country, and these forces have not been trained to
operate as a unit.
an insurgency.
Interdiction of guerrilla supply deliveries is poor.
Although interdiction of overland insurgent supply lines
has improved somewhat, defenses are still porous. Naval
interdiction also needs to be greatly improved,
particularly iii deep water. Moreover, there is almost no
capability for-air interdiction.
-- Finally, despite force expansion efforts, the manpower
ratio of the army and security forces to the insurgents
is still only about 5 to 1; far less than the 10 to 1
force advantage generally considered necessary to defeat
The Insurgent Situation
The Salvadoran guerrillas also have made considerable
improvements over the past year, including increasing their
forces by about 25 percent to the 4,500 to 5,000 range. In
addition to these regular insurgent forces, there probably are
another 5,000 to 10,000 local militia personnel to aid in the
defense of base areas.
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The insurgent units are generally concentrated in about
eight major base areas, primarily in rugged terrain. The most
secure are along the Honduran border. Within these
concentrations, we have been able to identify about 40 guerrilla
camps. There could easily be twice this number which we have not
Most insurgent training apparently takes place at camps
within the base areas. Insurgent leaders, communication
personnel, and other technicians and specialists, however,
probably get much of their training in Cuba, Nicaragua, the
Soviet Bloc, or the Middle East. Several hundred may be abroad
at any one time, and the cumulative total could be over a
thousand. As a result, the guerrillas have become noticeably
more skilled at handling their newer weaponry and adept at
launching ambushes and conducting sabotage operations.
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The routes used to deliver wea ons have been diversified
considerably in the past year.
most of the supplies began to move overlap through Honduras.
a result of increasingly effective Honduran interdiction efforts
during 1981,, however, delivery by sea gradually gained more
prominence. Shipments primarily arrive off the southeastern
coast of El Salvador, which is within easy reach of Nicaragua by
small fishing craft. Air deliveries also have picked up again,
usually by parachute drop. Airfields outside of Nicaragua,
including some in Costa Rica and Panama, have increasingly been
used as points of departure.
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Insurgent Efforts to Disrupt the Elections
By the end of 1981, insurgent recognition that the scheduled
? 28 March constituent assembly election could deal them a major
strategic setback, particularly if there were a high voter
turnout, led them to put aside many of their political and
military differences.
series of government military offensives since early February
into guerrilla staging areas--aided by improved intelligence--
disrupted insurgent supply lines and upset operational
schedules. Finally, the population generally preferred to remain
neutral and avoid involvement despite insurgent calls for popular
support.
The failure of their campaign to prevent the elections
forced the insurgents into a position where they had to attempt
an all-out effort to disrupt the actual balloting.
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 psychological blow to the guerrilla cause.
Prospects
The insurgent failure to disrupt the elections and the
unexpectedly large turnout have dealt a major political and
The military balance will not swing quickly in the
government's favor, however, as the insurgents still retain
strong residual capabilities:
-- The insurgent mobilization effort to disrupt the
elections has provided them with better arms, more
trained cadre, and new supply routes.
-- The Cuban and Nicaraguan arms pipeline will likely remain
open, although perhaps with lesser priority, and the
armed forces' interdiction capabilities are still
minimal.
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-- The insurgent offensive effort in eastern El Salvador,
although failing to take major cities, has left them in a
stronger position in Usulutan and Morazan Departments,
and it will take a major sustained effort to dislodge
them.
-- Despite the negative impact of the successful elections,
support in both political fora and the media.
the insurgents still enjoy considerable international
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1 I I
Table 1
Salvadoran Military Strength
February 1981 March 1982
Army 9,170 17,015
Navy 285 440
Air Force 180 510
9,635 17,965
National Guard 3,460 3,540
National Police 2,835 4,940
Treasury Police 1,320 2,040
7,615 10,520
GRAND TOTAL 17,250
28,485
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Salvadoran Military Organization
Santa Ana
nd
Brigade boundary
Military garrison
6 30
KilOmatM3
SAN SALVADOR*
El Salvador
ov d u ra
La Unidn
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SUBJECT: The Military Situation in El Salvador
Distribution:
Orig. Cy #1 - William P. Clark
2 - DCI
3 - DDCI
4 - ED/DCI
5 - EXEC REGISTRY
6 - CHAIRMAN, NIC
7 - DDO
8 - DDI
9 - ADDI
10 - AS/DDI
11 - SA/IA
12 - C/DDI/PES
13 - DDI REGISTRY
14 - NIO/LA
15 - D/ALA
16-17 - ALA/PROD. STAFF
18-21 - OCO/IMD/CB
22 - C/MCD/ALA
23 - DC/MCD/ALA
24 - C/CAWG/ALA
25 - ES-DESK
26-27 - FILE
DDI/ALA/MCD/CA~
(29Mar82)
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