EL SALVADOR: THE POLITICS OF LAND REFORM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R001800010005-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 5
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Rele 001800010005-1
entry Intelligence Agency
washinoxi. Q C 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
10 June 1982
EL SALVADOR: THE POLITICS OF LAND REFORM
Summary
We believe that prospects are favorable for land reform to continue in
El Salvador, but not without occasional lapses and implementation problems.
The land reform issue is subject to heated dispute, almost as much within the
parties as among them. Moderates and hardliners of every stripe in each group
seek to varying degrees to maintain, expand, limit, or reverse the process of
all reforms-financial, commercial, and agrarian. Nevertheless, in our
judgment, the final referee will continue to be the military, whose leadership
appears convinced that reforms--particularly for the moment agrarian reforms--
must continue if the government is to receive the domestic and international
support necessar to rebuild the economy and win the war against the
insurgents. lul 25X1
The interests of the tiny aristocracy aside, the issue of
agrarian reform in El Salvador has rarely been whether it was
necessary, but rather how to go about it in a strongly capitalist
country with such scarce land resources. Virtually all
agriculturally productive land is privately owned. Although half
was controlled by a handful of elites before March 1980, the
remainder was worked extensively by middle class, lower middle
This memorandum was requested by the Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs-It :was prepared by f the Cent2S.K1
America Working Group, Middle America/Caribbean Division, Office of African
and Latin American Analysis and contains information available as of 9 June
1982. Questions and comments-should be addressed to the Chief, Middle
America/Caribbean Division, GALA 25X1
SECRET
roved For Release 2007/05/10: CIA-RDP83M00914R001800010005-1
 Approved For Release 2007/05/18E-DP83M00914R001800010005-1
class, and peasant farmers, whose production is vital to export
earnings as well as domestic food supply. II 25X1
The interests of this latter group--land-oriented center-
right sector of society--traditionally have been represented by
the National Conciliation Party (PCN), which--despite its virtual
dissolution following the October 1979 coup--emerged from the
28 March election with a significant 14 of 60 seats in the
constituent assembly, the senior vice-presidential post, and four
government ministries. The PCN has habitually been split between
moderates and hardliners over the issue of agrarian reform. As
the official military electoral vehicle for two decades, some of
its executive and legislative representatives in government
pushed forward land reform bills that proved too modest for
liberal opposition parties and too radical for hardline
conservatives both in and out of the party. US Embassy reporting
suggests that currently, the PCN remains divided over how best to
implement land reform, but since the election, party leaders have
moderated their strident public attacks on reforms and now appear
convinced of the need to support the process in principle in
order to rebuild the ties to the military and strengthen their
popular support. lul 25X1
The ultra-rightist National Republican Alliance (ARENA) also
has moderated its position on land reform. An electoral
phenomenon created only last year around a core of extreme
rightists tied to wealthy exiles in Miami, ARENA managed to win
over many PCN members and their constituents with promises to
defeat the insurgents in three months and roll back "Communist"
land reform. According to US Embassy sources, however, the
party's failure to dominate the constituent assembly and capture
the provisional presidency has precipitated defections by party
hardliners and moderates alike, limited its political clout, and
reduced its funding by wealthy backers. In addition, its
obstructionist tactics have alienated the military high
command. To avoid political isolation, ARENA leaders now
publicly embrace land reform, although we believe that most
probably hope to limit its effects over time. This effort could
be undercut, however, by such political realities as ARENA's need
for greater grassroots support to compete in future elections,
the commitment of the military to protect the reform process, and
the ability of the PCN and the Christian Democrats (PDC) to
exploit the reform issue. 0 25X1
The PDC is the clear champion of land reform in El Salvador,
and we believe it will attempt to build on that image as it
prepares for national elections. Nevertheless, it too faces a
2
SECRET
roved For Release 2007/05/10: CIA-RDP83M00914R001800010005-1
 Approved For Release 2007/05/19E DP83M00914R001800010005-1
dilemma. By failing to gain majority control of the constituent
assembly, the PDC is obliged to choose between working with the
two conservative parties in a government of national unity--
wherein it is responsible in equal measure for government
policies--and the riskier course of active opposition. US
Embassy reports suggest that while trying to maintain its own
center/center-left constituency, the party recognizes that it
must recruit enough center-right voters to gain the edge in the
next elections, thus making its defense of land reform more
problematic. US Embassy reports demonstrate that PDC leaders
recognize the problems inherent in implementing land reform and
favor some revisions in procedures and timetables. We believe,
however, that they are unlikely to support any legislation that
might be perceived as a reversal of the process. I 25X1
Ironically, the armed forces stand to become the chief
guardian of agrarian reform. Although conservative in
orientation, the military demonstrated its political acumen
following the 28 March election by moving decisively to arbitrate
among the wa and prescribe a new
government. have25X1
pointed out hat senior officers are
pragmatic and recognize that the international perception of
their commitment to land reform is critical to El Salvador's
continued receipt of foreign military and economic support. US
military intelligence reporting also demonstrates that senior
officers recognize the importance of grassroots support in
defeating the insurgents. Finally, Defense Minister Garcia's
presumed presidential ambitions--in our judgment--require that he
also view agrarian reform as a political issue. He and other
senior officers have stepped up public statements defending the
land ref rm as inviolable and a sacred pledge of the armed
forces. 25X1
The military has begun to react to negative international
opinion generated by the suspension last month of new land
distribution under Phase III of the agrarian reform. This week,
members of the high command presided at ceremonies in various
cities where hundreds of new provisional and permanent land
titles were awarded to peasant beneficiaries. 125X1
I Ireports that Garcia recently instructed 25X1
military commanders to pressure the government agency responsible
for distributing land titles to expedite the processing of
claims. US Embassy, military intelligence. 2X1
reporting also shows that Garcia is increasing y upset over
illegal evictions of peasant farmers by some landowners, and has
directed military units in some areas of the country to intervene
by returning evicted peasants to their land. 25X1
3
SECRET
roved For Release 2007/05/10: CIA-RDP83M00914R001800010005-1
 Approved For Release 2007/05/1JZDP83M00914R001800010005-1
We believe that prospects for continued land reform in El
Salvador are favorable, but in fits and starts. Some
conservatives are likely to try to restrict the process through
legal and extra-legal actions, and even liberals may feel
compelled to acquiesce in some changes in order to spur
production of sorely needed cash crops and to reassure investors
and planters. It is our judgment that policy in the assembly is
likely to be decided more often by the ability of the PCN to
swing its votes to either side of the aisle than by any orderly
and continuing compromise among the three major parties. The
pace of implementation, therefore, will depend largely on the
resolve of the armed forces, which is in turn directly affected
by its appreciation of El av dor's need for international--
particularly US--backing. II 25X1
4
SECRET
roved For Release 2007/05/10: CIA-RDP83M00914R001800010005-1
 Approved For Release 2007/05/1ZDP83M00914R001800010005-1
SUBJECT: El Salvador: The Politics of Land Reform
Orig.
1 -
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - SA/DCI/IA
1 - DDI
1 - ADDI
1 - NIO/LA
1 - NIC/AG
1 - PDB Staff
1 - Foriegn Liaison Staff
1 - DDI Rep/CINCLANT
1 - C/DDI/PES
2 - D/ALA
2 - ALA Production Staff
1 - ALA Research Director
4 - OCPAS/IMD/CB
1 - C/ALA/MCD
1 - DC/ALA/MCD
1 - C/ALA/MCD/CAWG
5 - ALA/MCD
DDI/ALA/MCD/CA 9Jun82)
5
SECRET
roved For Release 2007/05/10: CIA-RDP83M00914R001800010005-1