EL SALVADOR: EVALUATION OF THE PERQUIN OPERATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R001800010004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 12, 2007
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: July 15, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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17
Directorate of Intelligence
Office of African and Latin American Analysis
16 July 1982
NOTE FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
/Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence
We prepared this paper at the request
of Tom Enders for today's IG meeting.
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Central Intelligence ligence Agency
15 July 1982
EL SALVADOR: Evaluation of the Perguin Operation
Summary
The recent government operation in northern Morazan Department to retake
Perquin revealed several new strengths but some continuing weaknesses of the
Salvadoran armed-forces. The operation leaves questions about the strategy
and tactics of the counterinsurgency effort and the long-term chances for its
success. On balance, we believe that while the military demonstrated some
improved capabilities, the Perquin episode reaffirmed that no easy military
solution to the conflict is in sight.
Insurgent Advantages
The insurgents chose northern Morazan as the place to
attempt a major victory over government forces for several
reasons.
-- The terrain is rugged, with few roads and limited access
from San Francisco, where most troops for the department
available as of 15 July 1982 was used in its preparation. Questions and
comments should be directed to Chief, Middle America/Caribbean Division, OALA,
Thismemorandum was requested by the Department of State. It was
prepared by of the Central American Working Group, Middle 25X1
America/Caribbean Division, Office of African and Latin American Analysis and
coordinated with the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America, the
Department of State, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. Information
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are garrisoned (see map). The only bridge into the area
was destroyed by the insurgents before their offensive.
-- During the rainy season that begins in May, the area is
usually cloud covered, hindering government observation
and air support. Streams are flooded, and off-road
mobility is limited.
-- The population is poor, isolated, and after several years
of guerrilla presence and indoctrination, basically
sympathetic to the insurgent cause.
-- The 1969 war between El Salvador and Honduras had
resulted in a large pocket of disputed territory, or
bolson, along the border. The area was demilitarized and
has offered the insurgents a safehaven.
In short, the area is ideal guerrilla territory and has long
been a major insurgent stronghold. One of the largest insurgent
factions, the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), is headquartered
there, with some 1,000 well organized and equipped guerrillas in
several heavily defended base camps. The area is so secure that
for over a year it has been the location of Radio Venceremos, the
insurgents' main propaganda station.
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The few government forces in the region normally consist of
small detachments in the major towns, which are outnumbered and
do no defensive patrolling for fear of being ambushed. The
insurgents are able to overrun any of the towns at will, merely
by concentrating superior forces. They have done so on several
occasions, most notably in August 1981 when they held Perquin for 25X1
over a week. The guerrillas were also able to prevent balloting
in the March 1982 election in every town of northern Morazan.
The government has launched several major offensives against
the insurgent bases in northern Morazan, but none has been
particularly successful. In December 1981 the government was
able to capture the site of Radio Venceremos, preventing it from
broadcasting for three weeks until the guerrillas could bring in
new equipment. During most government offensives, the guerrillas
are able to put up stiff resistance from well-prepared defensive
positions and inflict heavy casualties. When the insurgents run
low on ammunition and their position becomes untenable, they
generally are able to slip across the border.
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The government became aware of insurgent intentions in
northern Morazan and in late April launched a sweep of the area
to preempt them. The operation was poorly coordinated, however,
and one unit suffered heavy losses in a guerrilla ambush. The
sweep apparently upset the insurgents' timing, but it did little
damage to their infrastructure in the region.
The insurgents bided their time, and when the government
launched a major offensive elsewhere in late May that tied up all
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three quick-reaction battalions, the guerrillas struck in
Morazan. They seized the town of Perquin on 5 June--overrunning
the small garrison--and then prepared to ambush relief forces.
Government Response
The initial government effort to retake Perquin fell into
the insurgent trap. Two colunms of troops sent north from San
Francisco were badly mauled. The government rushed additional
reinforcements to rescue units trapped north of the Torola River,
but their advance was slowed by rugged terrain, bad weather, and
determined guerrilla resistance. The lack of adequate air
support and communications added to the general confusion.
The government finally was forced to send its three quick-
reaction battalions to the area, but even their advance was
slow. One of the major problems was logistical, as large amounts
of supplies had to be moved to the area before the units could
advance. In addition, command and control problems were
compounded by the large number of troops committed. The
situation was further complicated when the Deputy Defense
Minister was captured and the local brigade commander was killed
after their helicopter was shot down in the area on 17 June.
The insurgents' harassing attacks and sabotage operations
elsewhere in El Salvador created additional problems
Major targets were small government garrisons and the electrical
power and transportation systems. Troops on their way to Morazan
also were ambushed.
The government was determined not only to recapture Perquin,
however, but to sweep northern Morazan of enemy forces. The
Honduran military provided three battalios in a major coordinated
effort to block enemy escape across the border. Newly arrived US
A-37 attack aircraft also were rushed into action, reportedly
with good results.
By 19 June--faced with overwhelming government forces and
probably running short of ammunition--the insurgents announced
they had achieved their objectives and would withdraw. It took
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uin, and
ent forces several more days to advance on Perq
governm on the 26th. ion, even
they finally entered the abandhled swept the entire reg
The military then thoroug Y uted border area.
ces enter di
the again managed to escaper
allowing Honduran f, the?insurge the the entire
Desp ite these efforts f 3 July, Slightly
most major units were withdrawnthe
and there was little
nd ur mosther or units contact- left to garrison operation ended, however e been
larger security forces
a
.
towns in the are
stren the and Weaknesses the and
Salvadoran aw rmed eforces.
uin operation has revealed
The Perq a weaknesses of
confirmed lsen~ncluden
pluses
The
demonstrated that it can stileadeny tthe he
The military n eth enough control of an for
insurgents leg thy "liberated" zone. This is why
all costs
guerrillas to declare it a insignificant
an ui economically n at cally
them government simply abandon retake
region to athel penemy.
o eration should at least temporarily disrupt
-- The sweep p
ERP operations in northern Morazan.
demonstrated strengthened offensive The military especially by deploying all three quick-
capabilities, espec two consecutive major
co arrival of the six A-37
reaction battalions in the
operations. Furthermore,
attack aircraft greatly improved close air support
capabilities.
The improved coordination with Honduras offers theahsopae
that the border area will become
guerrilla base. launched an
Finally, the fact wIthelEttlesinitial lcotrdi atitn
offensive on its own wn other
factions er the s rrmaother factons Even insur after the litter
i a signi they could under
began t to assist, elsewhere in the
more than harassment and sabotage
country.
_
the shortcomings revealed are:
Among
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-- Command and control is still weak. The General Staff was
able to provide little central direction for the
operation, and the local brigade commander had difficulty
controlling the many different units sent to the area.
-- Logistical support was hampered by the limited road
access to northern Morazan and by the need to erect a
temporary bridge over the Torola River. Despite an
inventory of 20 UH-1H helicopters, military off-road
logistical support still appears inadequate for large
operations.
-- Interdiction of guerrilla supply deliveries remains
poor. The insurgents were able to move supplies to
Morazan overland from coastal delivery areas and via
Honduras with little government interference. Aerial
deliveries also were unhindered.
-- Despite early warning of the Morazan buildup, Salvadoran
military intelligence appeared to miscalculate the
guerrilla threat and intentions in the area. Tactical
units also apparently were poorly briefed about the
insurgent situation, resulting in numerous ambushes.
-- Finally, the government still lacks sufficient forces to
permanently garrison isolated insurgent-dominated areas
following sweep operations. The government-guerrilla
manpower ratio is only about 5 to 1, far less than the 10
to 1 force advantage generally considered necessary to
defeat an insurgency.
Strategy and Tactics
In addition to the Salvadoran military's strengths and
weaknesses evident in the operation, the entire episode raises
questions about the general strategy and tactics of the
counterinsurgency effort--particularly about the value of large-
scale sweep operations. The insurgents obviously retain
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considerable military strength despite repeated government
offensives. Until the military can improve its small unit
tactics through better training and leadership--and thereby
counter the guerrilla war of attribution--we believe it has
little choice but to resort to large-scale operations to prevent
a concentration of guerrilla forces large enough to pose a
serious and immediate threat in any area. In some cases, such as
last year in Cabanas Department, sweep operations have scored
some significant successes and seriously weakened insurgent
strongholds. They have also preempted any insurgent attempts to
The government fears than an insurgent declaration of a
"liberated" zone would challenge its claim to control all
Salvadoran territory.. It would also attract greater
international support for the insurgents and lead to the
formation of a "revolutionary" government inside El
To eliminate permanently major insurgent base areas,
especially in northern and eastern El Salvador, we believe the
government will have to reduce or overcome its basic weaknesses
in leadership, organization, and training. It will also have to
improve interdiction of foreign arms shipments and other aid to
the guerrillas. And it needs to offer the population of
contested areas greater inducement not to support the
insurgents. This will have to include not only better security,
but also a meaningful amnesty program and some hope of future
economic well-being.
The government's progress in correcting its major military
weaknesses has been agonizingly slow, and has required a
relatively significant input of US weapons and training
assistance. For the military to make further progress, we
believe it will require at least the same level of assistance for
the next several years. A greatly increased level of US aid
would be difficult for the Salvadoran armed forces to absorb, and
would probably require a corresponding increase in the US
training presence.
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SUBJECT: El Salvador: Evaluation of the Perquin Operation
Orig - William E. Knepper, INR/IAA
Copy #2 - DCI
3 - DDCI
4 - SA/DCI/IA
5 - DDI
6 - ADPI
7 - NIO/LA
8 - NI C/ AC,..-'
-
10 -
11 - L;/ Liu I/ PF S
12-13 - P/ALA
14-15 - ALA/Production Staff
16 - ALA/Research Director
17-20 - OCPAS/IMD/CB
21 - C/MCD
22 - DC/MCD
23 - Division File
24 - C/CAWG
25 - Branch File
26 -
27 -
DDI/ALA/MCD/CAB
(15Ju182)
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